

A COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA,
CIVIL, MILITARY, AND SOCIAL,

FROM
THE FIRST LANDING OF THE ENGLISH,
TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPOY REVOLT,

INCLUDING
AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF HINDOOSTAN

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ADVOCATE

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS

DIVISION IX



LONDON.
BLACKIE AND SON PATERNOSTER ROW, E. C.,
AND GLASGOW AND EDINBURGH

MDCCCLVII

more than 500 of their number had fallen sword in hand. Many more were cut down without the walls in attempting to escape. Among the 1600 prisoners taken, was the governor Hyder Khan, a brother of Dost Mahomed. In the hope of a protracted defence the place had been provided with immense stores of grain and flour. These, together with a large number of horses and arms, and a considerable sum in money, formed a very valuable booty.

The capture of Ghuznee, though good fortune had certainly a large share in achieving it, was most honourable to the British arms, not only on account of the valour and prowess displayed, but also of the moderation with which victory was used. Quarter was never asked in vain, and not a single female was outraged. This fact, so rare under similar circumstances, well deserves special record, both for its own sake, and for the important lesson which it teaches. No spirit rations had been served out to the soldiers during the preceding fortnight. On this Havelock remarks: "No candid man of any military experience will deny that the character of the scene in the fortress and the citadel would have been far different, if individual soldiers had entered the town primed with arrack, or if spirituous liquors had been discovered in the Afghan depôts." In proportion to the exultation of the British was the consternation produced among the followers of Dost Mahomed. His son Afzul Khan, who had been hovering in the vicinity with a large force, with which he hoped to fall upon the besiegers when baffled, dispirited, and exhausted by a protracted defence, took flight the moment he heard that Ghuznee had fallen, leaving his elephants and camp equipage behind him. His father was so enraged that he refused to receive him, and loudly professed his determination to maintain the struggle to the last. In this, however, he was not serious. His desperate position was manifest. In the early part of the campaign, supposing that the main attack would be made in concert with the Sikhs by the Khyber Pass, he had despatched his favourite son Akbar Khan in that direction, with the larger part of his forces, and had been obliged to recall him when made aware of the real quarter from which the greatest danger was to be apprehended. The Khyber Pass thus left unguarded made it comparatively easy for Colonel Wade to advance through it, with the force of which Prince Timour, Shah Shujah's son, was nominal commander. Cabool was thus about to be attacked from two opposite directions, and it was vain to hope that any effectual resistance could be offered. Negotiation therefore seemed to be his only resource, and his brother Jubbar Khan, after the sanction of a council of war had been obtained, was despatched to the British camp for the purpose of ascertaining the kind of terms that might be expected. His own proposal was to acknowledge Shah Shujah as his sovereign, provided he himself were guaranteed in the hereditary office of wuzeer or prime minister. This proposal seemed too extravagant to be listened to for a moment, and the only thing offered was what was called an honourable asylum within the British territories, on condition of immediate

A D 1833.
Hammans
conduct of
the capture
of Ghuznee

Consternation of Dost Mahomed.

A.D. 1839

surrender. When the views of the parties were so diametrically opposed, it was useless to keep up the appearance of negotiation, and Jubbar Khan took his departure

Flight of
Dost Ma-
hommed

Dost Mahomed began now to exhibit the energy of despair, and marched out at the head of his troops with a determination to give battle. It soon became apparent that he would be left entirely without the means. To whatever side he looked he saw only signs of lukewarmness and treachery. Entreaty, remonstrance, and reproof were equally in vain, and his ranks thinned so rapidly that only a handful of followers worthy of confidence remained. He therefore made a merit of necessity, and giving a formal discharge to all whom he knew to be longing for it, he followed the example of his Candahar brothers, and fled westward on the 2d of August in the direction of Bamian. On the following day the British army, now advancing from Ghuznee, were made acquainted with this important fact, and in order not to repeat the blunder by which the Candahar chiefs had been permitted to escape, it was resolved that no time should be lost in commencing the pursuit. The task was undertaken by Captain Outram, then acting as aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief. It could not have been in better hands, but very unwisely Hajee Khan Kakur, who was already suspected of being as treacherous to his new as he had been to his old friends, was associated with him, and having the command of the principal part of the troops employed, was able to throw so many obstacles in the way, that the pursuit again proved fruitless. The army meanwhile continued its march without interruption, and on the 7th of August Shah Shujah, mounted on a handsome and richly decorated Caboollee charger, and wearing a dress which glittered with diamonds, emeralds, and rubies, made a triumphant entry into his capital "An ocean of heads," says Havelock, "was spread out in every direction," and though there were no noisy acclamations, "the expression of countenances indicated a ready acquiescence, or something more, in the new state of things." After making his way with difficulty through the dense files of people which choked the narrow streets, and reaching the Bala Hissar or palace, the Shah hastened up the great staircase, and ran with childish delight from apartment to apartment. The great object of his ambition had been at last secured. After thirty years of exile he was once more seated on the throne

Shah Shu-
jah's entry
into Cabool

The governor-general, replying to the despatch in which Sir John Keane described the Shah's entry into Cabool, expressed his high gratification. "It is to be hoped," he said, "that the measure which has been accomplished of restoring this prince to the throne of his ancestors, will be productive of peace and prosperity over the country in which he rules, and will confirm the just influence of the British government in the regions of Central Asia." On this view further interference was unnecessary; and little more remained than to fulfil the promise of the Simla manifesto, by withdrawing the British troops. Unfor-

unately, the Shah's alleged popularity had proved delusive, and could no longer be regarded by the most sanguine as sufficient to insure the stability of the new order of things. While hedged round by British bayonets the restored throne might be safe, but were this security withdrawn it would fall as suddenly as it had been reared. In short, it was no longer possible to dispute the accuracy of the prediction attributed to the Duke of Wellington, that when Cabool was reached the most difficult part of the task which the British government had undertaken would only begin.

A D 1839.

A British
force indis-
pensable at
Cabool.

CHAPTER IV.

Partial withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan—Capture of Khelat—Surrender of Dost Mahomed—Commencing disturbances—Outbreak at Cabool—Gross mismanagement—Disasters.



SHAH SHUJAH, though he must have had many misgivings as to the future, professed to believe that the work of restoring him to the throne was accomplished, and therefore deemed it becoming to employ some method by which he could at once commemorate the event, and testify his gratitude to those by whose instrumentality it had been achieved. He accordingly addressed a letter to her majesty, which, after mentioning how he had, "by the favour of God and the exceeding kindness of the British government," ascended the throne of his ancestors, continued thus:—"I have been for some time considering by what means I could reward the gentlemen and troops who accompanied me, for all the troubles and dangers they have undergone for my sake. I have now fully resolved upon instituting an order, to be designated the Order of the Dooranee Empire (Nishan-Door-Dooran), to be divided into three classes." The first class he wished to confer on the governor-general, the commander-in-chief, the envoy, Sir Alexander Burnes, and Colonel Wade; the other two classes were to be conferred on the individuals named in an accompanying list; and he had, moreover, determined to have a medal struck, "commemorative of the battle of Ghuznee," and to confer it "on every officer and soldier present on that glorious occasion." "I have the fullest confidence," he concluded, "in the kind consideration for my wishes, which is felt by my royal sister; and I feel assured that she will be graciously pleased to permit the gentlemen and soldiers above mentioned to wear the decoration which I shall confer upon them, so that a memorial of me may be preserved, and that the fame of the glorious exploits achieved in this quarter may resound throughout the whole world."

Shah Shu-
jah's letter
to Queen
Victoria.

A D 1839

Withdrawal
of British
troops from
Afghanistan

While Shah Shujah was thus assuming the airs of a mighty potentate, and giving the name of empire to the comparatively limited portion of Afghanistan which nominally acknowledged his authority, his British allies were anxiously considering how far it might be possible to withdraw their troops and leave him to depend on his own resources. The hope held out by the Simla manifesto, that his own subjects and adherents would so rally around him as to render foreign aid unnecessary had been disappointed, but it was still thought that a single brigade, consisting of five or six regiments, might suffice. By this means the two capitals of Cabool and Candahar, and the important posts of Gluznee, Quettah, and Jelalabad might be effectually secured, and the rest of the British army permitted to withdraw, the Bengal division by the Khyber, and the Bombay division by the Bolan Pass. It soon appeared that the force thus proposed to be left would be inadequate. Dost Mahomed, instead of continuing his flight, had found an asylum in the north, and was reported to be levying troops for the purpose of resuming the contest; the Ghiljies and several other mountain tribes were giving unequivocal signs of hostility; Shah Kamran, at Herat, forgetting the deliverance which had recently been procured for him mainly through British interference, was engaged with his unprincipled minister, Yar Mahomed, in intriguing with Persia; and Russia, so far from abandoning the aggressive schemes which she had verbally repudiated, seemed bent on giving practical effect to them by an expedition against the Khan of Khiva. All these things considered, it was resolved that instead of a single brigade, nearly the whole of the Bengal division of the army should continue in Afghanistan.


Expedition
against
Khelat

The Bombay division of the army, commanded as before by General Wellshire, commenced its march homewards on the 18th of September, 1839. Its movements were not intended to be wholly peaceful, for instruction had been given to pay a hostile visit by the way to Khelat, and punish Mehrab Khan for alleged infringements of the treaty which bound him to furnish the British army with supplies, and suppress the marauding parties which harassed it on its march. These obligations he had not performed, but he had endeavoured to justify himself by pleading that the state of the country rendered the performance of them impossible. The excuse was certainly not without foundation, and might perhaps have been accepted as sufficient, had it not been deemed necessary to inflict punishment by way of example. In the proceedings against Mehrab Khan there was therefore more severity than justice. A victim was wanted, and it was Mehrab Khan's fate to furnish it. Accordingly, on arriving at Quettah, General Wellshire, directing the main body of his troops to continue their march by the Bolan Pass, proceeded, on the 4th of November, at the head of a detachment, mustering in all about 1000 bayonets, together with six light field-pieces, the engineer corps, and 150 irregular horse, and arrived on the 13th before Khelat, situated about eighty-

five miles to the S.S.W. It was a place of sufficient importance to be regarded as the capital of Beloochistan, and in addition to the natural defence of a commanding site, in a difficult and mountainous country, was well fortified and strongly garrisoned. General Wellshire indeed admits that, as in the case of Ghuznee, its strength had been underrated. A.D. 1859

As Mehrab Khan, when first threatened, had been profuse in apologies and professions of friendship, it had been rather hastily concluded that he would prefer submission to the risks of resistance. It now appeared that he was actuated by a very different spirit. When the invading force was within two marches of his capital, a letter was received from him, which left no doubt as to his determination to resist. It spoke, indeed, of negotiation as still pending, and directed a halt of the British troops, that an opportunity might be given of

Capture of
Khelat



REPLAT—the Candahar Gate — From Kennedy's Campaign in Cabool.

completing it, but at the same time breathed defiance, by threatening them with the consequences should they presume to advance another stage. To show that this was no idle threat a body of Beloochee horse made their appearance shortly after the British had resumed their march, and without asking or waiting for explanation, galloped up to the head of the advancing column and discharged their matchlocks. When a nearer approach brought Khelat itself in sight, its adjoining heights were crowned with masses of soldiers, who apparently disdaining the protection which the walls would have given them, seemed preparing to try their strength in the open field. If they had any such intention it was soon abandoned. A few discharges of artillery compelled them to a precipitate flight, and allowed a small body of troops, who were rapidly advancing to storm the heights, to take possession of them without a struggle. This success was immediately followed by another of greater importance. The place had only two gates. One of these was seized before the fugitives, who

A.D. 1839

Capture of
Khelat

were entering it in confusion, had time to close it, and the other, after a few rounds of shot, was so far demolished that a party, stationed for the purpose, rushed in and made good their footing within it. The garrison, thus cut off from all means of escape, retired into the citadel, and fighting with the energy of despair, succeeded for a time in resisting all attempts to force an entrance. Orders had therefore been given to blow open the gates by bags of gunpowder, but before they could be executed the artillery, placed on a commanding height and served with admirable precision, rendered them unnecessary, and the capture was completed. Among the slain, estimated at 400, was Mehrab Khan himself; the prisoners amounted nearly to 2000. The British loss was only 37 killed and 107 wounded.

Army of oc-
cupation in
Afghanistan

Though the Bombay division had, as already mentioned, commenced its march homewards on the 18th of September, the final arrangements with regard to the occupation of Afghanistan had not been announced. At length, however, on the 2d of October, it was intimated by a general order that "the whole of the 1st (Bengal) division of infantry, the 2d (Bengal) cavalry, and No. 6 light field battery, with a detachment of thirty sappers, were to remain under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton." The remainder of the troops were to move toward Hindoostan on a day to be afterwards fixed. By a subsequent order, issued on the 9th of October, the posts of the different portions of the army of occupation were definitely fixed as follows:—"Her Majesty's 13th light infantry, three guns of No. 6 light field battery, and the 35th native-infantry to remain in Cabool, and to be accommodated in the Bala Hissar. The 48th native infantry, the 4th brigade and detachment of sappers and miners, with a ressalah of Skinner's horse, to be stationed at Jelalabad. Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th native infantry, a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and such details of his majesty Shah Shujah's as are available. The whole to be under the command of Major Maclaren. Candahar will have for its garrison the 42d and 43d native infantry, 4th company, 2d battalion artillery, a ressalah of the 4th local horse, and such details of his majesty Shah Shujah's troops as may be available. Major-general Nott will command."

Shah Shujah
removed to
Jelalabad

The arrangements for the occupation of the country having thus been completed, the troops not deemed necessary started for India on the 15th of October, accompanied by Sir John Keane, and commenced their march in the direction of the Khyber Pass. Shah Shujah himself also abandoned his capital to escape the rigours of the approaching winter, by removing his court temporarily to Jelalabad, which possesses a much milder climate than Cabool. The envoy, as a matter of course, accompanied him, but Sir Alexander Burnes remained behind to act as his substitute. The native administration was left in less worthy hands, and the leading officials, both at Cabool and Candahar, instead of reconciling the people to the new order of things, only exasperated them by

extortion and general mismanagement. The interference of the British, restricted as it was to remonstrance, was totally inadequate to remedy the evils thus produced, the only effect often being to bring the two authorities into collision, and expose them to a common hatred and contempt. Meanwhile, the military successes were duly acknowledged at home. The army received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, the governor-general, raised a step in the peerage, became Earl of Auckland, the commander-in-chief Baron Keane of Ghuznee, the envoy a baronet, Colonel Wade a knight, and various other distinctions and promotions were distributed with a liberal hand. Notwithstanding many warnings to the contrary, the general belief at this time undoubtedly was that the principal object of the Afghan expedition had been triumphantly accomplished, and that the effect would be to give Great Britain a decided and permanent ascendancy in the countries immediately west of the Indus.

While this flattering prospect was sanguinely entertained at home, new causes of apprehension had arisen. The death of Runjeet Sing had endangered our friendly relations with the Sikhs. Not only had the obligations imposed on them by the tripartite treaty been evaded, but the new government, only nominally held by Runjeet Sing's imbecile son Kuruk Sing, and really administered by his turbulent grandson Nao Nehal Sing, was suspected of fomenting disturbances in Afghanistan, and actually intriguing for the restoration of the Barukzyes. The failure of the Russian expedition against Khiva had not yet been ascertained, and Burnes, installed at Cabool, was writing letters, in one of which he says, "We have brought upon ourselves some additional half million of annual expenditure, and ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and those of Russia will touch—that is, the states dependent on either of us will—and that is the same thing." The envoy participating in these alarms, did not hesitate to declare that "unless Lord Auckland act with vigour and promptitude to secure and open our rear, we shall soon be between two fires, if not under them. France and Russia are advancing with only the remote contingency of profit to stimulate them. We are supine, whilst our inactivity will probably be the cause of our ruin. France gratuitously supplies Persia with 30,000 muskets, at a time when Persia may be said to be at war with us. I cannot, though I have repeatedly and earnestly pressed my request."

In explanation of the envoy's complaint, it is necessary to mention that he had begun to dream of playing what he called a great game in Central Asia, and had failed in obtaining the governor-general's countenance to it. He would have rushed into a war with the Sikhs for the purpose of compelling them to give a free passage at all times to the British troops across their frontiers. Such a passage, he alleged, was absolutely necessary in order to keep open the communications with India and Hindoostan. Not satisfied with thus "macadamizing" the Punjab, he would have punished Shah Kamran and Yar Mahomed at Herat, by wresting that territory from them, and making a

A.D. 1839.

Congratulations on the success of the Afghan war.

New perplexities and alarms.

A great game in Central Asia proposed.

A D 1840.

Stoddart
and Conolly
in Bokhara

present of it to Shah Shujah. Another part of his plan would have been to despatch a force to Bokhara, whose barbarous khan had commenced that series of outrages which he crowned at last by the atrocious murder of Stoddart and Conolly. By the expedition to Bokhara he wished not only to compel the release of Stoddart, who was then, by a gross violation of the law of nations, pining in a loathsome dungeon, but secure the important political object of severing the connection which had recently been formed between the khan and Dost Mahomed. The latter, after various adventures, had sought an asylum from the former, and been received with open arms, and there was therefore ground to apprehend that an effort would be made at the head of a formidable army to re-establish the Barukzye ascendancy in Afghanistan. The envoy would have anticipated this danger, and talked of an expedition to Bokhara as "conveniently feasible, if entered upon at the proper season of the year." He expected, as the result, to compel "the Shah of Bokhara to release Stoddart, to evacuate all the countries on this side of the Oxus, and to pay the expenses of the expedition." The execution of this wild scheme, never seriously entertained except by the envoy himself, was soon seen to be unnecessary, in so far at least as it was designed to destroy the influence of Dost Mahomed with the Khan of Bokhara. The friendship of the two chiefs dissolved of its own accord, an open rupture ensued, and Dost Mahomed, after being subjected to indignity as a prisoner, was glad to make his escape into the territory of the Wullee of Khooloom, under whose protection his own family were then residing, and by whose aid he hoped to gain over several Usbek chiefs to his interest.

Unsatisfac-
tory state
of Afghan
interior

Shah Shujah and his court, as soon as the winter was past, prepared to return to Cabool, and took their departure from Jelalabad in the latter part of April, 1840. The state of the country continued to be very unsatisfactory, and the envoy, unable any longer to shut his eyes to the fact, was obliged to confess that on looking at the future he anticipated "anything but a bed of roses." Dost Mahomed had, as we have seen, made his escape into the territories of the Wullee of Khooloom, and was thus in dangerous proximity to the Afghan frontiers on the north-west. It had been expected, indeed, that an event which had recently occurred would make him hesitate before recommencing hostilities. Before his arrival at Khooloom, his family, previously resident there under the charge of his brother Jubbar Khan, had, after some negotiation, been brought by the latter to the outpost at Bamian, and placed under British protection, or in other words surrendered as prisoners, without any other stipulation in their favour than that of honourable treatment. Under these circumstances Dost Mahomed was somewhat in the position of a party who had given hostages for his good behaviour. It soon appeared, however, that he was not to be thus restrained from once more attempting to regain his power. When reminded of the danger to which he was exposing his family, he only answered, "I have no family; I have buried my wives and children;" and continued in concert with

the Wullee to levy troops for the avowed purpose of once more trying his fortune in Afghanistan. A D 1840

In other quarters the signs of approaching disturbance were equally manifest. The Ghiljies inhabiting the central portion of the mountainous districts which extend in a north-east direction between Candahar and Cabool, had from the first given unequivocal signs of hostility, and by the extent of their depredations inflicted such severe losses that it became necessary to send a detachment against them. It was headed by Captain Outram, who did the duty so effectually that many of the Ghiljie chiefs fled to the north and sought refuge among Dost Mahomed's other adherents. After remaining here for a few months they ventured to return, and having re-occupied their forts resumed their former practices with even greater boldness than before. General Nott, in command at Candahar, was obliged in consequence, in the beginning of April, 1840, to adopt measures for their suppression. At first the force employed for this purpose consisted only of a party of her Majesty's 2d cavalry, and a few of the 4th local horse, in all 210 men, under Captains Taylor and Walker, supported by a detachment of infantry, under Captain Codrington, and accompanied by a body of Afghans, forming part of the troops of Shah Shujah; but afterwards, when the extent of the resistance to be anticipated was better ascertained, it was deemed necessary to detach a reinforcement, consisting of her Majesty's 5th regiment of infantry, and four guns of the 2d troop of horse artillery, under Captain Anderson. On the 16th of May the Ghiljie chiefs, now in open rebellion, were found in force at Tazee, in the vicinity of the Turnuk. When summoned to submit, they replied that they had 12,000 men at their command, and being fully satisfied of the justice of their cause, had no fear of the issue. Their real number was about 3000, strongly posted on adjoining heights. Notwithstanding his inferiority in numbers, Captain Anderson immediately prepared for the encounter. It was maintained by the Ghiljies for some time with great gallantry, but after they had made two charges and been repulsed, in the first instance by the destructive fire of the artillery and in the second at the point of the bayonet, their courage failed, and they fled to their mountain fastnesses.

Expedition
against the
Ghiljies

Engagement
with them

Notwithstanding the severe chastisement thus inflicted, the rebellion seemed to gather strength, and so large a body of insurgents had concentrated in the vicinity of Kheilat-i-Ghiljie, that it was deemed necessary to make preparations against it on a larger scale. Accordingly, Sir Willoughby Cotton, in a letter to General Nott, appointing him "to the command of the force to be employed in tranquillizing the Ghiljie country," intimated his intention to send strong detachments from Cabool and Ghuznee, to unite with the troops which might accompany him from Candahar. Nott convinced that the insurrection was not so formidable as was supposed at head-quarters, and having, moreover, some apprehension of a rising in Candahar itself, took with him only a small portion

New dis-
turbances
threatened

A.D. 1840

of the 43d native infantry. The event proved the accuracy of his views. The Ghiljies, after all their boastings, scarcely ventured to resist, and the chiefs who headed them either submitted or fled. As it was hardly to be expected that tribes so turbulent would, if again left to themselves, remain tranquil, it was resolved to keep them in check by means of a permanent force, stationed in the vicinity, at Hoolan Robart, commanding a mountain pass of that name. The envoy, doubtful if tranquillity could be secured by this means, had recourse to others, in which he had greater confidence, and agreed to pay the Ghiljie chiefs, 30,000 rupees (£3000) annually, on condition of their abstaining from marauding, and giving free passage through the country.

Conspiracy
in Candahar

General Nott, it has been mentioned, was apprehensive of a rising in Candahar, and for this reason among others refrained, when setting out for Khelat-i-Ghiljie, from taking with him any large body of troops. From letters found



KHELAT-I-GHILJIE —From Sale's Defence of Jelalabad.

in the possession of the prisoners taken at Tazee, he discovered that certain chiefs residing at Candahar were in hopes that the garrison would be so weakened in providing for the Ghiljie expedition as to give them a favourable opportunity of rising, and massacring every European and Hindoo within the city. The fact that such a plot had been formed is a strong proof of the general hatred with which Shah Shujah and his allies were regarded. Nor is it difficult to find the explanation. According to Nott's account, which even supposing it to be somewhat coloured, was doubtless substantially correct, nothing could be more atrocious than the manner in which the government was conducted. Prince Timour, the Shahzada, or heir-apparent of Shah Shujah, accompanied by one of his brothers, was ruling at Candahar as his father's representative. The mode in which he discharged this duty Nott thus describes: "The fact is that the plunder, the robbery, and cruel oppression committed by the servants and followers of his highness Prince Timour, have been such as to outrage the

feelings of the natives, and sure I am, that should opportunity offer, these cruel and shameful proceedings will be retaliated upon the troops left in this country. Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty, and oppression as I witnessed in this camp." "The houses and corn-fields of the unfortunate inhabitants are entered, their property plundered, and the owners cut and wounded in the most cruel manner."

A. D. 1840.

The cruel treatment above described took place at Hoolan Robart during the expedition to Khelat-i-Ghilje, but as it was under the immediate eye of Prince Timour, who was personally present, he was undoubtedly responsible for it. General Nott, adopting this view, acted upon it with his usual decision. Having caused the plundered property and the plunderers to be seized, he intimated to the Shalzada and Captain Nicolson, the political resident, that he did not wish to interfere with his highness's servants, but as the plundered property had been brought into his camp, the inhabitants naturally looked to him for redress, and therefore, if those to whom the duty properly belonged did not punish the robbers, he himself would. The subsequent procedure is thus detailed in a letter to his daughters:—"The politicals blustered in the name of the prince. My answer was short: 'You are in possession of my determination, which I shall carry into effect at sunset unless you send your people to punish the marauders in my presence, and as an example to all.' Well, sunset came, when I had the fellows tied up and flogged, in presence of the poor inhabitants who had been plundered and robbed. I restored their property to them, and they went away rejoicing. I told the prince and politicals that unless a stop was put to such atrocious conduct, I would separate my camp from that of the prince. I fancy they have represented the whole to the Cabool authorities, who will not, I should think, dare to write to me on the subject. Yet they may, and how it will end I neither know nor care; I will never allow of such scenes in a camp under my command."

Oppression exercised by Shah Shujah's officials.

That General Nott was right in the course which he adopted can scarcely be questioned, but he judged too favourably of the "politicals" and the "Cabool authorities" when he thought that they would not dare to write him on the subject. Captain Nicolson, who had at first protested "most strongly" against General Nott's intention, and plainly told him that he would not allow the prince's people to be punished "upon inquiry made by others than the prince himself, or his responsible adviser myself," lost not a moment after the punishment was inflicted in forwarding a complaint to the envoy. "The prince," he assured him, "was evidently deeply hurt, and had said that 'though he had accompanied Sir C. Wade from Loodiana, and spent much of his time with British troops, this was the first time he had met with conduct which would doubtless produce a very bad effect on the Kuzzilbashes about his highness's person, and lower him in the estimation of all the subjects of the Shah.'" On receiving this complaint Sir William Macnaghten fired at once. The more the

Nott's mode of representing it

A.D. 1840

Nott's mode
of repress-
ing the
excesses of
the Shah's
officers

reality of power was denied to the dynasty which he was labouring so earnestly to establish, the more tenaciously he clung to its shadow, and he was therefore always forward to resent any effront offered to the Shah or any of the members of his family. In accordance with these feelings, he laid the correspondence on the subject before Sir Willoughby Cotton as commander-in-chief, accompanying it with a letter, in which he said, "I need not dwell on the anxiety of the governor-general in council, that in the difficult and perilous position we occupy in this country, the greatest possible respect and tenderness should be shown for the honour and feelings of his majesty; and should you concur with me in thinking that, in the act which has proved so offensive to the prince, Major-



1 KHAN SHAFIZADEH KHAN, Chief of the Jawahshoor Kuzul
Kabul. 2 Ghazi Miran, a Barukzye -- From Hart's *Chinatar*
and Customs of Afghanistan

general Nott has deviated from those principles, I have to request that you will be good enough to convey to him your opinion in such terms as may effectually prevent his falling into a similar error in future" Sir Willoughby applied to General Nott for explanation, and on receiving it gave his official opinion in very decided terms "The system of plunder which appears to have been carried on in the camp by the followers of the Shahzada was atrocious; and although I regret that Major-general Nott was driven to the necessity of punishing the prince's servants, yet as the political agent, to whom he states that he fruitlessly applied on several occasions, would not check the prevailing dis-

orders, it became General Nott's duty to take measures to arrest proceedings so disgraceful, and tending to alienate the feelings of the people both from the British troops and from his majesty's government" His concluding remarks deserve quotation: "I am sensible of the objects of the government in maintaining by all means the dignity of the Shah and his family, and of impressing upon the people of the country the proofs of his independence; but I presume that it is not intended to sacrifice the discipline and order of the army, or the credit of the nation for justice and moderation; and instead of being offended, I should humbly imagine that any prince, either European or Asiatic, would feel obliged to the general commanding for affording prompt justice to his ill-treated and oppressed peasantry." The question ought now to have been set at rest, but Sir William Macnaghten, describing the punishment inflicted by General Nott as "an unnecessary act of violence," urged the governor-general

¹ For an account of the Barukzyes, see p. 352

A D. 1849.

General
Nott's pro-
cedure dis-
approved by
the gover-
nor-general

to prevent the repetition of it, "if for no other reason than that it cannot fail of being prejudicial to our interests, as proving to the people of Afghanistan the truth of the rumours so industriously circulated by our enemies to the effect that the government of the country has been assumed by us, and that Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk is a mere puppet in our hands." Lord Auckland was only too much disposed to maintain the Shah's dignity at all hazards, and to view any apparent encroachment upon it with "great regret and displeasure." Almost therefore as a matter of course, his views coincided with those of the envoy, and Sir Willoughby Cotton was instructed to inform General Nott that his conduct in arrogating to himself "the power of punishing the servants of the Shah's son and representative within his majesty's dominions, where the Shahzada was actually in the exercise of the vice-regal functions, had excited" extreme surprise "in the governor-general in council, and created" an impression unfavourable as to his "discretion and perfect fitness for delicate duties in such a country."


New dis-
turbances

The triumph thus given to the envoy, by the censure of a distinguished officer for an alleged encroachment on the Shah's dignity must have been a poor compensation to him for the increasing difficulties of his position. His grand game in Asia, which would necessarily have led to new wars, and increased an expenditure already felt to be overwhelming, had met with no countenance, and it was every day becoming more doubtful if Shah Shujah's throne, hedged though it was with British bayonets, could long be maintained. So far from settling down into tranquillity, the country was becoming more disturbed. The revolt of the Ghiljies, and the threatened insurrection in Candahar, have been already mentioned, and in whatever direction we turn a similar spirit is found to prevail. When Khelat was captured and Mehrab Khan slain, it became necessary to provide for the future government of the territory. The plan adopted was to annex it as a dependency to Shah Shujah's dominions, and give the government of it to a new khan who was willing to accept it on this condition, and was also believed to be sincerely attached to British interests. Newaz Khan, the individual selected, belonged to a collateral branch of the ruling family, but this relationship, instead of conciliating his Beloochee countrymen, only made his acceptance of the title more odious to them. The youthful son of Mehrab Khan was not slow to avail himself of the strong feeling manifested in his favour, and no sooner made his appearance than the tribes hastened to rally around him. Though the danger must have been foreseen, no precautions were taken. The insurgents easily made themselves masters of the capital, and with the concurrence of Newaz Khan himself, who to avoid a worse fate was glad to abdicate, seated Mehrab Khan's son as the rightful heir upon the throne. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant Loveday, a British officer, who after some months of captivity was barbarously murdered.

A.D. 1840

Detachment
cut off by
BeloocheesMajor
Clibborn's
expedition.

During the various insurrections which accompanied or followed the revolution in Khelat, disaster on more than one occasion befell British troops. A detachment of 50 horse and 150 foot, under Lieutenant Clark of the 2d Bombay grenadiers, while proceeding from the fort of Kahun, situated in the south-east of Afghanistan, about twenty miles west of the Suliman Mountains, for the purpose of obtaining supplies, was suddenly attacked by a body of 2000 Beloochees, and after much unavailing gallantry, cut off to a man. Shortly afterwards the fort itself was attacked, and its small garrison, ably commanded by Captain Brown of the 50th native infantry, while making a valiant defence was in danger of being starved into surrender. Major Clibborn of the 1st Bombay grenadiers was therefore detached from Sukkur on the 12th of August with a convoy for its relief. The convoy consisted of 1200 camels and 600 bullocks; the escort mustered 464 bayonets, 34 rank and file of artillery, and three twelve-pounder howitzers. At Poolajee, a reinforcement of 200 Poonah and Scinde irregular horse was received, and the whole proceeded through a country presenting the most formidable difficulties. On the 31st of August, the pass of Nuffoosk came in sight, and presented an appearance by which the stoutest hearts were appalled. The road to be traversed led zig zag up the side of a precipitous mountain, the crest of which was crowned by a body of the enemy, who, as soon as the convoy appeared, gave notice to the surrounding country by setting fire to a beacon light. Though his troops were already exhausted by a long and toilsome march, and suffering dreadfully from thirst



THE PASS OF NUFFOOSK.—FROM KIRK'S VIEWS IN AFGHANISTAN

which there was no means of allaying, Major Clibborn immediately prepared to storm the pass. The result was disastrous. After the storming party had nearly gained the head of the pass, they were assailed by rocks and stones hurled down from the summit, and a murderous fire was opened upon them which they were unable to return with any effect. During the confusion produced

by this unequal conflict, the Beloochees, pouring down from the ridges sword in hand, bore all before them. Not satisfied with thus clearing the pass, they rushed into the plain and advanced to the very muzzles of the guns before they could be dispersed. Their loss must have been very great, but it could be borne far more easily than that of their victors, of whom 150 had fallen. Nor was this all. During the action most of the camel-men had absconded after plundering the commissariat, and the gun-horses were gone, so that both the guns and the convoy with the stores and camp equipage were necessarily abandoned. With the utmost difficulty, and the loss of many additional lives, a retreat to Poolajee, more than fifty miles distant, was effected.

The more immediate effect of Major Clibborn's disaster was to leave the fort of Kahun without supplies and almost at the mercy of the enemy. Captain Brown, who held it with a garrison of only three companies of native infantry with one gun, was at last compelled to surrender, but succeeded by the gallantry of his defence in obtaining honourable terms. Simultaneous outbreaks took place over the whole country, and serious attacks were made on Quettah and other British posts. As these were repulsed without much difficulty, it is unnecessary to give the details; but in order to show that success was in most instances owing much more to good fortune and to the discipline and courage of our soldiers than to any wisdom in the arrangements of their superiors, it may be worth while to quote the following passage from a letter of General Nott to Sir Willoughby Cotton. After deprecating the withdrawal of any part of the 42d and 43d regiments garrisoning Candahar, and declaring that "if any accident should occur to these regiments by detaching parties from them before reinforcements shall arrive, the game in this part of the Shah's dominions would be at an end," he continues thus: "Captain Bean confines his ideas to that miserable dog-hole Quettah, and dictates the troops to be sent to that place from Candahar. 'One regiment of regular infantry, four guns (out of six), and 300 horse;' (all now at Candahar), without noting the object in view! I could earnestly wish the envoy and minister to impress upon these gentlemen (the political residents) the propriety of at all times confining their application to stating the object, and leaving the means to the officer in command. But they reverse the order of things by calling for and particularizing the number



BELOOCHES ON THE LOOK-OUT
From Burnes, Atkinson, and Van Orlie.

Simultaneous outbreaks.

A.D. 1842

Injurious
mode of
surrounding
outbreaks
in Afghan
set out

of guns, infantry, and cavalry, without stating the object in view. Now no officer of common understanding would pay the least attention to such a call. The officer placed at Killah Abdoolah for the purpose of watching and keeping open the Kojuk Pass, quits his post, takes a trip to Quettah, from whence he is sent with others to beat the enemy (so report says) out of Moostung, without having the means of attacking 300 men. Away they gallop; and no sooner do they get sight of the place than they find it necessary to turn round, and gallop back again with the enemy at their heels! Even such a silly, paltry affair must have a ruinous effect among the half-savage, half-civilized, but brave mountaineers. Whose orders is this gentleman at the Kojuk under? The province of Shawl was, in general orders, placed under my command; yet a serious attack has been made on the post of Quettah, and other attacks foolishly provoked in its vicinity, and the officer commanding in Shawl never reports, never sends me a line on the subject, although the safety of the whole country from Ghuznee to the Bolan, and even to Sukkur, might have been compromised, and all this in consequence of the unmilitary and extraordinary orders issued to the Shah's troops. I repeat, that if this system is to be continued, disaster must follow."

Revolution
in Khelat

The revolution effected in Khelat, so serious in itself, and so dangerous as an example of successful resistance to the new order of things, could not be tolerated, and it was therefore determined either to oust Nusseer Khan, Mehrab Khan's son, from the throne which his own sword and the affections of his countrymen had purchased for him, or at all events only to permit him to hold it, like his predecessor, as an acknowledged dependant of Shah Shujah. In this instance, the person appointed to conduct the military operations was wisely selected, and General Nott, in obedience to an official despatch from the envoy and the commander-in-chief, dated 3d September, 1840, proceeded to take the necessary steps for the recapture of Khelat. The leading article in his instructions was as follows.—"The terms to be offered to the rebels now in possession of Khelat are, first, unconditional surrender, and an assurance that the son of Mehrab Khan will be recognized by the British government and his majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk as the lawful chief of Beloochistan, on his agreeing immediately to proceed to Cabool to pay personal homage to his majesty, and on his agreeing to subscribe to such other conditions as it may be thought proper to impose." This instruction was very unpalatable to Nott, who, writing to his daughters, thus animadverted upon it. "I am disgusted. They most unjustly dethroned Mehrab Khan, and placed a tool of Shah Shujah's in his place. Well, Mehrab Khan's son assembles his father's followers—retakes Khelat; our authorities talk big for a day or two, and then send me instructions to offer terms to the boy, declaring that they will place him on his father's throne; and thus they disgrace the character of our country. Had they taken this boy by the hand when he was a wanderer in the land of his ancestors, there would have been a generous and honourable feeling; but to bend the knee to

him and his bloody chiefs *now* is disgraceful." Though thus disapproving of the terms, Nott knew his duty too well as a soldier not to do his utmost to give effect to them. The means at his disposal, however, seemed very inadequate. The young khan, after rejecting the terms offered him, and swearing that he would revenge his father's death, set out at the head of 5000 men, in the direction of Moostung, and on the 29th of September arrived within sixteen miles of the spot, on which, from the non-arrival of reinforcements on which he had been led to calculate, Nott was encamped with a force not exceeding in all 600 men. Nusseer Khan, notwithstanding his vast superiority of numbers, did not venture to risk an encounter. After various movements Nott reached Moostung on the 25th of October, while the enemy moved rapidly on Dadur, situated about fifty miles to the south-east, near the eastern entrance of the Bolan Pass. Immediately on emerging from the pass, Nusseer Khan made preparations for attacking the British post at Dadur, and on two successive days (the 30th and 31st) made ineffectual attempts to force it. He had not despaired of succeeding, when the approach of a considerable reinforcement, under Major Boscawen, compelled him to desist. So precipitate, indeed, was his departure, that several of his camels and tents were captured. It was on this occasion that the fate of Lieutenant Loveday, the political resident made captive at Khelat, was ascertained. A very handsome European officer's tent was seen standing in the deserted camp. On entering it the body of the unfortunate officer was discovered lying with the throat cut on a small piece of carpet, with no clothing except a pair of *pajamas* or cotton drawers, and fastened by a chain, the friction of which had lacerated the ankles. The atrocious murder had just been committed, as the body was still warm, and a Hindoostanee attendant, who was weeping over it, told that Gool Mahomed, contrary, it was said, to the wish of Nusseer Khan, had ordered, that in the event of defeat, the last man quitting the camp should murder the English captive.

A D 1840

Expedition
to recapture
Khelat.Barbarous
murder of
Lieutenant
Loveday

The terror produced by the defeat at Dadur sufficed to make an open passage to Khelat. As Nott advanced the enemy fled before him, and he regained possession of the Beloochee capital without opposition. This success was preceded by another, which was of still greater consequence, and which, if it had been duly improved, might have permanently secured the Dooranee dynasty in Afghanistan. The escape of Dost Mahomed from Bokhara had infused new spirit into his adherents, and a letter was intercepted, which according to the envoy's interpretation of it, "implicated many chiefs in meditated insurrection." The Dost himself was also actively employed in levying troops, which, united with those of the Wullee of Khooloom, amounted to no contemptible army. A descent into Afghanistan was now openly talked of, and spread so much alarm, that even the envoy ceased to be sanguine, and became desponding. "It is reported," he wrote, "that the whole country on this side the Oxus is up in favour of the Dost, who with the Wullee, is certainly advancing in great

Dost Ma-
homed in
concert with
the Wullee
of Khoo-
loom

A D 1840

Dost Ma-
homed an-
nounced
the Wulles
of Khoo-
loom.

strength, so much so that our troops have been obliged to fall back on Bamian, while we have a formidable band of conspirators in the city, and the Kohistan is ripe for revolt." A strong confirmation of this alarming statement was shortly after received. An attempt had been made to raise an Afghan force, whose fidelity to Shah Shujah might be confidently relied upon. The futility of the attempt was soon proved. The first regiment raised with this view, was no sooner brought into proximity with the enemy than a company went off with arms and accoutrements to join the Dost, and it became necessary to disarm the other companies, as the only effectual means of preventing them from following the example. In a letter to the governor-general, dated 12th September, Sir William Macnaghten pressed with additional urgency, that a request which he had repeatedly made for a large increase of the army of



BAMIAN AND GHOOLOOLA — From Sale's Defence of Jelalabad

Necessity of
reinforce-
ments

occupation should be complied with, supporting his application by the opinion of Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had recently given it to him in the following terms:—"I really think the time has now arrived for you and I to tell Lord Auckland, *totidem verbis*, that circumstances have proved incontestably that there is no Afghan army, and that unless the Bengal troops are greatly strengthened, we cannot hold the country." Such was the ominous aspect of affairs, when the important intelligence arrived that Dost Mahomed was defeated and his army dispersed. As soon as he was known to be advancing upon Bamian, Brigadier Dennie hastened forward to that post with strong reinforcements. He arrived on the 14th of September, but was unable to obtain certain intelligence of the enemy's movements till the 17th, when he learned that large bodies of cavalry were emerging from a defile into the valley, and were at the distance of only six miles from Bamian. These troops were supposed to be the

enemy's advanced guard, under the Dost's son Afzul Khan, and as they were reported to have attacked a village, it was resolved to expel them. Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th, the brigadier set out with a detachment, consisting of four companies of the 35th native infantry, four companies of the Ghoorka corps, about 400 Afghan horse, and two horse-artillery guns. This comparatively small force, which expected to encounter only the enemy's advance, found itself in front of his whole army. It occupied a series of heights, crowned with forts, around which the troops were clustered in dense masses. Without hesitation Dennie, notwithstanding the immense disparity of numbers, determined to give battle. The guns immediately opened their fire, which told with dreadful effect, while no return could be made to it. The confusion thus produced in the enemy's ranks soon became apparent. While the guns following up their advantage drove them successively from height to height, the cavalry rushed forward, and coming up with the fugitives, now entangled in the defile, made fearful slaughter. So sudden and complete was the dispersion of the Dost's whole army, that he and his son only escaped by the fleetness of their horses.

A.D. 1840.

Dost Ma-
homed
routed by
Brigadier
Dennie

This reverse so disconcerted the Wullee of Khooloom, that he gladly insured his own safety by accepting of terms which annexed part of his territories to those of Shah Shujah, and bound him neither to harbour nor give countenance of any kind to Dost Mahomed, or any of his family. Thus once more a wanderer, Dost Mahomed fled eastward into Kohistan, where his adherents, always numerous, had of late been much increased by the oppressive proceedings of Shah Shujah's officers in levying revenue. It was impossible for him to raise a force with which he could venture to take the field, and he continued to flit about from place to place. As there was no doubt, however, that, if not in Kohistan, he was intriguing with their chiefs and had received strong promises of support, Sir Robert Sale, accompanied by Sir Alexander Burnes, marched thither at the head of a considerable force, and on the 29th of September came up with a large body of insurgents, posted in the fortified village of Tootundurrah, situated near the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass. Little difficulty was felt in dislodging them, but the Dost still eluded pursuit, and caused great alarm by repeated reports of his dangerous proximity to Cabool. Sale's next encounter with the rebels was less fortunate, and a premature attempt, on the 3d of October, to storm the fort of Joolgah, met with a severe repulse. The fort was immediately after evacuated by the garrison, but the moral effect of the repulse was dreaded, and the envoy, in writing to the governor-general on the 12th of October, did not hesitate to represent both Cabool and the country as "ripe for revolt." The Dost's cause certainly seemed to gather strength. When he again raised his standard at Nyrow, many of the Shah's soldiers deserted to him, and he began to move in the direction of Cabool

Submission
of the
Wullee of
Khooloom

A D 1840

Strange
question of
the envoy
as to the
treatment
of the Dost

These movements of Dost Mahomed so alarmed and irritated the envoy, that as if he had despaired of overcoming him by honourable means, he puts the question to one of his correspondents, "Would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head?" and then adds, "We have intercepted several letters from him, from all which it appears that he meditates fighting with us so long as the breath is in his body" It is lamentable to think that in putting the above question the envoy was in earnest. Not only was he meditating to rid himself of the Dost without any scruple as to the means, but he had even resolved in the event of his capture to show him no mercy. This clearly appears from a letter to the governor-general, in which, speaking of Sir Robert Sale's proceedings in Kohistan, he coolly remarks:—"Should he be so fortunate as to secure the person of Dost Mahomed, I shall request his majesty not to execute him till I can ascertain your lordship's sentiments." Fortunately for the envoy himself, and the honour of the British name, Dost Mahomed did not fall into his hands while these bloody thoughts were in his mind. On the 29th of October the British force, encamped at Bagh-i-Alum, about twenty-six miles NNE. of Cabool, having received intelligence of Dost Mahomed's approach from the north, at the head of a large body of troops, set out to meet him, and on the 2d of November found him posted in the valley of Purwan. Either desirous to evade the conflict, or perhaps not satisfied with his position, he was moving off to some higher ground in the rear, when the British cavalry moved forward to outflank him, and left him no alternative but to fight or flee. He preferred the former, and advanced to the encounter, at the head of a body of horse. Strange to say the British cavalry, native troopers, abandoning their officers, turned their backs, and Dost Mahomed following up his advantage, pursued them with great slaughter, almost within reach of the British guns, and then quietly withdrew. This success, however much it may have gratified his pride, did not blind him as to the hopelessness of the struggle in which he was engaged. Though he had put the cavalry to disgraceful rout, he did not venture to await the attack of the main body, and hastened to place himself out of reach. The effect produced by this affair of Purwan was singular. Sir Alexander Burnes, convinced that it must be followed by a general rising, had immediately written to urge a concentration of troops in Cabool, and meanwhile the Dost was wending his way thither to surrender himself a prisoner. He had ridden from the battle-field for this very purpose, and had been twenty-four hours in his saddle, when Sir William Macnaghten, returning from his ride on the evening of the 3d of November, was accosted by an attendant, who galloped up and informed him that the Ameer was at hand. "What Ameer?" asked the envoy. "Dost Mahomed Khan" And so it was. The ex-ruler of Cabool, dismounting from his horse, came forward, placed his sword in the envoy's hand, and claimed his protection.

The Dost's
surrender to
Sir William
Macnaghten

Dost Mahomed, now a prisoner in the city where he had once reigned,

reconciled himself to his fate, and by his free and manly bearing, gained the respect and excited the sympathy of all who came in contact with him. Shah Shujah indeed still cherished thoughts of vengeance, but not being permitted to carry them into effect, was obliged to content himself with applying opprobrious epithets to his prisoner, and refusing to admit him into his presence, excusing himself on the plea that he would be unable to behave to him with common civility. By this conduct he at once disgraced himself and saved the Dost from an interview which he would have felt to be humiliating. The envoy, on the contrary, now returned to a better mind than when he talked of setting a price on the Dost's head, treated him with the greatest kindness, and placed him under no more restraint than was absolutely necessary to secure his person.

A.D. 1840

Treatment
of Dost
Mahomed

SURRENDER OF DOST MAHOMED TO SIR W. H. MACNAGHTEN, AT THE ENTRANCE TO CABOOL FROM KILLA KAZEE.
From Atkinson's Sketches in Afghanistan

This, however, was scarcely possible in Cabool, and therefore on the 12th of November, ten days after his surrender, Dost Mahomed was sent off under a strong escort to British India. The envoy, in a letter written after his departure, not only expressed his hope that he would be "treated with liberality," but enforced it by an argument, which as coming from him must be admitted to be something singular. "His case," he says, "has been compared to that of Shah Shujah; and I have seen it argued that he should not be treated more handsomely than his majesty was; but surely the cases are not parallel. The Shah had no claim upon us. *We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim!*" It is doubtful if the governor-general concurred with the envoy in volunteering a sentence of condemnation on his own policy, but he at all events acted generously, and granted Dost Mahomed a pension of two lacs of rupees (£20,000).

He is con-
veyed to
British
India

A D 1841

Fancied
tranquillity
of Afghanis-
tan

The removal of Dost Mahomed rid Shah Shujah, of the only rival who could have competed with him for the throne of Afghanistan with any prospect of success, and the envoy, become again sanguine, expressed his belief that the tranquillity of the country was now secured. On the 21th of November he wrote to a correspondent that his majesty, 'who at one time seemed doomed to endure the winter of Cabool, was to start in a few days for his more genial quarters at Jelalabad, and added, "We shall now have a little time to devote to the affairs of the country, and I trust its condition will be soon as flourishing as its poor resources will admit." A similar impression prevailed in other official quarters. Sir Willoughby Cotton, anxious to return to India, now saw nothing to prevent him from resigning his command, and the governor-general, as if satisfied that all real difficulties had at length been surmounted, conferred the appointment not on General Nott, whose talents and services gave him the best claim, but on General Elphinstone, who by his incompetency was destined to teach a dreadful lesson on the subject of the abuse of patronage.

New insur-
rection

When the year 1840 closed, the anticipated tranquillity was not fully realized. In Zemindawar, a district to the west of Candahar, a body of insurgents, headed by a chief of the name of Aktur Khan, attacked and dispersed a detachment of the Shah's troops, who were assisting the officers employed in the collection of the revenue. On the 3d of January, 1841, the insurrection was apparently suppressed by Captain Farrington, who having been detached from Candahar, encountered an enemy mustering nearly 1500 men, and after a sharp struggle completely defeated them. The worst feature in this insurrection was that it consisted of Dooranees, who as hereditary rivals of the Barukzyes, ought to have been strenuous supporters of the new dynasty. Unfortunately their expectations from Shah Shujah had been greatly disappointed, and they were ready to join in any hostile movement against him. An opportunity was not wanting. Yar Mahomed, exercising his ascendancy at Herat, had come to open rupture with the British resident, and threatened an expedition against Candahar. As a preliminary measure he had fostered the discontent of the Dooranees in Zemindawar, whose insurrection, comparatively insignificant in itself, became formidable by its ramifications, and the hostilities by which it might be followed. The envoy's remedy would have been to fit out an expedition at once against Herat, and annex it to Shah Shujah's dominions, but as this was part of the "grand game" which the governor-general had distinctly repudiated, it was necessary to act with more moderation. When Aktur Khan again appeared at the head of his insurgents, Lieutenant Elliot, intrusted with the settlement of the district, was instructed to conciliate rather than fight. Acting in this spirit he offered terms, which Aktur Khan was only too glad to accept. The effect of thus purchasing submission, instead of compelling it, might have been foreseen, and was foretold by Colonel Rawlinson, resident at Candahar, who writing to the envoy, expressed himself in the

Yar Ma-
homed at
Herat.

following terms:—"I do not anticipate that by the conciliating treatment recommended by Lieutenant Elliot, we gain any other advantage than that of temporary tranquillity; and however prudent, therefore, it may be at present to induce the rebel chief of Zemindawer to abstain from disorders by the hope of obtaining, through his forbearance, substantial personal benefits, I still think that when the danger of foreign aggression is removed, and efficient means are at our disposal, the rights of his majesty's government should be asserted in that strong and dignified manner which can alone insure a due respect being paid to his authority." The accuracy of these views was soon confirmed. In the course of a few months Aktur Khan was again in arms at the head of a greater force than he had ever been able to muster before, threatening the important station of Ghiresk, on the west bank of the Helmund. These insurgents kept complete possession of the district till powerful reinforcements were forwarded, and even then they were not dispersed till they had tried their strength in a regular battle.

A D 1841
Insurrections headed by Aktur Khan

During this insurrection of the Dooranees, the Ghiljies were again in motion. Neither force nor money could wholly repress their native turbulence, and it had been resolved, as the most effectual means of keeping them in check, to hold their capital of Khelat-i-Ghiljie by a British force, and strengthen its fortifications. The commencement of the works at once aroused the fears of the Ghiljies for their boasted independence, and the attitude which they assumed made it almost certain that an open rupture was contemplated, and would not be long delayed.

New Ghiljo insurrection.

While matters were in this critical position Lieutenant Lynch, who had political charge of the country around Khelat-i-Ghiljie, having been insulted and defied in riding past a small fort in the vicinity, thought it necessary to punish this insolence in a manner which would deter others from imitating it. He accordingly sent out a body of troops, who after a refusal to surrender, attacked the fort and captured it, but not without a conflict in which the chief and many of his followers were slain. While the gallantry of the achievement was justly commended, the conduct of Lynch in ordering it was severely censured. "Why," exclaimed the envoy, "should we go and knock our heads against mud-forts? Why should we not have waited till the Ghiljies chose to attack us?" The governor-general, viewing the matter in a similar light, removed the offending officer, but it is very questionable if any degree of forbearance could have prevented or even delayed the insurrection. Be this as it may, the loss of the fort and the slaughter of its garrison were immediately followed by a formidable outbreak. It became necessary in consequence to send a reinforcement from Candahar, under Colonel Wymer, who on arriving on the 29th of May at Eelmee, near the banks of the Turnuk, received intelligence that a large body of insurgents, headed by two chiefs, were hastening forward to attack him. He had only time to bring his men into position when

Proceedings of Lieutenant Lynch

A D 1843

Defeat of the
Ghiljies

the encounter took place. The Ghiljies, advancing with the greatest boldness, had arrived within 900 yards, when the guns opened upon them. Though suffering severely they still advanced, and apparently in execution of a previously concerted plan, separated into three distinct columns, for the purpose of making a simultaneous attack on the British flanks and centre. Colonel Wymer, comparatively weak in numbers, and encumbered with a large convoy, was obliged to remain on the defensive, and allowed the enemy to approach, sword in hand, to within a very short distance. The grape of the guns and volleys of the infantry then told with full effect, thinning and breaking the ranks of the Ghiljies, and driving them back with fearful loss. A first repulse, however, did not deter them from renewing the attack, and they maintained the conflict for five hours before they finally gave way. Their force was estimated at 5000 men, and it is said that several hundreds of these were inhabitants of Candahar, who went out to join in the attack, and coolly returned after their defeat, even bringing some of their wounded along with them.

Prospect of
tranquillity

The severe chastisement inflicted on the insurgents successively on the banks of the Turnuk and at the Helmund, had the effect of producing a degree of tranquillity, which though far more in semblance than in reality, was so satisfactory to the envoy that he considered the prospect "most cheering," and even ventured to describe the country as "perfectly quiet from Dan to Beersheba." While he was thus lulling himself and others into a fancied security, an expedition which he had sanctioned if not suggested, was being prepared against a district which was still in open rebellion. After the defeat at Ghiresk, Azmal Khan and Akram Khan, two of the insurgent chiefs, returned to their respective forts of Tireen and Derawut, situated about sixty miles north of Candahar. When summoned to submit, they answered with defiance, and began mustering their followers for another struggle. The extent of the alarm thus excited, may be gathered from the fact that a large proportion of the troops in Candahar was withdrawn for the purposes of the expedition, and that General Nott, who had received instructions some time before, not "on any account to leave Candahar at present," and conceived them to be still binding, complained that so large a portion of the force under his command "should have been ordered on what may prove to be a difficult service," while he was not permitted to accompany it. The explanation returned having left him at liberty to act at his own discretion, he immediately set out to overtake the expedition. He reached the camp on the 29th of September, and on advancing into the insurgent districts had the satisfaction to find that the display of force had so overawed the insurgents as to render actual hostilities unnecessary. Chief after chief appeared in the camp to make his submission, and Nott, deeming his presence no longer necessary, returned to Candahar. Meanwhile, in another quarter an insurrection of a more formidable character had broken out. The enormous expenditure occasioned by the occupation of Afghanistan had drained

It proves a
disappoint-
ment.

the Calcutta treasury, and every letter from the government urged the necessity of large retrenchment. The envoy, perplexed how to proceed, fixed on the department which of all others ought to have been left untouched, and commenced by sweeping reductions of the pensions and allowances which had been granted to native chiefs and their followers. An increase of disaffection was the immediate result, and a general confederacy was formed for the purpose of resisting the deductions, or compensating for them by means of plunder. The eastern Ghiljies in particular, occupying the mountainous districts lying between Cabool and Jelalabad, made no secret of their determination to take the remedy into their own hands. The sums allowed them had, they said, been fixed by regular compact, and the resolution to curtail them was therefore a breach of faith. The undertaking on their part had only been to become responsible for robberies committed in their own immediate districts, but the terms, they alleged, had been changed without their consent, and their responsibility had been made to extend to districts over which they had no control. Such were the grievances of which they complained, and they commenced at once to redress them in their own peculiar fashion. The communication with India by the north-east being thus rendered almost impracticable, it was determined to take advantage of the intended return of Sir Robert Sale's brigade to Hindoostan, to suppress the Ghiljie rising, and compel a re-opening of the passes. Previous attempts had indeed been made, but of so absurd a nature that nothing but failure should have been anticipated. Humza Khan, acting as Shah Shujah's representative among the Ghiljies, was sent out by his majesty with orders to bring them back to their allegiance, and executed the commission with characteristic duplicity, by fostering the insurrection instead of suppressing it. He was in fact one of the parties aggrieved, or as the envoy expressed it, "at the bottom of the whole conspiracy." The effect of negotiation was then attempted, and a treaty was actually framed, by which the Ghiljies obtained a concession of all their demands. This mode of patching up a peace was only a premium on insurrection, and soon proved its futility. While the chiefs professed submission, their followers continued in arms, and carrying on their predatory warfare, made it at length obvious that nothing but force would be effectual. On the 9th of October Sale's brigade started from Cabool, and proceeded about four miles south-east to Boothauk. On the 12th two regiments, her Majesty's 13th and the 35th native infantry, with two guns, moved forward to Khoord Cabool, and prepared to force the pass of that name, which consists of a narrow defile, hemmed in by high and rugged rocks. The enemy stood prepared to dispute the entrance. They were few in number, but so completely sheltered by their position, that they remained secure, while they coolly shot down all who came within range of their muskets. In this way they picked off sixty-seven men, and wounded Sale himself, by a ball which entered his left leg, near the ankle, shivering the small bone. The pass was

A D 1841.

New Ghiljie
insurrectionExpedition
of Sale to
suppress it.

A.D. 1841

New Ghiljee
Insurrection.

however forced, and the 35th, under Colonel Monteath, took up an advanced position, while the 13th, as previously arranged, fell back again on Boothauk. While Sale waited here for reinforcements, Monteath reported that a night attack had been made on his position at Khoord Cabool. On this occasion the Ghiljies mustered far stronger than before, and maintained the contest with so much obstinacy and so many advantages in their favour, as to inflict a severe loss, aggravated by the treachery of the Shah's Afghan horse, who instead of defending their lines, admitted the enemy within them, and gave them an opportunity of carrying off a number of camels.

Lost sus-
tained by
the British

Sir Robert Sale when reinforced hastened forward from Boothauk, and again entering the Khoord Cabool Pass, proceeded without encountering serious opposition to Jugdulluk. The real struggle now commenced. The enemy, advantageously posted on the adjoining heights, opened a destructive fire, which could not be effectually returned, and in the face of which it would have been destruction to advance. The only alternative was to send out flanking parties, which clambered up the heights and dislodged the assailants, while a party under Captain Wilkinson, profiting by this diversion, pushed through the defile. Fortunately the enemy, though they had erected breastworks in many places, had, perhaps from over-confidence, left the main outlet unguarded. The march therefore was resumed, and Gundamak was reached, though not without a severe loss of lives and the abandonment of much camp equipage. Among the killed was Captain Windham of the 35th native infantry, who lost his life in performing an act of humanity. The enemy, having broken in upon the rear-guard and thrown it into confusion, was in full pursuit, when Windham, already lame from a hurt, dismounted to give a place on his charger to a wounded soldier. By this delay, and the slackening of the animal's pace by a double load, he was unable to keep up with the other fugitives, and on seeing escape to be impossible, turned round, faced his pursuers, and fell fighting like a hero.

Delusive
views of
tranquillity

While war was thus raging, and disturbances had actually broken out or were threatened in other quarters, the envoy was still dreaming of tranquillity, and even expressed a hope that the formidable attack made on Sale's brigade was "the expiring effort of the rebels." He was not alone in his delusion. It was shared in both by Sir Alexander Burnes and General Elphinstone, though there can now be little doubt that they were less guided by their judgments than blinded by their wishes. General Elphinstone, broken down in constitution, and perhaps also not without misgivings as to his fitness for command, had resigned, and with his face turned anxiously homewards was longing for the arrival of General Nott, who, as senior officer, was to take his place. Sir William Macnaghten, as a reward for the services which he was supposed to have rendered, had been appointed governor of Bombay, and was fretted by every new occurrence which delayed his departure; and Sir Alexander Burnes, who had long been indignant at the kind of nondescript position assigned him at Cabool, had

gained the great object of his ambition, and was, immediately on Sir William Macnaghten's departure, to enter on the full and uncontrolled discharge of the duties of envoy and minister. To all these officials, therefore, the first thing necessary was a tranquillity which, though more apparent than real, might suffice to justify the completion of the new arrangements. Under these circumstances it is easy to understand how, when warning was given of a gathering storm, they continued to see only a few passing clouds. The departure of Sale's brigade, depriving Cabool of a large portion of its defenders, has been already noticed. With similar infatuation, orders had been given to General Nott to send off a considerable number of his troops to Hindoostan, and three native regiments, together with the Bengal artillery, had actually started, when alarming tidings from Cabool rendered it necessary to recall them. The revolution had now commenced in earnest, and the whole country had risen to retaliate on the invaders, who had according to the idea of the inhabitants polluted their soil, and were merely employing Shah Shujah as a tool to secure their own usurpation. Before proceeding with the details, it will be necessary to give a brief description of the city of Cabool, and of the British positions within it and in its vicinity.

A D. 1841.

Delusive
views as to
tranquillity
of Afghan
istan.

Cabool stands at the western extremity of an extensive plain about 6000 feet above the level of the sea. Notwithstanding this elevation, the latitude, which is only 34° north, gives a most delightful climate in summer, and more especially in autumn, when heavy crops of grain are reaped, and all the fruits of the temperate zone obtained in an abundance and of an excellence not surpassed in any other quarter of the world. In proportion however to the genial, though sometimes oppressive heats of summer, are the rigours of winter, which extends from October to March, and during which storms are frequent and snow covers the ground to the depth of several feet. At all seasons earthquakes, sometimes of a very destructive character, occur. The river of Cabool, shallow, clear, and rapid, pursuing its course eastward to join the Indus, passes in front of the city, which is approached across it by three bridges; while a canal, which draws its water from the river and has a direction nearly parallel to it, furnishes the means of irrigation to numerous beautiful gardens and productive orchards. Though described as a plain, the ground in the vicinity of Cabool is very much broken. In particular two ranges of hills, converging till they leave only a narrow defile between them, form a kind of semicircle which incloses the city on three sides. Advantage has been taken of these heights to form a line of battlements, which are carried round so as to form a complete inclosure, but are so unsubstantially and injudiciously constructed as to furnish a very feeble defence. Better protection was given by the Bala Hissar, which was at once a royal palace and a citadel. Occupying the acclivity of a hill on the south-east extremity of the city, it completely overlooked it, and was thus equally well fitted to repel the attack of an enemy or put down internal insurrection. It formed

The city of
Cabool.

A.D. 1841

The Bala
Hissar,
Cabool

an irregular pentagon, and contained within its precincts, in addition to the buildings of the palace, about a thousand houses. It was thus ample enough to accommodate a considerable force, and from its elevation, wide ditch, and ramparts, strong enough, if suitably garrisoned, to resist any attack by troops unacquainted with siege operations. Hence Havelock, after briefly describing its advantages, and, it may be, from foreboding the kind of service in which the troops left in Afghanistan might be called to engage, exclaims—"Here then all depends, in a military point of view, on a firm hold of the Bala Hissar. It is the key of Cabool. The troops who hold it ought not to allow themselves to be dislodged but by a siege, and they must awe its population with their mortars and howitzers." Within the city itself there was little deserving of



THE BAZAAR, CABOOL, DURING THE FAIR SEASON.—From Atkinson's Sketches in Afghanistan.

It shows how
the streets of
the city

notice except the bazaars and markets, the former starting from a central square and extending at right angles in a series of arcades, and the latter deriving their chief attraction from the magnificent display of vegetables and fruits. The houses, for the most part of two or three stories and flat-roofed, consisted of a framework of wood interlacing and inclosing walls of mud; and the streets, many of them so narrow that two horsemen could not pass without difficulty, were badly paved, crooked, and dirty in the extreme. In thus huddling the streets together the only advantage gained was in the additional security it gave against a hostile assault, and the same object had undoubtedly been contemplated in the division of the whole town into districts, each occupied by its own particular tribe or division of inhabitants, and isolated from the other districts by its own inclosure and gates. The whole population was estimated at about 60,000.

The Bala Hissar was, as we have seen, the key of Cabool, and the secure

possession of it was therefore one of the first objects to which attention was turned in providing for the British occupation of the capital. Lieutenant Durand of the engineers being employed to select the proper station for locating the troops, at once fixed on the upper part or citadel of the Bala Hissar, but encountered an opposition which ultimately proved insurmountable. "The Bala Hissar," said Shah Shujah, "was his palace, and its privacy would be completely destroyed by allowing any portion of it to be occupied as British barracks." The envoy gave effect to these objections, and Durand was ordered to provide accommodation elsewhere. This however was no easy task, and the envoy, on its being represented to him that the winter would set in before it would be possible to execute the necessary erections, succeeded in obtaining the Shah's consent to the original proposal of accommodating the troops in the citadel. On the faith of this consent the necessary repairs were commenced, and the British troops had the prospect of soon occupying a position so strong by nature, and so much improved by art, that no Afghan force could have made any impression upon it. But this was too wise an arrangement to be carried out. No sooner was the execution of it seriously commenced than the Shah once more interfered, and in addition to his former objections declared that the occupation of any part of the Bala Hissar by a foreign force would make him unpopular with his subjects. This objection being the one to which of all others the envoy was most sensible, prevailed. The barracks, so far as constructed within the citadel of the Bala Hissar, were appropriated by the Shah for the accommodation of his harem, while the British troops were obliged to content themselves with hastily prepared lodgings at its base. In this locality they passed the winter of 1839-40, while the Shah and his court were at Jelalabad. Though far inferior to the locality originally fixed upon, the position adopted was not without its advantages. It commanded the access to the Bala Hissar, and made it easy should any alarm occur to occupy it effectually. Unfortunately even this advantage was not to be retained, and finally, but at whose instigation it is difficult to say, it was resolved to erect cantonments on a spot now universally acknowledged to be the worst that could have been chosen. This was a flat situated about two miles and a half to the north of Cabool, and nearly equidistant from the Bala Hissar at its eastern, and the Kuzzilbash quarter at its western extremity. The cantonments, consisting of long ranges of buildings, formed a parallelogram about 1200 yards long from north to south, and 600 yards wide from east to west. On the west they were bounded by the Kohistan road, which leads nearly due south to one of the principal city gates. The east side of the parallelogram was about 250 yards from the canal already mentioned, while about 300 yards farther east ran the river of Cabool. The defences of the cantonments consisted of a shallow ditch and feeble ramparts, together with a round bastion at each of the angles. Immediately north of the cantonments were two considerable inclosures ~~enclosed~~ merely by a wall.

A.D. 1841.
Proposal to accommodate the British troops in the Bala Hissar.

Its rejection.

Cantonments erected.

A D 1841

British cantonments at Caboul.

The larger and nearer of the two was the mission compound or residency; the other was chiefly occupied by the dwellings of officers, clerks, and other individuals attached to the mission. In the space allotted to the cantonments, there must have been ample accommodation not only for the troops but for the commissariat stores. But with an infatuation which looks like judicial blindness, the stores were excluded and placed in an isolated fort situated without the cantonments, about 300 yards north of their south-west angle, and separated from them by a garden or orchard, which in the case of an attack would give cover to the assailants. Nor was this the worst. The whole of the cantonments were commanded from various heights, several of them with forts, which had neither been made strong enough to furnish a kind of outworks for defence, nor dismantled so as to be unavailable to an enemy. Beside the cantonments, a small camp under the command of Brigadier Skelton, the second in command, had been established about two miles to the east, beyond a low range of heights called the Seeah Sung Hills, and for the purpose of keeping open the road to it bridges had been thrown across both the canal and the river. The only other posts which it is necessary to notice are the Bala Hissar, almost entirely occupied by the Shah's troops under the command of Brigadier Anquetil, and the residence of Sir Alexander Burnes, where a small body of sepoys acted as his escort and also guarded the treasury under the charge of Captain Johnson, the paymaster. At an earlier period the money had for safety been removed to the Bala Hissar, but the paymaster found the distance inconvenient, and on application was at once permitted to bring the treasure back into the town, and keep it as before at his own house, the envoy dashing off his permission, as if the subject had been beneath his cognizance, by a simple hurried remark:—"Johnson may, of course, put his treasure wherever he deems it most safe and convenient." The sum thus coolly bandied about without any precaution for its security amounted at this time to seven lacs of rupees (£70,000).

British sepoys in Afghanistan

The cantonments were completed in the autumn of 1840, and the British troops had passed the winter of 1840-41 in them in tolerable comfort. The sepoys indeed suffered severely from the intense cold, and the hospital soon became crowded with patients suffering from pulmonary affections. To the British, on the other hand, and more especially those of them who had long endured the scorching heats and deluging rains of India, nothing could be more grateful than the return of the seasons in the order to which they had been accustomed in their own native land, and though an excessive rise in prices necessarily curtailed them of many of their comforts and luxuries, they were able to pass their leisure pleasantly. Cricket, fishing, shooting, hunting, and horse-racing gave to the most active and robust their full share of bodily exertion; while the more sedate found endless sources of interest and instruction in acclimatizing plants, and trying how far it was possible to combine the luxuries of an Afghan with the more substantial productions of an European garden. It is not to be

denied that some, not satisfied with such pleasures, mingled with them or substituted for them others of a very different description. Licentiousness, instead of being confined to those unfortunates whom depraved custom regards as its legitimate victims, was too often emboldened to violate the domestic hearth and seek its indulgence within the very precincts of the harem. More than one chief, aware of having thus suffered in his happiness and honour, burned for revenge, and was not to be satisfied with anything short of the extermination of the infidel Feringhees. It would be wrong, however, to attach much importance to this feeling. Though it did exist, and not without a cause, it is to be hoped that licentiousness continued to the last to be a very partial exception to the generally good deportment of the British troops, and that when disaster did befall them, it was not in retribution for their own private vices but for the gross mismanagement of those to whom their welfare was intrusted, and the tyranny and injustice which lay at the foundation of the whole British policy in Afghanistan.

A.D. 1841.

Licentiousness in the British army



SIR W. H. MACNAGHTEN, BART.
From Lieutenant F. Eyre's Prison Sketches.

Though a crisis had long been foreseen by those who, looking below the surface, saw the causes which were working to produce it, all the leading authorities, civil and military, continued as it were spell-bound. General Elphinstone looking fondly forward, saw himself proceeding quietly under escort for the British frontier; Sir William Macnaghten had nearly completed the packing preparatory to his departure; and Sir Alexander Burnes felt so satisfied with the higher position on which he was about to enter, that on the evening of the 1st of November he did not hesitate to congratulate the envoy on his "approaching departure at a season of such profound tranquillity." Could he be serious? Some days previously the moonshee Mohun Lal, of whose intelligence and fidelity there was no doubt, had informed him of a general confederacy among the Afghan chiefs, and emphatically warned him against the danger of disregarding the threatening indications of a coming storm; and again, on the evening of that very day when he congratulated the envoy, the same individual called upon him with new proofs of the plots which the chiefs were engaged in hatching. The impression produced upon Burnes is explained very vaguely, but the account is that "he stood up from his chair, sighed, and said that the time was not far when we must leave this country." Another part of the account is, "that he did not choose to ask the envoy for a strong

Dreams of tranquillity

guard, as it would imply that he was afraid," and his determination, therefore, seems to have been to run all hazards. The notice of warnings seemed at last only to irritate him, and he actually turned out the son of Gholam Mahomed Khan, a leading Dooranee chief, who went by night to inform him of the plot, adding rudely and superciliously, that "we do not care for such things."

1 D 1831.
Suspensions
of a plot

The plot, of which information was thus with strange infatuation rejected, was now approaching its execution. The Afghan chiefs had assembled, and were concerting measures for the destruction of the British troops. The course which seemed most hopeful, was to work upon the prejudices and passions of the people, by circulating among them extravagant rumours. "The principal rebels," wrote Sir William Macnaghten in a letter, of which a fragment only remains, "met on the night before, and relying on the inflammable disposition of the people of Cabool, they gave out that it was the order of his majesty to put all infidels to death, and this of course gained them a great accession of strength." The accuracy of this statement is questionable. It proceeds on the supposition that the Shah was popular in Cabool, and that his name was, to the party who fraudulently used it, a tower of strength. Independently of the extravagance of the rumour that he had issued orders for the destruction of those on whom the stability of his own throne entirely depended, it is impossible to believe that the circulation of it gave what the envoy calls "a great accession of strength" to the insurgents. They were playing, in fact, a very different game, and their great object was to rid themselves at once of foreign aggression and of the obnoxious ruler whom it had imposed upon them. But though a general confederacy having this object had undoubtedly been formed, it has been questioned whether the actual outbreak was the result of a previously concerted plan. The time was certainly ill chosen. By waiting for a few days a large portion of the troops in Afghanistan under orders for India would have departed and been beyond recall, whereas by premature action much additional risk of failure was incurred. The account of a meeting held by the chiefs, though somewhat meagre, seems to show that the outbreak, at least at its commencement, was dictated as much by private revenge as by public resentment.

Infidelious
proceedings
of Burnes

Abdoollah Khan, who, on the restoration of the Shah, had been deprived of his chiefship, not satisfied with complaining loudly of the injustice, was at little pains to conceal his hostility, and lost no opportunity of intriguing against British interests. Burnes, made aware of his proceedings, sent him a blustering message, stuffed with opprobrious epithets, and threatening to deprive him of his ears. Abdoollah Khan, now complaining both of insult and injustice, threw off all restraint, and at a meeting of chiefs, held on the 1st of November at the house of Sydat Khan, took the lead in proposing an attack on the house of Burnes on the following day. The design undoubtedly was to assassinate every individual who should be found on the premises. While Burnes' fate was thus sealed, warnings which, duly improved, would have secured his escape

were again given him. A friendly native eager to save him called at his residence before daylight, but had the mortification to see his statement received with incredulity. Shortly afterwards, when the insurgents had begun to muster, and the stir of their movement was heard in the street, Oosman Khan, the Shah's prime minister, arrived with tidings which it was no longer possible to dispute, and urged Burnes either to return with him to the Bala Hissar, or take refuge in the cantonments. He refused to do either, but was so far moved to a sense of danger that he applied to the envoy for additional troops, and also tried to conciliate Abdoolah Khan by a message assuring him, that if he would in the meantime restrain popular violence, all grievances would be redressed. Both applications proved ineffectual, and Burnes, together with all the inmates of his residence, were left to their fate. They were not indeed entirely destitute of means of defence. Besides himself, his brother Lieutenant Charles Burnes, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot, who had just arrived to act as his military secretary, there was the small body of sepoy forming his escort, and guarding the treasure deposited in Captain Johnson's house, immediately adjoining. Fortunately for himself the paymaster passed that night in the cantonments.

A D. 1841.

Conspiracy
against
Burnes


After a furious mob thirsting for blood and plunder had filled the street in front of the house, and precluded all access to it, Burnes, instead of allowing his sepoy to use their muskets, imagined that he could calm the tumult by a speech, and kept haranguing from the upper part of the house. It was utterly unavailing, and he became fully awake to the danger, when Lieutenant Broadfoot fell pierced by a ball through his chest. Resistance, which used earlier might have been effectual, was now seen to be hopeless. The insurgents had set fire to the stables, made their way into the garden, and were evidently preparing to force an entrance into the house. As a last resort he offered large sums of money for his own and his brother's life, and was only answered with the cry, "Come down into the garden." As this would have been to meet instant death, the sepoy opened their fire, and were resisting manfully, when a native of Cashmere, who had gained admission to the house, took an oath upon the Koran, that, if the firing was stopped, he would safely convey Burnes and his brother to the Kuzzilbash fort, situated about half a mile to the north-west, and then held by Captain Trevor, though with a very inadequate force. Distrustful though he must have been of this volunteered deliverance, it was a last chance, and Burnes disguised in native attire descended to the door. The moment he stepped beyond it, his treacherous guide gave the signal, by calling out, "This is Sekunder Burnes." In a moment both the brothers were in the hands of the infuriated mob, who literally cut them to pieces with Afghan knives. The sepoy now left without a head made a fruitless defence, and were all murdered, and with them every man, woman, and child found on the premises. The paymaster's guard shared the same fate, and all his

His house is
attackedHimself
and all the
inmates
murdered.

A D. 1841

Calculable
delays of
General
Elphinstone
and the
envoy.

ance. I immediately went to General Elphinstone." The general's account is:—"On the 2d of November, at half-past 7 A.M., I was told by Colonel Oliver that the city was in a great ferment, and shortly after the envoy came and told me that it was in a state of insurrection, but that he did not think much of it, and that it would shortly subside." It thus appears that the envoy and the general were in consultation on this subject about half-past 7 A.M. The former had been told "that the town of Cabool was in a state of commotion," and the latter "that the city was in a great ferment," and the common impression produced on the minds of both was that the insurrection "would shortly subside." This, to say the least, was taking the matter very coolly, and prepares us for what appears to have been their common conclusion, that there was no necessity for immediate despatch. The envoy indeed says, "I suggested that Brigadier



INTERIOR OF SHAH SHIKHAN'S PALACE, CABOOL.—From Rattray's *Costumes and Scenery of Afghanistan*.

Shelton's force should proceed to the Bala Hissar, thence to operate as might seem expedient; that the remaining troops should be concentrated in cantonments and placed in a state of defence, and assistance if possible sent to Sir A. Burnes." In this proposal the general appears to have readily acquiesced, but a long delay must have taken place, for he afterwards admits that Brigadier Shelton did not move into the Bala Hissar till "about 12 o'clock;" and adds with the greatest coolness, as if he had thus done all that could reasonably be expected—"the rest of the troops were concentrated in cantonments, which arrangements occupied the rest of the day." He says nothing of the assistance requested by Sir Alexander Burnes, as if the life of a valuable public servant, the lives of the men who were sharing his danger, and the threatened plunder of the army chest, were matters too trivial to occupy his thoughts. But even assuming that the detachment of Brigadier Shelton was the only thing that promised to be of any immediate utility, how came it that though the distance between the Seel

A.D. 1841.

Singular in-
decision of
General
Elphinstone

Sung camp and the Bala Hissar scarcely exceeded a mile it was not completed till mid-day? In the emergency which had arisen despatch was everything, and yet nearly four hours elapse between the resolution to send the troops and their actual departure. General Elphinstone indeed hints at one cause of delay, when he says that "the envoy sent his military secretary, Captain Lawrence, to intimate his wishes and obtain the king's sanction to this measure," and a fuller explanation is given by the brigadier. "Between nine and ten," he says, "I got a note from General Elphinstone reporting a disturbance in the city, and desiring me to prepare to march into the Bala Hissar . . . I soon after got another, telling me not to go as the king objected to it." The obvious reply to this countermand was, that "if there was an insurrection in the city, it was not a time for indecision, and that the measures adopted must be immediate." Having thus urged despatch, the brigadier received a third note telling him to march immediately into the Bala Hissar, when further instructions would be given him by the envoy's military secretary. Believing everything to be now arranged, he was just in the act of marching off when he received a note from the secretary telling him to halt for further orders. Perplexed at this new interruption, he despatched Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers, Sir Robert Sale's son-in-law, to ascertain the cause; but that officer, on entering the precincts of the palace, was attacked in the act of dismounting from his horse by an Afghan youth, who inflicted three severe wounds with a dagger, and from the confusion of the moment or through connivance was permitted to escape. Sturt's wounds happily proved of a less deadly nature than was at first feared, and he was carried back to the cantonments under a guard of fifty lancers, while the military secretary himself brought his own answer, which was "to proceed." As already mentioned, these repeated commands and countermands so frittered away the time, that Shelton did not reach the Bala Hissar till mid-day, and then only to see Campbell and his Hindoostanees fleeing in disorder before infuriated and triumphant Afghans.


Its fatal con-
sequences.

On perusing the above details, it is impossible to repress a feeling of indignation at the irresolute, we had almost said heartless, course adopted by the envoy and the general. The city is in an uproar, and three British officers, with a small body of troops, suddenly attacked by an infuriated mob, are fighting for their lives. They implore assistance, and the application is received at an hour sufficiently early to enable the authorities, civil and military, to take the necessary steps for that purpose. At first the only question is, by what route shall the troops be sent? and the answer is, from the Seeh Sung camp to the Bala Hissar. But here a preliminary difficulty is started. Will Shah Shujah give his consent? and should he refuse, would it not be a complete subversion of the Auckland and Macnaghten policy to have recourse even to friendly compulsion? On such frivolous grounds the order for the march of the troops is delayed, in order that an attempt may be made upon the stubborn

A D. 1841

Fatal results
of the inde-
cisive and
vacillating
proceedings
of General
Elphinstone

will of a monarch, who had been placed upon his throne by British bayonets, and could not have continued to sit upon it a single day if they had been withdrawn. Negotiation is commenced, messages pass and repass between the palace and the cantonments, and according to their tenor, the troops in readiness to march for the suppression of the riot and the relief of their unhappy companions in arms, are tantalized by contradictory orders to halt or to proceed. At last they reach the Bala Hissar, but only to be most ungraciously received by the Shah, who, says Shelton, "asked me as well as I could understand, who



- A, Cantonment.
- B, Mission residence
- D, Magazine fort (unfinished).
- E, Commissariat fort
- F, Mahomed Shureef's fort.
- G, Rukabashie fort.
- H, Mahomed Khan's fort
- I, Zulfiar's fort

- J, Camp at Seeah Sang
- K, King's garden.
- L, Muzend.
- M, Spot where the envoy was murdered.
- N, Private garden
- O, Bazaar
- P, Kohistan gate of city.

- Q, Empty fort near bridge
- R, Brigadier Anquetil's fort
- S, Magazine in orchard
- T, Yaboo Khanah
- V, Captain Trevor's tower
- W, Sir A. Burnes' house
- X, Lahore gate of city
- Z, Captain Johnson's treasury.

sent me, and what I came there for." There was perhaps more meaning in this insolent question than it bears on the face of it, for of what use was it to send troops after the mischief was already done? Had they arrived several hours earlier, as but for the irresolution which prevailed at head-quarters they might easily have done, they might, instead of merely saving a remnant of the discomfited Hindoostanee regiment, have acted in concert with it, and penetrating to Burnes' residence, dispersed the mob before the work of rapine and murder had commenced. Still as the day was only half-spent when Shelton reached the Bala Bissar, how came it that he did little more than remain a passive spectator of the progress of the insurrection? The envoy's answer is, that it had then become impracticable for a body of troops to penetrate to the neighbourhood of Burnes' house. Why impracticable? Obviously because another

A D 1842

serious blunder had been committed in not sending a force adequate to the service required from it.

Different
routes by
which relief
might have
been sent

In the Seeah Sung camp on the morning of the outbreak, there was only a portion of the troops belonging to it. The rest were within the cantonments. Why, when Brigadier Shelton received the order to march, were not the absentees sent forward to join their comrades? They could not be required for the defence of the cantonments, which were not then threatened, and within which nearly 4000 men must then have been concentrated; and their addition to the force under Brigadier Shelton might have enabled him, instead of remaining passive, to make at least a bold effort to accomplish the task which had been assigned him. Such an effort could hardly have failed of success, had it been seconded, as to all appearance it might and ought to have been, by a diversion from another quarter. General Elphinstone says that "the route by Seeah Sung to the Bala Hissar was considered the fittest to enter the city, but it was not the only route, nor, as far as one can judge from the plan, was it either the shortest or most practicable. The Kohistan road, along the east side of which the cantonments were constructed, leads in a line almost due south to one of the city gates. Had a body of the surplus troops cooped up within the cantonments been sent along the road, they could have arrived at the gate without difficulty. Passing it and proceeding onwards for about 500 yards, a point is reached where the road branches off to the right and left. Taking the latter direction by a road which crosses the river by a bridge, the distance to Burnes' house is little more than half a mile. Where was the impracticability of accomplishing this distance? Supposing Brigadier Shelton to have been at the same time prepared to act, the effect would have been to place the insurgents between two fires. Would they in this case have ventured on continued resistance? The undisciplined mob, seeing themselves about to be hemmed in between two strong bodies of regular troops, would have listened only to their fears and dispersed. Even in a less favourable view, the diversion from the cantonments might have been made subservient to several important objects. On the banks of the river, a short distance above the bridge already mentioned, there was a tower occupied by Captain Trevor with a mere handful of men. It was of some importance to retain possession of it, because being situated in the Kuzzilbash quarter, it would have been the means of keeping up a friendly communication with the inhabitants, who were understood to be better affected towards the British than any other part of the Afghan population. Advantage might have been taken of its proximity to throw in a reinforcement sufficient to secure it from capture. Another object, of still more importance, might have been at the same time gained. On the right branch of the road, about 500 yards beyond the fort already mentioned, stood a fort of large dimensions, in which temporary magazines had been erected for the use of the Shah's commissariat. The place, though not well chosen, was defensible,

Nothing of
consequence
attempted.

and the vital importance of defending it is apparent from the fact that on the 2d of November it contained about 8000 maunds of grain. Even admitting that no general diversion from the cantonments could have been attempted, surely the most strenuous efforts ought to have been made to save this fort from falling into the hands of the enemy. Yet nothing was done. Though it was well known that on the very morning of the outbreak it was furiously assailed by the inhabitants in its vicinity, and its few defenders, if unrelieved, must soon be overpowered, no steps were taken, or rather the only step taken was in an opposite direction. Captain Lawrence offered to lead two companies to its relief and was not permitted.

A.D. 1841.

Incompetency of the British authorities, civil and military.

Other proofs of the utter incompetency of the civil and military authorities to meet the storm which had burst upon them crowd upon us, but enough has been detailed. The only active step that appears to have been taken in addition to the abortive detachment of Brigadier Shelton to the Bala Hissar, was to send a handful of troops into the commissariat fort, and thus make the number of its defenders amount in all to eighty. Why such a reinforcement? The subsistence of the troops depended on the preservation of the commissariat fort, and it could not but be foreseen that it would in all probability be the very first point against which the efforts of the enemy would be most strenuously directed, and yet, though there was a whole day during which free access to it was uninterrupted, and it might have been so strongly garrisoned as to defy assault, nothing worth mentioning was done. Not only was it allowed to remain isolated as before, with a garden and orchard intervening, from the cover of which the insurgents might open a murderous fire, but no attempt whatever was made to occupy and dismantle the adjoining forts by which it was commanded. Could it be alleged that the commissariat fort was, from its unfortunate position, indefensible, still there was surely an alternative. If it was practicable on the 2d of November to send a paltry reinforcement to it, it must also have been practicable, if such a course had been deemed expedient, to prepare for its abandonment, by emptying it of the whole, or at least the most valuable part of its stores and bringing them within the cantonments. The penalty due for the series of gross blunders committed on the first day of the insurrection was not long delayed.

While the envoy and general, with singular infatuation, frittered away the time, and apparently despaired of being able to effect anything with the large body of troops under their immediate control, no time was lost in sending importunate messages, recalling the troops, which during the delusive interval previous to the insurrection had been permitted to commence their march for India. By thus applying for distant aid, which owing to the state of the country could not possibly have arrived before the crisis was decided, the authorities only practised deception upon themselves, and found excuses for not exerting their own energies to the utmost. The note sent to Candahar, con-

Applications for aid to Nott at Candahar

A D 1841

Ineffectual
application
read to
General
Nott

sisting of a small scrap of paper inclosed in a quill, though dated the 3d of November, did not reach General Nott till the 14th. It required him to "immediately direct the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindoostan, to march upon Cabool instead of Shikarpoor," and to "instruct the officer who may command, to use the utmost practicable expedition." He was moreover required "to attach a troop of his majesty the Shah's horse artillery to the above service, and likewise half the 1st regiment of cavalry." Fortunately, as we have already seen, he had on his own responsibility, in consequence of alarming news from Cabool, recalled the troops which he had despatched under the command of Colonel Maclaren, after they had made only a single march. So far, therefore, as he was concerned, there was nothing to prevent his compliance with the peremptory order to send them off immediately to Cabool. There were, however, obstacles which he believed to be insurmountable, though the authorities at Cabool did not seem to have taken them into consideration, and he therefore declared that in sending the troops, he was obeying his superiors at the expense of his own judgment. His reasons are thus given in a letter to his daughters:—"First, I think at this time of the year, they (the troops) *cannot* get there (Cabool), as the snow will probably be four or five feet deep between that place and Ghuznee; besides which it is likely they will have to fight every foot of the ground, from the latter to the former place; at any rate they will arrive in so crippled a state as to be *totally* unfit for service; secondly, they will be *five* weeks in getting there, before which everything will be settled one way or other; thirdly, could I have kept the troops here which left this morning, I could ultimately have preserved the whole of Afghanistan, whatever the result at Cabool may be, and now these troops can be of no use *there*, and their removal will, I fear, ruin us *here*, for the people to-day openly talk of attacking us." "How strange," he adds, "that, from the time we entered this country up to the present moment, we have never had a man of common sense or energy at the head of affairs." Nott had only too good reason for his representation of the disordered state of the country, for a very short time before Captain Woodburn, who was proceeding on sick leave to Cabool, was attacked by a party of rebels after leaving Ghuznee, and barbarously murdered; only six out of his whole escort of 130 souls escaping the same fate. His account of the climate also proved correct, for Colonel Maclaren, after a few days' march, lost so many of his cattle by frost and snow, and found his difficulties accumulating so fast, that he was glad to retrace his steps. Accordingly, as might have been foreseen, Cabool could obtain no relief from Candahar.

Similar
failure of an
application
to Sale

An application to Sir Robert Sale to return with his brigade was equally unavailing. The 37th regiment, left to guard the western entrance of the Khoord Cabool Pass, at once obeyed the summons, and made their appearance on the morning of the 3d on the Seeah Sung Hills. They had been obliged to contest almost every inch of their ground, but notwithstanding, greatly to the

credit of Major Griffiths who commanded, "they came in," says Lady Sale, "with all their baggage in as perfect order as if it had been a mere parade movement." This, however, was all the aid obtained. Before receiving the summons to recall Sir Robert Sale had quitted Gundamuck, and was advancing on Jelalabad. The kind of difficulties encountered will be best explained in his own words. "Since leaving Cabool, they (the troops) have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Tazeen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour, throwing up entrenchments, and very severe outpost duty; while each succeeding morning has brought its affair with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with jezails which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery." Anxious, therefore, though he must have been to return to Cabool, where his wife and daughter were sharing the common danger, he declared it to be impossible, for the following reasons:—"I beg to represent that the whole of my camp equipage has been destroyed; that the wounded and sick have increased to upwards of three hundred; that there is no longer a single depôt of provisions on the route, and the carriage of the force is not sufficient to bring on one day's rations with it. I have at the same time positive information that the whole country is in arms and ready to oppose us in the defiles between this city and Cabool, while my ammunition is insufficient for more than two such contests, as I should assuredly have to sustain for six days at least. With my present means I could not force the passes of either Jugduluck or Khoord Cabool; and even if the *debris* of my brigade did reach Cabool, I am given to understand that I should find the troops now garrisoning it without the means of subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for the honour and interest of our government compels me to adhere to my plan already formed, of putting this place (Jelalabad) into a state of defence, and holding it if possible until the Cabool force falls back upon me, or succours arrive from Peshawer or India."

A D. 1841.

Sir Robert Sale unable to afford troops at Cabool any assistance

Having disposed of the applications for aid, and the answers, which from the length of time that intervened, have somewhat anticipated the narrative, we now return to Cabool, and begin with the insertion of a letter addressed to the envoy by General Elphinstone, on the evening of the 2d November, the very first day of the outbreak. "Since you left me I have been considering what can be done to-morrow. Our dilemma is a difficult one. Shelton, if reinforced to-morrow, might no doubt force in two columns on his way towards the Lahore gate, and we might from hence force in that gate and meet them. But if this were accomplished what shall we gain? It can be done, but not without very great loss, as our people will be exposed to the fire from the houses the whole way. Where is the point you said they were to fortify near

General Elphinstone conjures up difficulties.

A D 1811

Miserable
indecision
of General
Elphinstone

Burnes' house? If they could assemble there that would be a point of attack; but to march into the town, it seems, we should only have to come back again; and as to setting the city on fire, I fear from its construction that is almost impossible. We must see what morning brings, and then think what can be done. The occupation of all the houses near the gates might give us a command of the town, but we have not means of extended operations. If we could depend on the Kuzzilbashes, we might easily reduce the city." In this very characteristic letter the writer makes a series of proposals, which if practicable on the morrow when the insurrection had gained head, must have been still more so on the day previous; but instead of deciding on any one of them he merely plays at hide-and-seek with them, and then goes to bed with the sage resolution to trust to the chapter of accidents. "We must see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done." The morning came, and with it, as might have been anticipated, a vast increase of the insurgents. Thousands, whom excess of caution had previously kept aloof, now openly declared themselves, while multitudes, hearing of the plunder which had already been obtained, poured in from the neighbouring villages in the hope of obtaining a share. The Kohistan road, along which troops might have passed with little obstruction on the 2d, was now completely beset, and every step believed to be taken in the face of infuriated and exulting foes. The interval of a night had brought no additional clearness of perception or energy of purpose to the general and the envoy, and instead of boldly fronting the difficulties which their own imbecility had mainly created, they cowered before them. It was not till three in the afternoon of the 3d that any attempt was made to penetrate from the cantonments into the city. It proceeded upon the plan, which had already proved abortive, of attempting to accomplish the most important objects by inadequate means, and resulted in a complete failure. The whole force employed consisted of one company of her Majesty's 44th regiment, two companies of the 5th native infantry, and two horse-artillery guns. Major Swayne, who commanded, encountering an opposition which convinced him that success was impossible, had no alternative but to retrace his steps. Besides the gross blunder of sending out so feeble a detachment, no care had been taken to secure co-operation and support from the Bala Hissar. There was still time after this first repulse to correct the blunders which led to it, and make a new attempt under more auspicious circumstances, but a feeling of despondency was already beginning to prevail, and General Elphinstone once more resolved to wait till he should "see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done." Meanwhile, though he was supine, the insurgents were not. Captain Trevor, obliged to abandon his tower, was indebted to some friendly natives for the means of removing his wife and seven children to the cantonments; and Captain Mackenzie, who commanded at the Shah's commissariat, after keeping the enemy at bay for two whole days, and sending importunate but unavailing

His employ-
ment of
inadequate
means

messages for support, was compelled to quit his post as untenable, and happily succeeded in making an almost miraculous escape. The fort, of course, with all its stores fell into the hands of the insurgents. - A D 1841.

This was to be succeeded by a similar but still more serious disaster. The insurgents were now bent on capturing the British commissariat fort, and were pusillanimously allowed to avail themselves of every facility to insure success. The commissariat fort, situated about 300 yards south of the south-west bastion of the cantonments, was completely commanded by another called Mahomed Shureef's fort, which occupied a height on the opposite side of the Kohistanee road. This fort, which from its position could direct its fire equally against the commissariat fort and the cantonments, being not more than 300 yards north-west of the former, and 200 yards south-west of the latter, was crowded with the enemy, who were allowed to ply their jezails and matchlocks from its walls with deadly aim, while no attempt was made to dislodge them. Thus encouraged they ventured down into the lower ground and took undisputed possession of the intervening garden. Meanwhile that fort, thus beleaguered, and though containing the provisions and medical stores of the whole army, was held by a party which, according to Lady Sale, amounted only to fifty, and certainly fell far short of a hundred. Lieutenant Warren, the officer in command, wrote that he was reduced to extremity; that his men were deserting him; that the enemy were mining the walls and preparing for escalade; and that it would be impossible for him to hold out unless reinforced. On receiving this letter, what was General Elphinstone's resolution? One which nothing but dotage could have dictated. It was not to reinforce Lieutenant Warren, but to detach a party of infantry and cavalry, by whose aid he might be able to evacuate the place. On hearing of this insane proposal, Captains Boyd and Johnson, the respective heads of the British and the Shah's commissariat, waited upon the general, and pointed out that if the supplies were captured the destruction of the whole force would become almost inevitable. The remonstrance seemed to be effectual, and a vigorous attempt to reinforce the fort was promised. It was promised, but never performed. The general, who had no confidence in his own judgment, looked round helplessly for advice, and having found counsellors as ignorant or imbecile as himself, did nothing. In an earlier part of the day a paltry reinforcement of two companies of the 41th regiment had been driven back with serious loss, including that of Captains Swayne and Robinson, who were shot dead on the spot; in the afternoon a party of the 5th cavalry, designed to assist in the mad scheme of evacuation, suffered still more severely. Was not this proof that nothing more could be done, and that it only remained to do on the 4th as had been done on the 2d and 3d—"see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done?"

Such appears to have been General Elphinstone's final resolution, but the self-complacency with which he regarded it must have been somewhat disturbed

Progress of
Insurrection
at Cabool.

Blunder
upon
blunder.

A.D. 1811

The British
commissariat
fort
capturedDisgraceful
retreat
night

when the commissariat officers, seeing that the promise given them had not been kept, entered his presence and once more pointed out the absolute necessity of maintaining the commissariat fort at all hazards. He at once assented, and was even willing, as a preliminary measure, to take possession of Mahomed Shureef's fort. Captain Boyd, delighted at the result of the interview, volunteered to carry the powder to blow in the gate, and he and his commissariat colleague retired about midnight, under the impression that the capture of the one fort, and the relief of the other, would be immediately undertaken. This impression was all the stronger, because during the interview a new and most urgent application from Lieutenant Warren had been officially answered by a note, which assured him that he should receive reinforcements by two o'clock in the morning. Nay, as if to make it impossible to doubt that the promised aid would certainly be forthcoming we learn from General Elphinstone's own report that tools were "sent overnight" with a view to the introduction of reinforcements, and the withdrawal of supplies from the store. Though monstrous, it is true that the general again changed his mind, and had nothing to say in justification, except that the proceeding involved too much risk. The garrison, deceived in their expectation of support, and in danger of being every moment overpowered by the enemy, who had actually attempted to fire the gate and escalade, used the tools which had been sent for a very different purpose—in digging a hole from the interior, and through it made their escape. The scene presented by the captured fort is thus described by Captain Johnson:—"The Godown fort was this day something similar to a large ant's nest. Ere noon thousands and thousands had assembled from far and wide, to participate in the booty of the English dogs, each man taking with him as much as he could carry—and to this we were all eye-witnesses." Even Shah Shujah, looking down from the battlements of the Bala Hissar in amazement and consternation at this extraordinary scene, could not help exclaiming, "Surely the English are mad!" The soldiers were of course indignant when their means both of subsistence and relief in distress were thus ignominiously carried off, and called to be led against the contemptible enemy, who were parading their spoils before their very faces. The general, however reluctant, was unable to resist the call thus made upon him, and within three hours of the loss was dreaming of repairing it by an attempt to storm Mahomed Shureef's fort. In a note to the envoy, dated 5th November, 5 A.M., he thus announced his intention:—"We will first try to breach the place, and shell it as well as we can. From information I have received respecting the interior of the fort, it seems the centre, like our old bazaar (another fort only about a hundred yards from the cantonments), is filled with buildings; therefore if we succeed in blowing open the gate, we should only be exposed to a destructive fire from the buildings, which from the state of preparation they evince, would no doubt be occupied in force, supported from the garden. Carrying powder bags up under fire

would have a chance of failure. Our men have been all night in the works, and tired and ill fed, but we must hope for the best." He thus conjures up a host of difficulties which seem to make the attempt almost desperate, and then when the moment of action arrives, instead of proportioning the force to the duty imposed upon it, sends out only fifty men of the 44th, and 200 native infantry. Apparently anticipating failure, he stands in the gateway of the cantonments as if to be the first to announce it, and takes advantage of the first blunder to recall the detachment. The attack must indeed have been forced upon him, for there is proof that he had already begun to meditate a very different mode of deliverance.

A.D. 1841.

Mismanage-
ment of
General
Elphinstone.

In the above letter of General Elphinstone, addressed to the envoy, early in the morning of the 5th November, the following passage occurs:—"It behoves us to look to the consequences of failure; in this case I know not how we are to subsist, or, from want of provisions, to retreat. You should therefore consider what chance there is of making terms, if we are driven to this extremity." If such was his language on the very third day of the insurrection, what was henceforth to be expected but disgrace and ruin in their most hideous forms? He had an army which, handled by such men as Sale and Nott, would have sufficed to clear the district of every rebel Afghan who dared to show his face, and he keeps it cooped up within cantonments, timidly whimpering about difficulties, till he has broken the spirit of his men, taught them to dread an enemy whom they previously despised, and thus prepared them for every species of humiliation. On the following day, writing as before to the envoy, he recurs to the subject which was now evidently uppermost in his mind, and as if the resolution to treat had been already taken, seems only anxious that the negotiations should not be protracted. This was the more inexcusable, as on this very day (the 6th) the prospect had improved. Captains Boyd and Johnson had exerted themselves to the utmost to compensate for the loss of the commissariat stores, and with so much success, by extensive purchases in the neighbouring villages, that the danger of starvation was no longer imminent. Nor was this the only success which crowned the labours of this day. Mahomed Shureef's fort, which had been the subject of so much discussion, and the scene even of some disgraceful repulses, was taken at last in a manner which showed that had a proper spirit been evinced at the outset, the insurrection might have been put down before it assumed the character of a great national movement. After Lieutenant Sturt had so far recovered from his wounds as to be again fit for duty, he obtained permission to open upon the fort with three nine-pounders, and two twenty-four pounder howitzers. By twelve o'clock an excellent breach was effected, and the assault was made with so much impetuosity that the enemy, after a short resistance, abandoned the place. Lieutenant Raban of the 44th, while waving his sword on the highest point of the breach, which he had been the first to mount, was unfortunately killed, and

He begins to
talk of terms.A partial
success.

A D 1841

Partial success
of the
BritishGeneral
Diplomacy
shows a
groundless
fear

with him other eighteen of the assailants, besides several wounded; but the troops had been so long strangers to success that general joy was diffused, and at the request of the envoy, who was anxious to show that valour would not go unrewarded, a sepoy private who had distinguished himself was immediately promoted to the rank of sergeant. Before the enemy recovered from their consternation, two gallant charges were made, the one by a party of Anderson's horse, who rode straight up the ridge on the right, and the other by the 5th cavalry, who made a similar attack on the left. The effect was to hem the enemy in between the two corps, and give an opportunity of forcing them to a general action under circumstances so unfavourable that their defeat must have been almost certain. The idea of a victory, however, was so far beyond the highest aspirations of the general, that he once more sat down to address the envoy in language which could not have been more desponding if he had sustained another signal defeat. "We have temporarily, and I hope permanently, got over the difficulty of provisions. Our next consideration is ammunition, a very serious and indeed awful one. We have expended a great quantity; therefore it becomes worthy of thought on your part how desirable it is that our operations should not be protracted by anything in treating that might tend to a continuance of the present state of things. Do not suppose from this I wish to recommend, or am advocating humiliating terms, or such as would reflect disgrace on us; but this fact of ammunition must not be lost sight of." At this time the ammunition in store was sufficient to last twelve months, and therefore alarm in regard to it was utterly groundless. Yet on this creation of his own brain he urges upon the envoy the hasty conclusion of a treaty which, though he disclaims it in words, he could not but be well aware must be "humiliating," and "such as would reflect disgrace on us." As if he had not made his fears sufficiently palpable, he added the following lugubrious postscript:—"Our case is not yet desperate; I do not mean to impress that; but it must be borne in mind that it goes very fast." The words are so enigmatical that it is difficult to decipher their meaning. According to grammatical structure it is the "case" that was going very fast, but not improbably he was only calling the envoy's attention once more to the alleged deficiency of ammunition. After all, whatever be the interpretation adopted, the gist of the warning was, "We are in a dilemma from which there is no hope of escape by honourable and manly means. Fighting is of no use. Try diplomacy, and do not stand upon punctilios, for if it fails our case is desperate."

Sir William Macnaghten was only too much disposed to adopt the course thus recommended. He had often found money succeed when all other resources failed, and he therefore began to try what could be effected by distributing it with a liberal hand. He could not indeed hope to conciliate all the chiefs by this vulgar process, and he therefore resolved to employ it for the purpose of sowing dissension among them, and thus breaking up their confeder-

ney. It was well known that, though at present leagued in a common cause, mutual jealousies and suspicions abounded among them. In particular the Kuzzilbash or Persian party, separated as Shiites from the other inhabitants of Afghanistan, who were bigoted Soonees, dreaded the tyranny which the latter might exercise over them if the British were expelled, and thus furnished the envoy with an opportunity of giving his Machiavellian policy a full trial. The very agent fitted for the purpose had been accidentally provided. Mohun Lal, the moonshee of Sir Alexander Burnes, had saved his life when his master was murdered, by taking shelter under the garment of a Kuzzilbash chief of the name of Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Another still more influential chief of the same party, Khan Shereen Khan, had afterwards taken him under his protection, and he was residing with him on the 7th of November, when the envoy, following up a correspondence which had been previously commenced, wrote authorizing him to assure his friends Khan Shereen Khan and Mahomed Kumye, that if they performed the service, the payment would certainly be forthcoming, £10,000 to the former, and £5000 to the latter, "besides getting the present and everything else they require." In the same letter he added, "I hope that you will encourage Mahomed Yar Khan, the rival of Ameer-oolah; assure him that he shall receive the chiefship, and all the assistance necessary to enable him to support it. You may give promises in my name to the extent of 500,000 rupees (£50,000.)" The nature of the service expected is not here explained, but light is thrown upon it by a letter, written two days before to Mohun Lal, by Lieutenant John Conolly, who, though then with the Shah in the Bala Hissar, was the envoy's nephew and assistant, and in constant communication with him. Conolly's letter contained the following passages:—"You can promise one lac of rupees to Khan Shereen, on the condition of his killing and seizing the rebels, and arming all the Seeahs, and immediately attacking all rebels." "Hold out promises of reward and money; write to me very frequently. Tell the chiefs who are well disposed to send respectable agents to the envoy. Try and spread 'nifuk' (dissension) among the rebels." "P.S. I promise 10,000 rupees for the head of each of the principal rebel chiefs."

A.D. 1841.
The envoy resorts to bribery.



MOHUN LAL.—From portrait prefixed to his Life of Dost Mahomed Khan.

Proposals of assassination.

On comparing the above two letters, the envoy's is seen to be the complement and confirmation of his assistant's. Mohun Lal, though he had no scruples as to the kind of employment given him, naturally desired the written authority

A.D. 1842

Proposals to
assassinate
the rebel
chiefs.

of the envoy himself, and he received it in the form of a guarantee that the lac promised through Conolly to Shereen Khan, for "killing and seizing the rebels," would be paid as soon as the work was done. So far, there is no room for doubt that the envoy and assistant perfectly understood each other and were acting in concert. Even the postscript of Conolly's letter, horrible though its purport undoubtedly is, is not so unlike some of the suggestions which the envoy was accustomed to throw out in moments of rage and despondency, as to make it improbable that he sanctioned Conolly's atrocious offer of £1000 for the head of each of the principal rebel chiefs. We have already seen the envoy, when in alarm at the movements of Dost Mahomed, seriously asking, "Would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head?" and between such a question, and the offer of blood-money, the difference is not so great as to make it incredible that the individual who proposed the one also sanctioned the other. What gives peculiar interest to the latter case is, that Conolly's offer was acted upon. Within a month Abdoollah Khan and Meer Musjedee, two chiefs who had been specially marked out as the first victims of assassination, were both dead, and under circumstances so suspicious, that the blood-money was actually claimed by the wretches hired to assassinate them, and was only evaded by an abominable subterfuge. Abdoollah Khan was wounded in battle, not however by a British musket, but by an Afghan jezail in the hands of one of Mohun Lal's hired assassins, who after dogging his steps aimed at him from behind a wall. The murderer, when it was thought the wound might not prove mortal, promised to complete the work by poison. So the story goes. However much its accuracy may be doubted, it is certain that the hired assassin Abdool Aziz claimed the price of blood, and Mohun Lal refused it on the ground that the head for which alone the money was to be paid, had not been brought him. The manner of Meer Musjedee's death is more obscure, but in his case also the price of blood was claimed by a hired assassin, who swore that he suffocated him in his sleep, and was only refused by Mohun Lal on the same disgraceful quibble as before. One would fain keep the envoy free from all connection with these atrocious proceedings, and it has not only been suggested that Conolly made his inhuman offer at the suggestion of Shah Shujah alone, but a letter has been produced in which the envoy, writing to Mohun Lal a few days after the murder of the two chiefs, said, "I am sorry to find from your letter of last night that you should have supposed it was ever my object to encourage assassination. The rebels are very wicked men, but we must not take unlawful means to destroy them." In passing judgment on the case, due weight should be given to this unequivocal disclaimer, for unfortunately the envoy had already too much to answer for, and he should not be burdened with an additional load of guilt, so long as it is possible to doubt whether he actually incurred it.

Did the
envoy asso-
ciate them?

While General Elphinstone was counselling submission, and the envoy was

endeavouring to put off the evil day by a lavish distribution of money, the insurrection continued to spread rapidly over the whole country, and leave the British troops at the different stations little more than the ground which they actually occupied. In Kohistan, where the party of Dost Mohamed had always mustered strong, the Ghoorka regiment posted at Charikur was furiously assailed and threatened with annihilation. Fortunately Eldred Pottinger, the hero of Herat, who was acting as political agent on the Turkistan frontier, occupied the castle of Lughmanee, only two miles distant, and succeeded after a desperate struggle in uniting his handful of troops to the Ghoorkas commanded by Captain Codrington. The crisis, however, had only now arrived. Large bodies of the enemy immediately surrounded the fortified barracks of Charikur, and continued to press on with so much determination, that an effort to dislodge them became absolutely necessary. For this purpose Pottinger, once more in the character of an artillery officer, moved out with a field-piece, and was almost immediately disabled by a musket-shot in the leg. Codrington was still more unfortunate. While gallantly heading his little band against a torrent of the enemy who were sweeping everything before them, he fell and was carried back mortally wounded. Only one alternative remained. The ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the soldiers, reduced to 200 fighting men, having emptied their last pool of water, were perishing with thirst. It was therefore resolved to evacuate Charikur, and endeavour by a rapid unencumbered march to reach Cabool. This resolution, dictated by despair, could hardly have been expected to succeed. On the very first march, all order was lost. Pottinger and Houghton, suffering from wounds, and believing that they could be of no further service, put spurs to their horses, and after many hair-breadth escapes reached the cantonments at Cabool. The retreating party, thus left, was immediately headed by Ensign Rose and the medical officer Dr. Grant, and struggled on till it reached Kardurrah. Here it was overwhelmed by a furious onset of the enemy and cut to pieces. Ensign Rose, who was among the slain, sold his life dearly, having killed four of the enemy with his own hand. Dr. Grant's fate was still more melancholy. After escaping from Kardurrah, he had arrived within three miles of the cantonments, when he was seized by some wood-cutters and barbarously murdered.

General Elphinstone had repeatedly applied to be relieved from a position for which he felt that he was not qualified. It is said indeed that he was sent out to India with a view to this very appointment. If so, it must have been in all probability of his own seeking. It was at once an honourable and a lucrative post, and he doubtless thought himself a most fortunate man when he was made commander-in-chief of the army of occupation beyond the Indus. A short trial, however, seems to have satisfied him that he was *not* in his right place, and he had not only the honesty to confess it, but had obtained permission on medical certificate to return to India. He had, as he expressed

A D. 1841.

Spread of the
insurrectionDisasters of
British
army.Infirmities
of General
Elphinstone.

A D 1841

Infirmities
of General
Elphinstone

it, been "unlucky in the state of his health." Fever and rheumatic gout had made him almost a cripple, and on the 2d of November, the first day of the outbreak, he had, as he himself relates, "a very severe fall—the horse falling upon him." This unfortunate accident, added to his other infirmities, seems to have completely shattered him in mind as well as body. His personal courage never appears to have failed him, but any clearness of thought and energy of purpose which he may at any time have possessed were entirely gone. Successive resolutions flitted across his mind like mere phantoms, and not unfrequently after long hours of consultation he would change all his arrangements on the casual remark or frivolous objection of some one of the most forward and least qualified of his counsellors. These defects were only too apparent. Even the common soldiers saw them, and murmured when they saw themselves in danger of being sacrificed through the incompetency of their commander. It was necessary therefore that some steps should be taken, though it was a matter of some delicacy. So long as General Elphinstone found himself capable of acting at all, he felt bound to retain his command till either General Nott, for whom he had written, or some other regularly appointed officer, should arrive to supersede him. The utmost therefore to which his consent could be obtained was to call in Brigadier Shelton as the second in command, and allow the heaviest and most active duties to be performed by him, as a kind of deputy-commander.

He shares
his com-
mand with
Brigadier
Shelton

Much being expected from this new arrangement, no time was lost in acting upon it, and Brigadier Shelton, about four on the morning of the 9th of November, received orders to quit the Bala Hissar and come into cantonments, with the Shah's 6th infantry and a six-pounder gun. He started in little more than two hours after, and as he himself says, "marched in broad daylight, without the enemy attempting to dispute my passage." This fact seems to indicate that it was necessary only to show a bold front in order to keep the enemy at bay, and clear the communication between the city and the cantonments. The brigadier's first impressions on arriving were anything but favourable. "I was cordially received," he says, "but could read anxiety in every countenance, and they had then only three days' provisions. I was sorry to find desponding conversations and remarks too generally indulged, and was more grieved to find the troops were dispirited." On going round the cantonments he "found them of frightful extent, with a rampart and ditch an Afghan could run over with the facility of a cat, with many other serious defects." The brigadier complains of the general indulgence of "desponding conversations and remarks," but it is to be feared that he was in this respect one of the principal offenders. He had seen much service, and was possessed of indomitable courage, but his harsh and ungracious manner made him unpopular with all classes, and his judgment was by no means so excellent as to justify the unbounded confidence which he himself placed in it.

Character of
Brigadier
Shelton.

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Question of
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to that of the 10th that the spirits of the troops were little revived by it, and the envoy, as if despairing of more honourable means, became more active than ever in plying his wily policy. The very next day John Conolly wrote to Mohun Lal as follows:—"There is a man called Hajee Ali, who might be induced by a bribe to try and bring in the heads of one or two of the *Musfids*. Endeavour to let him know that 10,000 rupees (£1000) will be given for each head, or even 15,000 rupees (£1500). I have written to him two or three times" And that Mohun Lal might be urged to greater exertion, the envoy himself again took pen in hand and wrote to him thus:—"You are aware that I would give a reward of 10,000 rupees for the apprehension of Ameer-oollah Khan, and such of the Dooranee rebel chiefs." Attempts have been made to distinguish between the two commissions thus given to Mohun Lal, and it has been said that the blood-money offered by the one was not contemplated or sanctioned by the other. Be this as it may, it is quite certain that Mohun Lal had no idea of any such distinction, and therefore having some doubts as to the mode of proceeding, he wrote directly to the envoy for explanation, telling him that "he could not find out by Lieutenant Conolly's notes how the rebels are to be assassinated, but the men now employed promise to go into their houses and cut off their heads, when they may be without attendants."

A new position
taken
up by the
enemy

On the 13th of November the enemy appeared in force on the Behmaroo Hills, situated to the north-west of the cantonments, and opened an annoying fire from two captured guns which they had placed in a commanding position. On this occasion the envoy displayed more of the military spirit than either the general or the brigadier, and insisting, in opposition to both, that a vigorous attempt should be made to drive back the enemy and recapture the guns, carried his point. At four P.M., the earlier part of the day having been wasted in idle debate, Shelton proceeded on the service at the head of a strong detachment, with two guns. The troops moved in three columns and in different directions. Unfortunately the more serviceable of the two guns stuck fast in a canal, and though the other gun did good execution, the advanced column of infantry, brought into collision with the Afghan cavalry sooner than was intended, appears to have lost all presence of mind. When, at the distance of only ten yards they might have poured in a destructive volley, they fired wildly without taking aim, and were immediately enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, who charged through and through their ranks, and drove them in confusion down the slope. This ominous and disastrous commencement did not, however, decide the fortune of the day. At the foot of the hill they reformed behind the reserve, and in a new attack regained the honour which they had lost. Aided by Eyre's guns, both of which were now in full operation, and a gallant charge of Anderson's horse, they carried the height, and with it the two guns which had been the great object of contention. So far they were entitled to claim the victory, though it must be admitted that they failed to reap the full fruits of it. As night was

beginning to fall, and the enemy began again to press forwards, only one of the guns could be brought into cantonments. The other was abandoned after being spiked, and some loss was sustained before the troops could effect their return. Shortly afterwards intelligence arrived which spread a gloom over the cantonments, and shut out almost the only remaining ray of hope. The envoy, who had received no distinct tidings of Sale's brigade, buoyed himself with the idea that it might be actually advancing to their relief, but on the 17th of November it became certain that no such aid was to be obtained. On ascertaining this he addressed a letter to General Elphinstone, in which he entered into a detail of the various alternatives which it might be possible to adopt. They might retreat in the direction of Jelalabad, or retire to the Bala Hissar, or attempt to negotiate, or continue to hold the cantonments. He declared his leaning to be in favour of the fourth. "Upon the whole I think it best to hold on where we are as long as possible, in the hope that something may turn up in our favour." "In eight or ten days more we shall be better able to judge whether there is any chance of an improvement in our position." It was most unfortunate that the envoy, instead of thus trusting to the chapter of accidents, did not at once decide in favour of the second alternative—retirement to the Bala Hissar. It was in fact the only remaining chance of escape from destruction. Once within it the troops would have had an impregnable position, and freed from the harassing labour which the defence of the cantonment incessantly entailed upon them, must have been able by means of the stock of provisions already stored in the citadel, and the addition which might have been made to it by suitable exertion, to pass the winter in security and tolerable comfort. The envoy doubted if the heavy guns could be brought into the Bala Hissar, and foresaw a deficiency both of food and firewood to cook it. The general and the brigadier, now apparently intent on retreat with or without capitulation, seconded these objections, and added others, of which the only one not absolutely frivolous was the alleged difficulty of transporting the sick and wounded.

A.D. 1841

Dubious
success of
attempt to
dislodge
enemy

Continued
occupation
of the can-
tonments
resolved on

The loss inflicted on the enemy on the 13th had curbed their audacity, and for some days they gave comparatively little annoyance. Latterly they began to resume their aggressive attitude, and by taking possession of the village of Behmaroo, situated at the north-east foot of the Behmaroo Hills, cut off one of the main sources from which the British had been drawing supplies. In order to dislodge them, it was resolved to send out a strong force before daybreak on the morning of the 23d. The most remarkable fact in regard to the composition of the force is that it had only one gun. A general order, issued while Marquis Hastings was governor, enjoined that under no circumstances, unless where a second could not be obtained, were less than two guns to be taken into the field. The propriety of this rule, sufficiently obvious in itself, was destined this day to receive a striking confirmation.

New attempt
to dislodge
the enemy

some fanatical Ghazees, taking advantage of an eminence which concealed the movement, made a sudden rush from behind it. In an instant all was confusion in the British ranks, and both infantry and cavalry, when ordered to charge, shamefully turned their backs and fled. The brigadier and other officers, while the bullets were flying thick around them, vainly endeavoured to stop the fugitives. One of the first consequences was the capture of the solitary gun by the enemy. Their triumph, however, was short-lived. When everything seemed lost, the brigadier had the presence of mind to order the halt to be sounded. The men mechanically obeyed, reformed, and returned to the conflict. It was now the turn of the Ghazees to flee and leave the captured gun behind them. The conflict still continued with alternations of success, but as the capture of the village for which it was commenced had become impossible, it was suggested to the brigadier, that as the spirit of the troops could no longer be trusted, the wisest course would be "to return to cantonments while it was still possible to do so with credit." "Oh no! we will hold the hill some time longer," was his answer, and there he stood sacrificing valuable lives while no possible advantage could be gained by it. If this was mere bravado, it was dearly paid for. Another Ghazee rush was followed by a second panic, and the great body of the British troops were driven back in the utmost confusion. So completely indeed were fugitives and pursuers mingled, that the cantonments themselves must have fallen had the Afghans known how to improve their advantage.

A D 1841

The British routed by the Afghans

Brigadier Shelton, in narrating the above events, coolly remarks, "This concluded all exterior operations." The British troops pining with cold and hunger, exhausted by incessant fatigues, and broken in spirit, had refused to follow their officers, and been seen in dastardly flight before an enemy whom they had been accustomed to despise. What then could be expected from further conflict except additional disgrace and disaster? The question of retirement to the Bala Hissar was indeed still open, and the Shah, who had formerly refused to entertain it, being now fully alarmed for his personal safety and that of his family, urged its immediate occupation by the British troops, as the only remaining means of safety. The envoy, though strongly inclined to the same opinion, was haunted by so many apprehensions that he yielded without much difficulty to the objections of the military authorities.

All exterior operations abandoned


When the proposal to move into the Bala Hissar was rejected, there must have been some mention of a resource deemed preferable to it, and we are not left long in doubt as to what it was. The envoy had resolved to attempt to obtain terms from the insurgents, and having ascertained their willingness to treat, called upon General Elphinstone for his opinion "as to whether, in a military point of view, it is feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country." The opinion, which was previously well known, was given officially in the following terms: "I beg to state that having held our position here for

Resolution come to to treat for terms.

A D 1841

Resolution
came to to
treat for
terms

upwards of three weeks in a state of siege, from the want of provisions and forage, the reduced state of our troops, the large number of wounded and sick, the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated cantonment we occupy, the near approach of winter, our communications cut off, no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms against us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country, and that you ought to avail yourself of the offer to negotiate which has been made to you" Thus sanctioned, the envoy immediately despatched a message to the Afghan chiefs, requesting them to appoint deputies to discuss the preliminaries of a treaty. The meeting was fixed for the following day (the 25th November), and was



BALA HISSAR AND CITY OF CABOOL.—From Atkinson's Sketches in Afghanistan

Arrogant
demands of
the enemy

held at an intermediate spot, Sultan Mahomed Khan and Meerza Ahmud Ali representing the Afghans, and Captains Lawrence and Trevor the British. The former at once assumed a tone so arrogant, that after two hours' discussion no progress had been made. At last they asked to see the envoy himself, and had an interview with him in a guard-room in one of the gateways of the cantonments. It was unavailing. The Afghan chiefs demanded that the British should surrender as prisoners of war, and deliver up all their arms, ammunition, and treasure, and when these terms were indignantly rejected, departed, uttering menaces.

Ruinous
delay

Negotiation having failed, both parties seemed resolved to wait the progress of events, and for some days no active measures were taken. But delay, while it improved the position of the enemy, was absolutely ruinous to the British. Their supplies were consumed much faster than they could replace them, and the obvious consequence was that they must ere long be absolutely starved out. The troops meanwhile were becoming disorganized, and disgraced themselves.

on more than one occasion, by despicable cowardice. Thus, on the 6th of December, Mahomed Shureef's fort, which it had cost so much to gain, was recaptured by the enemy without an effort. Its garrison of 100 men, on seeing some Afghans, who had mounted to the window by using their crooked sticks as scaling ladders, show their heads, abandoned their posts, and fled back pell-mell to the cantonments. Lady Sale says, "They all ran away as fast as they could. The 44th say that the 37th ran first, and as they were too weak they went too." But according to Lieutenant Hawtrey, who commanded, "There was not a pin to choose—all cowards alike." "Our troops," wrote Macnaghten, "are behaving like a pack of despicable cowards, and there is no spirit of enterprise left among us." In this dilemma, the envoy displayed a far more manly spirit than his military coadjutors. While the latter did nothing but croak and reiterate the humiliating word *negotiate*, he returned to the alternative of gaining the Bala Hissar as at once the safest and most honourable, urging that the sick and wounded might be sent off under the cover of night, and that then, after destroying all the ordnance and stores that could not be removed, they might fight their way. This was his proposal on the 6th of December, but the general discountenanced it, and saw no possibility of relief except in what he was pleased to call "honourable terms." These, he thought, might still be obtained, but "after leaving cantonments, terms, I should suppose, are quite out of the question."

A D 1841.
New pro-
posals for
negotiation

Conference
with the
Afghan
chiefs

The envoy, most reluctant to announce a final decision, lingered on till the 11th, when there was just enough of food for the day's consumption of the fighting men, and then opened the negotiation. The conference took place on the banks of the Cabool, nearly a mile from the cantonments. It was attended by Akbar Khan and most of the other Afghan chiefs on the one part, and by the envoy, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, with a small escort, on the other. After the first salutations, the envoy produced and read the draft of a treaty which he had previously prepared. It consisted of a preamble, and eighteen separate articles. They were in substance, that the troops now at Cabool would repair to Peshawar, and thence to India with all practicable expedition, the Sirdars engaging to keep them unmolested, to treat them with all honour, and furnish "all possible assistance in arms and provisions;" that all the other British troops in Afghanistan should evacuate it as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made; that Shah Shujah should have the option of remaining in Afghanistan, on a maintenance of not less than a lac of rupees per annum, or of accompanying the British troops; that on the safe arrival of the British troops at Peshawar, arrangements should be made for the immediate return of Dost Mahomed and his family, with all other Afghans now detained in India, and that at the same time the family of the Shah, if his majesty elected to accompany the British troops, should be allowed to return towards India; that from the date on which these articles are agreed,

A D 1841

Draft of a
treaty sub-
mitted by
the British

"the British troops shall be supplied with provisions, on tendering payment for the same;" that "the stores and property formerly belonging to Ameer Durr Mahomed Khan shall be restored," and all the property of British officers left behind should be carefully preserved, and sent to India as opportunities may offer; and that, "notwithstanding the retirement of the British troops from Afghanistan, there will always be friendship between that nation and the English, so much so, that the Afghans will contract no alliance with any other foreign power without the consent of the English, for whose assistance they will look in the hour of need."



MAHOMED AKBAR KHAN.
From Lieutenant V. Eyn's Prison Sketches.

It is exten-
sively accepted
by the
Afghans.

unconditional surrender. He himself, no doubt, thought very differently, and could see nothing worse in the transaction than that "by entering into terms, we are prevented from undertaking the entire conquest of the country." This, however, was now past hoping for, and he could therefore look at the treaty with some degree of self-complacency. "The terms I secured were the best obtainable, and the destruction of 15,000 human beings would little have benefited our country, whilst the government would have been almost compelled to avenge our fate at whatever cost. We shall part with the Afghans as friends, and I feel satisfied that any government which may be established hereafter, will always be disposed to cultivate a good understanding with us." Such was the flattering side of the picture. But it had also a dark side. The Afghans were notoriously avaricious, crafty, and vindictive, and where was the guarantee that after agreeing to the terms they would fulfil them? The British troops were to evacuate the cantonments in three days. This done they would be entirely at the mercy of foes, who would have the option of exterminating them, either by starvation or the sword.

The first measure adopted in fulfilment of the treaty was not of a kind to

A. D. 1841

New in-
trigue of
the envoy

to that day he had postponed issuing any order in concert with the general for the evacuation of Ghuznee, Candahar, and Jelalabad. This was now done, but the envoy disappointed in one hope clung to another. The treaty provided for the abdication of the Shah. Who then was to be his successor? The answer was left indefinite, and revived the old jealousies of the Afghan tribes. The Barukzyes and their adherents claimed to be restored to their ancient ascendancy, while the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashes, dreading this as the worst event that could befall them, would willingly have retained Shah Shujah, in the expectation of being able to use him as their tool. The envoy, in order to profit by this dissension, did not hesitate to foment it, and began to scatter bribes on all hands. He thus entangled himself in a web of intrigue, which cost him his honour and his life. One is almost ashamed to relate how a high British functionary, after binding himself by treaty, could quibble upon its obligations.

Treacherous
correspond-
ence with
the Ghiljies
and Kuzuzi
bashas.

Though the 22d of December had been fixed for the departure of the British troops, the envoy was engaged up to that very day, by means of his old agent Mohun Lal, in a treacherous correspondence with the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashes. On the 20th he wrote, "You can tell the Ghiljies and Khan Shereen, that after they have declared for his majesty and us, and sent in 100 kurwars¹ of grain to cantonments, I shall be glad to give them a bond of five lacs of rupees." On the 21st he explained himself more fully. "In conversing with anybody, you must say distinctly that I am ready to stand by my engagement with the Barukzyes and other chiefs associated with them, but that if any portion of the Afghans wish our troops to remain in the country, I shall think myself at liberty to break the engagement which I have made to go away, which engagement was made believing it to be in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan nation. If the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashes wish us to stay, let them declare so openly in the course of to-morrow, and we will side with them. The best proof of their wish for us to stay is to send us a large quantity of grain this night—100 or 200 kurwars. If they do this and make their salaam to the Shah early to-morrow, giving his majesty to understand that we are along with them, I will write to the Barukzyes and tell them my agreement is at an end." In another letter, written in the course of the same day, he repeated the extraordinary doctrine that he should think himself at liberty to break his agreement, "because that agreement was made under the belief that all the Afghan people wished us to go away." He had the precaution, however, to add, "Do not let me appear in this matter." It is hardly necessary to give the reason. At this very time he was engaged in a similar intrigue with the Barukzyes, and had shown his friendship for Akbar Khan by making him a present of his carriage and horses.

¹ The *kurwar* of grain was a measure weighing about 700 lbs., and consequently rather more than ten bushels.

A.D. 1841

Counter
intrigues of
the Afghans

The game which the envoy was playing could hardly have been expected, and certainly did not deserve to succeed. While he was pluming himself on his dexterity in keeping it secret, the Afghan chiefs knew it all, and proceeded as they were well entitled to counterwork him. He accordingly received new overtures from the Barukzyes, and was easily caught by them, as they promised more than he was anticipating from the rival intrigue. He therefore intimated to Mohun Lal that "the sending grain to us just now would do more harm than good to our cause, and it would lead the Barukzyes to suppose that I am intriguing with a view of breaking my agreement." This reads ludicrously after the specimens of double-dealing already given, but the envoy, as if totally unconscious of anything of the kind, thus concluded a letter to Mohun Lal:—"It would be very agreeable to stop here for a few months, instead of having to travel through the snow; but we must consider not what is agreeable but what is consistent with faith." If these words have any meaning it is that the envoy held himself bound by the treaty, and would be guilty of a breach of faith by breaking or evading it, and yet, at this very moment, he was deep in an intrigue with Akbar Khan with this very object.

Extraordi-
nary pro-
posals.


On the evening of the 22d of December, the date of the letter last quoted, Captain Skinner came from the city into cantonments, accompanied by a first cousin of Akbar Khan and a Lohanee merchant, who was believed to be a friend of the British. They were the bearers of a new string of proposals, of such a nature that Captain Skinner remarked, half jocularly, to the envoy, that he felt like one loaded with combustibles. Their main purport was that the British troops, having been drawn up outside the cantonments, Akbar Khan and the Ghiljies would unite with them, and on a given signal attack the fort and seize the person of Ameen-oolah Khan, who was known to be the original contriver, and had throughout been a ringleader of the insurrection; that Shah Shujah should still be king; and that the British troops should remain till spring, and then to save their credit withdraw of their own accord. In return for his part in this plot, Akbar Khan should be recognized as Shah Shujah's wuzer or prime-minister, and should moreover be guaranteed by the British government in a present payment of thirty, and an annual pension of four lacs of rupees. One part of the proposal was to present Ameen-oolah's head to the envoy for a fixed price. This he at once rejected, but he grasped at the other proposals, and assented to them by a writing under his own hand. The following morning, the 23d, was fixed for holding a conference with Akbar Khan, and completing the arrangements.

Often had the envoy been warned of the danger of intriguing with Akbar Khan, but he had apparently made up his mind to risk all on a single chance, rather than prolong the suspense and agony which were making existence intolerable. After breakfast he sent for Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, and told them to prepare to accompany him to a conference with Akbar Khan.

A D 1841

Infatuation
of the envoy

Mackenzie, who had found him alone, having for the first time learned his intentions, exclaimed "It is a trap." He abruptly answered, "Leave me to manage that, trust me for that." As yet General Elphinstone had been kept wholly in the dark, but the envoy, now on the point of setting out, sent for him and explained the nature of the intrigue. Startled, and far from satisfied with the explanation, the general asked what part the other Barukzye chiefs had taken in the negotiation, and was simply answered "they are not in the plot." "Do you not then apprehend treachery?" rejoined the general. "None whatever," was the reply, "I am certain the thing will succeed. What I want you to do is to have two regiments and guns got quickly ready, and without making any show, to be prepared the moment required to move towards Mahomed Khan's fort." With more good sense and greater firmness than he usually displayed,



MAHOMED KHAN'S FORT — From Sale's Defence of Jelalabad.

the general continued to remonstrate till the envoy, rather rudely, cut him short by exclaiming, "Leave it all to me; I understand these things better than you do."

He proceeds
to a confer-
ence with
Akbar Khan

About noon of the 23d the envoy passed out of cantonments, accompanied by Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, and escorted by a few horsemen. The place of meeting was about 600 yards east of the cantonments, not far from the banks of the river where it is crossed by a bridge. It was situated on a slope among some hillocks, and was marked out by a number of horse-cloths, which had been spread for the occasion. While passing along, the envoy remembered that a beautiful Arab horse, which he had purchased from the owner at a high price, with the intention of presenting it to Akbar Khan, who was known to have coveted it, had been left behind. He therefore desired Captain Mackenzie to return for it, and in the meantime conversed with the other two officers on the subject which was nearest his heart. He was playing, he admitted, for a heavy stake, but the prize was worth the risk. Unable, however, to suppress misgivings, he is said to have remarked, "Death is preferable to the life we

are leading now." After the usual salutations and some conversation on horse-back, during which Akbar Khan was profuse in his thanks for the present of the Arab steed, and also for that of a handsome pair of double-barrelled pistols, which he had admired at a previous meeting, the parties repaired to the spot provided for their reception. The envoy reclined on the slope, and Trevor and Mackenzie seated themselves beside him, but Lawrence, whose suspicions were already awake, continued standing behind him, till, as the only means of avoiding the importunity of the chiefs, who urged him also to sit, he knelt on one knee-ready to start in a moment. Akbar Khan opened the conference by an abrupt question. "Are you ready," he asked, "to carry out the proposals of the previous evening?" "Why not?" replied the envoy. Meanwhile, the Afghans crowding round, Lawrence called attention to the suspicious circumstance, by observing that if the conference was meant to be secret the intruders ought to be removed. Some of the chiefs made a show of clearing a circle with their whips, but Akbar Khan interposed, saying that their presence could do no harm, as they were all in the secret. What this secret was did not remain a moment in doubt. The envoy and his companions, suddenly seized from behind, were rendered incapable of any effectual resistance. The three officers were immediately dragged away and placed each behind a mounted Afghan chief, who rode off at full speed in the direction of Mahomed Khan's fort. Captain Trevor unfortunately lost his seat, and was cut to pieces by Ghazees; Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie were lodged in the fort. Meanwhile, the envoy had been seized by Akbar Khan, and was struggling desperately with him on the ground. It is said, probably with truth, that his antagonist meant only to drag him off like his companions, and that it was not till resistance had exasperated him, that he drew a pistol, one of those just presented to him, and shot him dead. During the struggle wonder and horror were strongly depicted on the envoy's upturned face. The only words he was heard to utter were "*Az barae Khoda*" (For God's sake). In the fearful tragedy which thus terminated the life of Sir William Macnaghten, the most melancholy circumstance is that, whether because misfortune had unhinged his mind or weakened his moral principles, he was engaged at the time of his death, not in the faithful discharge of his duty, but in a course of tortuous policy, which every honourable mind must repudiate.

The murder of the envoy completely changed the relations previously formed between the Afghans and the British, and left it optional for the latter to choose their own course, independent of the obligations previously contracted by treaty. The highest representative of the government, an ambassador whose very office hedged him round with a sacredness which all nations, not absolutely barbarous, recognize and revere, had been decoyed into an ambush and treacherously murdered. With a people capable of doing such a deed, and boasting of it after it was done, engagements, however solemnly made, were

A.D. 1841.

Conference
with Akbar
KhanThe envoy
murdered.

A D 1842 useless, and all therefore that now remained for the British was to avenge their wrongs, or at all events, if that was beyond their power, to become once more their own protectors, and trust to nothing but Providence and their own stout hearts and swords. Such was evidently the course which was at once safest and most honourable, but it was not that which the military authorities prepared to adopt. At first they would not believe that the envoy had been murdered, and instead of taking the necessary means to dispel all doubt on such a subject, sent round an officer to calm the alarm which was generally felt, by intimating at the head of each regiment that though the conference had been interrupted by the Ghazees, and the envoy with the officers who accompanied him had been removed to the city, their immediate return to cantonments might be expected. The following day dissipated these delusions. A letter from Captain Lawrence made known the full extent of the atrocity, and at the same time, strange to say, contained overtures from the murderers for a renewal of negotiation. Instead of revolting at the very idea, the proposals were eagerly embraced. They differed little from the envoy's treaty, but when the chiefs found that they had only to ask in order to obtain, they immediately rose in their demands, and in returning the draft, appended to it four additional articles. "1st, Whatever coin there may be in the public treasury must be given up. 2d, All guns must be given up except six. 3d, The muskets in excess of those in use with the regiments must be left behind. 4th, General Sale, together with his wife and daughter, and the other gentlemen of rank who are married and have children, until the arrival of the Ameer Dost Mabomed Khan and the other Afghans and their families, and Doorances and Ghiljies from Hindoostan, shall remain as guests with us." These humiliating articles, after a fruitless attempt to modify them, were submitted to, except the last, and even it was not complied with merely because it could not be enforced.

Evacuation
of the can-
tonments.

On the 6th of January, 1842, the British troops, after waiting in vain for the safeguard which the Afghan chiefs had promised to provide, marched out without it through a large opening which had been made on the previous evening in the rampart of the cantonments, to facilitate their egress. The total number of those who thus quitted the cantonments amounted to about 4500 fighting men, and 12,000 followers. The march of such a body at such a season, through a rugged mountainous country, was in itself a most perilous undertaking, and there were other circumstances connected with it which made it all but desperate. The Newab Zemaun Khan, whom the Afghans had set up as their king, wrote Pottinger warning him of the danger of setting out without the promised safeguard, but it was too late to recede, and the unwieldy mass began to move. The same fatality which had hitherto frustrated all their operations was again manifest; and while time was everything, so many delays were interposed that the rearguard were not able to quit the cantonments till six o'clock P.M., and after a fierce conflict with Ghazees and plunderers, and did not

reach their encamping ground, on the right bank of the Cabool near Begramée, till two hours after midnight. This first march sufficed to reveal insuperable difficulties.

When the morning of the 7th dawned, a fearful scene was presented. Many of the Hindoo women and children, exhausted by fatigue and cold, had sunk down on the snow to die. Discipline was rapidly disappearing, and it was evident that ere long the whole force would become disorganized. Horses, camels, and baggage ponies, soldiers and camp followers, were huddled together in an inextricable mass. Meanwhile fanatic and marauding bands kept hovering on the flanks, and seized every opportunity of slaughter or plunder. The only chance of safety would have been a rapid march, by which the passes might have been cleared before the enemy could effectually obstruct them, but this was now impossible. Zemaun Khan having again promised to disperse the plunderers and send supplies of food and fuel, General Elphinstone was induced to order a halt at Boothauk. It was his intention to have continued the march during the night, had not the appearance of Akbar Khan on the scene caused him to abandon it. The Afghan chief was at the head of about 600 horsemen, and on being communicated with, announced that he had come to act as a safeguard, and at the same time to demand hostages for the evacuation of Jelalabad. Till these were given, and Sale's brigade should have actually retired, he was instructed to detain the retreating force, and furnish them in the interval with all necessary supplies. After this announcement, it could scarcely be doubted that the extermination of the whole force was intended. Another bivouac on the snow during a night of intense cold, would almost suffice for this purpose, and hence the only chance of escape was to push on at all hazards, without an hour's delay. Such, however, was not the resolution of General Elphinstone, who first ordered the halt, and then endeavoured to make terms. Ultimately, after another night of horror had been spent, Akbar Khan condescended to accept of Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie as hostages, and to permit the continuance of the retreat to Tezeen. Could this place have been reached, one of the greatest difficulties of the route would have been surmounted, inasmuch as the Khoord Cabool Pass, stretching for about five miles through a narrow gorge, hemmed in by precipitous mountain ridges, would have been cleared. No sooner however was the gorge entered, than the mountaineers rushed down to the attack, and a fearful massacre commenced. Akbar Khan, who had promised protection, seemed willing to afford it, but it was beyond his power, and the British force, now a mere rabble of fugitives, were shot down by hundreds, almost without any attempt at resistance. About 3000 persons are said to have perished in this dreadful pass. The English ladies accompanying the advance, though exposed to the murderous fire of the Afghan marksmen, escaped unhurt, with the exception of Lady Sale, who was struck by a ball which lodged in her wrist.

A D 1312

Delivery of
the married
officers and
their fami-
lies to
Akbar Khan

The remnant of the force reached Khoord Cabool fort on the evening of the 8th, but it was not to obtain any mitigation of their sufferings. "We had ascended," says Lieutenant Eyre, "to a still colder climate than we had left behind, and were without tents, fuel, or food." The consequence was, that "an immense number of poor wounded wretches," whose groans of misery and distress assailed the ear from all quarters, "wandered about the camp destitute of shelter, and perished during the night." On the 9th, before sunrise, the camp was again in motion, and three-fourths of the fighting men, without waiting for orders, pushed on in advance with the camp followers. The remaining troops had afterwards marched and proceeded about a mile, when another of those fatal halts was ordered. It had been made as before at the suggestion of Akbar Khan, on a renewed assurance of protection and supplies, and was preliminary to a compliance with a startling proposal which accompanied it. During the negotiation at Cabool, the Afghan chiefs had demanded the delivery of the married gentlemen and their families as hostages. This was evaded at the time, but the demand had never been lost sight of, and was now renewed. The proceedings of the previous day furnished a plausible pretext, both to Akbar Khan for making the proposal, and to General Elphinstone for granting it. The latter indeed has removed all doubt as to the motives which influenced him, by a written statement, in which he justifies his compliance on two grounds: first, because he desired "to remove the ladies and children, after the horrors they had already witnessed, from the further dangers of our camp," and secondly, because he hoped "that as from the very commencement of the negotiations, the Sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the married people as hostages, this mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him." Judging by the event, it is impossible to deny that the first reason was well founded. The ladies and children had passed unscathed through a shower of Afghan balls, but the repetition of such a miraculous escape was more than could be hoped for, and to expose them to the dangers of another murderous conflict would have been to throw away their last chance of safety. It was indeed a horrible alternative, and we can better conceive than express the feelings of Lady Macnaghten when told that she was to quit British protection, and become what was called the "guest" of the man who had murdered her husband. There was indeed some guarantee for their personal safety, in the fact that Akbar Khan's own family were in the hands of the British, and it therefore seems that the general's first reason ought to be sustained. On his second reason, a different judgment must be passed. After the experience he had had of Akbar Khan, it was mere fatuity to imagine that any "mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him." The necessity which justified the surrender of the ladies did not apply at all to their husbands, and one is puzzled to understand why they, instead of remaining at their posts to share the common danger, were also sent off to become the "guests" of Akbar Khan.

The command to halt on the morning of the 9th was disapproved by the whole force, and Shelton, in order to give effect to a personal remonstrance against it, declared that it would involve their entire destruction, whereas another day's march would carry them clear of the snow. The general listened, but refused to be convinced. The consequence was, that the native soldiers took what seemed the only remedy into their own hands, and prepared to desert. The example had previously been set by the Shah's cavalry, and they were not slow in following it. On the morning of the 10th, when the march was resumed, the native regiments had almost melted away. "The European soldiers," says Eyre, "were now almost the only efficient men left, the Hindoostanees having all suffered more or less from the effects of the frost in their hands and feet; few were able even to hold a musket, much less to pull a trigger: in fact, the prolonged delay in the snow had paralyzed the mental and bodily powers of the strongest men, rendering them incapable of any useful exertion. Hope seemed to have died in every breast; the wildness of terror was exhibited in every countenance." The end was now fast approaching. The enemy hovering on the heights were watching their opportunity, while the inextricable mass below kept moving onward as if mechanically and unconsciously to inevitable destruction. At a narrow gorge between two precipitous hills, where the promiscuous crowd of disorganized sepoys and camp followers were so huddled together that they could neither recede nor advance, the slaughter was renewed, and barbarously continued till, of the 16,000 persons who started from Cabool, less than a fourth remained. The sepoys were entirely annihilated, and the Europeans were not able to muster of fighting men more than 250 soldiers of the 44th, 150 cavalry, and 50 horse artillerymen, with one gun. On observing the slaughter at the gorge, General Elphinstone called upon Akbar Khan, who had stood aloof, to make good his promises of protection. The oft-repeated answer was returned that he could not, and along with the answer a new humiliating proposal: let the British lay down their arms, and he would undertake to save their lives. There was still spirit enough remaining to treat this proposal as it deserved, and the march was resumed. By a rapid movement the defile, where so many of the camp followers had already perished, was reached, but before it could be cleared the enemy opened a destructive fire on the rear. Shelton, who commanded there, gave another proof of his unflinching courage, and being seconded by a handful of men who stood by him, as he expresses it, "nobly and heroically," gained another short respite for the whole. Akbar Khan, when again appealed to, having only renewed his ignominious proposal, it was determined to move on Jugduluck by a rapid night march. This, under the most favourable circumstances, could only be effected by throwing off the camp followers and leaving them to their fate. The march was resumed with this view as quietly as possible, but the deception which stern necessity alone could justify did not succeed,

A.D. 1842.

Horrors of
the retreat
upon Jug-
duluck.

A.D. 1812 and the fighting men found themselves cumbered as before with an unmanageable rabble. Little molestation, however, was experienced for some miles, and the advanced guard after halting at Kuttur Sung for the arrival of the rearguard, pushed on for Jugduluck, still ten miles distant. It was reached at last by the advance guard, without much obstruction, but not without the greatest difficulty by the rearguard, who, commanded as before by Shelton, fought their way manfully, contesting every inch of ground.

Treacherous
conduct of
Akbar Khan

At Jugduluck the survivors of the British force, now few in number and exhausted with fatigue, found a temporary shelter behind some ruined walls, and were endeavouring to snatch a little repose, when they were suddenly aroused by volley after volley poured from the adjoining heights into the heart of their bivouac. They were in consequence obliged to quit it, and make one bold effort to clear the ground before them. It succeeded, and the troops when night closed, were able again to seek the shelter of the ruined walls. Meanwhile Akbar Khan was preparing a new act of treachery. On being once more appealed to for protection, he sent a message inviting a conference with General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnstone. They went, and after being received with the greatest apparent kindness and hospitality, found themselves in his trap. Jelalabad was not yet evacuated in terms of the treaty, and he meant to detain them as hostages. The general, whose sense of honour notwithstanding all his blunders remained as keen as ever, endeavoured to procure his own return, by pleading that disappearance from the army at such a time would look like desertion, and disgrace him in the eyes of his countrymen; but Akbar Khan was not to be moved, and detained all the three officers. On the morning of the 12th the conference was resumed, and the troops prolonged their halt to await the issue. The only object of the detained British officers was to save the small remnant of the force still surviving, and they not only earnestly implored Akbar Khan's interposition, but engaged Mahomed Shah Khan, his father-in-law, and a Ghiljie chief of influence, to purchase the forbearance of his savage countrymen at the price of two lacs of rupees. After much discussion, during which it became manifest that the Ghiljies were thirsting as much for blood as for money, Mahomed Shah Khan arrived about dusk, and intimated that all was finally and amicably arranged for the safe conduct of the troops to Jelalabad. The announcement had scarcely escaped his lips, when the lie was given to it by a sound of firing. It came from the direction of the British bivouac, and told that the Ghiljies had resumed their murderous work.


Mahomed
Shah Khan
attack by
the Ghiljies

The firing announced that the enemy were on the alert waiting to pounce upon their victims, but the soldiers displayed so much determination, and inflicted such severe chastisement on the most forward of the plunderers, that the first part of the march was effected without serious loss. A fearful struggle however awaited them. They had still to clear the pass of Jugduluck, up

which the road climbs by a steep ascent between lofty precipices. By incredible exertion the summit was nearly gained, when a sudden turn brought them in front of a barricade formed of shrubs and branches of trees. To penetrate it seemed impossible, and either to halt or recede was inevitable destruction, since the enemy, who had been lying in ambush, were already busy with their long knives and jezails. It was a most unequal struggle, and terminated in the almost total extinction of the force. Brigadier Anquetil, Colonel Chambers, and ten other officers, here met their deaths. During the conflict, about twenty officers and forty-five privates managed to clear the barricade and make their way to Gundamuck at daybreak of the 13th. The respite thus obtained was of

A D 1842.

Annihilation of the British force



Jumbuck, where General Elphinstone made his last stand — From Rattray's *Costumes and Scenery of Afghanistan*.

short duration. The enemy began to pour in from all quarters, and their intended victims had become incapable of resistance, as not more than two rounds of ammunition to each man remained. What was to be done? Obviously the only alternatives were to make terms, or if these were refused, to sell their lives as dearly as possible. The former alternative seemed not unattainable, for shortly after their arrival a messenger arrived with overtures from the chief of the district. Major Griffiths, now the senior officer, set out to have an interview with the chief, and was only on the way, when the blood-thirsty mob broke in upon his little band and massacred every man of them, except Captain Souter of the 4th and a few privates, who were made prisoners. A few officers, who had quitted the column at Soorkhab and continued in advance of it, still survived. As they proceeded, one after another perished, and at Futteahbad their number was reduced to six. Being now only sixteen miles from Jelalabad, their final deliverance seemed at hand, but the measure of disaster was not yet complete. In the vicinity of Futteahbad a treacherous offer of kindness threw them off their guard. While snatching a hasty meal to strengthen them for their remaining fatigues, they were attacked by a party of armed

Massacre of
Major Griffiths and his
company

A.D. 1842.

Arrival of
Dr. Bryden
at Jelalabad
as sole sur-
vivor of the
British
force

men. Two of their number were immediately cut down, and three, overtaken after an ineffectual flight, shared the same fate. Dr. Bryden, now the only survivor, having providentially escaped, pursued his journey. He rode a pony so jaded that it could scarcely carry him, and on which, as he was both wounded and faint, he was hardly able to keep his seat. At length, however, on coming within sight of Jelalabad, he was descried from the walls. The British garrison there, though without any certain information on the subject, knew as much as filled them with the most dismal forebodings as to the fate of the Cabool force. Colonel Dennie, who had ventured, one cannot help thinking, somewhat unadvisedly, to predict that only one man would escape to announce the destruction of all the rest, no sooner heard that a solitary and apparently exhausted rider, recognized by his dress and appearance to be a British officer, was approaching, than he exclaimed, says Mr Gleig, in a voice which "sounded like the response of an oracle, 'Did I not say so? Here comes the messenger.'" A party of cavalry immediately hastened out to Dr. Bryden's relief. He was too much exhausted to be able to give any details, but told enough to confirm their worst fears. A British force had been completely exterminated, and the British arms had sustained a disgrace greater far than had ever befallen them in any previous Indian campaign. It was some small relief however to learn that Dennie's prophecy, if he ever uttered it, was not literally fulfilled. Instead of one, there were several survivors, and among them the very persons in whom the deepest interest was felt. The British ladies and children though captives were still alive, and might yet be recovered. They were so in fact, but as it was after a considerable delay, the details properly belong to a more advanced part of the narrative.

CHAPTER V.

Operations in different parts of Afghanistan—Sale at Jelalabad—Conflicts in the Khyber Pass—Nott at Candahar—Views of the Indian Government—Conclusion of Lord Auckland's administration—Lord Ellenborough governor-general—Proposed evacuation of Afghanistan—Double advance upon Cabool by Generals Pollock and Nott—Recapture of Ghuznee—Re-occupation of Cabool—Recovery of British prisoners—Evacuation of Afghanistan—Lord Ellenborough's proclamations.



HE formidable difficulties encountered by Sir Robert Sale in marching his brigade from Cabool to Jelalabad have already been referred to, with his consequent refusal to risk its entire loss by endeavouring to retrace his steps, in compliance with the urgent importunities of the envoy. When the first order to return was received on the 10th of November, the brigade was encamped in the valley of Gundamuck. Previously, however, it had been so

roughly handled, and was so imperfectly provided with the provisions and military stores which would be absolutely required in marching back through one of the most difficult countries in the world, and in the face of a population understood to be almost universally hostile, that a council of war, summoned to consider the important subject, decided, though not unanimously, that the march on Jelalabad ought to be continued. Even this could not be effected without sacrifice. In order to move as lightly as possible, it was necessary to leave a large amount of valuable property in the cantonments at Gunda-muck, and in the absence of better custodiers to intrust it to the charge of a body of the Shah's irregular cavalry. The result, which was probably not unforeseen, immediately followed. The Janbaz, such being the name by which these cavalry were designated, lost no time in fraternizing with the insurgents, the cantonments were burned down, the property disappeared, and the insurrection itself spread wider and wider over all the surrounding districts.

The brigade resumed its march on the 11th of November, and the insurgents, probably not yet fully prepared for action, offered little obstruction. On the morning of the 12th, it became obvious that a different course was to be pursued. By day-break the adjoining hills were covered with armed men, watching their opportunity to descend and sweep all before them. The task of keeping them in check was intrusted to Colonel Dennie, who, after a kind of running fight had for some time been kept up, had recourse to a manoeuvre. Placing the cavalry in ambush, he led out the infantry to the attack, with instructions suddenly to wheel round when about to come into actual collision with the enemy, as if a panic had seized them. The enemy mistaking the feint for a real flight, raised a wild shout, and to complete their victory rushed into the low ground. A charge from the cavalry threw them into irretrievable confusion, and they fled leaving the valley covered with their dead. After this decided check, no further opposition was made to the march of the brigade, which entered Jelalabad on the 13th of January, and took unchallenged possession of it. Sale's intention was to hold it as an intermediate post, from which reinforcements received from India by way of Peshawer might be forwarded to Cabool, and where, should the retirement of the Cabool force itself become necessary, it might find a haven of safety. The nature of the task which he had thus undertaken cannot be better explained than in his own words. "I found the walls of Jelalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them. The enceinte was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme. It had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which then was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of 400 yards together, on which none of the garrison could show

A.D. 1842.

Sale's
brigade con-
tinues its
march to
Jelalabad.Its arrival
there.

A.D. 1842

Sale's
brigade at
Jelalabad.

themselves excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole enceinte was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened at twenty or thirty yards" After the above description, it is almost superfluous to observe that the difficulty of holding such a place was certainly not less than that of defending the British cantonments at Cabool. Fortunately, however, a very different spirit prevailed, and the very same circumstances which General Elphinstone mismanaged so as to bring disgrace and ruin on the Cabool force, sufficed to make Sir Robert Sale and his brigade a band of heroes.

As soon as Jelalabad was entered, it became a question whether the whole city ought to be held, or whether it would not be more prudent to retire into the citadel, which might be much more easily defended, and was ample enough to afford sufficient accommodation. Strong reasons for the latter course were not wanting, but the former and bolder course was preferred, and it was determined not to yield up an inch of the city except under dire



JELALABAD.—From Masson's Narrative of Journeys in Beloochistan, &c.

Its danger-
ous position

compulsion. The state of the city when this resolution was formed has already been described, and notice must now be taken of several circumstances by which the difficulty of defence was greatly increased. When the brigade entered the city, the provisions for men and horses fell short of two days' supply, and the surrounding country, from which alone additional supplies could be looked for, was so completely in the hands of the insurgents that not fewer than 5000 of them were seen crowning the adjoining heights. It was in vain to think of proceeding with the defences, while the workmen would only have afforded a sure aim for Afghan marksmen. The first thing necessary therefore was to give the insurgents a lesson which would teach them to keep their distance. A general attack was accordingly arranged, and on the 14th of November Colonel Monteith of the 35th Bengal native infantry, moved out at day-break at the

head of 300 of her Majesty's 13th, 300 of the 35th native infantry, 100 sappers and miners, 200 of the Khyber corps, a squadron of the 5th light cavalry, a few irregular horse, and three guns, in all about 1100 fighting men, to give battle to an enemy which outnumbered them fivefold. The boldness of the enterprise was justified by its success. The enemy gave way at every point, and suffered so severely in their flight that a fortnight elapsed before they again ventured to show themselves in force.

The enemy having recovered from the terror of their defeat, began again to press so close upon the defences that another chastisement was deemed necessary. The task was intrusted to Colonel Dennie, who made a vigorous sortie on the 1st of December, and put the insurgents once more to disgraceful rout and terrific slaughter. But while Sale and his brigade were thus main-



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT SALE, G.C.B.
From a portrait by H. Mowbray

taining the honour of the British arms, the tidings from Cabool were assuming a darker hue, and on the 9th of January a letter arrived which disclosed the full extent of the calamity. This letter, dated 29th December, 1841, was signed by Eldred Pottinger, in charge of the Cabool mission, and W. K. Elphinstone, major-general, and addressed to Captain Macgregor. The bearer of it was an Afghan horseman. It was in the following terms:—"It having been found necessary to conclude an agreement founded on that of the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Afghanistan by our troops, we have the honour to request that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Jelalabad, our wish that the troops now at that place should return to India, commencing their march immediately after the receipt of this letter, leaving all guns the property of Dost Mahomed Khan with the new governor, as also such stores and baggage as there may not be the means of carrying away, and the provisions in store for our use on arriving at Jelalabad. Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, who is the bearer of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been appointed governor of Jelalabad on the part of the existing government." This letter certainly placed both Macgregor and Sale in a dilemma, but their mode of extricating themselves, subsequently approved by government, will now be condemned by none. The following was their joint answer, returned on the same day:—"We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ult., which you therein state was to be delivered to us by Abdool

Order for the
delivery of
Jelalabad to
the Afghans

A D 1842

Order disre-
garded for
the delivery
of Jelalabad
to the
Afghans


Ghuffoor Khan, appointed governor of this place by the existing powers at Cabool. That communication was not delivered to us by him, but by a messenger of his, and though dated 29th December, 1841, has only this moment reached us. We have at the same time positive information that Mahomed Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neighbourhood, urging them to raise their followers for the purpose of intercepting and destroying the forces now at Jelalabad. Under these circumstances, we have deemed it our duty to await a further communication from you, which we desire may point out the security which may be given for our safe march to Peshawer. Only four days after this answer, the arrival of Dr. Bryden made it impossible to doubt the propriety of the course which had been adopted. The evacuation of Jelalabad would have procured no relief to the Cabool force, whose destruction had already been all but consummated, and would only have been a new triumph to Afghan treachery.

Defeat of a
relieving
force in the
Khyber Pass

After the above refusal to retire voluntarily from Jelalabad, it became doubtful if it would be possible to retain it. The insurgents, afraid again to risk an encounter in the open field, endeavoured to shake the fidelity of the troops by insidious offers, which were so far successful that it was deemed necessary "as a measure of prudence, to get rid first of the corps of the Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of jezailchees, and a few of the Afghan sappers, and a body of Hindoostanee gunners who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mahomed Khan." This diminution of the garrison, though it doubtless added to its real strength by making treachery more difficult, had this obvious disadvantage, that it threw "additional labours on the remaining troops, who, reduced to half rations, were already tasked beyond their strength." At this very time the disheartening intelligence arrived that a prospect of succour which had cheered them amid their privations was not to be realized. Four regiments had been despatched from India, under the command of Brigadier Wyld, to the relief of Jelalabad. This force, which with some additions made to it amounted to 3500 men, arrived at Peshawer on the 27th of December, and shortly afterwards advanced to Jumrood, near the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The Khyberees having been previously gained by Akbar Khan, Brigadier Wyld had to force his way in spite of them. Accordingly on the 15th of January, 1842, he entered the pass, and succeeded so far as to carry the fort of Ali Musjid, which commands the most difficult portion of it. This however was the limit of success, and he was obliged, after sustaining severe loss both by casualty and desertion, to make a disastrous retreat. This serious disappointment to the defenders of Jelalabad was soon followed by a disaster which no human efforts could have averted. By unceasing labour they had destroyed an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, by demolishing forts and old walls, filling up ravines, cutting down groves, &c., had raised the parapets to six or seven feet high, repaired and widened the ramparts, extended the

bastions, retrenched three of the gates, covered the fourth with an outwork, and excavated a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve in width, and were congratulating themselves on being now secure against any Afghan attack. "But," to borrow again from Sir Robert Sale, "it pleased Providence on the 19th of February to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawer face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but it is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature."

A.D. 1812.

Tremendous
earthquake
at Jelalabad

FOUR OF ALI MURAD, in the Khyber Pass — From Lieutenant W. Barr's
March from Delhi to Peshawer and Cabool.

The garrison of Jelalabad lost not a day in commencing to repair the damage done to the fortifications, but Akbar Khan, now no longer employed in the extermination of the Cabool force, was

also on the alert, and made his appearance with a large body of troops at Murkail, about seven miles distant. The previous defeats sustained by his countrymen had taught him the danger of immediate approach, and he therefore contented himself at first with endeavouring to cut off the foraging parties of the garrison. After a short time, he ventured on a bolder course, and having formed two camps, one with his head-quarters two miles to the west; and the other about a mile to the east, invested the city and established a vigorous blockade. A series of skirmishes ensued, most harassing to the British, whose only object was to protect their parties, but invariably to their advantage, the Afghans never risking an encounter without paying dearly for their rashness. On the 10th of March, from a suspicion that the enemy had begun or were preparing to run a mine, a vigorous sortie was made on the following morning, and terminated as usual in the flight of the Afghans after considerable loss. This success freed the garrison from any danger of immediate attack, but did not otherwise improve their position, which was becoming more and more critical from a deficiency both of provisions and military stores. The former deficiency

Fortifica-
tions re-
paired.

A D 1842 was considerably relieved on the 1st of April, by a well-conducted sortie, which captured several large flocks of sheep; the prospect of supplying the latter was also brightening, as it was known that a large force which had assembled at Peshawer under General Pollock had already started.

Defeat of the
Afghans

On the 6th of April Akbar Khan fired a royal salute. On inquiring into the cause, different accounts were given. One was that it was in honour of a victory gained over General Pollock in the Khyber Pass; another that it was preparatory to Akbar Khan's departure, who had resolved to break up his camp and hasten to Cabool, to take advantage of a new revolution which had taken place there. In either case, it seemed advisable that the Afghan camp should be attacked, and accordingly at daybreak of the 7th, a large force, formed into three columns, moved out from the western gate of the city. Akbar Khan prepared for the encounter by drawing up his troops, estimated at about 6000 men, in front of the camp, resting his right on a fort, and his left on the Cabool. The central column directed its efforts against the fort, which from the annoyance it had formerly given, it was deemed of primary importance to capture. The struggle was severe, and cost Colonel Dennie his life. He had led his column with his usual gallantry, and after passing the outer wall was endeavouring to penetrate to the interior, when he fell mortally wounded. Meanwhile Captain Havelock had penetrated the enemy's extreme left, and was engaged in dubious conflict, when the recall of the 13th from the fort gave him a seasonable relief, and a combined attack was made on the camp. The result is thus told by Sir Robert Sale:—"We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, recaptured four guns lost by the Cabool and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our government is a matter of much honest exultation among our troops, seized and destroyed a great quantity of material and ordnance stores, and burned the whole of the enemy's tents. In short, the defeat of Mahomed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal." General Pollock was now at hand, and on the 16th of April, only nine days after the garrison had gained their last laurels, they had the happiness of receiving him and the ample succours he brought along with him within their gates. A few details of his march and the obstacles he successfully encountered, will form an appropriate appendix to the heroic defence of Jelalabad.

State of
affairs at
Peshawer

General Pollock reached Peshawer on the 5th of February, 1842, and found the state of the troops there even worse than the sinister reports which met him on his journey had represented. Wyld's defeat had filled them with dismay, and delegates from different regiments of his brigade were holding meetings by night for the purpose of resisting any order which might be given to advance. While this disaffection continued, no success was to be expected; and the question therefore was, whether he should wait for reinforcements which he knew to be on the march, or start with such materials as he had, at the

risk of "disaffection or cowardice." Prudence counselled him to wait, but Sale's urgency left him no alternative, and the march was commenced. His force was intended to amount in all to 12,000 men, but 4000 of these, chiefly Europeans, had not yet joined, while a considerable portion of the 8000 actually assembled were Sikhs, in whom little confidence could be placed.

A D 1312.

General
Pollock's ad-
vance from
Peshawar

Before starting, attempts had been made to gain the Khyberees, and part of a stipulated bribe had been paid in advance, but the marauding habits of the mountaineers were too strong to be overcome, and it soon became obvious that force would be necessary. Accordingly after reaching Jumrood, General Pollock started about half-past three on the morning of the 5th of April, in dim twilight, and with all possible secrecy. Immediately at the entrance of the pass the Khyberees had erected a strong barricade. It might have been stormed, but the more effective plan was adopted of turning it, and two columns of infantry began to crown the heights on either side. The mountaineers, astonished at seeing themselves thus compelled to maintain a hand-to-hand fight on ground where, from deeming it inaccessible, they had never dreamed of being attacked, soon gave way. The barricade thus left without defenders was easily surmounted, and the main body of the force encumbered with its long string of baggage, began to move slowly along the defile. Before evening closed, Ali Musjid was reached, and found to be evacuated. The key of the pass being thus secured, no further difficulty of a serious nature was experienced, and the relief of the garrison, after its five months of severe privation and heroic daring, was triumphantly achieved. How different its fate from that of the wretched fugitives from Cabool!

The Khyber
Pass forced
and Jelala-
bad relieved

While the honour of the British arms was maintained, and the disgrace of Cabool partly retrieved at Jelalabad, the tidings received from the south and south-west were of a mixed character. Nott was nobly doing his part at Candahar, but Ghuznee had fallen into the hands of the insurgents. Maclaren's brigade, which Nott against his better judgment had detached to Cabool, after a vain attempt to advance, retraced its steps, and reached Candahar on the 8th of December. The necessity of the return can scarcely be disputed, and yet it was in one respect most unfortunate. Ghuznee had been invested by the surrounding tribes as early as the 20th of November. It was ill provided either for a siege or a blockade, and the garrison therefore learned with no small delight that the enemy, alarmed at the advance of Maclaren, had suddenly retired. Colonel Palmer, the officer in command, availed himself of the respite to improve the works and lay in supplies, but had done little when the enemy, encouraged by Maclaren's retirement, reappeared. An act of humanity, praiseworthy in itself though injudicious under the circumstances, added greatly to the difficulty of the defence. The townspeople, instead of being turned out, were allowed to remain, and repaid the kindness thus shown them by admitting their countrymen outside through a hole which they had dug in the wall. The

Ghuznee
captured by
the Afghans

A D 1842

Glunzee
captured by
the Afghans

consequence was that the garrison were compelled on the 17th of December to shut themselves up within the citadel. There they continued to maintain themselves with the utmost difficulty till a letter of similar import to that sent by Pottinger and Elphinstone to Jelalabad arrived. Under the circumstances the commandant could hardly have been expected to imitate the spirited refusal of Sale and Macgregor to comply with the letter. He therefore on the 1st of March entered into an agreement to evacuate the place. Ultimately the sepoy of the garrison, who had thrown discipline aside, perished almost to a man in an attempt to force their way across the country to Peshawar, which they ignorantly imagined to be only fifty or sixty miles distant; and their British officers, who had surrendered on the futile promise of "honourable treatment," remained in rigorous confinement.



BRITISH COMMANDANT OF SHAH SHUJAH'S JANBAZ CAVALRY. 2 MEER
HUMAYUN OF THE JANBAZ CAVALRY. — FROM HART'S CHARACTERS AND COSTUME OF AFGHANISTAN

At Candahar, though the British force mustered nearly 9000 men, under the command of an officer of indomitable spirit and distinguished ability, the state of affairs was very alarming. "The good people here," wrote General Nott, "are anxiously looking for the result of the affairs at Cabool, when, should they be against us, they will try their strength." It was not merely open hostility, but treachery also that was to be dreaded.

State of
affairs at
Candahar

Of the latter a specimen was given on the 27th of December. Two corps of *janbaz* or Afghan cavalry in Shah Shujah's service, after murdering one British officer and mortally wounding another, moved off with a quantity of treasure which had been intrusted to them. This was the forerunner of more serious defections. Only two days after the mutiny of the *janbaz*, Prince Sufder Jung, a younger son of Shah Shujah, turned traitor, and joined Atta Mahomed, who, having been sent by the chiefs at Cabool into Western Afghanistan to raise the country, had encamped beyond the Urgandab, about forty miles north-west of Candahar.

In a previous part of the above letter Nott had pledged himself that if Sufder Jung and his rebels approached within twelve or fifteen miles of the city, he would move out and disperse them. The case supposed occurred much sooner than any had imagined. On the 12th of January, only four days afterwards, Sufder Jung and Atta Mahomed advanced within fifteen miles of Candahar at the head of a force estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 men, and took up a

A D 1842.

Afghan force
defeated
near Can-
daharMutual pre-
parationsOrder to
deliver up
Candahar
disregarded.Preparations
for defence

strong position on the right bank of the Urgandab. Nott lost no time in redeeming his pledge. Starting at the head of a force consisting of five and a half regiments of infantry, the Shah's 1st cavalry, a party of Skinner's horse, and sixteen guns, he came in sight of the enemy after four hours' march over a very difficult country. Without waiting to recruit their exhausted strength, the British troops immediately rushed to the encounter, by crossing the river. The enemy, scarcely waiting to receive them, broke and fled, but were not allowed to escape without severe chastisement.

The season for operations in the field was now past, and the two armies seemed not indisposed to suspend hostilities, the British troops holding the city, while the insurgents, now openly headed by Meerza Ahmed, a Dooranee chief, established their camp at no great distance. Intelligence of the envoy's murder was received at Candahar for the first time on the 30th of January, and prepared the garrison for still more dismal tidings. During the suspension of hostilities Nott had been unremitting in his exertions, and not only improved the fortifications, but laid in a stock of provisions for five months. He had never despaired of being able to maintain his position, and from his recent victory had reason to be more sanguine than ever, when the letter of Pottinger and Elphinstone directing the immediate evacuation both of Candahar and of Khelat-i-Ghilje arrived. It was addressed to Major Rawlinson as political resident, and was similar in import to that sent to Jelalabad.

Major Rawlinson did not recognize the authority of the order to evacuate, but thought that, taking all circumstances into consideration, it would be desirable so far to act upon it as to make it the basis of a negotiation, the terms of which might enable the British government, even in the event of retiring from Afghanistan, to retain a certain degree of political influence. Nott had no patience with this temporizing policy, and in answer to Rawlinson's official letter on the subject of evacuation wrote as follows:—"I have only to repeat that I will not treat with any person whatever for the retirement of the British troops from Afghanistan, until I shall have received instructions from the supreme government. The letter signed 'Eldred Pottinger' and 'W. K. Elphinstone' may or may not be a forgery. I conceive that these officers were not free agents at Cabool, and therefore their letter or order can have no weight with me."

In order to hold Candahar and also attack the insurgents encamped in its vicinity, it became necessary as a preliminary measure to expel from the city all who were known or believed to be disaffected. In this predicament stood almost all the families of pure Afghan descent, and accordingly on the 3d of March an order was issued for the expulsion of about 1000 families, containing according to the ordinary calculation 5000 to 6000 individuals. No direct opposition was experienced, and the clearance was completely effected by the 6th. The very next day, the other part of the design was proceeded with, and

A.D. 1842.

Afghan attempt to take Candahar by stratagem

Nott, leaving only about 2600 men to garrison the city, marched out with the remainder of his force to attack the enemy. In proportion as he advanced they retired, first across the Turnuk, and then across the Urgandab, keeping always so far in front as to prevent our infantry from coming in contact with them. This they were the more easily enabled to do, as in their whole force of 12,000 they had upwards of 6000 well-mounted cavalry, while the British had only a single wing of the Shah's horse. At last however, on the 9th, the artillery came near enough to open with effect, and the enemy broke and fled. It soon appeared that this flight was part of a premeditated plan; for instead of removing to a greater distance, the Afghans made a circuit which brought them into the British rear, and hastened back to Candahar. The object was to carry it by assault while the greater part of the garrison was absent. Accordingly early on the 10th, large bodies of the enemy made their appearance, and began to occupy the cantonments and gardens in the vicinity. During the day their numbers continued to increase, and towards evening Sufder Jung and Meerza Ahmed arrived. There could now be no doubt that an immediate attack was intended, and the garrison exerted themselves to make everything secure. It would seem however that sufficient caution had not been used. After sunset, a villager, pretending to be from a great distance, came up to the Herat gate with a donkey-load of faggots, and asked to be admitted. As the gate had been previously closed for the night, he was refused, and threw down his load against the gate, muttering that he would leave it there till morning. His conduct under the circumstances ought certainly to have aroused suspicion, but no notice was taken of it, and the faggots were allowed to remain. Shortly afterwards a party of the enemy stole up and poured oil and ghee over them. A similar process at the citadel gate was only accidentally defeated. The officer in charge of this gate was proceeding to fasten it, when something inducing him to look outside, he perceived several faggots laid against it. It immediately struck him that they had been placed there for some bad purpose, and he ordered them to be brought within. About eight o'clock, the faggots placed at the Herat gate burst suddenly into a flame, and set fire to the gate itself, which burned like tinder. The enemy immediately rushed forward and attempted to force an entrance. In this they were frustrated, mainly by the presence of mind of the commissary-general, who seeing the danger threw open the stores and formed a barricade on the gateway by means of bags of flour. The enemy still persisted, and even gained the barricade, but were met with such a deadly fire that after repeated attempts to assault, they finally drew off. Had they been able, as they intended, to make simultaneous and equally determined attacks on the other gates, the result might have been different.


It will now be necessary to withdraw a little from the scene of military operations, and attend to the proceedings of the Indian government. The position of the governor-general, in consequence of the disasters in Afghanistan,

It is frustrated

A.D. 1842.

Views of
government
on learning
the Afghan
disaster

was rendered still more embarrassing by the state of political parties at home. The Whig ministry was tottering to its fall, and was about to be succeeded by a Conservative ministry, which having made political capital out of the blunders in Afghanistan, would be obliged in mere consistency, if not from conviction, to adopt a different line of policy. Lord Auckland was not the man to struggle successfully against the difficulties of such a position, and his former confidence was succeeded by diffidence and vacillation. He could not now hope that the government, on his resigning it, would be carried on in accordance with his views, and he seems to have resolved to conduct it in future in such a manner as would be least embarrassing to his successor. The outbreaks which were constantly occurring in Afghanistan, as if to belie the envoy's promises of tranquillity, destroyed all hope of a permanent settlement before his successor should arrive; and when to these was added the astounding intelligence that the whole country had risen in rebellion, and that the British army, so far from being able to occupy it effectually, would in all probability have to fight their way out of it, the governor-general and his council lost no time in announcing their determination to shun the conflict. Accordingly the only orders issued to Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief, were to forward troops to Peshawer for the purpose of assisting the army in its expected retirement. At first it was supposed that one brigade would suffice for this purpose, but ultimately, not without some demur on the part of the governor-general, it was deemed expedient to detach a second brigade. Major-general Pollock, appointed to the command, hastened forward to Peshawer, under the impression that the only task assigned him was to relieve Salo's brigade, then beleaguered in Jelalabad, and facilitate the immediate evacuation of Afghanistan. In the south General Nott's command was continued, and both officers, contrary to what had hitherto been the usual order of precedence, were no longer to be subordinate, but superior to the political residents within their respective commands. The expediency of this arrangement, in unsettled countries where the sword was the only arbiter, cannot be questioned, but it ran so counter to existing prejudices and interests, that some credit is due to Lord Auckland's government for having resolved to adopt it.



GENERAL POLLOCK.—From a portrait by G. H. Ford

A.D. 1842

First proclamation promising vigorous measures.

At the date of the resolution conferring new, and to some extent discretionary powers on the military commanders, the full extent of the Cabool disaster was not known at Calcutta, but on the 30th of January letters were received which destroyed all hope, and made the reality even worse than had been apprehended. Severe as the blow must have been felt, not a day was lost in officially publishing it to the world, and at the same time pledging the government to the adoption and steadfast prosecution of the most active measures "for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the British government." A proclamation issued from Fort William on the 31st, after making the above declaration and adding that "the ample military means at the disposal of the British government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations and to cause efficient protection for its subjects and allies," continued thus, "a faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed by distance and difficulties of season from the possibility of succour. But the governor-general in council, while he most deeply laments the loss of the brave officers and men, regards the partial reverse only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British Indian army."

Subsequent despondency

The resolution displayed in the above proclamation was but feebly followed up, and the governor-general soon relapsed into a state of despondency and perplexity. There was no doubt much to embarrass him. He had no wish whatever to interfere with his successor's policy, and yet he would fain, before taking his departure, have achieved some success which might partially retrieve the honour of the British arms. Fortune however seemed to have entirely forsaken him, and the last military operation of importance undertaken during his government proved a disaster. Brigadier Wyld had entered the Khyber Pass, only to be ignominiously driven out of it. No wonder that Lord Auckland's heart sank within him, and that he now saw no alternative but immediate evacuation. In a letter dated 19th February, 1842, he wrote as follows:—"Since we have heard of the misfortunes of the Khyber Pass, and have been convinced that from the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jelalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jelalabad clear and positive, and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-general Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders, by confining his efforts to the same objects." In this desponding spirit Lord Auckland's administration closed, Lord Ellenborough, his successor, having arrived at Calcutta on the 28th of February.

A D 1842

Change of
language by
Lord Ellen
borough

At Calcutta he had, in concurrence with his council, declared it to be one of the main objects of government to re-establish "our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans," at Benares he spoke a language and issued orders dictated by a very different spirit. It was now his "deliberate opinion" that it is "expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-general Pollock and those under Major-general Nott at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India. That opinion is founded upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed." In accordance with this general view, the instructions given to the former general were to withdraw from Jelalabad and retire upon Peshawer, and to the latter to withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje, evacuate Candahar, and "take up a position at Quettah until the season may enable you to retire upon Sukkur."

General
England's
defeat in the
Kojuk Pass.

This sudden change of the governor-general's "deliberate opinion," can only be accounted for by new intelligence which he had received from Afghanistan, and which, by its chequered character, threw him into perplexity. While cheered by accounts of the triumphant defence of Jelalabad, the dispersion of Akbar Khan's camp, and the junction of Sale and Pollock, he learned that these successes in the north were counterbalanced by disasters in the south. Ghuznee had fallen, and though Khelat-i-Ghiljje, which was considered far less tenable, continued to make a gallant defence, a new defeat had been sustained by the British arms. Brigadier England, then commanding the Scinde field force, had been ordered, as formerly mentioned, to march from Dadur through the Bolan Pass towards Quettah, and thence penetrate through the Kojuk Pass for the purpose of reinforcing General Nott, and conveying to him supplies of treasure, ammunition, and medicines. He had with him only five companies of her Majesty's 41st, six companies of Bombay native infantry, a troop of Bombay cavalry, fifty Poonah horse, and four horse-artillery guns. On the 28th of March he arrived at the entrance of a defile leading to the village of Hykulzye, where he intended to halt for the remainder of his brigade, which was then advancing through the Bolan Pass. In the hope that General Nott would send two or three regiments to the Kojuk Pass, he had resolved to halt in the Pisheen valley till they should arrive; and it was only after learning that no such co-operation was to be expected that he had moved forward towards Hykulzye. This movement was made without due consideration. He had been distinctly warned that the enemy were preparing to dispute his passage; and yet, instead of waiting for the arrival of his whole brigade, he continued rashly to advance, in total ignorance of the country, and with so little precaution that he was not even aware of the presence of the enemy till he was almost in contact with them. The result was an unequal conflict, during which 100 out of his small party of 500 were killed or wounded, and he

A D 1842.

General
England's
defeat.

was compelled to give way. On the following morning he ordered a retreat, and continued it as far as Quettah, where he began to entrench himself as if pursued by an overwhelming force. The moral effect of this defeat was far more damaging than the actual loss. Indeed the governor-general distinctly ascribed to it his change of policy. "The severe check experienced by Brigadier England's small corps on the 28th ultimo—an event disastrous as it was unexpected, and of which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the results—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of movement and of action which were possessed by General Nott, as to render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of that officer's corps, by withdrawing it at the earliest practicable period from its advanced position into nearer communication with India."

General
condemnation
of the
governor-
general's
retrograde
policy.

Both to Pollock and Nott the peremptory orders to withdraw were mortifying in the extreme, and neither of them was slow in giving utterance to his feelings. So anxious indeed was the former to retain his position, in the hope that the governor-general might yet adopt a more manly policy, that he dexterously availed himself of a deficiency of carriage, and declared that until it was supplied he had not the means of retiring to Peshawer. To Nott, who had repeatedly declared himself in similar terms, the order to withdraw must if possible have been still more mortifying. Brigadier England after his ignominious retreat seems to have settled it in his own mind that he was never more to attempt to penetrate the Kojuk Pass, and thus coolly addressed his superior officer:—"Whenever it so happens that you retire bodily in this direction, and that I am informed of it, I feel assured that I shall be able to make an advantageous diversion in your favour." This letter completely exhausted Nott's patience, and called forth a severe reply, in which he said—"I think it absolutely necessary that a strong brigade of 2500 men should be immediately pushed from Quettah to Candabar with the supplies noted in the foregoing paragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a brigade of three regiments of infantry and a troop of horse artillery, with a body of cavalry, to march from Candabar on the morning of the 25th instant. This force will certainly be at Chummun, at the northern foot of the Kojuk, on the morning of the 1st of May, and possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall therefore fully rely on your marching a brigade from Quettah, so that it may reach the southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date." The brigadier, not daring to disobey this peremptory order, started again from Quettah on the 26th of April, and must have been almost as much mortified as gratified to find that the fears which haunted him were imaginary. At Hykulzye, which was reached on the 28th, the enemy occupied the same barricades, and in greater force than before; but it was only to show how utterly unable they were to cope with British troops properly handled, for after little more than a show of resistance they turned their backs and fled.

New advance
of General
England
through
Kojuk Pass.

A D 1842.

Irritation
occasioned
to General
Nott by
order to
retire

On the 30th he arrived at the southern entrance of the Kojuk Pass, and sending his advance-guard along the heights, had the satisfaction to find those in front already occupied by the Candahar troops. The united brigades continued their march without interruption, and reached Candahar on the 10th of May. It was at the very time when Nott had received the supplies, the want of which had kept him almost inactive, and was in hopes of being able to advance to the relief of Khelat-i-Ghiljje, and perhaps at the same time strike a blow which might in some measure retrieve the honour of the British arms, that he received official information of Lord Ellenborough's retrograde policy, which was in fact nothing more than a reiteration of the cuckoo note "Withdraw." His mortification appears to have been so great that he could not trust himself to give utterance to it, and he therefore simply replied on the 17th of May—"These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions of his lordship accomplished in the best manner circumstances will admit of." His real feeling was doubtless expressed by Major Rawlinson, who on the following day wrote to Major Outram, "The peremptory order to retire has come upon us like a thunder clap. No one at Candahar is aware of such an order having been received except the general and myself, and we must preserve a profound secrecy as long as possible." He added the reason for this secrecy—"When our intended retirement is once known, we must expect to have the whole country up in arms, and to obtain no cattle except such as we can violently lay hands on. If the worst comes to the worst we must abandon all baggage and stores, and be content to march with sufficient food to convey us to Quettah." Notwithstanding these apprehensions, Nott, feeling that the peremptory orders of the governor-general deprived him of all discretionary power, proceeded to carry them into execution, and on the 19th of May despatched a brigade which he had prepared for the relief of the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje to assist the garrison in evacuating the place after destroying its works. This was indeed a humiliating employment. Only two days before the garrison, which, under the command of Captain Halket Craigie, had made a most meritorious defence, had crowned all their previous achievements by the repulse of a formidable assault, during which 300 of the enemy are said to have fallen, and now the only result was something like an acknowledgment of defeat by an abandonment of the place as no longer tenable.

Lord Ellen-
borough's
misgivings.

Lord Ellenborough, while he scarcely omitted an opportunity of repeating his unaltered "determination to withdraw," was not without misgivings as to its soundness. He was well aware that it was generally reprobated, and that the best Indian authorities, civil and military, were unanimous in condemning the evacuation of Afghanistan, at least until the English captives were released, and some blow struck which would show to all the world that the British government was perfectly able, had it so willed, to retain possession of the country. At first his lordship affected to despise public opinion, and refer-

ring to the opposition experienced from distinguished officials, expressed himself thus vauntingly:—"The danger is in the position of the army, almost without communication with India, too far off to return quickly at any season, unable from the season to return now, without adequate supplies of food or courage. This is the danger which all the great statesmen in India would perpetuate if they could, and while they maintain it, destroy the confidence of the sepoy and ruin our finances. If I save this country, I shall save it in spite of every man in it who ought to give me support, but I will save it in spite of them all." These were mere words. At the very time when his lordship used them, he was beginning to feel his position untenable, and preparing to back out of it, provided he could devise some means by which he could save or at least seem to save his dignity and consistency.

A D 1842
Opposition
to the
governor
general's
policy

By the treaty concluded between the British authorities at Cabool and the Afghan chiefs, Shah Shujah had the option of returning to India or of continuing in temporary possession of the Bala Hissar. He chose the latter, because he had been flattered into the belief that the chiefs would still recognize him as their lawful monarch. The effect of this arrangement was only to make him a tool in their hands, and to place him in a dilemma, from which far more wisdom than he possessed would not have sufficed to extricate him. There was an irreconcilable enmity between the Afghans and their British invaders, and it was therefore impossible for him to retain the friendship of both. There is little reason to doubt that if he could have been sure of the fidelity of his countrymen, he would at once have given them the preference, and forgotten all the obligations which he owed to the British government. But as it was only too probable that he might be again compelled to apply to it for an asylum, his true policy seemed to be to avoid as far as possible coming to an open rupture with either the British or the Afghans. His own letters completely furnish signal proofs both of his cunning and his perplexity, but it is needless to give any details. He was totally unworthy of the support which the British government in an evil hour had resolved to give him, and he was now endeavouring to play a double game, in which it was hardly possible for him not to be a loser. He was safe only while he remained within the Bala Hissar, and therefore the chiefs who were bent on his destruction used every means in their power to allure him beyond its walls. This was no easy task, as he was aware of his danger, but they succeeded at last by throwing doubts on his sincerity, and insisting that he could only wipe off the suspicion by placing himself at the head of the Afghan troops, and accompanying them to Jelalabad, on a projected expedition to expel the British. A reluctant consent having been wrung from him, and his personal safety having been guaranteed by the most solemn oaths, he moved out of the Bala Hissar on the 4th of April, and in the course of the same day returned to it unharmed. The fact seemed to prove that his fears were groundless, and it was therefore announced that on

Fate of Shah
Shujah

A.D. 1842

Murder of
Shah Shujah

the following morning he would review his troops encamped at Seeah Sung, and forthwith start with them for Jelalabad. He kept his word, and having descended at an early hour from the Bala Hissar, under a salute and with all the insignia of royalty, was proceeding towards the camp, when a party of Afghan marksmen starting suddenly from an ambush levelled their pieces and fired a murderous volley. Shah Shujah's death must have been instantaneous, as one of the balls had entered his brain. Shujah-ul-Dowlah, son of the Newab Zemaun Khan, who had plotted the assassination, hastened up to satisfy himself that the deed was done, and stood gazing at it while others of the assassins busied themselves in stripping the dead body of its jewels, and then threw it into a ditch. It would seem however that the assassins had mis-calculated their strength, for before the night closed, Futteh Jung, the second son of Shah Shujah, was carried to the Bala Hissar and proclaimed king. He was able in consequence to rescue his father's body from further indignity, and to bring it back to the palace, where all the honours of royal sepulture were bestowed upon it. The elevation of Futteh Jung was followed by a state of anarchy, during which the guns of the Bala Hissar were opened on the city, and rival factions met in deadly conflict in its streets. The details however are devoid of interest, and we therefore proceed to exhibit a new phase of the governor-general's policy.

The order to
withdraw
from Af-
ghanistan
virtually
counter-
manded.

After leaving his council, as already seen, at Calcutta, Lord Ellenborough had taken the additional step of becoming his own commander-in-chief, and as if he had forgotten, or was disposed to ignore the fact that that office was still held by Sir Jasper Nicolls, began to communicate his orders directly to Generals Pollock and Nott. Lord Ellenborough, by his last instructions, had consented, at least by implication, that Pollock should not retire from Jelalabad till October, and on this ground had given Nott to understand that a similar delay on his part would not be objected to. While thus obviously changing his policy, he was most anxious to disguise the fact, because he appears to have dreaded nothing so much as a candid admission that he had receded from a resolution which he had once formed, and even declared to be immutable. Accordingly he continued to address letters to the two generals, in which he never failed to remind them that "withdraw" was still his watchword, and yet in these very letters express permission was given to the one to advance upon Cabool, and to the other to meet him there, after a march through the heart of the country, by way of Gluznee. The inflexible resolution to withdraw, and the permission to advance, look very like a contradiction, but Lord Ellenborough had succeeded in reconciling them by a very extraordinary device. "Withdraw" was still the order of the day, but there were different modes of effecting it. General Nott, for instance, instead of taking the shortest road, and retiring into Scinde by the Bolan Pass, might prefer to go a thousand miles about, and after traversing Afghanistan from south to north, reach India

by the Khyber Pass and the Punjab. Some may say that to speak of such a march as a "withdrawal," was a mere play upon words—in short, a despicable quibble. The governor-general thought differently, and saw in this very quibble the means of at once saving his own consistency, and retrieving the honour of the British arms. As the device, whatever may be thought of it in other respects, is original, his lordship must be permitted to explain it in his own words. In a letter to General Nott, dated Allahabad, 4th July, 1842, he wrote as follows:—"Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure commended by considerations of political and military prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Afghanistan at the earliest period at which their retirement can be effected, consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have received remain unaltered, but the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Afghanistan, induce me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country." His lordship next proceeded to canvass the merits of the only two lines supposed to be practicable—the one by Quetta and Sukkur, and the other by Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelalabad. By the former, "there is no enemy to oppose you," and "the operation is one admitting of no doubt as to its success." On the other hand, "if you determine upon moving upon Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelalabad, you will require for the transport of provisions a much larger amount of carriage, and you will be practically without communications from the time of your leaving Candahar, dependent entirely upon the courage of your army for the opening of a new communication by an ultimate junction with Major-general Pollock." After adding more in the same strain, his lordship continued thus:—"I do not undervalue the aid which our government in India would receive from the successful execution of a march through Ghuznee and Cabool, over the scenes of our late disasters. I know all the effects which it would have on the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin, and I would inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also." It was scarcely fair to blow hot and cold in this manner, and instead of dictating the course to be adopted, to throw the whole responsibility of selection on the military commander. It is easy however to see that Lord Ellenborough, while professing to leave the question open, had not only decided it in his own mind, but was perfectly satisfied that on the part of Nott there would not be a moment's hesitation. Accordingly, the greater part of his letter proceeds on the assumption that

A. D. 1842.

Letter from
the governor
general
to General
Nott

Responsibility
thrown
on the
latter

A D 1842 the longer, but more honourable route, would certainly be chosen. "If you should be enabled by a *coup de main* to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabool, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee his club which hangs over it, and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnauth. These will be just trophies of your successful march." Apparently as an additional inducement to choose the Ghuznee route, Nott was informed that a copy of his letter would be forwarded to Pollock, with instructions to make a forward movement to facilitate his advance, and that the operations of the two armies would be combined upon their approach, "so as to effect with the least possible loss the occupation of Cabool, and to keep open the communication between Cabool and Peshawar."

Nott's march
from Candahar
towards
Ghuznee

The original instructions of the governor-general to retire from Afghanistan by the nearest practicable route having been virtually withdrawn, the two generals did not hesitate for a moment to accept the responsibility which was somewhat selfishly and ungenerously thrown upon them, and had no sooner been made aware by correspondence of their mutual resolves than they began to execute them. Nott, as having the longer march to perform, was the first to move. Having despatched Brigadier England with five regiments and a half, twelve guns, and some cavalry, for the purpose of returning by the Bolan Pass, he himself prepared to take the much longer and more difficult route with the remainder of his force. Candahar was finally evacuated on the 7th of August, and on the 9th Nott made his first march northward in the direction of Ghuznee. A proclamation by which he assured the population "of protection, and of payment for every article," was attended with the best effects, and the march continued undisturbed as far as Mookur, 130 miles north-east of Candahar, and 40 miles S.S.E. of Ghuznee. This place was reached on the 27th of August. By this time the enemy had made their appearance in some force, and there was every reason to believe that a conflict was at hand. Shumsooden, the governor of Ghuznee, was in the field at the head of a considerable force, and had taken up a position which is said to be the most defensible on the entire road between Candahar and Cabool. On the 28th of August the first actual skirmish took place, and with a result not at all creditable to the British arms. The grass-cutters had been sent out for forage, and were thus engaged when it was reported to the officer in charge of them that the enemy had come suddenly upon them and were cutting them to pieces. He at once moved out with all the cavalry at his disposal, and on finding that it was a false alarm went forward to reconnoitre. When about three miles from the camp he fell in with a small body of infantry, and having easily put them to flight was tempted to follow in pursuit. He was thus brought to the foot of a range of hills, and on winding round one of them was surprised to

First encounter
with the
enemy

find them crowned by a considerable number of jezailchees, who immediately opened a galling fire. There was nothing for it but retreat, which was made in good order, until a kind of panic was produced by a charge of about 150 of the enemy's horse, and the British troopers actually turned and fled. On seeing the approach of the British main body, the enemy, satisfied with what they had already achieved, moved off. A D 1812.

The effect of the affair of the 28th was to add greatly to the number of Shumsooden's troops, and at the same time to inspire him with so much confidence that he began to think of assuming the offensive. Accordingly on the 30th, while Nott was marching on Ghoaine, the Afghan governor moved parallel to him, and took up a position on the hills to the right. To tempt him to a fair trial of strength, Nott, about three in the afternoon, moved out with one half of his force. The challenge was at once accepted, and a battle was fought, which cannot be more briefly or fairly described than in the general's despatch. "The enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position; their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge, until their flank rested on a fort filled with men. They opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse-artillery guns, which were admirably served; our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c., &c., and dispersing them in every direction; one hour more daylight would have enabled me to destroy the whole of their infantry. Shumsooden fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen."



GANYARA, OR GRASS-CUTTER.
From Selwyn, Les Hindous.

Defeat of the
Afghans

Recapture
of Ghuznee.

This victory allowed the British force to advance without further interruption to Ghuznee. "On the morning of the 5th instant," says Nott, "I moved on to Ghuznee. I found the city full of men, and a range of mountains running north-east of the fortress covered by heavy bodies of cavalry and infantry; the gardens and ravines near the town were also occupied." "I at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping my force. The troops ascended the height in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained. The village of Bullool is situated about 600 yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to

A D. 1842. the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery, to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it to be occupied by two regiments of infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into camp. The engineer officers, sappers and miners, and infantry working parties, were employed under the direction of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in erecting a battery for four eighteen-pounders. These guns were moved from the camp before daylight on the morning of the 6th, but before they had reached the position assigned them, it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress." Possession of the place being thus obtained, what was called the work of retribution commenced by blowing up the fortifications, and setting fire to the principal buildings. The anxiety of the governor-general to obtain the club and shield of Mahmood of Ghuznee, and the gates of his tomb, said to be those of the ancient Hindoo temple of Somnauth, was not forgotten. In regard to the club and shield, his lordship could not be gratified, as they had disappeared some time before; but he was delighted above measure on learning that the gates were secured, and expressed his delight in a private letter to General Nott, abounding in minute and frivolous details as to the mode in which the gates were to be paraded on the march, and carried to their final destination.

Nott's victory at Maidan.

After the capture of Ghuznee Nott continued his march and met with no opposition till the 14th of September, when on arriving at Maidan, only twenty miles south-west of Cabool, he found Shumsooden, Sultan Jan, and other Afghan chiefs, prepared to dispute his further progress. Their force, estimated at about 12,000 men, occupied a series of heights commanding the line of road. It was immediately attacked. The result is given in a single sentence of Nott's despatch on the subject: "Our troops beat them and dislodged them in gallant style, and their conduct afforded me the greatest satisfaction." This was the last affair of any consequence in which the Candahar force was engaged. The march of the 17th September brought it within five miles of the capital, which was already in the occupation of General Pollock, of whose triumphant march a brief account must now be given.

Triumphant march of General Pollock.

The force under General Pollock, mustering about 8000 men, made its first march from Jelalabad on the 20th of August, and reached Gundamuck on the 23d. Here, as the enemy appeared in some force, several days were spent in desultory operations not of sufficient importance to deserve detail, and it was not till the 7th of September that the march was resumed by the first division under Sir Robert Sale, while the second division under General McNeill prepared to follow next day. On the 8th when the advance reached Jugluluck, large bodies of the enemy were seen occupying the heights which formed an amphitheatre inclining to the left of the road. Without waiting the arrival of the second division Pollock immediately ordered the attack. It was for some time met with great firmness, the enemy steadily maintaining their posts

while the shells of our howitzers were bursting among them, but the impetuous gallantry of the assailants, composed chiefly of the old Jelalabad garrison, was irresistible, and a complete victory was gained. The success of the first division materially facilitated the progress of the second, and both divisions again united at Tezeen on the 11th. The Afghan chiefs, having become convinced of their inability to offer any effectual resistance, held a conference, and resolved to endeavour to save themselves by submitting to terms. With this view Akbar Khan, who held Captain Troup as one of his prisoners or hostages, sent for him and told him that he was immediately to proceed to Gundamuck to General Pollock, and offer on the part of the Afghan chiefs submission to any terms he might be pleased to dictate, provided he would stay the advance of his army on Cabool. Troup knowing that the time for negotiation had passed, represented the utter uselessness of the proposed journey. Akbar Khan appears to have taken the same view, for immediately on learning that the British force was halting in the Jugduluck Pass, and might probably be entangled in it, he moved his camp from Boothauk to Khoord Cabool, and then hastened forward to Tezeen. Here the British position was by no means free from peril. It was in the bottom of a valley completely encircled by hills. Some of these had been prudently occupied, but many others remained, of which the enemy hastened to avail themselves by posting large bodies of jezailchees on them. Such was the state of matters on the 13th of September, and it became necessary to decide whether this valley, where the bones of one British force already lay bleaching, was again to become the scene of a similar disaster; or whether, on the contrary, it was to witness the retrieval of the honour of the British arms, and the signal punishment of Afghan perfidy and cruelty.

A.D. 1842.

The Afghan chiefs resolve to offer submission

Recapture of Cabool.


The circumstances in which this battle was about to be fought were sufficient to call forth the utmost energies of the combatants on both sides. The Afghans, elated with their previous success on the same spot, hoped that they were to achieve a second and still more glorious victory, while they also knew that defeat would involve the loss of their capital, and it might be the loss of their national independence. The British were animated by still stronger motives. Their companions in arms whose remains lay scattered around them were calling aloud for vengeance, and the only question now was, whether by victory they were to give a true response to this call, or by defeat to be in like manner exterminated. The battle began with a body of Afghan horse, who, tempted by the baggage in the plain, descended in the hope of plunder. Before they could effect their object they found themselves in a whirlwind of British cavalry, who at once threw them into confusion and put them to disastrous flight. In the meantime the British had climbed the heights, and trusting only to the bayonet were carrying everything before them. The enemy thus deprived of the double advantage which they expected to find in their elevated position and the long range of their jezails, made a very ineffectual resistance.

A D 1842

Recapture
of Cabool.

As soon as they saw that the British had cleared the ascent they acknowledged their defeat and dispersed. Akbar Khan fled almost unattended to the Ghorebund valley, leaving his troops to seek their safety where they could, while General Pollock continued his march without further interruption through Khoord Cabool and Boothauk, and encamped on the 15th of September on the race-course at Cabool. On the following day he proceeded to the Bala Hissar and planted the British colours on its ramparts.

The Jelalabad and Candahar forces having now triumphantly effected a junction by means of a mutual advance, which according to the governor-general was



TOWER AT TEZEEN, where General Elphinstone died
From *Exile & Prison Sketches*.

not, and was never meant to be an advance at all, the principal thing now remaining was to commence the real withdrawal by evacuating Afghanistan and returning to India. There were still, however, several objects of importance to be accomplished, and to these it will be necessary to advert. The first undoubtedly was the release of the captives. The married families were, as has been already related, committed to the charge of Akbar Khan on the 9th of January, 1842. He was bound by express promise to protect them from harm and conduct them in safety to Jelalabad, which the unfortunate Cabool force was vainly endeavouring to reach. On the 11th they were conducted over ground thickly strewn with the mangled remains of their slaughtered countrymen,

and lodged in the fort of Tezeen. On the 13th when they were taken to Jugduluck, they found General Elphinstone and Captain Johnson, who had been detained as hostages for the evacuation of Jelalabad. They were afterwards carried from place to place in Akbar Khan's train, and on the 17th were lodged in the fort of Budeeabad, belonging to Mahomed Shah Khan, Akbar Khan's father-in-law. Here Akbar Khan left them, and they continued to reside for nearly three months, suffering many privations, but also enjoying some comforts, of which none were more highly prized than the privilege of meeting together every Sunday for religious service. Shortly after Sale's signal defeat of Akbar Khan, his father-in-law arrived with a large party of followers, and announced to the captives that they were immediately to depart from Budeeabad. Of their new destination he said nothing, but like a mean-hearted wretch he busied himself in plundering them. Thus stripped of every-

Adventures
of the
English
captives.

thing of value, the whole of the captives were removed under a guard of fifty Afghans, and commenced a mysterious journey, no one knew whither. After various movements they were brought back to Tezeen on the 19th of April, and remained there till the 22d, when they were carried off towards the mountains and lodged in a place called Zandah. The only persons left behind were a few invalids, one of them General Elphinstone, who was completely broken down by disease and anxiety, and a few days after breathed his last.

A.D. 1842

Adventures
of the
English
captives

On the 23d of May the captives were brought down from Zandah and lodged in a fort belonging to a chief of the name of Ali Mahomed, on the banks of the Loghur, only about three miles from Cabool. Here their privations were far fewer than they had been at any previous period of their captivity, and they were even permitted to exchange visits with the British hostages detained in the Bala Hissar. Ever and anon, however, they were alarmed by rumours that Akbar Khan was about to carry them off to Turkestan. These rumours were only too well founded, for on the 25th of August they were ordered to start for Bamian under an escort of 300 men. They reached it on the 3d of September. In the intention of Akbar Khan this was only the first stage of their journey to a hopeless captivity beyond the Hindoo Koosh, but the inhuman design was happily frustrated. Saleh Mahomed, the commander of the escort, was not inaccessible to a bribe, and on the 11th of September, after producing a letter from Akbar Khan, instructing him to convey his prisoners to Kooloom and deliver them to the Wullee, concluded by intimating that he had just received a message sent by Mohun Lal, through one Syud Moorteza Shah, promising that if he would release the prisoners, General Pollock would make him a present of 20,000 rupees, and guarantee him in a pension for life of 1000 rupees a month. "Now," continued Saleh Mahomed, "I know nothing of General Pollock, but if you three gentlemen (Pottinger, Lawrence, and Johnson) will swear by your Saviour to make good to me what Syud Moorteza Shah states that he is authorized to offer, I will deliver you over to your own people." It was not the first time that a similar proposal had been mooted, and as it was now made in earnest it was at once accepted. An agreement was accordingly drawn out in Persian, and signed by Messrs. Pottinger, Johnson, Mackenzie, and Lawrence. It was to the following effect:—"Whenever Saleh Mahomed shall free us from the power of Mahomed Akbar Khan, we agree to make him a present of 20,000 rupees, and to pay him monthly the sum of 1000 rupees; likewise to obtain for him the command of a regiment in the government service." The four officers having thus bound themselves personally, it was only fair that their responsibility should be shared by their fellow-captives. This was accordingly done by a regular agreement in the following terms, dated "In our prison at Bamian, 11th September, 1842:" "We whose signatures are hereunto attached, do bind ourselves to pay into the hands of Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, on condition of our release being


Their re-
moval to
Bamian.Arrangements for
setting them
at liberty

A D 1842

Arrangements for setting the English captives at liberty

effected by an arrangement with Saleh Mahomed Khan, such a number of month's pay and allowances as they shall demand from us—such pay and allowances to be rated by the scale at which we shall find ourselves entitled to draw from the date of our release from captivity. We who are married do further agree to pay the same amount for our wives and families as for ourselves. We whose husbands are absent do pledge ourselves in proportion to our husbands' allowances. We who are widows (Lady Macnaghten and Mrs Sturt) do pledge ourselves to pay such sums as may be demanded from us by Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, in furtherance of the above scheme."

No time was lost by Saleh Mahomed in carrying out his part of the agreement, for the British flag was immediately hoisted on the fort, and active



VILLAGE OF URGUNDEH —From Atkinson's Sketches in Afghanistan

Their final release

preparations were made to put it in a state of defence, and furnish it with the necessary supplies. This happily proved to be a work of supererogation, for on the 15th of September a horseman arrived with the glad news of Akbar Khan's defeat by General Pollock at Tezeen. The resolution, immediately taken, was to quit the fort and start for Cabool. They had made their first day's journey, and were bivouacking in the clear moonlight, when another horseman arrived, to intimate that Sir Richmond Shakespere, General Pollock's military secretary, at the head of 600 Kuzzilbash horse, was hastening to their relief. His arrival on the 17th put an end to all their fears, and made them feel that they were prisoners no longer. An agreeable surprise was still reserved for them. On the 20th, when nearing Urgundeh, a large body of British infantry and cavalry was perceived, and proved to be a portion of Sale's brigade, with the hero himself at its head. The meeting may be better conceived than described. Shortly after the reoccupation of Cabool, it was deemed expedient to send

General M'Caskill with a detachment against Istalif in the Kohistan, where A D. 1812.
 Amcen-collah Khan was reported to be collecting the remains of Akbar Khan's
 defeated army. As the place, situated about twenty miles N.N.W. of Cabool, Expedition
 on a spur of the Hindoo Koosh, was supposed by the Afghans to be almost against
 impregnable, and had in consequence been selected by them as a safe asylum Istalif.
 for their families and deposit for their treasure, considerable resistance was
 anticipated, and the force employed was proportionably large. M'Caskill arrived
 within four miles of Istalif on the 28th of September, and found that its
 strength had apparently not been overrated. The town rose in terraces on the
 slope of a mountain, and besides being protected by numerous forts, was accessible
 only by surmounting heights separated by deep ravines, or threading narrow
 passages lined on each side by strong inclosure walls of vineyards and gardens.
 Fortunately the enemy, confident in the strength of their position, had not
 been very careful in making their arrangements for defence, and when the
 British troops advanced on the morning of the 29th to the attack with the
 greatest gallantry, they soon cleared the approaches. The assault immediately
 followed, and was completely successful. In the town much booty was found,
 and outrages must doubtless have been committed, but the victors appear to
 have conducted themselves with singular moderation, and were able indignantly
 to repel the calumnious charges of barbarity that were afterwards brought
 against them. After burning down about a third part of the town, General
 M'Caskill marched northward to Charikur, which was likewise burned down,
 as a kind of wild revenge for the annihilation of a British force in its vicinity.

Futteh Jung, who on the murder of his father had been set up as a puppet Puppet
 king, had soon been displaced, and after suffering imprisonment, had found his kings at
 way in a state of utter destitution to General Pollock's camp at Gundamuck. Cabool.
 His reception was friendly, and he was even encouraged to hope that British
 influence would yet reinstate him. He accordingly accompanied the British
 force to Cabool, and formed a prominent object in the cavalcade which marched
 through the town to take possession of the Bala Hissar. When the British flag
 was hoisted on the ramparts, he had already seated himself on the musnud,
 and again performed a ceremony of installation, at which, not very wisely, the
 principal British officers assisted, Pollock sitting in a chair of state on the
 right and M'Caskill on the left of the throne. The countenance thus afforded
 him was of little avail, and when he saw himself about to be thrown on his
 own resources by the approaching departure of the British army, he announced
 his wish to return with it, rather than wear a crown which he knew would
 soon cost him his life. The throne was thus once more vacant, and it was
 deemed necessary to fill it. A candidate was found in the young prince Shah-
 poor, another of Shah Shujah's sons, who, undeterred by the examples of his
 father and brother, had ambition enough to risk a similar fate. It was not
 long before he experienced it, for the British forces had not reached India when

A D 1842 the news of his dethronement arrived. One thing however his accession had secured. The Bala Hissar, which had been doomed to destruction, was saved, and the retribution which it had been judged necessary to inflict on the capital of Afghanistan for the cruelty and treachery of its inhabitants, fell chiefly on the Great Bazaar, one of the finest of its kind in the East, which, after an ineffectual attempt to destroy it piece-meal by mechanical agency, was blown up with gunpowder. There was something wanton in thus destroying a building solely devoted to purposes of trade and commerce. The only excuse for selecting it was, that the mutilated remains of Sir William Macnaghten had been exposed and ignominiously treated within its walls.

Destruction
of the Great
Bazaar
Cabool

Evacuation
of Afghan-
istan

The British army finally quitted Cabool on the 12th of October, 1842. The advance of both divisions had been a series of triumphs, and Lord Ellenborough was all impatience to publish them to the world in official proclamations. When intelligence of the re-occupation of Cabool reached him, he was residing at Simla, and immediately prepared the necessary document. On the 1st of October he submitted it to Sir Jasper Nicolls, and on the very same day he signed it. In the date and place of execution there was a curious coincidence which his lordship doubtless perceived, and of which he was not unwilling to take advantage. Exactly four years before, on the very same day, and from the very same room, Lord Auckland had issued his manifesto explaining the grounds on which he had undertaken the Afghan war. The contrast between that document and the one now issued was very striking, and could not possibly have been overlooked, though no special reference had been made to it; but Lord Ellenborough deemed it necessary to be still more explicit, and without exactly saying it in words, took care to let the world know that he was a far wiser and more successful statesman than his predecessor. In no other way can we account for the appearance of the proclamation with the date 1st October. It was not issued for many days after, and had it not been antedated, might have communicated the gratifying intelligence that the English captives, about whose fate the public mind had been kept anxiously on the stretch, were at length released. This fact which was not known to his lordship on the 1st of October, was known to him when he issued his proclamation, but he could not mention it without either committing an anachronism, or altering the original date. The latter alternative his vanity would not permit him to adopt, and therefore his proclamation when it appeared ignored the most interesting fact which he could have inserted in it, and even left it to be inferred, as Nott expressed it in his gruff way, that "the captives had been thrown overboard by the government."

Having issued his proclamation, Lord Ellenborough might have felt that his part in connection with the Afghan war was played out, and that nothing more remained than to allow the troops to take up their different stations, and then await the honours which the crown might be pleased to confer as rewards.

A D 1842.

Lord Ellenborough's proclamation regarding the gates of Somnauth.

for distinguished services. Unfortunately for himself, his lordship took a very different view of the course to be adopted. The gates of Somnauth, about which he had been so puerile and minute in his instructions, and to which he attached so much importance that he had required Nott to guard them as he would his colours, had been transported to the frontier. It was now necessary publicly to announce their arrival, and acquaint the world with the mode in which they were to be disposed of, and forthwith appeared an address in which, indulging in extravagant orientalisms, he sets himself at open variance with good taste, right feeling, and sound policy. As a specimen of this miserable effusion, and in justification of the censure passed upon it, it will suffice to quote its commencement.

"From the Governor-general to all the Princes, and Chiefs, and People of India."

"MY BROTHERS AND MY FRIENDS,—Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnauth in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. The insult of 800 years is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory, the proof of your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus. To you, princes and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarra, of Malwah, and of Gujerat, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful war. You will yourselves with all honour transmit the gates of sandal wood through your respective territories, to the restored temple of Somnauth. The chiefs of Sirhind shall be informed at what time our victorious army will first deliver the gates of the temple into their guardianship, at the foot of the bridge of the Sutlej."

When the "proclamation of the gates" appeared, it was received with many doubts of its genuineness. These, however, were only too soon dispelled by the stubborn fact, and it only remained for his friends to blush, and his opponents to exult and laugh at the folly of which he had been guilty. The story of the gates would not be complete without mentioning that Lord Ellenborough, when he indited what the Duke of Wellington called his "song of triumph," was totally in error as to the point of fact. The gates were not those of Somnauth, and their date was much more recent than the time of Mahmood of Ghuznee.

CHAPTER VI.

Relations with Scinde—Lord Ellenborough's policy in regard to it—New treaty—Proceedings of Sir Charles Napier—Capture of Emaumghur—British residency at Hyderabad attacked—Battles of Meance and Dubba—Subsequent proceedings—Annexation of Scinde—Relations with Scindas—Hostilities commenced—Victories of Maharajpooor and Puniar—New treaty with Scindia—Abrupt recall of Lord Ellenborough.



DURING the preparations for the final evacuation of Afghanistan, Lord Ellenborough's attention had been particularly drawn to Scinde. Though the nature of the government of this territory, and the relations established with its Ameers or rulers, were formerly explained, a brief recapitulation will not be unnecessary.

A D. 1812.

Relations
with Scinde.

The native
government.

The population consisted chiefly of Scindians proper, with a considerable intermixture of Hindoos and Beloochees. The last had long been the dominant race, but a change had at no distant period taken place in the ruling dynasty, by the substitution of the Talpoora tribe for that of the Kalloras. The government was a kind of family confederation. The Talpoora chiefs, when they first obtained supremacy, were four brothers, who portioned out the country into four separate independencies, one for each brother, though they still continued so closely related, that they might be said to govern in common. By the death of one of the brothers without issue, the number of reigning families was reduced to three, and on the death of Ali Moorad, the last surviving brother, in 1833, family dissensions broke out, and were not suppressed till the country had been subjected to the calamities of a civil war. By the ultimate arrangement, the government still remained vested in the three families, at the head of which respectively were Nusseer Khan at Hyderabad, Roostum Khan at Khyrpoor, and Shere Mahomed Khan at Meerpoor. Between these Ameers, though they all claimed to be independent, degrees of precedency were recognized, and Roostum Khan, perhaps because he was the oldest, and nearest to the original stock, was regarded as their head. These three Ameers, considered as the rulers of their respective families, were all independent princes, but each exercised his authority under considerable limitations, as he was not entitled to act without consulting with the other members of his own family. In this way, Roostum Khan had for his colleagues in the government at Khyrpoor Nusseer Khan, Ali Moorad Khan, and Shakur Khan, and Nusseer Khan at Hyderabad, Shahdad Khan, Hussein Ali Khan, Mahomed Khan, and Sobhidar Khan.

The importance of the commerce of Scinde had early engaged the attention

of the East India Company, and they had been permitted, though not without much hesitation on the part of the native authorities, to establish an agency at Tatta, near the mouths of the Indus. Owing to misunderstandings and occasional acts of caprice and violence, this agency never made much progress, and was at last withdrawn. The subject, however, was not lost sight of, and after several less important attempts to establish more extensive commercial relations with Scinde, Lord William Bentinck, then governor-general, despatched Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Pottinger on a special mission to Hyderabad. The main obstacle to be overcome was a suspicion on the part of the Ameers, that conquest rather than commerce was intended, and accordingly, when a treaty was at length concluded, special articles were introduced for the purpose of allaying the apprehensions thus not unnaturally entertained. Nothing could be more explicit than these articles, which, notwithstanding subsequent arrangements, remained intact, and were in full force in 1838, when Lord Auckland, having finally adopted his fatal Afghan policy, began to inaugurate it by doing wholesale injustice. The articles forbade the transport of troops and military stores by the Indus, but as this mode of transport seemed necessary, Lord Auckland, by his simple fiat, set the treaty aside, and intimated to the Ameers that, as he found it inconvenient to fulfil, he had resolved to violate its obligations. The Ameers, after struggling in vain against this injustice, were obliged to succumb, and then learned that much worse was in store for them. At the very time when the governor-general was openly violating solemn treaties because he could not conveniently observe them, he did not hesitate to station a body of reserve at Kurrachee, for the avowed purpose of keeping the Ameers in check. This was but a preliminary step to a forced treaty, by which they were not only deprived of their independence by the admission of a subsidiary force, but taken bound to pay for this force a sum of three lacs per annum. It was in vain that one of the Ameers, taking the previous treaties from a box, indignantly asked, "What is to become of all these?" and then observed that, "since the day that Scinde has been connected with the English there has always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted; we have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain." An army was at hand to impose the treaty, if it was not voluntarily accepted, and the Ameers had no alternative but to resign their independence, by agreeing to accept and pay for a subsidiary force, and at the same time deprive themselves of what they regarded as a main source of their revenue, by abolishing all tolls on boats navigating the Indus.

A.D. 1833.

Commercial
treaty with
ScindeLord Auckland's
disregard of his
obligations

Lord Ellenborough was so well aware of the injustice with which the Ameers had been treated, that he had declared it "impossible to believe that they could entertain friendly feelings," and he might therefore have been expected to make some allowance for them, if, during the tragedy which was

A D 1842.

Lord Ellenborough's instructions to Sir Charles Napier regarding the Ameers of Scinde.

Report by Sir Charles.

acted in Afghanistan, they had manifested feelings of an opposite nature. This, however, was a degree of generosity for which he was not prepared, and hence, while he admitted that "we would not be justified in inflicting punishment upon the thoughts," he issued his instructions on the subject to Sir Charles Napier, who had been appointed to the chief command in Scinde, in the following terms: "Should any Ameer or chief with whom we have a treaty of alliance or friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power, it is the present intention of the governor-general to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct." He was pleased, however, to add that "he would not proceed in this course without the most ample and convincing evidence of the guilt of the accused," and hence Sir Charles Napier considered it as his first business to ascertain whether such evidence could be found. The result was communicated in a paper entitled "Return of Complaints," in which the delinquencies of every particular Ameer were carefully enumerated.

This return of complaints Sir Charles Napier accompanied with a lengthened report, which commenced as follows: "It is not for me to note how we came to occupy Scinde, but to consider the subject as it stands. We are here by right of treaties entered into by the Ameers, and therefore stand on the same footing as themselves; for rights held under treaty are as sacred as the right which sanctions that treaty. There does not appear any public protest registered against the treaties by the Ameers; they are therefore to be considered as free expressions of the will of the contracting parties." Having thus cleared the way by promulgating a theory which he knew to be, in this instance at least, totally at variance with fact, he proceeded to argue, that a rigid adherence to treaty ought to be exacted from the Ameers, because the effect would be, "to favour our Indian interests by abolishing barbarism and ameliorating the condition of society," and in short, obliging the Ameers to do "that which honourable civilized rulers would do of their own accord." But here an important question arises. Would a rigid adherence to treaties suffice for the accomplishment of the objects contemplated by them? The government of the Ameers, "hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to the interests of England and of its own people, a government of low intrigue, and so constituted that it must fall to pieces by the vices of its construction," will be constantly coming into collision with us. The consequence may easily be foreseen. "The more powerful government will at no distant period swallow up the weaker;" in other words, Scinde must sooner or later form part of British India. If so, "would it not then be better to come to that result at once?" To this question, proposed by himself, Sir Charles Napier gave the following answer: "*I think it would be better if it can be done with honesty.*" This point of honesty, which at first sight looked formidable, was easily disposed of by the following

simple consideration. "The refractory Ameers break the treaty to gratify A D 1812
their avarice, and we punish the breach. I perceive no injustice."

In the interval, while awaiting Lord Ellenborough's final answer, Sir Charles Oppressive
proceedings
against the
Ameers.
Napier saw plainly that the Ameers were mustering their forces, and would not submit to the terms about to be proposed to them, without making a trial of their strength. He made his preparations accordingly, and with full confidence in the issue, though he knew that in point of numbers his little force

would be a mere handful compared to that of the enemy. On the 2d of December the treaty, as Lord Ellenborough had finally sanctioned it, was transmitted to Hyderabad, and on the 4th to Khyrpoor. Its terms were harsh in the extreme, and still more humiliating than harsh. In addition to the cessions of territory demanded, the Ameers were to be deprived of one of the most generally recognized privileges of sovereignty, that of coining money in their own name. In future the British government would appropriate this privilege to itself, and establish a currency in which the coins were to bear on one side "the effigy of the sovereign of England." In short every article in the treaty was worded as if the object had been to provoke a refusal, and then take advantage of it. We

can easily understand that the Ameers received the treaty "with great apparent disgust," and that for a time nothing was talked of in their durbars but war, "open or concealed." Prudence, in the meantime, suggested the latter, and the unfailing resource of negotiation was resorted to. This deceived no one, and least of all Sir Charles Napier, who on the 9th of December sent a letter to the Ameers of Khyrpoor, in which he thus addressed them:—"Your submission to the orders of the governor-general, and your friendship for our nation, should be beyond doubt, because you have solemnly assured me of the same. We are friends. It is right, therefore, to inform you of strange rumours that reach me. Your subjects, it is said, propose to attack my camp in the night time. This would of course be without your knowledge, and would also be very foolish, because my soldiers would slay those who attacked them; and when day dawned I would march to Khyrpoor, transport



LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER.
From a portrait by Smart

A D. 1842

The Ameers
of Scinde.

the inhabitants to Sukkur, and destroy your capital city—with exception of your highnesses' palace, which I would leave standing alone, as a mark of my respect for your highnesses, and of my conviction that you have no authority over your subjects. I should also entrench so far on your highnesses' treasury as to defray the expense of this operation; because it is just that governments should pay for the mischiefs their subjects inflict on their neighbours. I therefore advertise your highnesses of the destruction which such an attempt on our camp would inevitably draw down upon Khyrpoor, in order that you may warn your people against committing any act of hostility."

Their pro-
fessed sub-
mission,
and secret
hostility
against the
British

These menaces, notwithstanding the jocular terms in which they are expressed, were not lost upon the Ameers, who at once redoubled their professions of submission and their preparations for hostilities. Sir Charles Napier therefore announced to them that he would proceed forthwith to occupy their territory, and with this view began on the 10th of December to convey his troops across the Indus from Sukkur. Meer Roostum, the turbaned Ameer, feeble and imbecile old man, above eighty years of age, was in the greatest alarm. He knew that his brother Ali Moorad, by strong professions of submission, had gained the ear of the British commander, and was intriguing to supplant him. According to the form of government established in Scinde Ali Moorad was entitled to be his successor, but even this Meer Roostum was not disposed to concede, and he had set his heart on securing the succession to the turban to his own son. After crossing to the left bank of the Indus, and encamping at Roree, Sir Charles Napier was within a march of Khyrpoor, which is only ten miles to the south-west. This brought matters to a crisis, and Meer Roostum wrote to say that, feeling himself powerless in the hands of his own family, he had resolved to escape to the British camp. As it was feared that his presence there might prove a source of embarrassment, the answer returned to his proposal was that he would find a more appropriate asylum in the camp of Ali Moorad. Either in consequence of this answer or some more private arrangement, Meer Roostum took refuge in his brother's fort of Deejekote, about ten miles south of his capital. Meanwhile Meer Roostum's formal acceptance of the new treaty and all its rigorous and humiliating exactions having been obtained, he was henceforth to be regarded as a British ally, and the territory of Upper Scinde, of which Khyrpoor was the capital, became entitled to the benefit of British protection. A necessary consequence was that those chiefs who refused to follow in Meer Roostum's wake, and submit to the treaty, were held to be public enemies. The leading malcontents were Meer Roostum's son and nephew, who instead of submitting fled to their forts in the desert. The most important of these was Emaumghur, situated about eighty miles south-east of Khyrpoor, and nearly 100 north-east of Hyderabad. Here a considerable body of troops had assembled under these two leaders, who believing their position unassailable, in consequence of the difficulty of reaching it,

Preparations
for hostilities.

seemed it no longer necessary to conceal their hostile intentions Sir Charles Napier determined to teach them that they were not so secure as they imagined, and immediately began to prepare an expedition against Emaumghur.

While preparing for the expedition the British commander was somewhat disconcerted by the escape of Meer Roostum, apparently with Ali Moorad's connivance. The point is not of much consequence, but as Ali had previously

A D 1843



MEER MAHOMED, MEER NUSSEER KHAN, AND MEER NOUR MAHOUD, three principal Amirs of Scinde

From engraving in Illustrated London News.

induced or compelled his brother to resign the turban to him in the most formal manner, the probability is that he wished to make his possession more secure by frightening Meer Roostum into a flight which would leave him sole master. At first it was supposed that a change of plans would be necessary, as the enemy were reported to be mustering in great strength at a place called Dhinjee, but it was ultimately found that there was no necessity to deviate from the original plan, and the march into the desert was commenced. As the Duke of Wellington afterwards declared the march upon Emaumghur "one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life," some details of it will naturally be expected. The plan adopted cannot be better described than in Sir Charles Napier's own words:—"My plans are fixed to march to the edge of the desert; then encamp, select 500 of the strongest Europeans and natives, mount them on camels, and load all my other camels with water, except a few to carry rations. My camel battery also shall go, and as many irregular horse as it shall be prudent to take, and then slap upon Emaumghur in the heart of the desert; if it surrenders, good; if not, it shall have such a hammering as shall make the fire fly out of its eyes. While this is going on, my camels shall go back for provisions, and water is abundant at Emaumghur. My expectation is that four shells, out of the four hundred, with my battery, will produce a surrender, to say nothing of an escalade, for which I am prepared."

Expedition
against
Emaum-
ghur

Leaving Khyrpoor, Sir Charles Napier arrived on the 3d of January, 1843, at Khanpoor, and on the 4th at Deejeekote. On the following day he made his

A.D. 1817. final arrangements for crossing the desert. "On the night of the 5th we moved with 350 of the 22d regiment (queen's), all mounted on camels, two soldiers on each. We have two 24 lb. howitzers, with double teams of camels, and two hundred of the Scinde horse, and provisions for fifteen days; water for four." On the 7th Choonka, twenty-five miles from Deejeekote, was reached. Though the enemy had repeatedly shown himself, no opposition was encountered, and at last, on arriving on the 12th before Emaumghur, it was found to be evacuated. The fort, built of burned brick in the form of a square with round towers, from forty to fifty feet high, and inclosed by an exterior wall, was of great strength, and capable of resisting any force without artillery. In this arm, however, Sir Charles was, as we have seen, well provided, and must therefore have made good the capture, though it might have been preceded by a perilous delay. Having halted only so long as was necessary to shatter Emaumghur to atoms, with 10,000 lbs of gunpowder, the expeditionary force retraced its steps, and on the 21st of January arrived at Peer Abubek situated within Scinde proper, eight miles south of Deejeekote, on the road from Khyrpoor to Hyderabad.

Expedition
against
Emaum
ghur

Proceedings
at Hydera
bad

Having been joined by the troops which he had left at Deejeekote, Sir Charles commenced his march southward in the direction of Hyderabad, hoping that the consternation produced by the capture and destruction of Emaumghur would smooth the way and render actual hostilities unnecessary. At the outset it seemed that this hope was about to be realized. The Ameers, afraid to commit themselves to a final rejection of the treaty, professed their willingness to accept it, and even fixed the day on which they were formally to sign it. Procrastination, however, was their object, and they managed to wear various pretexts for delay. Major Outram, who was conducting the negotiation on the part of the British government, gave them more credit for sincerity than they deserved, and even became so far their dupe as to propose that Sir Charles Napier should leave his army behind and come in person to Hyderabad.

For Charles
Napier
advances
upon it.

"This," said the commissioner, "will remove all difficulties." "Yes," was the reply, "and my head from my shoulders." That in this instance the military had formed a more correct judgment than the political officer was soon made manifest. On the 12th of February, twenty-five Beloochee chiefs of the Murree tribe, with their followers, being taken in arms, were arrested. On Hyat Khan, who held the chief command, was found an order from Mahomed Khan, one of the Hyderabad Ameers, directing him to assemble every male able to wield a sword, and join his victorious Beloochee troops at Meanee on the 9th. On the very day when this discovery was made, the Ameers met in full durbar, and with the exception of Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, signed what was justly styled a penal, and was to them a most obnoxious treaty. This, which ought to have been the conclusion of a peaceful arrangement, was only the consummation of a system of duplicity. The Ameers had only been endeavouring to gain

A.D. 1843

Advances on
Hyderabad.

time to complete their military preparations. These, however, they were at last obliged to precipitate, as Sir Charles Napier, too well aware of their real intentions, refused to listen to their procrastinating pleas, and was rapidly advancing on Hyderabad. On the 15th of February he reached New Halla, about thirty miles north of Hyderabad, and there learned that instead of waiting for his nearer approach the Ameers had commenced actual hostilities by a formidable attack on the British residency in that capital. Fortunately the few troops within the inclosure, though not exceeding in all 100 men, after gallantly resisting all the attempts of an enemy, estimated at 8000, to force an entrance, were able, when their ammunition was nearly expended, to embark on board a steamer which lay in the river, and thus escaped the slaughter to which the Beloochees had doomed them.

Preparations
for battle

The sword being now the only arbiter, Sir Charles Napier moved his camp first to Muttaree, and then to Meanee. The latter place, situated only six miles north of Hyderabad, was reached on the 17th of February, and was destined, ere that day closed, to become famous in the military annals of British India. When at Halla, the British commander had a choice of two roads, one by the river which would bring him directly in front of the enemy, leaving their rear open; and the other by Jamhallaka Tanda, which would turn their right, and force them to fight with their back to the Indus. His inclination was to take the latter, because, to use his own words, "if victorious, I should utterly extirpate the Beloochee army, and I am as sure of victory as a man who knows that victory is an accident can be." Nothing can show more clearly how happily his well-known hardihood was tempered with caution than the conclusion at which he arrives. It must be given in his own words. After mentioning the strong temptation to choose the Jamhallaka Tanda road, he says: "It is dangerous—1. Because 2800 men will be opposed to 25,000 or 30,000, and these are stiff odds. 2. A reverse would cast me off from the river and my supplies. 3. A repulse would add 20,000 men to the enemy; for barbarians hold no faith with the beaten, and numbers are now abiding the issue of the first fight. . . . All the doubtful would on a repulse turn upon us, and certainly it is no over-estimate to say, that with a beaten force I should have to fight a way to Sukkur through 50,000 men." In regard to the river road, he says: "It is shorter, and my right flank is secure; if worsted, my provisions are safe in the steamers; the nearer the river the more ditches, and as the Ameers have most cavalry that suits me best. They have 20,000 horsemen; mine are but 800, and a victory will not therefore be so decisive; still I can pursue them with vigour. Yes! I will march along the river and trust to manœuvring in the battle for turning their right, without losing the river myself."

The British force, mustering 2800 men of all arms, with twelve pieces of artillery, started from Muttaree at four in the morning of the 17th, and after

A D 1813

Victory of
Measee

a march of four hours, discovered the enemy strongly posted, having each of their flanks covered with a wood, and in front the bed of a river, now dry, but with a high bank. At 9 A.M. the British were formed in order of battle, and began to advance from the right in echelons of battalions, the artillery and her majesty's 22d regiment in line forming the leading echelon, the 25th native infantry the second, the 12th native infantry the third, and the 1st grenadier native infantry the fourth. The 9th Bengal light cavalry formed the reserve in rear of the left wing, and the Poonah horse, together with four companies of infantry, guarded the baggage. "In this order of battle," says Sir Charles Napier, "we advanced as at a review, over a fine plain swept by the cannon of the enemy" The distance between the two lines being not more than 1000 yards, was soon traversed, and the battle became general along the bank of the river. The combatants coming at once to close quarters, "fought for three hours or more with great fury, man to man. Then," continues the despatch, "was seen the superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sword, and shield, and matchlock. The brave Beloochees, first discharging their matchlocks and pistols, dashed over the bank with desperate resolution, but down went these bold and skilful swordsmen under the superior power of the musket and bayonet" At one time the 22d, 25th, and 12th regiments were almost overborne by the courage and numbers of the enemy, but a brilliant charge by the 9th Bengal cavalry and the Scinde horse completely relieved them, by forcing the right of the enemy's line, capturing a standard and several pieces of artillery, and even driving a large body of horse beyond their own camp. "This charge," says Sir Charles, "decided in my opinion the crisis of the action, for, from the moment the cavalry were seen in rear of their right flank, the resistance of the enemy slackened, the 22d regiment forced the bank, the 25th and 12th did the same, the latter regiment capturing several guns, and the victory was decided." The loss of the British was 256 killed and wounded; that of the enemy was estimated at 5000. The results of the victory were the capture of the whole of the enemy's artillery, ammunition, standards, and camp, with considerable stores and some treasure, the personal submission of the Ameers, who yielded themselves up as prisoners of war, and the surrender of Hyderabad, on the great tower of which the British flag was hoisted on the 20th of February.

Shere Ma-
hommed still
in arms.


Notwithstanding the splendid victory of Measee, the war was not yet terminated. Shere Mahomed of Meerpoor, the most talented of all the Ameers, was on the way to join his confederates when he learned their signal defeat. The British commander offered to accept his submission on the same terms as the other Ameers, but he disdained to yield, and kept the field at the head of a force which continued to accumulate till it amounted to about 20,000 men. For some time after his victory, Sir Charles Napier was not able to muster a disposable force of 2000 men, and therefore, instead of entering on a new cam-

paign, prudently formed an entrenched camp on the left bank of the Indus, and also constructed a fort on the right bank, as a protection to the steamers which carried his supplies. Here he remained waiting for reinforcements, and consoling himself with the reflection: "If he (Shere Mahomed) assails my works, he will be beaten; if he does not, the delay will exhaust his money, seeing that the Beloochees are as rapacious as they are brave." He had not miscalculated. The

A.D. 1842.

Shere Ma
homed still
in arms.

Ameer gradually approached nearer and nearer, and seeing no appearance of being attacked, became so confident of success, that on the 15th of March, when only twelve miles distant, he sent a letter offering to allow the British to quit the country on liberating the Ameer, and restoring what they had taken. "Just as his messengers delivered this letter," says Sir Charles Napier, "the evening gun



NORTH WEST FACE OF THE FORT OF HYDERABAD.
From Edwards' Sketches in Scinde.

was fired There, said I, do you hear that? Yes. Well, that is your answer."

On the 21st of March the expected reinforcements arrived, and the British force, increased to 5000 men, immediately prepared to assume the offensive. With this view it moved from Hyderabad at daybreak of the 24th, and after a march of four miles arrived at Dubba. Here the enemy, consisting of 20,000 men of all arms, were found strongly posted behind a kind of double nullah, formed by two deep parallel ditches, the first 8 feet deep and 22 feet wide, and the second 17 feet deep and 42 feet wide. Between the two was a bank 43 feet wide. The attack was immediately commenced, the whole of the British artillery opening on the enemy's position, while the line led by her majesty's 22d advanced in echelons from the left. In a short time the enemy were seen moving considerable bodies to their left, and apparently retreating, as if unable to stand the cross fire of the British artillery. This moment was chosen to order a charge, which was made with the greatest gallantry and success by the 3d cavalry under Captain Delamain, and the Scinde horse under Captain Jacob, who crossed the nullah and pursued the retreating enemy for several miles. While this was passing on the right, her majesty's 22d gallantly attacked the nullah and carried it, though not without considerable loss. The 22d were closely followed by the 25th, 21st, and 12th native infantry, and the victory

Victory at
Dubba.

A D 1843

was decided. On the 26th the British force was again in motion, and arrived on the 27th at Shere Mahomed's capital, Meerpoor, of which possession was immediately taken. Sir Charles Napier was afraid to advance farther, being obliged, as he says, "to watch the Indus, which will soon swell, and may cut me off by the inundation." Unwilling, however, not to reap the full fruits of his victory, he sent a squadron of cavalry, on the 28th of March, to reconnoitre Omerkote, a fort situated in the desert, about 100 miles east of Hyderabad, and on the following day detached Captain Whittie, with his battery, to make progress so far as water could be found. The report of the reconnoitring party was, that Omerkote was defended by 4000 men, and, on the faith of it, an express was immediately sent after Whittie ordering him to return. This was unfortunate, for the real fact was that Omerkote had been abandoned. As soon as this was known, a second express was sent off countermanding the first. By this time, however, Whittie, who had received the first express, was acting upon it, and had only consented to halt at the urgent request of Captain Brown, who, feeling sure that the order to return had been given under misapprehension, volunteered to ride back to head-quarters and return with new instructions. This feat he successfully performed. The result was, that Major Woodburn, who had succeeded to the command, hastened forward to Omerkote, and found it without defenders. The importance which the British commander attached to this capture, appears not only from his having previously declared, "I will have it if it costs another battle;" but also from his speaking of it in such terms as the following: "Omerkote is ours . . . This completes the conquest of Scinde; every place is in my possession, and, thank God! I have done with war. Never again am I likely to see a shot fired in anger." It will be afterwards seen that in these anticipations he was too sanguine, but in the meantime it will be necessary to give some explanation of the main ground on which he founded them.


Victory at
DablaCapture of
OmerkoteAnnexation
of Scinde

The obnoxious treaty which the governor-general had sought to impose on the Ameers ceased to be applicable to the actual situation of affairs after the victory of Meanee and the surrender of the Ameers as prisoners of war. By these events the old constitution of Scinde was virtually abolished, and it became necessary to provide a substitute for it. What this was to be was first publicly announced March 5, 1843, by a "notification" which concluded in the following terms:—"Thus has victory placed at the disposal of the British government the country on both banks of the Indus from Sukkur to the sea, with the exception of such portions thereof as may belong to Meer Ali Moorad of Khyrpoor, and to any other Ameer who may have remained faithful to his engagements." In other words, Scinde with the exception above mentioned was henceforth a province of British India.

Sir Charles Napier believing that with the capture of Omerkote the conquest of Scinde was completed, had said that he did not expect to be obliged to fire

another shot. In the course of a short time he was obliged to modify this expectation. Shere Mahomed, returning from the desert to which he had fled, once more raised his standard, and was able towards the end of April to take post with 8000 men at Khoonera, about sixty miles north-east of Hyderabad, Shah Mahomed his brother had also mustered a force of several thousands, with four guns, and gone down to Sehwan with the view of crossing the Indus and taking part in a preconcerted insurrection at Hyderabad. Meer Hossein, Meer Roostum's son, was in the desert at Shaghur with a body of 2000 men, and in concert with several refractory killedars was menacing Ali Moorad at Khyrpoor. The delta of the Ganges was traversed by predatory roving Beloochees to the number of about 20,000; and to the east of the delta, beyond the Poorana

A D. 1843

Continued
resistance
of Shere
Mahomed
and other
chiefs

ENTRANCE TO TOWN OF SEHWAN, with Tomb of Lal Shaz Baz.—From Edwards' Sketches in Scinde

branch of the river, a tribe mustering some 5000 was threatening to intercept the communications with Bombay. Instead of uninterrupted tranquillity, therefore, everything foreboded a new struggle, and called for the immediate adoption of decisive measures. Shere Mahomed was by far the most formidable of all these insurgent chiefs. His actual force was the largest, and there was reason to fear that he might be able to double or triple its numbers by penetrating into the delta of the Indus, which formed the principal part of his original territory, and where he had only to appear in order to rally all the predatory hordes around his standard.

The first actual encounter, however, was not with Shere Mahomed, but Shah Mahomed his brother. This chief, hearing of the arrival of Colonel Roberts at Sehwan and his preparations to cross the river, hastened forward at the head of 3000 men, in the hope of taking him at an advantage. In this he completely outwitted himself, for Roberts came upon him by surprise, and besides dispersing his force and burning his camp, took him prisoner and sent

Encounter
with Shah
Mahomed

him on to Hyderabad. His arrival here was most opportune, for the intended insurrection, of which he was to be one of the main supports, was immediately abandoned in despair. This success was soon followed by another of still greater consequence. Sir Charles, anxious to put down Shere Mahomed, had marched out of Hyderabad in the very middle of the hot season. His sufferings and those of his troops were dreadful, and on the 15th of June, he and forty-three other Europeans were struck down by sun strokes. Within three hours they were all dead except himself. Speaking of this wonderful escape, he attributes it to his temperate habits; "I do not drink, that is the secret; the sun had no ally in the liquor amongst my brains," but at the same time mentions another circumstance which he says "roused me from my lethargy as much as the bleeding." This was a message from Colonel Jacob, intimating that he had encountered Shere Mahomed, defeated him and dispersed his forces without the loss of a single man. Everything like open hostility was now at an end, and the British commander had at length the full opportunity which he had earnestly desired, to devote himself, as governor of Scinde, to the work of internal improvement. It is not too much to say that in this department he displayed administrative talents of the highest order. The powers conferred upon him by Lord Ellenborough were almost absolute, and he used them under circumstances of great difficulty, in repressing crime, encouraging industry, and developing the resources of the country by opening new channels of communication and irrigation, and bringing under cultivation fertile tracts, which the Ameers had converted into *shikargahs* or hunting grounds. His administration will again come under notice. Meanwhile it is necessary to attend to the proceedings of the governor-general in a different quarter.

A D 1843
Defeat of
Shere
Mahomed

Junkojee Row Scindia, who succeeded by adoption in 1827 to Dowlut Row Scindia, died childless on the 7th of February, 1843. Two years before, he had become subject to attacks of illness, which it was believed must ultimately prove fatal, and it therefore became necessary for the British government to provide for their interests at the court of Gwalior in the event of his demise. The maharajah was, like his predecessor, childless. His wife, the maharanee, was daughter of a person named Jeswunt Row Goorpuria, and only twelve years of age. While the illness of the sovereign and the youth of his wife thus left the government without a proper head, the administration was intrusted to a regency of five individuals. Among these the Mama Sahib, the maharajah's maternal uncle, who had at one time been sole regent, still possessed the greatest influence, but it was very doubtful if he would be able to retain it after his nephew's death, as all the persons composing the regency were notoriously at enmity with each other. Colonel Spiers, the resident at Gwalior, in communicating these facts to Lord Auckland, in February, 1841, suggested that he should be authorized, in the event of the maharajah's death, to recommend to his widow the adoption of the nearest heir of Scindia's family, and that on this adoption

Relations
with Scindia.

"the mother and her adopted son should be supported by the British government from foreign and domestic enemies." The answer was, that in the event of the maharajah's death "without male issue, or the delegation of authority to his widow to adopt a son," the proper course for the resident would be to "make known the willingness of the British government to recognize an adoption from the family of Scindia, which may be made by his widow, with the consent of the leading chiefs of the durbar."

A D 1813.

Relations
with Scindia

The day after the maharajah's death, the resident received two pressing messages, earnestly requesting his presence at the palace. On arriving there he found assembled the ministers and all the influential persons about the court, and was informed that the Tara Ranee (the late maharajah's widow, whom they acknowledged as their sovereign mistress), themselves, and also those then present, had selected as successor to the *guddee*, Bhageerut Row, a boy about eight or nine years of age, and the nearest in blood in the family to the late maharajah. On the 9th of February the resident wrote as follows:—"The maharanee and the boy she has selected may be still considered as children; it may therefore appear to the governor-general requisite that a regency should be appointed; the present ministry certainly do not possess the confidence of the army or of the people. The Mama Sahib (the maternal uncle of the late maharajah) appears to me to possess the greatest influence of any person about this court, and seems to be attached to our interests; he would perhaps be the person best calculated to place at the head of the regency." In replying to this letter, Lord Ellenborough expressed great satisfaction that the Tara Ranee, had "adopted, with the apparently general concurrence of the chiefs and people," the boy whom he "had himself deemed to be nearest in blood to the late maharajah," but added, "The adoption of a boy too young to administer the government necessarily creates anxiety as to the selection of the ministers by whom the government is to be carried on, and the governor-general awaits with much interest the communication he expects shortly to receive on that head." In another letter, dated only three days later, he entered more fully on the subject of the regency. He considered that "it would be most for the benefit of the Gwalior state, that the regency should be confided to one person, in whom, during the minority of the maharajah, may reside all the authority of the state. It would be for the regent to nominate the ministers, and they would be responsible to him." Having thus given his opinion in favour of a single regent, invested with all the authority of the state, the governor-general ventured on still more delicate ground, and declared he would "gladly see the regency conferred upon the Mama Sahib." This recommendation appears to have been effectual, and on the 23d of February, after the young maharajah had been placed on the *guddee*, it was officially proclaimed by the ministers, with the full concurrence of the Ranee, that the Mama Sahib had been nominated regent.

Bhageerut
Row's suc-
cession to
the throne.Mama Sahib
regent.

On receiving notice of this appointment, the governor-general gave the

A D 1843

Mama Sahib
recognized
as regent of
Scindia by
the British
government.

resident the following instruction:—"You will inform the Mama Sahib, that having understood from you that he has, in your presence, been nominated regent of the Gwalior state, I recognize him as the responsible head of that state, and am prepared to support his authority" At the time when Lord Ellenborough thus pledged himself to the regent, he was not unaware of the extent to which it might involve him in the internal affairs of Gwalior. Not only was the pay of the troops heavily in arrear, while the available funds were insufficient to meet it, but an infantry brigade of three battalions had manifested a mutinous spirit. One of these battalions, under a native commandant named Ishuree Sing, when proceeding into Malwah, had before quitting the Gwalior territory been guilty of several outrages. The resident advised that an example should be made of its commander, and the late maharajah gave orders that he should be recalled, and on his arrival at Gwalior, be not only dismissed the service, but confined in the fort. Ishuree Sing probably suspected what was intended, and therefore, instead of returning alone, as he had been peremptorily ordered to do, he brought his battalion along with him. Having committed himself by this bold step, he succeeded in gaining over the other two battalions of the brigade, and engaging the whole three to make common cause with him. The governor-general, fully alive to the danger of these proceedings, wrote a second letter to the resident, which referring to the former, concluded as follows:—"The governor-general did not acquaint you that he was prepared to support the authority of the regent, without taking at the same time the necessary preliminary steps to enable him to give at once the most effectual support if it should be desired. It is inconvenient that there should be protracted suspense on this point, and the governor-general is anxious to know, as soon as possible, whether the state of affairs at Gwalior is such as to render it improbable that his immediate aid will become necessary to support the regent's authority." The thing intended could not now be mistaken. The governor-general by "support" meant armed intervention, and was ready, at a moment's notice, to march an army into Scindia's territory, for the purpose of helping the newly appointed regent to inflict punishment on a mutinous brigade. Fortunately Lord Ellenborough's military ardour was neutralized by the prudence of the regent, who "hoped he might be pardoned for stating that he would prefer awaiting his own time for the punishment of Ishuree Sing," inasmuch as the calling in of British troops "might cause a serious disturbance throughout the whole army," and "lose him that popularity and confidence which the officers and troops of it certainly at present appear to repose in him." His lordship could hardly have been pleased with this rebuff, which by implication charged him with a readiness to hurry into hostilities, which might have set the whole state of Gwalior in a flame. He had however the good sense to abandon his design, though he had gone so far as to have actually taken several measures "for the purpose of concentrating a preponderating force."

Declines the
military aid
proffered by
the gover-
nor general.

Meanwhile the court of Gwalior was the scene of intrigues, which though paltry in themselves were paving the way for important changes. In these intrigues a woman of the name of Nurunjee took a leading part. She was in the confidence of the ranee, and had acquired such an ascendancy over her that the regent felt his own authority to be in danger, and was considering how he might be able to remove her and her faction from the palace. The governor-general, after being thwarted in an important military operation which he had contemplated, was in no humour to listen to the detail of petty intrigues, and therefore wrote as follows when they were communicated to him by the resident:—"The governor-general intended to advise and to approve the selection of a sole regent having all the authority which, according to our English understanding of the word, appertains to his office as the responsible head of the government; and he will still indulge the hope that no little views and interests will be permitted to intervene, and to deprive the state of Gwalior of the only sort of government which, during the minority of a young uneducated boy adopted by a girl, can maintain the dignity of the family of Scindia, and the efficiency of the administration of the state." The woman Nurunjee was induced to retire, after making an excellent bargain for herself, but it soon appeared that a still more formidable intriguer was resident in the palace. This was the Dada Khasjee Walla, who had originally aspired to the regency, and was labouring incessantly to undermine the Mama Sahib, whose position in consequence became untenable, and he was obliged not only to resign the regency, but to retire into the Deccan.

A D. 1843.

Court in
trigues dis-
place the
Mama Sahib

No new regent or minister having been appointed after the expulsion of Mama Sahib, the resident suggested, that as the maharanee held durbars daily, the best mode of conducting official intercourse would be by direct communication with herself. The governor-general caught at this suggestion, and was inclined to think that this direct mode of communication, while there was no ostensible minister, might be that which would practically give the resident "the most beneficial influence over the government." Having come to this conclusion he retracted the contemptuous opinion he had previously expressed, and declared it to be his impression "that the maharanee is a very sensitive and somewhat impetuous girl, but that she is by no means without a good disposition; and that with her character, anything may be made of her according to the manner in which she is approached and treated." Meanwhile the Dada Khasjee Walla, who continued in high favour with the maharanee, had not lost sight of Mama Sahib, and accordingly when the ex-regent halted in his journey southward at Seronge, the capital of a small native state, he meditated sending a body of troops into that territory to seize him. Hearing of this design the governor-general determined not to allow the rights of an ally to be infringed by an unprovoked aggression, and therefore instructed Colonel Spiers that if he had the least apprehension of any intention of the *de facto* government of Gwalior

New form
of adminis-
tration

A D 1843

Affairs of
hindia

to violate the territory of Seronge, he would "address" the maharanee herself, and refer her highness to the concluding sentence of the governor-general's proclamation of the 1st of October, 1842, wherein his lordship made this declaration: "Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers upon the people, the governor-general is resolved that peace shall be maintained, and he will direct the whole power of the British government against the state by which it shall be infringed."

Intrigues of
the Dada
Khasjee
Walla

The Dada Khasjee Walla, thus interdicted from gratifying his vindictive temper on a personal rival, showed his rage and disappointment by exerting himself in opposition to British interests, and the governor-general in consequence became convinced that the tranquillity of Gwalior could only be secured by his removal. At first his lordship had expressed himself in such a way as seemed to imply that a simple removal would satisfy him, but ultimately on passing in review all the delinquencies of the court favourite, he declared his conviction that "the mere dismissal of the Dada Khasjee Walla, after all that has passed, would not be sufficient to afford security against similar intrigues to that in which he has been the mover, and to place the relations between the two governments upon a satisfactory footing." He therefore instructed the resident to demand, as the only condition of friendly intercourse with Gwalior, that the Dada should not only be dismissed, but banished for ever beyond the limits of the Gwalior territory.

Delivery of
his person to
the British
trustfate.

On the very day preceding that on which the governor-general gave the above instruction to the resident, the Dada was a prisoner in the hands of the chiefs who had all along opposed him. Feeling convinced that while he was at the head of affairs, friendly relations with the British government would never be re-established, they had determined to keep no terms with him. His own fears and those of the ranee, whose favour for him had suffered no diminution, led to a kind of compromise, and he was given up after stipulating that he should not be maltreated. It was hoped that the next step would be to deliver him into British custody, but an unexpected obstacle arose. The troops who had been gained over to the Dada mustered in full force, and having surrounded the campoo where he was confined, threatened to take him away by force if he were not voluntarily given up. A collision thus became imminent, but the parties were so equally matched that they both deemed it prudent to temporize, and hence, as the resident reported, "during the whole of these disturbances not a sword has been drawn nor a drop of blood spilt." The result was that the Dada, though he still remained in custody, could not be delivered to the resident at Dholepore, as the chiefs who seized him wished and had intended. The ranee still stood by him, and even when warned that if he was not delivered the British troops would certainly advance, displayed considerable ability in arguing the case with a moonshee, whom the resident had sent to remonstrate with her.

On the 1st of November, the governor-general, who was about to leave Fort William for the north-western provinces, lodged an elaborate minute, in which he plainly showed that his designs in regard to Gwalior were of a more sweeping character than he had yet ventured to confess. After adverting to the fact that "the British government has now, for many years, assumed the rights and performed the obligations of the paramount power in India within the Sutlej," and that it was impossible therefore "to take a partial and insulated view of our relations with any state within that limit," he proceeded to show that "the state of Gwalior is altogether peculiar," and that in the event of disturbance within it, intervention was "not only justifiable, but absolutely necessary." Having laid down this principle, his lordship proceeded to apply it. "When the existing relations between the state of Gwalior and the British government are considered, it is impossible to view the expulsion of the Mama Sahib, and the elevation of the Dada Khasjee Walla to the ministry, otherwise than an affront of the gravest character offered to the British government, by that successful intriguer in the Zenana of Gwalior, and by the disorganized army by which he has been supported," still, "under ordinary circumstances, we might perhaps have waited upon time, and have abstained from the adoption of measures of coercion," but the circumstances were not ordinary. The Sikhs, no longer friendly, have within three marches of the Sutlej "an army of 70,000 men," and though "it may perhaps be expected that no hostile act on the part of this army will occur to produce a war," it would be "unpardonable" not to take every precaution against it, and "no precaution appears to be more necessary than that of rendering our rear and our communications secure by the re-establishment of a friendly government at Gwalior." The expulsion of the Dada was therefore only the first of a series of measures which are thus enumerated in the conclusion of the minute:—"To obtain reparation for an affront, which if left unpunished would affect our reputation and our influence at every durbar in India; to secure the tranquillity of our frontier and of that of our allies by the future cordial co-operation of the officers of the durbar of Gwalior in its preservation; and to diminish an army, which is the real master of the Gwalior state and placed within a few marches of our second capital—these appear to be the just and legitimate objects to be held in view; but the time and manner of their accomplishment must, as I have said, depend upon circumstances, and be governed by a general view of our position in every part of India."

The governor-general arrived at Agra on the 11th of December, and immediately "decided upon moving forward the whole of the troops with as little delay as possible." On the following day he addressed the maharanee, and gave her the first distinct intimation that he had risen in his demands. "The British government can neither permit the existence, within the territories of Scindia, of an unfriendly government, nor that those territories should be without a government-willing and able to maintain order, and to preserve the

A.D. 1813.

Military preparations to enforce demand for delivery of the Dada

Governor-general's policy

A.D. 1819

relations of amity with its neighbours. The British government cannot permit any change in the relations between itself and the house of Scindia, which have for forty years contributed to the preservation of the peace of Central India. Compelled, by the conduct which your highness has been advised to adopt, to look to other means than those of friendly remonstrance for the purpose of maintaining those relations in their integrity and spirit, I have now directed the advance of the British armies, and I shall not arrest their move-

Movement
of British
troops to-
wards the
frontier of
Scindia



GWALIOR.—From an original sketch in possession of Royal Asiatic Society.

ment until I have full security for the future tranquillity of the common frontier of the two states, for the maintenance of order within the territories of Scindia, and for the conducting of the government of those territories in accordance with the long-established relations of amity towards the British government."

Consternation
at
Gwalior

This letter, which produced the greatest consternation at Gwalior, was immediately followed by the actual surrender of the Dada, who was sent forward under charge of an escort, and brought on the 18th of December into the British camp. The maharane seems to have expected that the delivery of the Dada would be accepted as a sufficient compliance with the demands of the British government, and therefore, in answering the governor-general's letter, expressed her earnest wish that the march of the British army might be arrested, and official intercourse resumed by the return of the resident to Gwalior. At the same time she availed herself with some dexterity of a declaration of his lordship, to the effect "that he was fully determined in his proceedings, in regard to Gwalior, to maintain in all their integrity the conditions of the existing treaties between the two states." This declaration, which the governor-general had volunteered only two days previously, certainly pledged him to all which the maharane understood by it when she thus expressed herself:—"Your lord-

ship's purpose that the treaties and engagements which have been in force for forty years shall not be changed or interfered with, is gratifying. This purpose has its origin in the good feeling and integrity of your lordship. The parties to all these treaties and engagements felt the fullest confidence in them; for the good faith of the British government is well known." This home-thrust his lordship appears to have had some difficulty in parrying, for in a subsequent letter to the maharanee, after telling her that "the delivery of the Dada Khasjee Walla is the best indication of the sincerity of your highness's friendship," he veiled his future intentions under such vague expressions as these:—"I have, myself, no more earnest wish than that of re-establishing the good understanding between the two states, and of giving it a firmer basis." To the resident, now Colonel Sleeman, who had succeeded Colonel Spiers, he was much more explicit. "He was gratified," he said, "by the delivery of the Dada, but was no longer disposed to accept it as sufficient atonement for the past, or security for the future. The British armies could not be arrested without a guarantee for the maintenance of tranquillity on the common frontier, and the establishment of a government willing and able to coerce its own subjects, and maintain the relations of amity."

A D. 1843.

Ultimate
views of the
governor-
general
regarding
Scindia

As the governor-general professed to be advancing with no hostile intentions to the Gwalior state, it was proposed that the young maharajah, with the maharanee and chiefs, should come out to meet him, "in the manner usually observed on the occasion of a friendly visit to the governor-general by the ruler of the Scindia state," and that then the whole should proceed to Gwalior as if the governor-general were returning the visit. A meeting was accordingly held on the 20th of December, at Dholepore, in the governor-general's tent, for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements. The governor-general took part in the conference, which was attended on the part of Gwalior by the chiefs Ram Row Phalkeea and Sumbajee Angria, and the vakeel Bajee Row. The main point discussed was the place of meeting. The chiefs began by assuming that the meeting would take place on his lordship's present encamping ground at Dholepore. "This," they said, "was the usual place where all former governors-general had been met by the rajahs, on occasion of their visits to Gwalior," and "any deviation from that established usage would detract from the honour of the maharajah." The governor-general having replied that as the maharajah was not here, and delay was impossible, his camp would move on as soon as the whole of the army had joined the head-quarters, and that his meeting with the maharajah might "take place at such spot as they should both arrive at on the same day." The chiefs showed the importance which they attached to the place of meeting, by urging "that if the governor-general, with the commander-in-chief and the British army, passed the Gwalior frontier before the maharajah had a meeting with his lordship, it would be a breach of all precedent, and eternally disgrace the maharajah and the government of Scindia." When his

Negotiations
for an inter-
view with
the maharajah.

A D 1843

Negotiations
for an inter-
view with
the maharajah

lordship still refused to delay, the chiefs represented "that if the British army crossed the frontier before the meeting with the maharajah, the troops of Gwalior, who were already in a state of the utmost alarm, would believe that the governor-general was coming, not as a friend, but with a hostile purpose," and, "they implored him with joined hands, to weigh well the step he was taking," since, in their opinion, "the most serious consequences depended on the passing of the British army across the frontier before the meeting." Finding that the resolution to move on was irrevocable, the chiefs asked "to know the longest time his lordship could give the maharajah to come out and meet him here" The answer was as follows:—"If the maharajah should meet the governor general at this ground on the 23d instant, prepared to ratify a treaty drawn up in accordance with the principles laid down in the paper which had been placed in the hands of the chiefs, the details of which should be prepared to-morrow, and they would guarantee that his highness should do so, the army should not pass the river Chumbul (the boundary between the two states) till after that day; but that if his lordship were induced thus to delay the passing of the troops for two days, and the chiefs should fail to redeem their guarantee, a heavy fine, in addition to the account which was already to be charged to them, should be imposed" The governor-general says he offered these terms because he had "every disposition to meet any reasonable wish of the chiefs," but one cannot help thinking that if he had really had this "disposition," he would have taken a different way of proving it. As must have been anticipated, the terms were declined

March of
British
troops into
Scindia's
territory

On the 21st of December, the first brigade of the British army crossed the Chumbul, and encamped about six miles to the south, beyond the defiles and ravines. The head-quarters, with the governor-general's camp, followed on the 22d, and by the 26th the whole of the right wing of the army, with the heavy guns, had crossed, and had been placed in position at Hingona. Up to the 27th, it was considered probable that the Gwalior troops, notwithstanding their vaunts and menaces, would not venture to oppose the British advance, though circumstances were not wanting to suggest and justify an opposite conclusion. On the 25th, Bapoo Setowlee, who had been appointed prime-minister, and professed his earnest desire for the restoration of friendly relations on the very terms which had been offered, suddenly quitted the British camp, in which he had arrived to conduct the negotiations on the part of the durbar. He proceeded to Dhunaila, and there, in an interview with Colonel Sleeman, attributed his departure to a summons from Gwalior, where he would, if possible, "defeat the machinations of ill advisers, and prevent hostilities." The fact, as proved by his subsequent conduct, was that the object of his journey was not to prevent hostilities, but to take a prominent part in them. On the 26th it was ascertained that troops and guns were leaving Gwalior, in the direction both of Chandore and Hingona, in the former to encounter General Grey, who

Advance of
the British
army

was advancing with the left wing of the army through Bundelcund, and the latter to resist the further progress of the right wing under the commander-in-chief. On the same day, Sumbajee Angria, another of the Gwalior negotiators, imitated the example of his colleague Bapoo Setowlea, and suddenly disappeared from the British camp without giving any intimation of his intention. These facts seemed to indicate that both the chiefs and the troops had for the time forgotten their dissensions, to unite in resisting what they regarded as an unjustifiable invasion of their native soil, and that therefore the British army, instead of having only to chastise a mutinous section of the Gwalior troops, would be opposed by the whole military power of the state. Both the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, however, were reluctant to abandon the idea of a peaceful campaign, and continuing to hope for it, appear to have been to some extent taken by surprise when hostilities actually commenced.

A. D. 1843.

Disaffection
of chiefs.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LORD GOUGH.
From an engraving by J. R. Jackson.

On the 28th of December, when a small reconnoitring party were examining the ground at a short distance from Chounda, where the Mahratta army had taken up a strong position, the fire from the batteries was suddenly opened upon them. Whatever room there might have been for doubt before, there could be none now. The Gwalior troops, so far from succumbing without a struggle, had taken the initiative, and sent their defiance from the mouth of their guns. Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, was not slow to accept it, and both armies immediately prepared for battle. The inequality in point of numbers was not so great as usual in battles in India, the British troops mustering about 14,000, with 40 guns, and the Mahrattas 18,000, with 100 guns.

Hostilities
commenced.

By eight o'clock on the morning of the 29th, the whole British troops, after passing over a country rendered extremely difficult by deep ravines, and crossing the Kohary in three columns, were in their appointed places about a mile in front of Maharajpoo. This place, contrary to expectation, was found occupied by the Mahrattas, who during the previous night had taken possession of it with seven regiments of infantry, each with four guns, which they had entrenched. These immediately opened on the British advances, and rendered necessary a change of plan, which is thus described by the commander-in-chief:—"Major-general Littler's column being exactly in front of Maharajpoo, I ordered it to advance direct, while Major-general Valiant's brigade took it in

Battle of Ma-
harajpoo

A D 1813

Battle of Ma-
harajpooor

reverse; both supported by Major-general Dennis's column and the two light field batteries. Your lordship must have witnessed with the same pride and pleasure that I did, the brilliant advance of these columns under their respective leaders, the European and native soldiers appearing emulous to prove their loyalty and devotion; and here I must do justice to the gallantry of their opponents, who received the shock without flinching, their guns doing severe execution as we advanced; but nothing could withstand the rush of British soldiers. Her majesty's 39th foot, with their accustomed dash, ably supported by the 56th regiment native infantry, drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts. Here a most sanguinary conflict ensued; the Mahratta troops, after discharging their matchlocks, fought sword in hand with the most determined courage. General Valiant's brigade with equal enthusiasm took Maharajpooor in reverse, and twenty-eight guns were captured by this combined movement. so desperate was the resistance, that very few of the defenders of this very strong position escaped. During these operations, Brigadier Scott was opposed by a body of the enemy's cavalry on the extreme left, and made some well-executed charges with the 10th light cavalry, most ably supported by Captain Grant's troop of horse artillery, and the 4th lancers, capturing some guns and taking two standards, thus threatening the right flank of the enemy." After the decisive success at Maharajpooor, the entrenched position of Chounda was carried, and the victory was complete, the enemy having dispersed and fled, with a loss of 3000 in killed and wounded, and of 56 pieces of ordnance, 43 of them of brass. The British loss also was severe, amounting in all to 797 in killed, wounded, and missing.

Battle of
Punnar

While the main body of the British army was gaining the victory of Maharajpooor, the left wing, under General Grey, which had crossed the frontier from the south-west, and pushed on rapidly to Punnar, which is only twelve miles from Gwalior, was there achieving a similar success against another Mahratta force of 12,000 men, with forty guns

Rigorous
terms dis-
tated to
Gwalior

After these victories all idea of further resistance was abandoned, and it only remained for the governor-general to give effect to his designs in regard to Scindia's dominions. Hitherto he had always talked of Gwalior as an independent state, but he now acted as if he had conquered it, and not only set the rights of the maharanees aside, but changed the form of its government. In future she was to be only a pensioner with three lacs of revenue, and no political authority, and the administration was to be carried on during the maharajah's minority by what was called a council of regency, in regard to which it was stipulated that it "should act in accordance with the advice of the British resident, and that its members should not be liable to be changed, or vacancies occasioned by the death of its members filled up, except with the sanction of the government of India" This stipulation, which virtually converted Scindia's dominions into a British dependency, was forthwith secured

by a regular treaty, which was not so much negotiated as dictated and imposed by the governor-general at Gwalior. It consisted of twelve articles, of which, in addition to the above stipulation, the most important were those which limited the number of the Gwalior army to 9000 men, of whom not more than 3000 were to be infantry, with twelve field-guns and 200 gunners with twenty other guns; and supplied the place of the troops disbanded by a large increase of the contingent or subsidiary force, provided by the British, and paid for by the Gwalior government. The fort of Gwalior was in future to be garrisoned by the contingent, and Brigadier Stubbs, who commanded the contingent, was moreover appointed commandant of the maharajah's forces. Truly might the governor-general boast that the result of the victories gained over the Gwalior troops had been "the secure establishment of British supremacy," but truly also might it at the same time have been declared that this result had only been obtained by vigorously exercising all the rights of conquest while hypocritically disclaiming them.

A D. 1813.

Terms dictated to Gwalior

THE KING OF GWALIOR.—From Potytkoff, *Voyage dans l'Inde*.

While the governor-general was carrying matters with a high hand at the court of Gwalior, he was himself undergoing a severe ordeal in the court of directors. By his absurd proclamation of the gates, he had destroyed confidence in the soundness of his judgment, and the whole course of his administration so little accorded with the pacific policy to which he had pledged himself on leaving England, that serious doubts began to be entertained as to his fitness to govern India. His policy in regard to Scinde was particularly objected to. He had concocted a series of charges against the Ameers on insufficient evidence, and then made them the pretext for imposing a penal treaty, to which he might have foreseen that they never would submit without coercion. In this way, when the exhaustion of the Indian treasury by the disasters of Afghanistan made it most desirable that peace should be maintained, he provoked a war of the most formidable description, which, but for the singular ability of the military commander, might have proved ruinous, and which, after the most brilliant victories, had only added to our already overgrown Indian empire a tract of territory which for years to come would not pay the expense of governing it. His policy in Gwalior was of a similar description, and there

Lord Ellenborough recalled by the directors.

A.D. 1844.

Lord Ellenborough's recall

was reason to suspect, from hints which he had thrown out, that he was meditating a greater war than any he had yet carried on. Such were the leading public grounds on which Lord Ellenborough was assailed, but he might perhaps have passed unscathed through the ordeal to which they subjected him, had he not imprudently provoked jealousies and animosities between the two great branches of the public service, by the mode in which his patronage was distributed. Lord Auckland had set him the example of making the political subordinate to the military department, when special circumstances seemed to require it; but this, which had hitherto been the exception, was made by Lord Ellenborough the rule, so much so indeed, that he both spoke and acted as if he thought that the first qualification for office of any kind was to be a soldier. Conduct thus systematically pursued was naturally resented by the civil service, and his lordship arrayed against himself many of the ablest and most influential of Indian officials. The effect of this hostility soon became apparent at the India House, and the question of recalling the governor-general was seriously mooted among the directors. This power of recall they undoubtedly possessed, and though they had never before exercised it, they saw so much to disapprove in the mode in which the government of India was conducted, that nothing but the urgent remonstrance of the British cabinet prevented them from exercising it. At last, however, even remonstrance proved unavailing, and on the 21st of April, 1844, Sir Robert Peel, then prime-minister, announced, in answer to a question put to him by Mr. Macaulay, "that on Wednesday last her majesty's government received a communication from the court of directors that they had exercised the power which the law gives them to recall at their will and pleasure the Governor-general of India." This announcement is said to have been received with loud cheers from the opposition benches, though it could hardly be called a party triumph, as eighteen of the twenty-four directors were supporters of the ministry, and yet the vote of recall had been unanimous. This fact affords a strong presumption that it was not dictated by factious or improper motives, but as the papers which could have explained the whole matter were withheld, on the ground that they could not be made public without injury to the public service, we are necessarily left to conjecture. This is so far unfortunate for the directors, as it left them without the means of replying effectively to a speech made against them in the House of Lords by so high an authority as the Duke of Wellington, who stigmatized the recall as "an act of indiscretion at least," and as "the most indiscreet exercise of power" he had ever known.

Character of his administration

The deep mortification felt by Lord Ellenborough at his abrupt recall, was allayed to some extent on finding that he was to be succeeded by his own brother-in-law, who would naturally be more tender of the reputation of his predecessor than could have been expected from a stranger, and would innovate as little as possible on the policy which he had pursued. That this was the

view taken by Lord Ellenborough himself appears from one of his letters to Sir Charles Napier. "You will have heard that the court of directors has done as I expected. I am recalled. Fortunately Sir Henry Hardinge is my successor, and he will carry out all my views with the advantage of having military experience." Military experience seems indeed to have been regarded by his lordship as the most essential qualification of the Governor-general of India, and hence, during his whole administration, he had done little more than endeavour to acquire it. Under the influence of this ruling passion he had turned his back on the seat of government at Calcutta, as if he had no civil duties to perform. It were vain therefore to search the annals of his government for any important internal reforms. For these he had little time, and, it is to be presumed, still less taste, since he took care, in the course of a speech delivered at a farewell entertainment, to make the following announcement: "The only regret I feel at leaving India is that of being separated from the army. The most agreeable, the most interesting period of my life has been that which I have passed here in cantonments and in camps."

A.D. 1844.

Character of Lord Ellenborough's administration.



VISCOUNT HARDINGE.
After a portrait by Sir W. Ross, R.A.

CHAPTER VII.

Sir Henry Hardinge governor-general—His first measures—Threatening aspect of affairs in the Punjab—State of the court of Lahore—Disorder and military ascendancy—British frontier threatened—Assemblage of troops—Invasion of the British territories and commencement of hostilities—Battle of Moodkee—Battle of Ferozeshah—Battle of Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Termination of the first Punjab war—Treaty of peace—Proceedings in Scinde—Sir Charles Napier's hill campaign—Resignation of the governor general.



N the 14th of July, 1844, Lord Ellenborough left Calcutta, and on the 23d of the same month, Sir Henry Hardinge arrived, and entered immediately on the duties of his office. The first months of his government were employed in making judicious arrangements for replacing the civil service in its proper position; in removing grievances, and at the same time maintaining strict discipline in the native army; in promoting education, and in opening up new sources of

Lord
Hardinge's
policy.

A. D. 1844

prosperity by encouraging steam navigation and the construction of railways. While he was thus engaged in peaceful measures, it was daily becoming apparent that he would soon be obliged to abandon them for others of an opposite character. The Punjab had fallen into a state bordering on anarchy, and a large Sikh army, which defied all control, had assumed a menacing attitude on the British frontier.

Unfriendly
relations
with the
Sikhs

After the death of Runjeet Sing in 1839, the friendly relations which he had always carefully maintained underwent a sudden change. His son Khurruk Sing, who succeeded him, possessed none of his talent, and ruled only in name under his own son Nonchal Sing. This youth was unfortunately as hostile as his grandfather had been friendly to British interests, but before his hostility could be fully developed he was killed by a stone or beam which fell upon him as he was passing under a gate. This tragical event, though represented as an accident, was in fact a murder, which had been planned for the purpose of securing the throne for another claimant. This was Shere Sing, who was by repute one of Runjeet Sing's sons, but not acknowledged by him, because he suspected his wife's fidelity. Still, however, his status had been so far recognized that he was allowed to rank as one of the Lahore princes, and hence when both Khurruk Sing, who had previously died, and Nonchal Sing were removed, he had no difficulty in finding numerous supporters. Among these, by far the most influential was Dhyan Sing, who had been prime-minister to Runjeet Sing, and hated Khurruk Sing and his son for having dismissed him in order to make way for a worthless favourite. Notwithstanding this support Shere Sing failed at first to obtain the object of his ambition. His opponent was Chund Koonwur, Khurruk Sing's widow, who having placed herself at the head of a powerful party, drove him from the capital, and was proclaimed queen. By the advice of Dhyan Sing he withdrew from the contest to wait his opportunity. He had not to wait long, for the ranee's government proved a failure, and the old wuzeer having persuaded the soldiers that they ought not to submit to a woman's rule, Shere Sing was recalled. The ranee, still in possession of the capital, prepared to resist his entrance, till the desertion of the troops convinced her that her cause was hopeless.

It is a mis-
conception of
rulers in
Lahore

Shere Sing proved unworthy of the throne to which he had been raised. He had long been addicted to vicious indulgences, and shortly after his elevation, having thrown off all restraint, became a mere drunkard and debauchee. The pernicious consequences were not at first fully developed, as Dhyan Sing, in whom all power now centred, was an able administrator, but ultimately the intrigues of Shere Sing's boon companions began to prevail, and the wuzeer was not only threatened with disgrace, but furnished with evidence which convinced him that his life was in danger. Under the influence of these fears he sanctioned the assassination of the maharajah. This assassination was immediately followed by that of his son Pertaub Sing. Dhyan Sing himself

was not permitted to escape, and was shot dead by Ajeet Sing, the same chief who had murdered his master. After all these atrocities, and a short interval, during which a kind of anarchy prevailed, Dhuleep Sing, another son of Runjeet Sing, was placed upon the throne, and Heera Sing, the son of the murdered wuzeer, succeeded him as prime-minister. The army, now conscious from the part which they had played in effecting these changes that the whole power was in their hands, began to clamour for increased pay, and never hesitated, whenever their demands were refused, to take summary vengeance on the individuals obnoxious to them. In this way Heera Sing met his death, and his successor Juwaheer Sing, the uncle of the new maharajah, who was a mere boy, shared the same fate. By this last event the government of Lahore was left without any administrative head, and the ranee, Dhuleep Sing's mother, in her capacity as guardian, assumed the direction of affairs. Her authority, however, was merely nominal, and all real power was usurped by the army, who exercised it by means of delegates called *punches*. These issued their imperious mandates, which the ranee and her advisers, however reluctant, durst not refuse to obey. The course which this military despotism could hardly fail to take had for some time been foreseen. The soldiers were sufficient in numbers to form a mighty host, and possessed inexhaustible supplies of military stores; but there was no field on which they could display their prowess and enrich themselves with plunder, unless they were to invade the British territories. The temptation was under the circumstances irresistible, and notwithstanding the aversion of the ranee she was obliged to give a formal assent to this unprovoked war. While this was the general resolution of the army, and in appearance at least that of the government also, Gholab Sing, the chief of Jummo, and brother of the murdered wuzeer, Dhyan Sing, managed to keep aloof and dexterously play a double game, professing secret friendship to the British government, while externally complying with the demands of the army so as not to bring down its vengeance.

A.D. 1845.

Power of the
army

While these crimes and revolutions were taking place at Lahore, and a formidable army, subject to no control, was assembled on the frontiers, the British could not remain as unconcerned spectators, and run the risk of being overwhelmed by the bursting of a storm for which they had made no preparations. Lord Ellenborough had placed the threatening aspect of affairs in the Punjab in the foreground, when seeking to justify the coercion he was about to use towards Gwalior, and the force then employed had been pushed forward to take up central positions at Ferozepoor, Loodiana, and Umballa. So strong, however, was the known desire of the directors for a period of peace, that Sir Henry Hardinge proceeded with the utmost caution, and had barely completed the necessary measures of precaution when the time for action arrived. Having reached Umballa on the 2d of December, 1845, he moved with his camp on the 6th towards Loodiana, to fulfil his previously announced intention of visiting

Invasion of
British ter-
ritory by a
Sikh army.

A.D. 1848

the Sikh protected states, according to the usual custom of his predecessors. His movements were made in as peaceful a manner as possible, because he was not only anxious not to furnish the Sikhs with any pretext for hostilities, but had not ceased to hope for an amicable settlement. He only deemed it probable that some act of aggression might be committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling the British government to interfere, and as nothing was further from his wish than to be thus involved in war, he resolved to carry his forbearance as far as possible. The wisdom of this resolution may be questioned. A more spirited conduct might have made the Sikhs pause, whereas forbearance, being only regarded by them as a symptom of fear, probably hastened the crisis. On the 18th of December information was received that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river within the British territory. On the same day Sir Henry Hardinge issued a proclamation which concluded thus—"The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories. The governor-general must therefore take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace. The governor-general hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing on the left or British banks of the Sutlej confiscated or annexed to the British territories."

Proclamation of the governor-general.

Preparations for battle.

Ferozepoor was at this time held by a body of about 10,000 troops, with twenty-four guns, under command of General Sir John Littler. This place being only fifty miles S.S.E. of Lahore, and thrice as far north-west of Umballa, where on the 11th of December Sir Thomas Gough, the commander-in-chief, had his head-quarters, was seriously threatened the moment the Sikhs, headed by an able leader of the name of Tej Sing, had crossed the Sutlej. Their designs upon it were indeed at once manifested, for they immediately invested it on one side, while the remainder of their force proceeded ten miles in advance to Ferozeshah, evidently for the purpose of intercepting the forces now advancing for its relief from Umballa and Loodiana. On the 16th of December the two British divisions thus advancing formed a junction at Bussean, and continued their march in the direction of Moodkee, which is only twenty-five miles south-east of Ferozepoor. It was reached on the 18th, and as the few Sikh cavalry who occupied it retired as the British advance appeared, it was not supposed that an encounter was at hand. Under this impression the British troops took up their encamping ground, and were preparing refreshments after a fatiguing march of twenty-two miles, when scouts arrived with the intelligence that the enemy were hastening forward, and were only three miles distant. They had, it appeared, begun to entrench themselves at Ferozeshah, and on learning the arrival of the British at Moodkee, resolved at once to assume the aggressive, in the belief that they would not have to encounter

the whole British force, but only its advanced guard. The equality of numbers was much nearer than they supposed, for the British mustered 12,350 rank and file, and forty-two guns, while the Sikhs did not amount to more than 30,000, with only forty guns, most of the latter, however, of much heavier metal than those of the British, which were merely the six-pounders of the horse-artillery.

It was about three in the afternoon when the approach of the enemy was announced, and the British troops, already in a state of great exhaustion, had not more than sufficient time to get under arms and move to their positions, when they were ordered to advance to the attack.

They had not proceeded above two miles when they found the enemy in position. The battle, which immediately commenced, is thus described in Sir Hugh Gough's despatch: "The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground afforded, and whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigade into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field-batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyze that of the enemy; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough, to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry the 3d light dragoons, with the 2d brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body-guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers, turned the left

A D 1845

Battle of
MoodkeeGROUP OF SIKHS¹

¹ 1, From a suit of armour in the Tower of London. 2, An Akalee, from the Honourable Miss Eden's *Portraits of the Princes and People of India*.

3, A chief on horseback, from Soltykoff's *Habitants de l'Inde*. 4 and 5, Soldiers, from the Hon. C. S. Hardinge's *Recollections of India*.

A D 1845

Battle of
Moodkee

of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry, under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field-battery, to threaten their right. This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect. When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John McCaskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours, but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre, our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, wherever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object." The victory though glorious was dearly purchased, the British loss amounting to 872, of whom 215 were killed and 657 wounded. Among the former were two officers, who had acquired distinction in Afghanistan—Sir John McCaskill, who was shot dead while gallantly leading his division, and Sir Robert Sale, who was fatally wounded, and survived only a few days.

Battle of
Ferozeshah

The British troops having returned to their camp at midnight, halted during the 19th and 20th. During this interval two heavy guns reached Moodkee, escorted by her majesty's 29th, the 1st European infantry, and the 11th and 41st native infantry, and an express was sent off to Sir John Littler, directing him to join with as many troops as he could safely bring, without compromising the safety of Ferozepoor. He immediately started with 5000 foot, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one field guns, and on the 21st succeeded in forming a junction with the main army, which, disencumbered of its baggage, which had been left with the wounded at Moodkee under sufficient protection, was now hastening to the attack of the entrenched camp at Ferozeshah. During the operations which followed, the governor-general, who had volunteered to act as second in command, had charge of the left wing of the army, while the commander-in-chief personally conducted the right. The British force

A.D. 1845.

Battle of
Ferozeshah

consisted of 16,700 men, and sixty-nine guns, chiefly horse-artillery; the Sikhs mustered about 50,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre. This superiority of numbers was not the only advantage of the enemy, for they occupied an entrenched camp, which extended in the form of a parallelogram, about a mile in length and half a mile in breadth, and included within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah. For a description of the operations we must again have recourse to the commander-in-chief's despatch. "A very heavy cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position upwards of one hundred guns, more than forty of which were of battering calibre; these kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less numerous artillery, of much lighter metal, checked in some degree, but could not silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our infantry advanced and carried these formidable entrenchments; they threw themselves upon their guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy, but when the batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiers had to face such a fire of musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that in spite of the most heroic efforts, a portion only of the entrenchments could be carried. Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging. Although I now brought up Major-general Sir Harry Smith's division, and he captured and long retained another point of the position, and her majesty's 3d light dragoons charged and took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouacked upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In this state of things the long night wore away. Near the middle of it one of their heavy guns was advanced, and played with deadly effect upon our troops. Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge immediately formed her majesty's 80th foot and the 1st European light infantry. They were led to the attack by their commanding officers, and animated in their exertions by Lieutenant-colonel Wood (aide-de-camp to the lieutenant-general), who was wounded in the outset. The 80th captured the gun, and the enemy, dismayed by this counter-check, did not venture to press on further. During the whole night, however, they continued to harass our troops by fire of artillery, wherever moonlight discovered our position. But with daylight of the 22d came retribution. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse-artillery, whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played with great effect upon this point, dismounting one piece and blowing up our tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing. Our line advanced, and unchecked by the enemy's fire, drove them rapidly out

A.D. 1845

Battle of
Ferozeshah

of the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment; then changing front to its left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition; and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manœuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along in front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field. The force assumed a position on the ground which it had won, but even here its labours were not to cease. In the course of two hours, Sirdar Tej Sing, who had commanded in the last great battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozepoor fresh battalions, and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorepurras, hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position of Ferozeshah. This attempt was defeated; but its failure had scarcely become manifest when the sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank, and when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village as compelled us to change our whole front to the right. His guns during this manœuvre maintained one incessant fire, while our artillery ammunition being completely expended in these protracted combats we were unable to answer him with a single shot. I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which apparently caused him suddenly to cease his fire and to abandon the field."


Critical posi-
tion of the
British

It is obvious from the above despatch, and the inferences which though not mentioned may be legitimately drawn from it, that the British army was at one time in great peril, and that had the Sikhs displayed as much skill in taking advantage of their position as valour in defending it, the operations which terminated so honourably for the British arms on the 22d, might have had a very different termination on the 21st. On the evening of that day, the Sikhs not only retained possession of a large portion of their entrenched camp, but their cavalry and infantry kept moving about, harassing and firing on the British as they lay bivouacked, and feared to make any return lest it should only discover their position and increase their danger. "This," as Macgregor justly remarks in his *History of the Sikhs* (vol. ii p. 105), "was a fearful position to be in, and from the intervals between the European infantry regiments and the native brigades with them being left vacant, there was no possibility of forming a line, or acting in concert; portions of one regiment got mixed up with more of another in the entrenchment, and in the darkness of the night could not regain their respective positions. If a regiment had attempted to move right or left in search of another, the Sikh guns were sure to be directed to the spot; and where the 50th bivouacked, Sir Harry Smith, with admirable prudence, forbade a shot to be fired in return for any that might be

A. D. 1845

Battle of
Aliwal

quence by the arrival of his second brigade, which had moved to his support under Brigadier Wheeler. It was now Sir Harry's turn to assume the offensive, and Runjoor Sing retired to his entrenched camp. Even at this time he had a great superiority of force, for the British only mustered about 10,000 men, with thirty-two guns, while the Sikhs had 15,000 men, with fifty-six guns. On the 26th of January, 1846, this disparity was still further increased by the arrival of 4000 regular troops, twelve pieces of artillery, and a large force of cavalry. Thus strengthened, Runjoor Sing was obliged to yield to the impatience of his



- a a, First British line
- b b, Advance to attack
- c c, Position after breaking enemy's line
- d d, Sikh cavalry threatening the left flank
- e e, Colonel Curzon turning the left flank of the enemy
- f f, Charge of three troops of 3d light cavalry, under Major Angelo
- g g, Charge of right wing of the 16th lancers


- h h, Charge of 3d squadron
- i i, Charge of 4th squadron
- n n, Charge of 3d cavalry
- o o, Advance of two troops of H A, with 53d foot and 30th N I.
- p p, Left wing, after driving the enemy from Boondra
- q q, Village of Aliwal stormed by the 31st Foot and Nussereen bat
- r r, Batteries (not occupied)
- s s, Final position of the British after the battle

troops, who imagining that the British retreat from the cannonade and submission to the loss of their baggage was equivalent to a confession of their inability to maintain the conflict, were confident of obtaining an easy victory. They accordingly began to advance, and on the 28th, when the British came in sight of them, stood drawn up close to the village of Aliwal, about eighteen miles west of Loodiana, their left resting upon their entrenched camp, and their right occupying a ridge. After some manœuvres, "per-

formed," says Sir Harry Smith, "with the celerity and precision of the most correct field-day," the British line advanced, but, continues the despatch, "scarcely had it moved forward 150 yards when, at ten o'clock, the enemy opened a fierce cannonade from his whole line. At first his balls fell short, but quickly reached us. Thus upon him, and capable of better ascertaining his position, I was compelled to halt the line, though under fire, for a few moments, until I ascertained that by bringing up my right, and carrying the village of Aliwal, I could with great effect precipitate myself upon his left and centre. I therefore quickly brought up Brigadier Godby's brigade, and with it and the 1st brigade, under Brigadier Hicks, made a rapid and noble charge, carried the village and two guns of large calibre. The line I ordered to advance, her majesty's 31st foot and the native regiments contending for the front, and the battle became general. The

thrown upon the two brigades that had passed its trenches, it became necessary to convert into close and serious attacks the demonstrations with skirmishers and artillery of the centre and right, and the battle raged with inconceivable fury from right to left. The Sikhs, even when at particular points their entrenchments were mastered with the bayonet, strove to regain them by the fiercest conflict sword in hand. Nor was it until the cavalry of the left, under Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward and ridden through the openings of the entrenchments made by our sappers in single file, and re-formed

A D. 1846.

Battle of
Sobraon.OUTPOST AT SOBRAON.—FROM PRINCE WALEMAR'S *Erinnerung an der Reise nach Indien*

as they passed them, and the 3d dragoons, whom no obstacle usually held formidable by horse appears to check, had on this day, as at Ferozeshah, galloped over and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field-works, and until the full weight of three divisions of infantry, with every field-artillery gun which could be sent to their aid, had been cast into the scale, that victory finally declared for the British. The fire of the Sikhs first slackened, and then nearly ceased, and the victors then pressing them on every side precipitated them in masses over their bridge and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water, they suffered from our horse-artillery a terrible carnage. Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the early part of the action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mutilating every wounded soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of war left at their mercy. I must pause in this narrative, especially to notice the determined hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Ghoorkas, the Sirmoor, and Nusseree, met the Sikhs wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of

Overthrow
of the Sikhs

A D 1847

Battle of
Sobraon

small stature but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with the grenadiers of our own nation, and, armed with the short weapon of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat. Sixty-seven pieces of cannon, upwards of 200 camel-swivels (zumboorucks), numerous standards, and vast munitions of war, captured by our troops, are the pledges and trophies of our victory." It was indeed a victory most honourable to the British arms, and was well described by the governor-general as one of the most daring exploits ever achieved; "by which in open day a triple line of breastworks, flanked by formidable redoubts bristling with artillery, manned by thirty-two regular regiments of infantry, was assaulted and carried." The British loss, which under the circumstances could not but be serious, amounted in killed and wounded to 2383; the Sikh loss in the action and in crossing the river was estimated at nearly 10,000 men

Submission
of the Sikhs

Great was the consternation in the Lahore durbar when news of the complete overthrow at Sobraon arrived. Further resistance was at once seen to be hopeless, and nothing remained but to try the effect of negotiation. Gholab Sing, who had been playing the double game formerly referred to, now endeavoured to profit by it, and on receiving full powers from the ranee and the durbar, proceeded to the British camp at the head of a deputation, in the hope of being able to act the part of mediator. He arrived on the 15th of February, while the governor-general was still at Kussoor, and was immediately put in possession of the terms which it had been resolved to enforce. He at once declared that he was empowered and prepared to accept them, but when he expressed an earnest wish that the army would now halt, and not advance nearer to the capital, the governor-general, so far from assenting, distinctly told him that the treaty, if signed by him at all, would be signed only at Lahore.


Terms dictated
to them
in their own
capital

On the 22d of February, after a brigade of British troops with the commander-in-chief at their head had taken military possession of the citadel, the governor-general issued a proclamation which commenced thus: "The British army has this day occupied the gateway of the citadel of Lahore, the Badshahee Mosque, and the Hoozooree Bagh. The remaining part of the citadel is the residence of his highness the maharajah, and also that of the families of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, for so many years the faithful ally of the British government. In consideration of these circumstances no troops will be posted within the precincts of the palace gate. The army of the Sutlej has now brought its operations in the field to a close by the dispersion of the Sikh army, and the military occupation of Lahore, preceded by a series of the most triumphant successes ever recorded in the military history of India. The British government, trusting to the faith of treaties, and to the long subsisting friendship between the two states, had limited military preparations to the defence of its own frontier. Compelled suddenly to assume the offensive by the unprovoked invasion of its territories, the British army under the command

of its distinguished leader has in sixty days defeated the Sikhs in four general actions, has captured 220 pieces of field-artillery; and is now at the capital, dictating to the Lahore durbar the terms of a treaty, the conditions of which will tend "to secure the British provinces from the repetition of a similar outrage." On the following day at a public durbar, attended by the maharajah with his principal officers and a numerous suite, the new treaty was signed and ratified. Of its sixteen articles, the most important were those which confiscated all the Sikh territories on the left bank of the Sutlej, and also the whole of the fertile tract on the right bank, situated between the Sutlej and Beas, and known by the name


A.D. 1846.

Terms imposed on the Sikhs



THE ENTRY TO LAHORE.—From the Hon. C S Hardinge's Recollections of India.

of the Jalindar Doab; stipulated for an indemnity of a crore and a half of rupees (£1,500,000), the half or fifty lacs to be paid immediately, and the crore to be discharged by ceding as an equivalent for it "all the hill country between the



SIKH GUN, captured at Lahore.—From originals in Guard Chamber, Windsor Castle. A SIKH CAP, SIKH FORTIFICATION, and MATCHLOCK.—From originals in Tower of London.

Beas and the Indus, including Cashmere and Huzareh;" and while providing for the immediate disbandment of the mutinous troops, limited the Lahore army in future to twenty-five battalions of infantry, of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry.

A.D. 1846

Arrangements with
Gholab
Sing

By the 12th and 13th article, Gholab Sing was to be recognized "as an independent sovereign over the territories which the British may make over to him," and "all disputes between Gholab Sing and the Lahore government were to be referred to the British." These articles rendered it necessary to enter into a treaty with Gholab Sing himself. It was concluded at Umritsur on the 16th of March, 1846, and consisted of ten articles, of which the most important were the 1st and 3d, by which the British government transferred to him and the heirs male of his body, in independent possession, "all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravee, including Chumba, and excluding Lahool, being part of the territory ceded to the British government by the Lahore state," and he in consideration of this transfer agreed to pay to the British government "seventy-five



GHOLAB SING.—From McGregor's History of the Sikhs

lacs of rupees, fifty lacs to be paid on the ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five lacs on or before the 1st of October of the current year, A.D. 1846." The Lahore durbar, aware that the troops had hitherto been their masters, were afraid of the consequences of disbanding them, and petitioned the governor-general to leave a body of British troops in their capital. He consented, though not without some degree of hesitation, and a supplementary treaty was in consequence concluded on the 11th of March. It consisted of eight articles, of which only the first three deserve notice. By these it was agreed that

the British government "shall leave at Lahore, till the close of the current year, A.D. 1846, such force as shall seem to the governor-general adequate for the purpose of protecting the person of the maharajah and the inhabitants of the city of Lahore during the reorganization of the Sikh army;" and that the force thus left "shall be placed in full possession of the fort and city of Lahore, and that the Lahore troops shall be removed from within the city." The Lahore government further engaged to pay all the extra expenses incurred by this arrangement, and "to apply itself immediately and earnestly to the reorganization of its army according to the prescribed condition"

State of
affairs in
Scinde

The engrossing importance of the Sikh war has for the time withdrawn our attention from Scinde, where Sir Charles Napier was still displaying consummate skill both as an administrator and a warrior. The recall of Lord Ellenborough, who had treated him with the utmost confidence, and with whose policy he had openly identified himself, made him doubtful whether he ought not at once to resign a position from which the known disapproval of some of his

measures by the court of directors made it probable that he would sooner or later be driven; but he manfully and wisely resolved, though suffering severely from the climate, to remain at his post, and not willingly quit Scinde till he could truly say that his conquest of it was complete. As yet this could not be said, since among the Cutchee Hills, to the north of Shikarpoor, there were several hill tribes capable of mustering many thousands of marauders, and ever and anon carrying devastation within the frontiers of Scinde. Among these the Ameer Shere Mahomed after his defeat had sought an asylum, and it was therefore not impossible that while indulging their pillaging habits they might become the nucleus of a political confederacy, designed once more to revolutionize Scinde, and again subject it to the tyranny of the Ameer. Influenced at once by a desire to protect the peaceful inhabitants of his government from their half-savage invaders, and defeat the designs of those who fomented these frontier disturbances for political purposes, Sir Charles Napier drew up the plan of a Hill Campaign. The difficulties were of no ordinary kind, but he was the very man to surmount them, and mingled so much prudence with his daring that his plan was approved successively by Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Hardinge. When preparing for this expedition, which he deemed of sufficient importance to demand his personal presence, he proceeded to Sukkur, and was there delayed for some time by an endemic which made fearful ravages among the troops, and more especially among the 78th Highlanders, who had been recently brought up from Kurrachee, and were not at all inured to the climate. So great was the mortality that on the 19th December, 1844, he wrote as follows:—"I have lost the 78th. That beautiful regiment arrived here in high health, and every other part of Scinde was healthy; but the first week in November they began to grow sickly, and here they are bodily in hospital, about 200 dead, men, women, and children. I am sending them away as fast as I can to Hyderabad. As to any movement against the hill tribes at this moment, I have no men. This place is just a *dépôt* of fever—not a man has escaped." After a time spent in repairing the loss thus sustained by a visitation which no human sagacity could have foreseen or prevented, the final arrangements were completed.

A.D. 1844.

State of
affairs in
ScindeSir Charles
Napier's hill
campaign

Cutch Gundava, situated to the north-west of Scinde, and belonging to the Khan of Khelat, is connected with the lower Indus by a range of singularly rugged rocks called the Cutchee Hills, stretching nearly due west from the river towards the Bolan Pass. These hills were inhabited by numerous fierce predatory tribes, under the names of Muzarees, Bhoogtees, Jackranees, Doomkees, Kujjacks, &c., who could bring about 18,000 warriors into the field, besides their armed servants, and made it their boast "that for 600 years no king had ever got beyond the first defiles in their land, though some had tried with 100,000 men." This immunity they owed chiefly to the rugged precipices which rendered their country impassable, and the surrounding deserts which

Physical
features of
Cutch Gun-
dava

A. D. 1845.

his renown among his countrymen by the repulse of an injudicious attempt to surprise him in his fort of Poolajee, situated near the western extremity of the Cutchee Hills. Fitzgerald of the camel corps, who had once resided at Poolajee, believed that his knowledge of the place would enable him to take Beja in his bed. With this view a detachment, consisting of 500 horsemen under Captain Tait, and 200 of the camel corps under Lieutenant Fitzgerald, was sent to make a forced march across the desert. The result was that they lost their way, and on arriving at eight in the morning exhausted with fatigue, found Beja, who had been fully apprised of their design, prepared to receive them with a garrison of several hundred matchlock-men. The surprise proved a complete failure, and after some loss a retreat became necessary, which must have terminated in disaster had not water been found at an abandoned post which had been fortunately overlooked by the enemy when filling up the other wells.

Mutinous spirit of the sepoys

Shortly after this repulse the spies returned with intelligence that the tribes, elated by Beja's victory, were assembling in great numbers around Poolajee, and were talking of bringing back Shere Mahomed into Scinde. About the same time the Jackranees and Doomkees made a successful incursion; and, as if to complete the list of misfortunes, a mutinous spirit was manifested by the native troops at Shikarpoor. When ordered to proceed from the north-west provinces to Upper Scinde, they had insisted on higher allowances, on the ground that Scinde was no part of India, and that they would therefore when there be on foreign service. Accordingly, some time after reaching Shikarpoor, when the lower pay was offered, the 64th native infantry refused it, alleging, and as it turned out truly, that Colonel Mosley, their commanding officer, had promised them the higher rate. The danger was that the other Bengal regiments at Shikarpoor would follow the same course, but this was happily prevented by the decisive measures of Brigadier Hunter, who, on finding personal remonstrances vain, and being even assailed by missiles, brought out the whole garrison of Sukkur, to which place the mutinous regiment had been moved by his orders, seized thirty or forty of the mutineers, and having disarmed the rest, compelled them to cross to the left bank of the Indus.

Sir Charles Napier's hill campaign.

The alarms produced by the mutiny, and the renewed ravages of the Cutchee Hill tribes, made it most desirable that the campaign should no longer be delayed; and accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1845, it was opened by an advanced guard of cavalry and guns, which marched under the general himself from Sukkur to Shikarpoor, and on the 15th arrived at Khangur. Jacob, who had started with the left wing from Larkhana, arrived on the same day at Rojan. The left wing and centre then proceeded northwards in parallel lines, at the average distance of about twenty miles from each other, the former to Shapoor, where Beja Khan was reported to be in force, and the latter to Ooch. On the 18th the general arrived in the vicinity of Ooch, and was relieved from some anxiety which he had felt on account of a detachment.

A D 1845

Sir Charles
Napier's hill
campaign.

which had preceded him, by learning that Captain Salter, who commanded it, had on the previous night defeated 700 hill-men, led by the Jackranee chief, Deyra Khan. Intelligence equally gratifying was at the same time received from Captain Jacob, who had surprised and totally defeated a body of hill-men under Khan Beja's son. Wullee Chandia, a friendly chief, had also been successful at Poolajee; and thus at the very outset Beja Khan and his confederates had sustained a triple defeat, under the terror of which they at once abandoned the western and took refuge among the eastern hills. This movement necessitated a corresponding change in the plan of the campaign. Salter remained at Ooch; Jacob was detached to Poolajee and Lheree, to co-operate with Wullee Chandia in overawing the Khelat tribes; and the infantry, the artillery, and all the supplies were directed upon Shapoor, where a magazine for fourteen days' consumption was formed. In this position the army occupied two sides of a square, the one menacing the passes from the desert on the south, and the other commanding the western mouths of the long parallel valleys which run eastward toward the Indus. The real pursuit of Beja now commenced, and proved one of the most remarkable that was ever undertaken and successfully performed by disciplined troops. It had usually been taken for granted that such troops would have no chance in warring with hill-men among the rugged precipices and narrow ravines of their native hills, but it was now shown that under a skilful and energetic leader their superiority there was almost as decided as in the plains. It is impossible, however, to make the details intelligible without occupying far more space than their relative importance would justify, and it must therefore suffice to mention that Beja and his confederates, hemmed in on all sides and threatened with starvation, had no alternative but unconditional surrender. This event, which took place on the 9th of March, ended the war.

Internal re-
forms of the
governor-
general.

During the year 1847, though the intrigues of the ranee at Lahore for the purpose of dethroning the council of regency rendered it necessary to remove her to a distance from the capital, the general tranquillity of India was not disturbed, and the governor-general was permitted to give his almost undivided attention to internal improvements. Among the acts of his government none did him higher honour, or was in its effects, direct and indirect, more beneficial, than that by which he prohibited the Christian part of the population from labouring on Sunday. Education also received new encouragement, and the natives were made to feel that nothing but the want of qualifications, which it would be their own fault if they did not acquire, could henceforth exclude them from employment in the public service. The finances, previously deranged by the enormous sums which had been wasted in Afghanistan, and not improved by the military tastes and expensive shows of his predecessor, were again brought into order; while in the erection of public works, and particularly in the liberal patronage bestowed on railway companies, a solid foundation was

laid for general prosperity, and as its consequence a large and permanent increase of revenue. Through undue partialities, capriciously if not tyrannically indulged, jealousies and heart-burnings had been introduced into every branch of the public service. He threw oil upon the troubled waters, and merited the honourable title of Peace-maker. The termination of such an administration was indeed a calamity, and we cannot wonder at the general regret which was felt when, at the end of little more than three years from the date of his entrance upon office, he announced his intention to resign. It only remains to add that his services, as well as those of his gallant colleagues in the Punjab war, were duly acknowledged at home. The governor-general became Viscount Hardinge, the commander-in-chief Lord Gough, and the victor of Aliwal a baronet. These honours were doubtless well earned, but there was another whose merits were as great as theirs, and it would be difficult to give any satisfactory answer to the question, Why was not Sir Charles Napier also rewarded with a peerage?

A.D. 1847.

Close of Lord
Hardinge's
administra-
tion

CHAPTER VIII.

The Earl of Dalhousie governor-general—Second Punjab war—Siege of Mooltan—Defection of Sher Singh, and consequent raising of the siege—Repulse at Ramnuggur—Siege of Mooltan resumed—Its capture—Subsequent military operations—Battle of Chillianwalla—Victory of Gujarat—Annexation of the Punjab—Sir Charles Napier's return to India as commander-in-chief.



IN the end of 1847, when Viscount Hardinge quitted India, and the Earl of Dalhousie arrived to assume the reins of government, the Punjab seemed to be settling down into a state of tranquillity. It was, however, only the lull before the storm, which at length suddenly broke out in the south-west, in the province of Mooltan. Here Sawun Mull, a chief of great ability, had been succeeded as dewan, in 1844, by his son Moolraj, who, following out the ambitious designs of his father, aspired almost openly at independence. His succession had been confirmed at Lahore, on the understanding that he would pay into the treasury a slump sum of thirty lacs of rupees. Taking advantage of the confusion which prevailed, he not only failed to pay this sum, but withheld the regular revenue. It was in consequence resolved to call him to account, and Lal Sing, the prime-minister, despatched a body of troops for this purpose. Moolraj resisted, and an encounter took place, in which the Lahore troops were defeated. Ultimately, through British mediation, an arrangement was made, by which Moolraj allowed the withdrawal of a considerable tract of territory previously included in his government, paid a large sum in name of arrears, and became bound for an

Lord
Dalhousie
governor
general.

Khan Sing, the newly appointed dewan, set out for Mooltan. He was accompanied by two British officers—Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew of the civil service, and Lieutenant W. A. Anderson of the 1st Bombay fusiliers. Chiefly as an escort, but partly also to supply the place of a portion of the Mooltan troops, which were to come to Lahore, Mr. Agnew had with him the Ghoorka regiment, above 600 strong, 500 to 600 cavalry, regular and irregular, and a troop of horse-artillery. These troops marched by land, while the British officers proceeded by water. In this way the officers and the troops met for the first time on the 18th of April, at the Eedgah, a spacious Mahometan building within cannon-shot of the north face of Mooltan fort. In the course of the 18th Moolraj paid two visits to the Eedgah, and arranged that the fort should be given up to the new dewan. Accordingly on the following morning, Sirdar Khan Sing and the two British officers accompanied Moolraj into the fort, received the keys, put two of the Ghoorka companies in possession, placed their own sentries, and after endeavouring to allay the manifest discontent of the garrison at the change by promises of service, prepared to return. They had passed the gate and entered on the bridge over the ditch, when one of two of Moolraj's soldiers, who were standing on it, rushed at Mr. Agnew, knocked him off his horse with his spear, and then inflicted two severe wounds with his sword. Before he could complete the murder the assassin was tumbled into the ditch by a trooper of the escort. Moolraj, instead of interfering, forced his horse through the crowd, and rode off to his residence of Am Khus, situated outside the fort. Lieutenant Anderson, who had as yet escaped, was afterwards attacked by some of Moolraj's personal attendants, who wounded him so severely that he was left for dead, till some of the Ghoorkas found him, and carried him on a litter to the Eedgah. Thither, too, Mr. Agnew had been brought by the assistance of Khan Sing, and of Rung Ram, Moolraj's brother-in-law, particularly the latter, who placed him on his own elephant, and hurried off with him to the camp, rudely binding up his wounds as they rode along. Mr. Agnew was able to report these occurrences to the resident, and also to write off for immediate assistance to Lieutenant Edwardes, who was employed with a small force in settling the country and collecting the revenue in the vicinity of Leia. He also addressed a letter to Moolraj, calling upon him to prove his own innocence, by seizing the guilty parties and coming in person to the Eedgah. In his answer Moolraj denied his ability to do either. "All the garrison, Hindoo and Mahometan, were," he said, "in rebellion, and the British officers had better see to their own safety." At this very time he was presiding over a council of his chiefs, while the garrison, composed indiscriminately of Afghans, Hindoos, and Sikhs, were taking the oath of allegiance to him in the forms prescribed by their different religions.

A.D. 1848.

Khan Sing
new dewan
at Mooltan.Barbarous
murder of
two British
officers.

Whatever may have been Moolraj's original intentions, he was now in open rebellion. On the evening of the 19th, the whole of the carriage with

A D 1848

Moolraj in
open rebel-
lion

belonging to the escort were carried off. Escape being thus precluded, nothing remained but to put the Eedgah as far as possible into a state of defence. With this view all the soldiers and camp followers were called within the walls, and six guns, which had been brought from Lahore, were placed in battery. The case was almost desperate, but there was still a hope that if the place could be maintained for three or four days succour might arrive. Unfortunately the worst was not yet known. When on the morning of the 20th the guns of the fort opened on the Eedgah, the six guns stationed there replied with only a single round, and then ceased. The Lahore attillerymen had refused to act, and the efforts to seduce the troops from their fidelity were so successful, that when evening arrived the whole had deserted except Khan Sing, eight or ten troopers, and the moonshees and domestic servants of the British officers. All idea of resistance was now abandoned, and a message was sent to Moolraj to treat for surrender. The utmost that could be obtained from him was that the officers should quit the country, and the attack upon them should cease. It would seem that even before these terms could be communicated to the inmates of the Eedgah, the soldiers and mob had taken the decision into their own hands, and were not to be satisfied without blood. Rushing in with horrible shouts, they made Khan Sing prisoner, and barbarously murdered the two British officers. This atrocious crime Moolraj made his own by conferring rewards on those who had taken the lead in perpetrating it.

Contemplan-
ted advance
of British
force upon
Mooltan

The resident at Lahore receiving intelligence of the attack on the British officers only two days after it occurred, and under the impression that the mutiny had no ramifications, and was in all probability not countenanced by Moolraj, immediately "put in motion upon Mooltan, from different points, seven battalions of infantry, two of regular cavalry, three troops and batteries of artillery, and 1200 irregular horse." On the 23d, when the full extent of the revolt was better understood, he saw that the above Sikh force would be altogether inadequate, not merely from the smallness of its numbers, but a more alarming cause—its doubtful fidelity.

To meet the emergency Sir Frederick Currie at first determined on moving the British moveable column from Lahore upon Mooltan. Immediately afterwards, on learning the barbarous murder of the two British officers, and the treachery of their native escort, he abandoned this determination, because he suspected that the other troops of the durbar might act a similar part, and that any British force sent for support and succour would find supposed friends as well as foes united against it. "I could not," he wrote, "consent under any circumstances to send a British force on such an expedition, whatever may be the result and consequences of the state of things which will follow to the continuance of the Sikh government." Notwithstanding this decided language, a declaration by the Sikh rulers of their inability without British aid to coerce Moolraj, and bring the perpetrators of the outrage to justice, sufficed to bring

the resident back to his original intention, and he accordingly addressed a letter to Lord Gough, the commander-in-chief, then at Simla, in which he said:—"In a political point of view, I am satisfied that it is of the utmost importance to the interests of British India that a force should move upon Mooltan, capable of reducing the fort and occupying the city, irrespective of the aid of the durbar troops, and, indeed, in the face of any opposition which those in that quarter might present in aid of the enemy. It is for your lordship to determine, in a military point of view, the possibility of such operations at this season of the year." The resident was evidently inclined to think them possible, but Lord Gough at once decided otherwise. "There can be no doubt that operations against Mooltan, at the present advanced period of the year, would be uncertain if not altogether impracticable; while a delay in attaining the object would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged, most injurious in its moral effects, and highly detrimental to those future operations which must, I apprehend, be undertaken." The governor-general in council concurred in this opinion, and the proposed campaign was accordingly delayed. Meanwhile, however, military operations were actively carried on in another quarter.

A D 1848.

Lord Gough
decides
against
moving a
force on
Mooltan

Lieutenant Edwardes, who was at Dera Futteh Khan, on the left bank of the Indus, on the evening of the 22d April, when he received Mr. Agnew's note calling for assistance, instantly mustered his force, amounting in all to twelve infantry companies, and about 350 sowars, with two guns and twenty zumboorucks, and prepared to cross the river at the ferry of Leia, intending to hurry on to Mooltan, a distance of ninety miles. At the same time he wrote to Lieutenant Taylor, who was with General Van Cortlandt, an officer in the Sikh service, in Bunnoo, for a regiment of infantry and four guns. Having crossed on the 24th, he moved on to Leia and took peaceful possession of it, Moolraj's governor retiring as he advanced. He had resolved to entrench himself at Leia, and await the approach of Moolraj, who was said to have crossed the Chenab for the purpose of opposing his further progress, when an important document fell into his hands. It was an address from the Sikh deserters in Mooltan to the Sikh regiment under his command, calling upon them to imitate their example. On receiving this document and learning that before it reached him it had probably been seen by every man in the regiment, the confidence of Lieutenant Edwardes in his Sikh soldiers was gone. He resolved, therefore, to delay advancing, and wait the arrival of General Cortlandt with reinforcements, while he also increased his own force by recruiting among the Afghans, who had no feelings in common with the Sikhs. He was thus employed when he received intelligence that Moolraj had actually crossed the Chenab with about 3000 men, and eight heavy guns, and would reach Leia by the 1st of May. Doubting the fidelity of two-thirds of his men, Lieutenant Edwardes deemed it prudent to avoid the encounter, and recross the Indus with the view of halting under cover of the fort of Girang. Here he was joined on

Military
operations
of Lieut.
Edwardes

A D 1818 the 4th of May by General Cortlandt, with Soobdan Khan's infantry regiment of Mahometans, and six horse-artillery guns.

Successor of
Lieutenant
Edwards

By the 19th of May a British force assembled, mustering in all about 1000 men who were believed to be faithful, and about 800 Sikhs who were known to be disaffected. The artillery consisted of ten guns and twenty-nine zumbooruck's. This force was far outnumbered by that of the enemy, but a strong diversion had already been or was about to be made by the Nawab of Bhawulpoor, who with his usual fidelity was advancing to cross the Sutlej and threaten Mooltan. So strong did Lieutenant Edwards now feel, that on the 20th of May, he wrote to the resident, "I am prepared to undertake the blockade of that rebel (Moolraj) in Mooltan for the rest of the hot season and rains, if you should honour me with that commission, and order Bhawul Khan to assist me." For

Capture of
Dera Ghazee
Khan

the present, however, the main object was the capture of Dera Ghazee Khan, and this was happily effected in a mode as gratifying as unexpected. The country around Dera Ghazee Khan had been given by Moolraj to a native of the name of Julal Khan Khowrah Khan, a powerful chief, who was his bitter enemy, immediately made his submission to the British, and sent his son Gholam Hyder Khan with a contingent. This youth, who was accompanying General Cortlandt, volunteered on the 20th to go on in advance, raise his father's clan, and without any other assistance drive Lunga Mull across the Indus. The general, without attaching much importance to the offer, accepted of it. Gholam Hyder Khan was as good as his word, and having with his father's consent raised the clan, prepared for the encounter. Lunga Mull, Cheytun Mull, and Julal Khan, at the head of the Lugharee tribe, did not decline the challenge, and a bloody and obstinate conflict ensued. It commenced with a night attack on the 20th by Gholam Hyder Khan, but remained undecided till the following morning, when his clan attacked their enemies sword in hand and gained a complete victory, killing Cheytun Mull and making Lunga Mull prisoner. Some of the fugitives who had taken refuge in the fort capitulated, on condition of being permitted to cross the river, and the whole place was yielded up without further opposition.

Auxiliary
force of the
Khan of
Bhawulpoor.

After the defeat at Dera Ghazee Khan, the division of Moolraj's force which had been higher up the Indus moved down towards that place, and took up a position on the left bank opposite to it at the village of Koreyshee. Their object had been to seize a fleet of boats which had been collected by Lunga Mull, and thus obtain means of effecting the passage. In this they were disappointed, and the two armies remained opposite to each other with the broad river rolling between them. This state of inaction was interrupted by the movements of Bhawul Khan, who in the beginning of June crossed the Sutlej, with the design of moving on Soojabad, which is only twenty-five miles south by west from Mooltan. The effect was to draw off the enemy from Koreyshee, and leave the passage of the river open to the British force, which had no lack

of means, in consequence of having secured the fleet of boats above mentioned. The main-obstacle was a peremptory order of the resident not to quit the right bank, but this was removed at the earnest request of Bhawul Khan, who was now anxious for support. The Indus was accordingly crossed without delay, and the whole force proceeded south-east to Khangur on the right bank of the Chenab or Jhelum, the river after their junction being designated indiscriminately by either name. Meanwhile the Mooltan force had been concentrated, and was advancing on Soojabad, with positive orders from Moolraj to fight Bhawul Khan before the British could come to his aid.

A D. 1648.

Auxiliary
force of the
Khan of
Bhawulpoor

The relative strength and position of the three armies are thus described by Lieutenant Edwardes, in his work entitled *A Year in the Punjab* (vol. ii. p. 376, 377):—"The rebel army, of from 8000 to 10,000 horse and foot, and ten guns, commanded by Moolraj's brother-in-law Rung Ram, and the Daoodpotra (Bhawulpoor) army of about 8000 horse and foot, eleven guns and thirty zumboorucks, commanded by Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree, were on the left bank of the Chenab; and my force, consisting of two divisions (one of faithful regulars, foot and artillery of the Sikh service, about 1500 men and ten guns, under General Cortlandt, and another of about 5000 irregulars, horse and foot, and thirty zumboorucks under my own personal command), was on the right bank. Rung Ram's camp was pitched across the highroad to Mooltan, three miles south of Soojabad; Futteh Mahomed's at Goweyn, fifteen miles farther south; and mine at Gaggianwallah Ferry, about twelve miles south of Khangur. The three formed a triangle, in which the Daoodpotras were nearer to me than to the enemy, but nearer to the enemy than I was; while a river about three miles wide divided the allies." Rung Ram's plan should have been to attack the Bhawulpoor army with the least possible delay, for though the numbers were nearly equal, his troops were far better disciplined, and could hardly have failed to give him the victory. Instead of availing himself of this opportunity, he lost it by waiting till the evening, and then moving eight miles lower down the Chenab, to the village of Bukree, within an easy march of Kineyree, where he knew that the British force must cross. His object was to seize this ferry, and having thus prevented the passage, to deal with the Daoodpotras when left destitute of relief. He was fortunately anticipated by the rapid movements of the allies, the Daoodpotras having hastened down towards Kineyree, while a strong British division, consisting of 3000 Patan irregulars under Foujdar Khan, had crossed the river and moved forward in the direction by which their allies were expected. Scarcely had the junction been effected, on the morning of the 18th, when Lieutenant Edwardes, who had left General Cortlandt to bring over the rest of the force, and was crossing the Chenab, was startled by a cannonade, which announced that the conflict had commenced. Rung Ram hurrying on from Bukree before dawn to seize the ferry, and finding it occupied, took up a strong position on the salt-hills of Noonar, and opened his fire.

Strength and
position of
the different
armies

Battle of
Kineyree.

In consequence of the victory of Kineyree the killedar of Soojabad sent in his submission, others followed his example, and Lieutenant Edwardes felt so strong, that on the 22d of June he suggested to the resident that the siege of Mooltan should be immediately commenced. "We are enough of us in all conscience," he said, "and desire nothing better than to be honoured with the commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy guns, a mortar-battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and Major Napier to plan our operations. That brave and able officer is, I believe, at Lahore; and the guns and mortars are doubtless ere this at Ferozepoor, and only require to be put into boats and floated down to Bhawulpoor." This was an over-sanguine estimate, for not only were ominous desertions constantly occurring among the Sikhs, but Moolraj was determined not to allow himself to be shut up in his fort without risking another general action. It was fought on the 1st of July near the village of Suddoosam, where Moolraj, commanding in person, had taken up a strong and advantageous position with his whole force, estimated at about 12,000 men. The allied force considerably exceeded this, amounting in all to about 18,000 men. Of these, however, 4000, who had arrived in camp only three days before, and formed the converging column under Sheikh Emam-ud-Geen, could not be depended on, and in fact scarcely took any part in the action. On this occasion the enemy took the initiative, and about noon advancing in line were close at hand before the allies became convinced that they had really resolved to risk a battle. The issue was never doubtful, the allies being superior not only in numbers but in artillery, theirs amounting to twenty-two pieces, while that of the enemy did not exceed ten. The conflict, however, was maintained with considerable obstinacy till Moolraj put spurs to his horse and fled. His example was immediately followed, while the victors continued the pursuit till they were almost under the walls of Mooltan. This victory, which obliged Moolraj to take refuge within his fort, again raised the question as to the practicability of immediately laying siege to it. Lieutenant Edwardes had, as we have seen, offered to undertake it, and suggested a plan which he thought would "obviate the necessity of a British army taking the field at all." The resident "was disposed to think that the addition of a single British brigade with ten guns, and twenty mortars and howitzers, would be sufficient." Lord Gough adhered to his former opinion, and the governor-general in council entirely concurred with him. The letter conveying this decision to the resident was despatched on the 11th of July, but on the 10th of the same month, and of course a day before it was written, he had taken the decision into his own hands, and directed General Whish, commanding the troops in the Punjab, to "take immediate measures for the despatch of a siege-train with its establishment, and a competent escort and force, for the reduction of the fort of Mooltan." This was certainly a bold step, but as the danger of abandoning it after it had been publicly announced seemed to the governor-

A D 1848.


Victory of
SuddoosamPreparations
for siege of
Mooltan

A.D. 1848

general greater than the danger of prosecuting it, he informed the resident that since he had considered it necessary, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him, "to assume this responsibility," the government being anxious to maintain his authority, confirmed the orders he had issued, and therefore enjoined him "to proceed with vigour to carry out at all hazards the policy which he had now resolved upon."

Advance of
General
Whish

The die being thus cast, the necessary preparations were made with all possible expedition, and on the 24th of July General Whish started for Mooltan with a force amounting to 8089 men, with thirty two pieces of siege ordnance, and twelve horse-artillery guns. It moved in two columns; the right with the general's head-quarters marching from Lahore along the left bank of the Ravee,



TOWN AND FORT OF FEROZPOOR.—After a sketch by H. Pilleau, Esq.

and the left, commanded by Brigadier Salter, marching from Ferozepoor along the right bank of the Sutlej. The native force previously assembled consisted of 8415 cavalry, and 14,327 infantry, with forty-five horse-artillery guns, four mortars, and 158 camel-swivels. Of this force, including that of General Cortlandt, 7718 infantry and 4033 cavalry were commanded by Lieutenant Edwardes, 5700 infantry and 1900 cavalry formed the Bhawalpooor army commanded by Lieutenant Lake, and 909 infantry and 3382 cavalry formed the Sikh army commanded by Rajah Shere Sing. To this besieging force of nearly 32,000 men, Moolraj was not able to oppose more than a garrison of 12,000 men, with an artillery of fifty-four guns and five mortars. This great disparity of numbers was compensated by the strength of the works.

Description
of Mooltan

Mooltan, about three miles from the left bank of the Chenab, but within reach of its inundations, is surrounded by groves of date trees and beautiful gardens. These, however, fail to make it a pleasant residence, for its scorching climate is proverbial even in India, and with its usual accompaniments is not inaccurately described in the following doggerel couplet:—

"Churchyards, beggars, dust, and heat,
Are the four best things at Mooltan you'll meet"

A D. 1848.

It was a place of great antiquity, and had undergone so many vicissitudes that the mound on which it stands is said to be composed of the ruins of earlier cities which occupied the same site. When the battle of Suddoosam was fought in its vicinity Mooltan was only surrounded by an old brick wall; but Moolraj, on seeing that his whole forces were about to be shut up within this feeble inclosure, had by unremitting exertion lined it with an enormous rampart of mud, and thus converted it into a powerful means of defence. It was not so much to it, however, that Moolraj trusted, as to the citadel, which had long been renowned in Indian warfare, had stood many sieges, and was now stronger than ever, in consequence of the sums which Moolraj's father lavished upon it, when, with the view of asserting his independence, he withheld the revenue due to Lahore, and employed it in strengthening the citadel so as to make it, as he thought, impregnable. It had in consequence become one of the strongest and most regular of the Indian fortresses constructed by native engineers. Beyond its deep and wide ditch faced with masonry rose a rampart, externally forty feet in height, and surmounted by thirty towers. Within, everything had been done for its security, and its magazines were stored with all the materials requisite to enable it to stand a lengthened siege.

Description
of Mooltan

On the 4th of September, as soon as the siege train arrived, General Whish issued a proclamation addressed "to the inhabitants and garrison" of Mooltan, inviting them "to an unconditional surrender within twenty-four hours after the firing of a royal salute at sunrise to-morrow, in honour of her most gracious majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and her ally, his highness Maharajah Dhuleep Sing." In the event of non-compliance he would "commence hostilities on a scale that must insure early destruction to the rebel traitor and his adherents, who having begun their resistance to lawful authority with a most cowardly act of treachery and murder, seek to uphold their unrighteous cause by an appeal to religion, which every one must know to be sheer hypocrisy." The only notice taken of this proclamation was a shot from the citadel, which "pitched into the earth just behind General Whish and his staff from a distance much exceeding two miles" Moolraj, after making proposals for surrender, had recently received new confidence. At the very time when he was compelled to shut himself up in his capital, the general disaffection of the Sikhs became more manifest than ever, so that the resident, who in the beginning of July had been sanguine enough to expect "that the rebel Moolraj will either destroy himself or be destroyed by his troops before the next mail goes out," was obliged to confess on the last day of the same month, that "plans were forming, combinations were being made, and various interests were being enlisted, with a view to a grand struggle for our expulsion from the Punjab and all the territories west of Delhi." Shere Sing, though he had been ordered to halt at Tolumbia,

Proclamation
of Gen-
eral Whish

A.D. 1845.

Siege of
Mooltan

had continued to advance on Mooltan. Various suspicious movements had taken place in other quarters, and a formidable outbreak headed by Chuttur Sing had broken out in the Hazareh country, in the north-west of the Punjab. This outbreak derived additional importance from the fact that Chuttur Sing was the father of Shere Sing, who, though now encamped with his troops before Mooltan as part of the besieging force, must have previously been made acquainted with his father's designs, and in all probability given his sanction to them.

The siege of Mooltan was opened at daylight of the 7th of September. The first parallel commenced at the unusual distance of 1600 yards, said to have



SHERE SINGH AND HIS SUITE.—FROM Prince Soltykoff's *Voyage dans l'Inde*.

Progress of
the

been rendered necessary by the nature of the ground. On the night of the 9th an attempt to dislodge the enemy from some gardens and houses in front of the trenches failed, owing to the darkness and confusion of a hastily planned night attack. This repulse so much increased Moolraj's confidence that he began to strengthen the position which had been attacked, and thus besiegers and besieged continued for two days throwing up works within a few hundred yards of each other. On the 12th the general, having determined to clear his front, caused the irregulars to create a diversion on the left, while two British columns advanced to do the real business of the day. A fierce conflict ensued, during which Moolraj's troops, confident in the strength of their entrenchment, and elated by their success on the 9th, fought better than they had ever done before. British valour, however, prevailed, and the enemy, driven back from his position, left 500 dead upon the ground. The effect of this success was to

bring the besiegers about 800 yards nearer, and consequently within battering distance of the walls of the city. Its speedy capture was now confidently anticipated, but after the troops had nearly spent two days in securing the advance which they had gained, an event took place which disappointed all these expectations.

A.D. 1849.

Ever since the rebellion of his father in Hazareh, Shere Sing had been loud in professions of continued loyalty, and did not desist till the morning of the 11th September, when his camp moved bodily off to Mooltan, he himself heading, the movement, and ordering the *dhurum kha dosa* or religious drum to be beaten in the name of the Khalsa. On receiving this intelligence the general summoned a council of senior officers, who were unanimously of opinion that "the siege was no longer practicable." The besieging troops were in consequence immediately withdrawn from their advanced position within breaching distance of the walls of the town, to a new position at Tibbee, there to "await the arrival of such reinforcements as the commander-in-chief may think proper to send."

Defection of
Shere Sing

When Shere Sing arrived with his troops at Mooltan, Moolraj, though delighted with this accession of strength, was far from feeling perfect confidence in his new friends, and therefore, instead of admitting them into the fort, obliged them to remain under its guns, while he took the rajah and all his officers to a temple outside the city, and made them swear that they had no treacherous design. Even this oath proved insufficient, and after serious misunderstandings, Shere Sing volunteered to join his father in Hazareh if some pay were advanced to his soldiers. Moolraj grasped at the proposal, and on the 9th of October, Shere Sing departed to become the leader of a new Sikh war. Before, following him, it will be necessary to tell all that remains to be told concerning Moolraj and Mooltan.

Reception of
Shere Sing
by Moolraj

The siege, raised on the 14th of September, was not resumed till the 17th of December. The interval, however, was not one of entire inaction. The British troops were employed, partly in practising the erection of field-works and model batteries, and partly in preparing materials for siege purposes, so that when the time of action arrived, the enormous number of 15,000 gabions and 12,000 fascines had been provided. Moolraj on his part was equally active in strengthening the fortifications of the town and suburbs, and raising recruits to supply the place of those who had gone off with Shere Sing. Not satisfied, however, to remain dependent on his own resources, he looked round for allies. In the choice of these he displayed considerable political sagacity, making his first offers to Dost Mahomed of Cabool, and the chiefs of Candahar, whom he tempted with the offer of making the Indus their mutual boundary after they should, by their united exertions, have expelled the Feringhees.


Operations
of contend-
ing parties

The plan of siege now adopted was not to take the city as a preliminary, but to make a regular attack on the north-east angle of the citadel, and occupy

A.D. 1849

Siege of
Mooltan

only so much of the suburbs as were required for actual operations. The portions of suburbs thus required were the tomb of Sawun Mull, Moolraj's father, called Wuzeerabad, and Moolraj's own residence of Am Khus, and as they were naturally the first objects to which the attention of the besiegers was directed, not a day was lost in effecting the capture of them. At the same time an attack, which had been intended only as a feint, proved so successful that the besiegers were brought almost close to the city walls. On the 30th of December, a considerable part of the citadel was laid in ruins by the explosion of the principal magazine. It was situated beneath the dome of the grand mosque, which was supposed to be bomb-proof till it was pierced by a shell from one of



STORMING OF THE KHOONEE BOORJ BREACH, MOOLTAN.—From Dunlop's Sketches during the Siege of Mooltan

the British mortars. The extent of the catastrophe may be inferred from the fact that the magazine contained about 400,000 lbs of gunpowder, and that about 500 of the garrison were killed by the explosion. On the 2d of January, one breach in the city wall was declared practicable, and another sufficient to allow of its being attacked as a diversion. The latter breach proved to be far more imperfect than had been imagined, for the storming party assigned to it, after passing under a heavy fire across a deep intervening hollow, "found to their surprise the city wall in front about thirty feet in height, unbreached and

hemmed in, his courage gave way, and he made an overture for surrender, by sending a letter to Major Edwardes in the following terms:—"Having sundry representations to make before you, I write to say that, with your permission, I will send a confidential person of my own to wait on you, who will tell you all." He was referred in answer to General Whish, who refused to receive any confidential person, unless he were sent simply to state, "My master wishes to come in, and will do so at such an hour, and will come out from the fort at such a gate, and by such a road." Not yet prepared for unconditional surrender, Moolraj allowed some days to elapse, and then as if he had at last made up his mind to it, intimated on the 8th of January, that he meant to avail himself of the general's permission to send a messenger. He was accordingly admitted on the following morning, but on being asked point blank whether he had authority to tender his master's submission, and replying that he had not, was at once dismissed. Thus repulsed in his attempts to make terms, Moolraj continued his defence, and even on the night of the 12th of January ventured to make a *sortie* on the British trenches. The end was, however, evidently approaching. On the 14th the British sappers crowned the crest of the glacis at the north-east angle of the citadel, with a cavalier only fifteen feet from the edge of the ditch, and on the 19th two breaches, one on the north and the other on the south face, seemed so nearly practicable that the assault was fixed for the morning of the 22d. There could have been no doubt as to its success, but this was not put to the proof, as Moolraj at the last moment of respite allowed him came out and yielded himself a prisoner. The fort was immediately taken possession of without opposition. During the siege, which had lasted twenty-seven days, the British loss was 210 killed and 910 wounded. Moolraj was afterwards tried at Lahore, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged, but as his judges had recommended him to mercy as "the victim of circumstance," the sentence was commuted into banishment beyond seas.

A D 1817.

Moolraj's
courage failsHe sur-
renders.Revolt in
Hazareh

The insurrection of Chuttur Sing in Hazareh, after a slight check, assumed larger dimensions, and threatened to become still more formidable in consequence of the alliance which he had formed with the Afghans. On the 24th of October, the whole Sikh troops in Peshawer revolted, and Major George Lawrence, after endeavouring in vain to recall them to duty, was obliged to consult his personal safety by retiring with his assistant Lieutenant Bowie to Kohat, situated about thirty-six miles to the south. This place belonged to Sultan Mahomed Khan, the brother of Dost Mahomed of Cabool. His conduct during the Afghan war had proved him to be a mere compound of heartlessness and villany; but as the circumstances left no room for choice, Major Lawrence, who had previously learned that Mrs. Lawrence, whom he had sent off for Lahore at the commencement of the outbreak, had been carried to Kohat under the pretext of giving her a more secure asylum, had no alternative but to place himself and his assistant also in his power. The result was as might have been

A. D. 1849

Siege of
Mooltan

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The city
taken

hemmed in, his courage gave way, and he made an overture for surrender, by sending a letter to Major Edwardes in the following terms:—"Having sundry representations to make before you, I write to say that, with your permission, I will send a confidential person of my own to wait on you, who will tell you all." He was referred in answer to General Whish, who refused to receive any confidential person, unless he were sent simply to state, "My master wishes to come in, and will do so at such an hour, and will come out from the fort at such a gate, and by such a road." Not yet prepared for unconditional surrender, Moolraj allowed some days to elapse, and then as if he had at last made up his mind to it, intimated on the 8th of January, that he meant to avail himself of the general's permission to send a messenger. He was accordingly admitted on the following morning, but on being asked point blank whether he had authority to tender his master's submission, and replying that he had not, was at once dismissed. Thus repulsed in his attempts to make terms, Moolraj continued his defence, and even on the night of the 12th of January ventured to make a *sortie* on the British trenches. The end was, however, evidently approaching. On the 14th the British sappers crowned the crest of the glacis at the north-east angle of the citadel, with a cavalier only fifteen feet from the edge of the ditch, and on the 19th two breaches, one on the north and the other on the south face, seemed so nearly practicable that the assault was fixed for the morning of the 22d. There could have been no doubt as to its success, but this was not put to the proof, as Moolraj at the last moment of respite allowed him came out and yielded himself a prisoner. The fort was immediately taken possession of without opposition. During the siege, which had lasted twenty-seven days, the British loss was 210 killed and 910 wounded. Moolraj was afterwards tried at Lahore, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged, but as his judges had recommended him to mercy as "the victim of circumstance," the sentence was commuted into banishment beyond seas.

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command the nullah, while the third, on the island, fired into it point blank. The artillery thus suddenly checked in their career, were obliged to retire with the loss of one of their guns, which having tumbled over the high bank of the nullah along with two ammunition waggons, could not have been recovered without a fearful sacrifice of life. Nor was this the worst. When the enemy saw the confusion produced by their fire, they sent over from 3000 to 4000 of their cavalry under the cover of their guns. These, from some mistake, it is said, of an order given for a different purpose, were charged in the most gallant style by Colonel Havelock of the 14th dragoons and by the 5th cavalry, and on their giving way by retreating across the nullah, were followed down the bank till close upon the batteries. The murderous fire drove them back, but they re-formed a second and a third time, and were continuing the attack when Brigadier Cureton arrived with orders from Lord Gough to retire. He had scarcely uttered the word when he fell dead, struck by two matchlock-balls. Colonel Havelock was also killed, and Captain Fitzgerald mortally wounded.

A D. 1849.

Repulse at
Ramnuggur

Shere Sing still maintained his position on the right bank of the Chenab, with a force estimated at about 35,000 men, and as the unfortunate affair above related had shown how difficult it would be to dislodge him by an attack in front, it was resolved to attempt to turn his left flank. With this view General Sir Joseph Thackwell, who commanded the cavalry, was sent up the river with a detachment, consisting of three troops of cavalry, the horse artillery, and two light field batteries. He proceeded accordingly to Wuzerabad, and there having succeeded, on the 2d of December, in effecting a passage, he began his downward march toward the Sikh camp. He was not allowed to proceed far when he was encountered by a large Sikh force, which Shere Sing had detached in the hope of overwhelming him. At first Sir Joseph was somewhat puzzled how to act, as his instructions were not to attack, but to content himself with repelling aggression, unless he found the enemy in retreat. He therefore ordered a halt, which the Sikhs as usual mistook for fear. Under this mistake they commenced a cannonade, at the same time attempting to turn the British flanks by numerous bodies of cavalry. On finding that their cannonade was not returned their confidence increased, and they were advancing as if to certain victory, when the British artillery opened a most destructive fire, which silenced their cannonade and frustrated all their operations. Meanwhile Lord Gough, as soon as he learned that Sir Joseph had crossed, opened a heavy cannonade on the enemy's encampment. Shere Sing thus attacked in front, and threatened not only by Sir Joseph Thackwell's detachment, but by a brigade of infantry under Brigadier Godby, who had also crossed only six miles above Ramnuggur, saw that his position was untenable, and hastened off on the night of the 3d towards the Jhelum. As the retreat had been made precipitately, and in the utmost disorder, it was

Strength of
the Sikh
post onTheir
repulse.

A. D. 1849

Strength of
the Sikhs
still un-
broken

confidently predicted that the whole Sikh force would immediately disperse. This prediction was far too sanguine. Shere Sing's strength was still unbroken, and by retreating to the north, where his father was still at the head of a formidable insurrection, he undoubtedly took the most effectual means of preparing for a more decisive struggle. His troops accordingly, so far from dispersing, rapidly increased in numbers, and he was ere long at the head of 40,000 men, with sixty-two guns.

Lord Gough having crossed with the whole of his army to the right bank of the Chenab, continued his march northwards in the direction which Shere Sing had taken, and on the 12th of January, 1849, on arriving at Dingee found the Sikh chief with his whole force encamped in its vicinity, with his right on the villages of Lukneewalla and Futteh Shakechuck, the main body at the village of Lollianwalla, and his left at Russool on the Jhelum. In this position he occupied the southern extremity of a low range of hills intersected by ravines, and Lord Gough believing the ground "to be excessively difficult, and ill adapted to the advance of a regular army," determined to move on Russool with a view to reconnoitre. The subsequent operations on the 13th, we must allow Lord Gough himself to describe. After mentioning that the day was far advanced, the despatch continues thus:—"The engineer department had been ordered to examine the country before us, and the quarter-master-general was in the act of taking up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse-artillery, and opened a fire on the skirmishers in front of the village. I immediately ordered them to be silenced by a few rounds from our heavy guns, which advanced to an open space in front of the village. The fire was instantly returned by that of nearly the whole of the enemy's field artillery, thus exposing the position of his guns, which the jungle had hitherto concealed. It was now evident that the enemy intended to fight, and would probably advance his guns so as to reach the encampment during the night. I therefore drew up in order of battle; Sir Walter Gilbert's division on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, which I strengthened by the 14th light dragoons, well aware that the enemy was strong in cavalry upon his left. To this were attached three troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Grant. The heavy guns were in the centre. Brigadier-general Campbell's division formed the left, flanked by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and three troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Brind. The field batteries were with the infantry divisions."

They ad-
vanced anew
to the
attack

Before proceeding to quote further from Lord Gough's despatch, several reflections suggested by the portion already given will not be out of place. First, it is clear that his lordship, if he had any intention of fighting a battle on the 13th, had abandoned it. He thought the day too far advanced, and had therefore ordered ground to be taken up for encampment. Secondly, it is equally clear that the reconnoissance which had been made was understood to be

imperfect. This appears both from the order given to the engineers to "examine the country," and also from the fact that the actual position of the enemy's field artillery was unknown, till they themselves, at a later period of the day, divulged it by opening their fire. These two considerations—the advanced hour and imperfect knowledge of the ground—seem sufficient to justify the determination to defer the battle, and the question naturally arises, On what grounds were these considerations afterwards overruled? To this question the answer, in so far at least as Lord Gough has been pleased to give it, is neither explicit nor satisfactory. "It was now evident," he says, "that the enemy intended to fight." Does it therefore follow that his lordship was bound to allow the enemy to choose his own time, and force him to fight at a disadvantage? But then it was probable that the enemy "would advance his guns so as to reach the encampment during the night." This undoubtedly would have been both annoying and insulting, but surely, assuming that there was no means of preventing it, the evil would have been far more than compensated by the advantage of allowing the troops a night's repose after the fatiguing march they had already undergone, since this would not only have enabled them to commence the conflict with recruited strength, but given them a full day to decide it. On these and similar grounds it may be questioned whether his lordship gave sufficient reason for his change of purpose, when after narrating the enemy's movements he simply adds:—"I therefore drew up in order of battle."

A.D. 1849.

Lord
Gough's de-
termination
to fight.

The order of battle having been arranged as above, the troops were ordered to lie down, while the heavy guns opened a powerful and well-directed fire on the enemy's centre, and the light field batteries opened theirs on the flanks. After an hour of this cannonade seemed to have "sufficiently disabled" that of the enemy, the left division, which had to move over the larger extent of ground, began the advance, and was shortly afterwards followed by the right division, protected on its flank by Brigadier Pope's cavalry brigade. The advance of both divisions was ultimately successful, though not unattended with a very untoward occurrence in each. The two leading officers of the right brigade of the left division "waved their swords over their heads as they cheered on their gallant comrades." Somehow this act was mistaken for "the signal to move in double time." The consequence is thus described in the despatch: "This unhappy mistake led to the Europeans outstripping the native corps, who could not keep pace, and arriving completely blown at a belt of thicker jungle, where they got into some confusion, and Lieutenant-colonel Brookes, leading the 24th, was killed between the enemy's guns. At this moment a large body of infantry, which supported these guns, opened upon them so destructive a fire that the brigade was forced to retire, having lost their gallant and lamented leader Brigadier Pennywick, and the three best field officers of the 24th, and nearly half the regiment, before it gave way."

Battle of
Chillian-
walla.

native regiment, when it came up, also suffering severely." At this crisis Brigadier Penny's brigade, left in reserve, was ordered up, but its support proved unnecessary, for, adds Lord Gough, "Brigadier-general Campbell, with that steady coolness and military decision for which he is so remarkable, having pushed on his left brigade and formed line to his right, carried everything before him, and soon overthrew that portion of the enemy which had obtained a temporary advantage over his right brigade." The untoward occurrence in the right division was still more serious, and must like the other be described in the words of Lord Gough, who after saying that "the right attack of infantry was most praiseworthy and successful," and that "this division nobly maintained the character of the Indian army, taking and spiking the whole of the enemy's guns in their front, and dispersing the Sikhs wherever they were seen," continues thus.—"The right brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Pope, was not, I regret to say, so successful. Either by some order, or misapprehension of an order, they got into much confusion, hampered the fine brigade of horse-artillery, which, while getting into action against a body of the enemy's cavalry that was coming down upon them, had their horses separated from their guns by the false movements of our cavalry, and notwithstanding the heroic conduct of the gunners, four of their guns were disabled to an extent which rendered their withdrawal at the moment impossible. The moment the artillery was extricated, and the cavalry re formed, a few rounds put to flight the enemy that had occasioned this confusion." Lord Gough in the above extract speaks only of the impossibility of withdrawing the guns "at the moment," and spared himself the mortification of confessing that the enemy carried them off as trophies, and along with them five stand of colours. It was not indeed a victory to be boasted of, for the Sikhs, though they acknowledged their defeat by retiring and allowing the British to encamp in advance of the battle-field, were so little broken and dispirited that they managed to return in the course of the night and carry off unobserved all the guns that had been captured from them, except twelve which had been previously secured.

Nothing shows more clearly how indecisive the above battle of Chillianwalla had been, than the fact that the enemy, instead of being driven across the Jhelum, kept possession of his entrenchments, while Lord Gough considered it imprudent to attempt to force them. One good reason for this delay was that General Whish with his victorious army had started from Mooltan, and might soon be expected at head-quarters. His actual arrival was indeed most opportune. The Sikhs, pressed by the want of provisions, had quitted their entrenchments, and made a retrograde movement toward the Chenab by way of Gujerat. Their intention is supposed to have been to cross over into the Rechna Doab, and after ravaging it advance upon Lahore. General Whish, who had now arrived at Wuzcerabad, was able to defeat this intention by guarding the fords above and below this town, and also to effect his own

A D 1819

Battle of
Chillian
wallaIndecisive
result.

junction with the commander-in-chief by means of a bridge of boats. ~~The British~~ British army now amounted to 25,000 men; that of the enemy had also gained a great accession of strength, and was estimated at 60,000, of whom 1500 were Afghan horse, under Akram Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, who had obtained possession of Peshawer, and openly become a Sikh ally. The vast inferiority of the British in point of numbers was compensated, both by the superior excellence of the troops, and by a most powerful artillery, consisting of 100 guns, while the Sikhs had only 59. Strength of the respective forces

On the 21st of February the enemy's camp nearly encircled the town of Gujerat, lying between it and a deep watercourse, the dry bed of the Dwarna, which here bending very tortuously, passed nearly round two sides of the town, and then diverged to a considerable distance in a southerly direction, so as to intersect the British camp. The enemy's position on the right flank and centre was greatly strengthened by this nullah, and he had skilfully availed himself of it by placing his guns immediately behind it, and his infantry in front, under the cover of its banks; his left was in like manner covered by a deep though narrow stream, which running from the east of the town, turned south and fell into the Chenab, in the direction of Wuzeerabad. The interval between the two watercourses was an open space of nearly three miles, which presented no natural obstacle to military manœuvres, and was therefore selected by Lord Gough as the direction of his principal attack. His plan, and the mode in which it was subsequently carried out, are thus detailed in his lordship's despatch: "On the extreme left I placed the Bombay column, commanded by the Honourable H. Dundas, supported by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and the Scinde horse, under Sir Joseph Thackwell, to protect the left, and prevent large bodies of Sikh and Afghan cavalry from turning that flank; with this cavalry I placed Captains Duncan's and Hush's troop of horse-artillery, whilst the infantry was covered by the Bombay troop of horse-artillery, under Major Blood. On the right of the Bombay column, and with its right resting on the nullah, I placed Brigadier General Campbell's division of infantry, covered by No. 5 and No. 10 light field batteries, under Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, having Brigadier Hoggan's brigade of infantry in reserve. Upon the right of the nullah I placed the infantry division of Major-general Sir W. Gilbert; the heavy guns, eighteen in number, under Majors Day and Horsford, with Captain Shakespeare and Brevet-major Sir Richmond Shakespeare commanding batteries, being disposed in two divisions on the flanks of his left brigade. This line was prolonged by Major-general Whish's division of infantry, with one brigade of infantry under Brigadier Markham, in support in a second line; and the whole covered by three troops of artillery—Major Fordyce's, Captains Mackenzie's and Anderson's, and No. 17 light field battery under Captain Dawes, with Lieutenant-colonel Lane's and Captain Kinleside's troops of horse-artillery in a second line in reserve, under Lieutenant- Victory of Gujerat

A D 1849

Battle of
Gujerat.

colonel Brind. My right flank was protected by Brigadiers Hearsey's and Lockwood's brigades of cavalry, with Captain Warner's troop of horse-artillery. The 5th and 6th light cavalry, with the Bombay light field battery, and the 45th and 69th regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Mercer, most effectually protected my rear and baggage. With my right wing I proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy's line, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it with little loss, and in co-operation with the right to double upon the centre the wing of the enemy's force opposed to them. At half-past seven the army advanced in the order described, with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the enemy was one of the most magnificent I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effects. The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity, and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position, but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. I then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, covering the movement with my artillery as before. The village of Burra Kalra, the left one of those of that name in which the enemy had concealed a large body of infantry, and which was apparently the key of their position, lay immediately in the line of Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert's advance, and was carried in the most brilliant style by a spirited attack of the 3d brigade under Brigadier Penny, consisting of the 2d Europeans, and the 31st and 70th regiments of native infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover with great slaughter. A very spirited and successful movement was also made about the same time, against a heavy body of the enemy's troops, in and about the second or Chota Kalra, by part of Brigadier Harvey's brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant-colonel Franks, of her majesty's 10th foot. The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, while the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the horse-artillery and light field batteries, which I strengthened by bringing to the front the two reserve troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole horse-artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at all points. The whole infantry line now rapidly advanced, and drove the enemy before it; the nullah was cleared, several villages stormed, the guns that were in position carried, the camp captured, and the enemy routed in every direction, the right wing and Brigadier-general Campbell's division passing in pursuit to the eastward, the Bombay column to the westward of the town. The retreat of the Sikh army thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight, all arms dispersing over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops for a distance of twelve miles,

Complete
discomfiture
of the Sikhs.

their track strewn with the wounded, their arms and military equipments, which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers." A D 1849

There was no room to doubt, as at Chillianwalla, whether a victory had been gained. The enemy's army had been annihilated, fifty-three of their guns, being, except six, the whole they brought into action, had been captured, and the Sikh war was in fact ended. What made this signal success still more gratifying was the comparatively small cost at which it had been purchased, the total British loss being only ninety-two killed and 682 wounded. Well might the governor-general say in his letter to the secret committee, "Under Divine Providence the British arms have signally triumphed. On the 21st of February an action was fought which must ever be regarded as one of the memorable in the annals of British warfare in India; memorable alike from the greatness of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the encounter. For the first time Sikh and Afghan were banded together against the British power. It was an occasion which demanded the putting forth of all the means at our disposal, and so conspicuous a manifestation of the superiority of our arms as should appal each enemy, and dissolve at once their compact by fatal proof of its futility. The consequences of the victory which has been won equals the highest hopes entertained."

Important
results of
battle of
Gujerat

The day after the victory Major-general Gilbert, at the head of a force of about 15,000 men, with forty guns, resumed the pursuit of the fugitives in the direction of the Jhelum, but on reaching Noorungabad, on the left bank, found that Shere Sing had already crossed, and was encamped on the right bank with the relics of his army, estimated at about 8000 men. The Sikh leader, however, had no idea of continuing the contest, and employed the intervention of Major Lawrence, who had formerly been treacherously detained as a prisoner, to make his own submission together with that of the other rebel chiefs. Meantime, General Gilbert having crossed the Jhelum, directed his attention chiefly to the Afghans, who were now in full flight toward the Indus. He so nearly overtook them that he reached Attock, which they had just evacuated, before they had time entirely to destroy the bridge of boats, with the view of precluding further pursuit. He was therefore able to convey his troops across, and enter the territory of Afghanistan, but as there was now no hope of reaching the flying Afghans before they entered the fatal Khyber Pass, he prudently desisted from following them, and retraced his steps.

Pursuit of
the Afghan
auxiliaries.

With regard to the future government of the Punjab, the governor-general had already decided, and therefore no time was lost in acquainting the Lahore council of regency that the Sikh dominion was at an end. The members, aware that resistance would be unavailing, contented themselves with endeavouring to obtain favourable terms, and on being assured that those of them who had not taken part in the rebellion would be liberally dealt with, gave their consent to a treaty, which, though made in the name of the maharajah, and signed by

Extinction
of the Sikh
dominion.

A D 1849

Extinction
of the Sikh
dominion

him, could not be considered as his, since he was then a boy of only eleven years of age. By this so-called treaty, consisting of five articles, the maharajah for ever renounced all right of sovereignty in the Punjab, gave up all state property as confiscated to the British government; surrendered to the Queen of England "the gem called the Koh-i-noor, which was taken from Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk by Maharajah Runjeet Sing;" and agreed to reside at such place as the governor-general should select, only stipulating in return that he should be treated with respect and honour, retain the title of "Maharajah Dhuleep Sing Bahadoor," and receive a pension of not less than four, and not more than five lacs of rupees. It may here be mentioned as an interesting fact that this youthful prince has since embraced Christianity. On the 29th of March the governor-general issued a proclamation in which, after narrating the peace and friendship which prevailed in the time of Runjeet Sing, the subsequent gross violation of treaties by the Sikhs, the clemency extended to them after their discomfiture, and the most ungrateful return which they had recently made by waging



MAHARAJAH DHULEEP SING
From Harding's Recollections of India.

a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their

power," proceeded as follows:—"The government of India formerly declared that it desired no further conquest, and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions. The government of India has no desire for conquest now; but it is bound in its duty to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge. To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the state from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasting wars, the governor-general is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people whom their own government has long been unable to control, and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace. Wherefore the Governor-general of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the kingdom of the Punjab is at an end, and that all the territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing are now and henceforth a portion of the British empire in India."

Annexation
of the
Punjab.

The action of Chillianwalla, when the news of it reached this country, was generally regarded by the British public as equivalent to defeat and prognostic of future disaster, and all eyes were turned to Sir Charles Napier as the man best qualified to bring the war to a successful termination. The cry for his appointment became in consequence so loud and determined that the directors, though he was almost at open war with them, were compelled to yield, and the

conqueror of Scinde, who thought he had bidden a final farewell to India, sailed for it again as commander-in-chief, on the 24th of February, 1849. During the voyage, when off Ceylon, he received intelligence of the victory of Gujerat. As the circumstances under which his appointment had been made were thus entirely changed, and as he was himself by no means of a tractable temper, it is easy to understand that it was not long before he began to find himself in a false position. Others soon came to be of the same opinion, and not a few, who were smarting under his severe though probably not undeserved censures, began to wait for his halting. The governor-general was far above entertaining any such feeling himself, or of countenancing it in others, but he was jealous of his authority, and is said to have hinted to the new commander-in-chief, at their very first interview, that he must beware of encroaching on it. There was thus from the outset no great prospect of harmonious co-operation, and before a year elapsed a collision took place. Believing that a mutinous spirit prevailed among the sepoys serving in the Punjab, and that one main cause of it was a diminution of pay, produced by a government regulation affecting their allowance for purchasing food, Sir Charles Napier suspended the regulation on his own responsibility, without waiting to obtain the sanction of the governor-general, who was then at sea, or even consulting the supreme council. Subsequently he had not only disbanded the 66th native infantry, on the ground of mutiny, as he was entitled to do, but also by another stretch of authority had given its colours to a Ghoorika battalion, which was henceforth to rank as the 66th instead of the regiment disbanded. This latter proceeding the governor-general simply disapproved of by letter, but the former proceeding was deemed too serious an encroachment to be thus quietly disposed of, and the decision in regard to it was communicated in a formal letter addressed by the government secretary to the adjutant-general of the army. This letter was a reprimand of the harshest description, both in form and in substance. Through it the commander-in-chief was told that the governor-general in council viewed the orders which he has issued to the officers in the Punjab "with regret and dissatisfaction"—and given to understand for his future guidance "that the governor-general in council will not again permit the commander-in-chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall change the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the supreme government alone." After such a reprimand nothing but resignation could have been anticipated, and accordingly on the 22d May, it was transmitted through Lord Fitzroy Somerset to the Duke of Wellington, the commander-in-chief. His grace, who had always been a staunch friend of Sir Charles Napier, and had even himself in procuring his appointment, was greatly displeased with the manner in which he had brought it up, and moreover declared his conviction that his opinion had been grossly censured. Sir Charles Napier arrived in England in March, 1851, and

A.D. 1849

Sir Charles Napier proceeds to India as commander-in-chief

Misunderstanding with the governor-general.

A D 1853.

Resignation
and death of
Sir Charles
Napier

pleasing to add, that by none was he welcomed more heartily than by the Duke of Wellington. The interview is thus graphically described by himself: "I never was so kindly, so graciously received as just now by the duke; I thought he would have embraced me. Will your grace let me put your name on my card for the levee on Wednesday? Oh yes! yes! and I will go there, and take care to tell the queen that you are there; she will be glad to see you safe back, and so am I, so is everybody." As an appropriate supplement to this anecdote, it may be mentioned that Sir Charles was one of the pall-bearers at the duke's funeral, and caught a cold which accelerated his death. Disease had indeed long been preying upon him, but he was permitted to exceed the allotted span of life, and was in his seventy-second year when he expired on the morning of the 29th of August, 1853.

CHAPTER IX.

A new Burmese war—Capture of Martaban, Rangoon, and Prome—Annexation of Pegu—Peace with Burmah—Claims of the British government in India as the paramount power—Annexation of Oude—Termination of the Marquis of Dalhousie's government—Changes in the constitution of the East India Company.



HE Sikh war was no sooner triumphantly terminated, than attention was called to an opposite quarter. Under the treaty with Burmah, British subjects trading to its ports were entitled to "the utmost protection and security." The governor of Rangoon was charged with grossly violating this obligation, and in addition to individual complaints, a formal memorial was presented to the council at Calcutta, by several merchants and commanders of trading vessels, in which they stated that they had "for a long time suffered from the tyranny and gross injustice of the Burmese authorities" at Rangoon, and that trade was "seriously obstructed and almost suppressed in consequence." Commodore Lambert, of her majesty's ship *Fox*, was therefore ordered to proceed with his ship and a small squadron to Rangoon, to demand reparation. In doing so, he was directed to use the utmost caution. He was first to address a letter to the governor of Rangoon, briefly setting forth the facts of each case. If compensation was granted, the matter was not to be carried any further; but as it seemed very probable that this amicable settlement would not be acceded to, he was furnished with a letter to the King of Ava, which was to be forwarded only in the event of a refusal by the governor of Rangoon, and recommended the removal of this officer as essential to a continuance of good understanding between the two governments.


New Bur
mese war

Commodore Lambert arrived at Rangoon in the end of November, 1851, and on the 28th of this month addressed a letter to the council at Calcutta, explaining his reasons for "deviating" from part of their instructions as to the mode of demanding redress. The charges made against the governor, instead of being overcharged, fell, he said, far short of the truth, and therefore, since it must be as useless as it was unpleasant to attempt an arrangement with an official guilty of such gross misconduct, he had at once forwarded the letter to the King of Ava, and along with it a letter from himself to the prime-minister. In transmitting these letters through the governor of Rangoon, he addressed him in the following laconical terms:—"I shall

A D 1852

Proceedings
of Commodore
Lambert.

expect that every despatch will be used for forwarding the same, and I hold you responsible for an answer being delivered in these waters within five weeks from this day." The governor-general was of opinion that Commodore Lambert had "exercised



MOULMEIN.—From the Illustrated London News.

a sound discretion" in so far deviating from his instructions by "cutting off all discussion with the local governor," but he at the same time cautioned him "not to have recourse to the terrible extremity of war except in the last resort, and after every other method has been tried without success." On the supposition that the King of Ava might either decline to answer the letter, or refuse to comply with its demands, the governor-general concluded thus: "The only course we can pursue which would not on the one hand involve a dangerous submission to injury, or on the other hand precipitate us prematurely into a war which moderate counsels may yet enable us to avert, will be to establish a blockade of the two rivers at Moulmein, by which the great mass of the traffic of the Burmese empire is understood to pass."

On the 1st of January, 1852, the court of Ava returned an answer which seemed to leave no doubt of an amicable settlement, since it announced that the obnoxious governor had been recalled, and his successor instructed to make due compensation. The commodore, encouraged by this friendly proceeding, immediately endeavoured to open a communication with the new governor, and with this view having addressed a letter to him, sent Commander Fishbourne and two other officers ashore to deliver it. Their reception was the very opposite of what had

Hopes of an
amicable
settlement.


been anticipated. After being subjected to ignominious treatment they were obliged to return with the letter undelivered, and without seeing the governor, who, they were told, was asleep, and must not be awaked. This treatment was at once resented, by establishing a blockade. It would have been well if the commodore had stopped here, instead of taking a step which made hostilities all but inevitable. His own explanation is as follows.—“Having failed in carrying out the instructions of the government of India by the conduct of the governor of Rangoon, whom I considered as speaking the voice of the court of Ava, I could regard it as nothing but a national insult that had been offered to the British flag, and accordingly gave directions to Commander Fishbourne, of the *Hermes* to take possession of a ship belonging to the King of Ava by way of reprisal.” Shortly after this exploit he set sail for the mouth of the river. The *Fox* met with no obstruction, but when the *Hermes* was seen towing behind her the vessel familiarly known in the port of Rangoon by the name of the *Yellow Ship*, and belonging to the king, the Burmese opened their fire upon her from a stockade. She of course returned it with shot and shell, and had little difficulty in silencing her opponents. Actual hostilities being thus commenced on the 10th of January, Commodore Lambert hastened off in the *Hermes* to Calcutta to report. Still anxious, if possible, to avert “the terrible extremity of war,” the governor-general in council once more addressed a letter to the King of Ava, which, after a narrative of previous proceedings, made the following specific demands:—“1 Your majesty, disavowing the acts of the present governor of Rangoon, shall, by the hands of your ministers, express great regret that Captain Fishbourne and the British officers who accompanied him were exposed to insult at the hands of your servants at Rangoon on the 6th of January last. 2. In satisfaction of the claims of the two captains who suffered exactions from the late governor of Rangoon, in compensation for the loss of property which British merchants may have suffered in the burning of that city by the acts of the present governor, and in consideration of the expenses of preparation for war, your majesty will agree to pay, and will pay at once, ten lacs of rupees to the government of India. 3 Your majesty will direct that an accredited agent, to be appointed in conformity with the 7th article of the treaty of Yandaboo, and to reside at Rangoon, shall be received by your majesty’s servants there, and shall at all times be treated with the respect due to the representative of the British government. 4 Your majesty will direct the removal of the present governor of Rangoon, whose conduct renders it impossible that the government of India should consent to any official intercourse with him.” Immediate assent to these conditions, and their complete fulfilment on or before the 1st of April next, or immediate war, were the only alternatives that could now be offered. The Burmese by non-compliance with the former alternative virtually accepted the latter, and both governments prepared for war.

A D 1852.

New Bur-
mese warSedress
refused by
the King
of Ava.

The British force consisted of two separate armaments, the one from Calcutta and the other from Madras. The former, under the command of General Godwin, who had served in the former Burmese war, and to whom the charge of the whole expedition was now intrusted, sailed from the Hooghly on the 28th of March, and arrived on the 2d of April off the mouth of that branch of the Irawadi on which Rangoon stands. Here he found Admiral Austen, the naval commander-in-chief, who had come from Penang in H.M.S. *Rattler*. The Madras armament had not yet arrived, but delay being deemed inexpedient, it was resolved forthwith to attack Martaban, situated on the east coast near the mouth of the Salween, opposite to Moulmein. The attack was made at daybreak of the 5th of April. The admiral, notwithstanding the numerous shoals and currents which obstructed his progress, moved up with five steamers, and placed the *Rattler* within 200 yards of the city wall. Under cover of the tremendous fire which he then opened, the troops landed, and effected an easy capture.

A.D. 1852.

Expedition
against
Burmah.

TEMPORARY STOCKADE, MARTABAN.—FROM A SKETCH BY AN OFFICER OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

The Madras division having arrived, the admiral again moved up the river, and anchored close off Rangoon. On the 11th of April the fire which the enemy had opened from both banks was silenced by the steam frigates, and on the 12th the troops, after landing, began to move forward. "They had not proceeded far," says General Godwin in his despatch, "when, on opening some rising ground to our right, guns opened on us, and shortly after skirmishers showed themselves in the jungle. This was a new mode of fighting with the Burmese, no instance having occurred last war of their attacking our flanks, or leaving their stockades, that I remember ever to have taken place. I make this remark, as they are now not only good shots, but bold in their operations, and clever in selecting their ground and covering themselves." Their new tactics, however, though they increased the number of casualties, proved unavailing, and they were driven back to the shelter of a strong stockade, from which they kept up a fire of musketry, so steady and effective, that it was not carried without "a very severe loss," and such a "complete exhaustion of

Operations
at Rangoon.

A.D. 1852. the storming party," that though it was only eleven o'clock A.M., the general resolved to halt where he was, after concentrating the force "in as strong a position as the country admitted of." This halt on the 12th was followed by another on the 13th, because the heavy guns could not be forwarded "before the middle of that day," and the troops therefore did not move again till the morning of the 14th. Before proceeding to detail the subsequent operations, it will be proper to mention that in 1850 the old city of Rangoon was almost entirely destroyed by fire, and that in consequence, instead of the old town which stood on the river bank, a new town had been formed about a mile and a quarter from it. "It is," says General Godwin, "nearly a square, with a bund or mud wall about sixteen feet high and eight broad; a ditch runs along each side of the square, and on the north side, where the pagoda stands, it has been very cleverly worked into the defences, to which it forms a sort of citadel. The distance from the pagoda to the south entrance of the town is about three-quarters of a mile, and it (the town) is something more than that breadth from east to west. The old road from the river to the pagoda comes up to the south gate, running through the new town, and it was by this road the Burmese had settled that we should attack it, and where they had made every preparation to receive us, having armed the defences with nearly 100 pieces of cannon and other missiles, and with a garrison of at least 10,000 men."

Faction of
New Ran-
gon

Capture of
the pagoda.

An assault made in the direction where the enemy expected would, in General Godwin's opinion, have cost him half his force, and his plan therefore was to force his way into the pagoda, by moving on a road which "entirely turned all the defences of this real stronghold." He accordingly marched to the north-west through thick jungle, passed the stockaded town, and got to the east side of the pagoda, the capture of which, as the key of the place, was his main object. A battery of heavy guns was forthwith erected, and opened with so much effect that the assault, which had been fixed for noon, took place an hour sooner, and was completely successful. The city and all the country around fell with the pagoda. The next capture was Bassein, situated about sixty miles above the mouth of the river of same name, forming the most westerly branch of the Irawadi. This place, standing in a deep re-entering angle of the river, was surrounded by an irregular fortification. It was captured on the 17th of May after a sharp contest, and the general, contenting himself with leaving a small garrison in it, returned with the remainder of his force to Rangoon.

Though the Burmese had already lost three of their most important towns, and sustained defeat in every encounter, they were so far from showing signs of submission, that on the 26th of May they made a bold attempt to recover Martaban, by suddenly attacking it with a force of about 1000 men. The small garrison, by signal gallantry, were able to maintain their ground, but so much confidence and daring were displayed by the enemy, as to show that

still more decisive measures would be necessary in order to humble them. It was therefore resolved to threaten the Burmese capital of Ava or Umerapoor, by moving up the main branch of the Irawadi, and making an attempt upon Prome. With this view Captain Tarleton was despatched with five steamers early in July, to examine its position and defences. On this occasion he did much more than was expected, for he not only forced his way up the river in the face of all the obstructions thrown in his way, but by choosing a navigable channel, different from that by which the Burmese, to the number of about 10,000, were waiting his approach, he reached Prome on the 9th of July, and found it without a garrison. This was indeed a prize had he been able to take advantage of it, but as he had not been furnished with the means, he could only carry off a few guns, spike others, destroy the stores, and return.

A D 1852.

Capture of
Prome.

The apparent determination of the Burmese not to yield, having shown the necessity of carrying on operations on a more extensive scale than had been originally contemplated, the governor-general repaired in person to Rangoon, where he arrived on the 27th of July. During his stay, which lasted only about ten days, it was arranged that extensive reinforcements should be forwarded, so as to raise the whole force, henceforth dignified with the title of the army of Ava, to the number of nearly 20,000 men. Much time was spent in preparing reinforcements, and it was the 9th of October when the British army again came in sight of Prome.

The Burmese scarcely made a show of defence. "Upon our advanced guard reaching the pagoda," says General Godwin in his despatch, "it found that the enemy had abandoned that position, as well as the heights beyond it, leaving in our possession an entirely evacuated town, overgrown with thick and rank vegetation, and I regret to add abounding in swamps." The general appears to have been somewhat puzzled at the facility with which a place, on which he had so long hesitated to advance, had been yielded, but adds, as if in justification of his own dilatoriness, that he had been "for a long time aware of the assemblage of a large force about ten miles east of Prome," and that he had "ascertained, from very good authority, that they have now about 18,000 men well posted in two or more stockades." After this statement one naturally expects him to add that he was just preparing to encounter this host, and thus crown his hitherto comparatively tame campaign with a signal victory. Nothing, however, was further from his intention; and it is therefore with a feeling somewhat stronger than mere surprise, that we find him in the very next sentence of his despatch writing as follows:—"It is not my intention to disturb them at present in any way, as by their concentration at that place, the fine force now assembling here will have an opportunity of striking a blow which may put an end to much future opposition." From such tactics nothing was to be expected.

General
Godwin's
desultory
proceedings.

Early in June a small force had been detached to Pegu, situated on the

A D 1852

Capture of
Pegu

river of that name, about fifty miles above the junction of the Rangoon, and effected its capture. Unfortunately, however, in accordance with the desultory mode of warfare which General Godwin was too much accustomed to pursue, the detachment was too small to leave a garrison in it, and as a natural consequence, as soon as it departed the Burmese returned and resumed possession as before. It thus became necessary to repeat the capture. For this purpose four river steamers, having on board 300 of the Bengal fusiliers, 300 of the Madras fusiliers, and 100 of the 5th Madras native infantry, with details of artillery and sappers, and two guns, sailed from Rangoon on the 19th of November, and having anchored on the evening of the 20th a little below Pegu, disembarked the troops on the following morning. General Godwin's despatch contains the following description of the locality: "The site of the old city, wherein the enemy was posted, is formed by a square surrounded by a high bund, each side of which is presumed to be about two miles in length. The west side faces the river, and the square is surrounded by a wet moat, between seventy and eighty paces wide. From the south-west angle there is a causeway over the moat, close to and parallel with the river. This causeway the enemy had made exceedingly strong by traverses, and breaking it down at various intervals to prevent our advance. On the whole of the south face of the bund, fronting our position, they had bodies of troops stationed extending for about a mile and a quarter. As the causeway on the right of their position was so narrow that only a file of men could advance along it against their numerous musketry and local impediments, I abandoned all idea of attacking them there. It was therefore determined to force our way along the moat, and to turn the left of their position on the south face of the square." In carrying out this plan the troops had to struggle "through the almost impenetrable grass and jungle along the outer moat," exposed to a warm fire. At last, however, they reached a part of the moat which admitted a passage beyond the enemy's left, and turned their position. Here, having gallantly stormed a post which was defended by two guns, they halted for some time to refresh themselves and collect the wounded, and then again advanced by an excellent path in the direction of the great pagoda, which was occupied without difficulty, and completed the capture of the place. After garrisoning it with 400 men under Major Hill, General Godwin, who had personally superintended the capture, returned with the remainder of the force to Rangoon. In leaving Pegu so feebly garrisoned, he furnished another instance of that desultory and inefficient mode of warfare on which we have already animadverted. The consequence was that the Burmese immediately re-appeared, and having without opposition resumed possession of the town, made a daring attack on the pagoda, which they completely invested so as to shut up the garrison within its precincts. The first attack was vigorously repulsed, but in a few days after a second attack of a still more formidable character was made, and Major Hill,

It is re-
sumed
by the
Burmese

A. D. 1852

Successful
defence
the Bri
garrison

scarcely able to maintain his position, was obliged to make an urgent application for speedy reinforcements. The general now did what he ought to have done at first, and set out for Pegu with a force of about 1350 men. During his passage up the river he paid the penalty of his former negligence, by the state of fearful suspense in which he was kept, while scarcely venturing to hope that his small garrison had been able to hold out against their numerous and persevering foes. His intense anxiety was not relieved till he obtained a distant view of the pagoda, and ascertained by his telescope that a single individual observed upon it was a Madras lascar. The garrison had indeed made a most gallant defence, and were justly complimented in a general order expressing "admiration of the noble defence of the Pegu pagoda (against a host of enemies) made by Major Hill and the brave handful of officers and soldiers under his command, for so many days and anxious nights, cut off as they were from the succour of their comrades by the works of the enemy in the river, as well as by the distant communication with the head-quarters of the army." It seems not to have occurred to the general when penning this order, that he would be expected to explain why, when he had it in his power to provide an adequate garrison, he left only what he himself calls a "brave handful."

Annexation
of Pegu.

On the 20th of December, after receiving intelligence of the capture of Pegu, the governor-general issued the following proclamation:—"The court of Ava having refused to make amends for the injuries and insults which British subjects had suffered at the hands of its servants, the Governor-general of India in council resolved to exact reparation by force of arms. The forts and cities upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured; the Burmese forces have been dispersed wherever they have been met; and the province of Pegu is now in the occupation of British troops. The just and moderate demands of the government of India have been rejected by the king; the ample opportunity that has been afforded him for repairing the injury that was done has been disregarded; and the timely submission which alone could have been effectual to prevent the dismemberment of his kingdom has been withheld. Wherefore, in compensation for the past, and for better security in the future, the governor-general in council has resolved, and hereby proclaims, that the province of Pegu is now, and shall be henceforth, a portion of the British territories in the East. Such Burman troops as may yet remain within the province shall be driven out; civil government shall immediately be established; and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs of the several districts. The governor-general in council hereby calls on the inhabitants of Pegu to commit themselves to the authority and to confide securely in the protection of the British government, whose power they have seen to be irresistible, and whose rule is marked by justice and beneficence. The governor-general in council having exacted the reparation he deems sufficient, desires no further conquest in Burmah, and is willing to consent that hostilities should cease.

A.D. 1832.

But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations of friendship with the British government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the governor-general in council will again put forth the power he holds, and will visit with full retribution aggressions which, if they be persisted in, must of necessity lead to the total subversion of the Burman state, and to the ruin and exile of the king and his race."

Submission
of the King
of Ava.

Owing to the strict blockade of the mouths of the Irawadi, trade with the interior was entirely stopped, and provisions rose to famine prices in the Burmese capital. The old king, to whose obstinacy the continuance of the war was attributable, became in consequence very unpopular, and was, after a struggle, ousted from the throne by his brother. Shortly afterwards overtures for peace were made, and on the 4th of April, 1853, British and Burmese commissioners met at Prome to arrange the terms. During the conference, which lasted nearly two hours, the Burmese commissioners seemed anxious for peace, and offered to sign a treaty in accordance with the proclamation annexing Pegu, provided the frontier was fixed not at Megaday, as the British, who had taken possession of that place, proposed, but lower down in the vicinity of Prome. On application to the governor-general this point was conceded to them, but so far from having the desired effect, they receded from their previous declarations, and on the 9th of May returned with an answer, to the effect that the king could not "assent to any treaty by which a cession of territory should be made." They were of course immediately dismissed, and it seemed as if the war was about to rage more fiercely than ever. It happily proved otherwise. The objection, it afterwards appeared, was not so much to the cession of territory, as to the humiliation of doing it by formal treaty, and the king, who was aware of the ruin which awaited him should hostilities be recommenced, managed to avert them by addressing a letter to the governor-general, in which he virtually granted all that had been asked of him. The governor-general accepted this equivalent, and on the 30th of June, 1853, issued a notification, proclaiming the restoration of peace. Thus terminated a war which, though it proved comparatively barren of brilliant events, added to our empire in the East a province containing 40,000 square miles, and a population of at least 3,000,000.

Peace with
Burmah.

The policy of annexation, which had long been discountenanced by the home authorities, on the ground that our Indian empire was already of unwieldy magnitude, was once more in the ascendant. It was alleged, indeed, that in the cases of the Punjab and Pegu, necessity overruled all questions of policy, and no alternative remained but to incorporate them with the British territories, since in no other way was it possible to obtain at once compensation for the past and security for the future. In both wars the British government, while anxiously desiring peace, had been forced to take up arms in order to repel

unprovoked aggression, and in inflicting punishment had not exceeded the due measure of retribution, by the extinction of the one kingdom and the dismemberment of the other. But there were annexations of a different kind, in regard to which the above pleas of necessity and just retribution could not be urged—annexations made in time of peace, without provocation, and on the simple ground that the territories annexed had lapsed to the British government, as the paramount power, by the failure of other heirs. The first case of importance in which this principle of annexation was fully avowed and acted upon was that of Sattara. In a previous part of this work it has been told how the Rajahs of Sattara, who were the original, and continued to be recognized as the nominal heads of the Mahratta confederacy, had been gradually deprived of all real power by their peishwas or prime-ministers, and at last reduced to the condition of state prisoners. When the rule of the peishwa was extinguished in 1818, the Marquis of Hastings deemed it expedient to reinvest the titular rajah Pertaub Sing with a real sovereignty, and for this purpose entered into a treaty with him, by which he himself, his heirs and successors, were guaranteed in possession of a territory yielding about £200,000 of revenue. Pertaub Sing, for alleged violations of the treaty, was deposed by the British government in 1839, and succeeded by his brother, who died in 1848. He left no issue, but a few hours before his death adopted a boy distantly related to him. This adoption having been made in regular form was recognized as binding, so far as to give the adopted son all the rights which his adoptive father could convey to him, but it was denied that the succession to the raj was one of those rights. Sattara, it was said, was a British dependency, and adoption could have no validity to carry the succession, until it was sanctioned by the paramount power. On this ground the adoption was so far set aside, and Sattara was incorporated with the British territories. The principle, to which effect was thus given, is laid down in the following terms in a letter of the home authorities, dated 24th January, 1849:—"That by the general law and custom of India, a dependent principality like that of Sattara cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the paramount power; that we are under no pledge direct or constructive to give such consent, and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it."

A D 1852

Annexation
of Sattara.Circum-
stances
leading to it

In the above case of Sattara two questions were considered. Had the British government a legal right to seize and appropriate Sattara as a lapsed principality? Was it expedient, all circumstances considered, to enforce this right? Both these questions were answered in the affirmative, and Sattara ceased to exist as a separate sovereignty. It is necessary, however, to remember that the questions of right and expediency are perfectly distinct, and that cases might occur when the one was answered in the affirmative, and the other without any inconsistency in the negative. In fact, the very next case which occurred was of this description. On the 10th of July, 1852, the Rajah of

A D 1853

The gover-
nor general
thwarted in
his propo-
sal of annexation
of Kerowly

Kerowly, a minor Rajpoot state, whose capital is situated about eighty miles south-west of Agra, died without issue, but though he was a mere youth he had adopted a son, without applying for the sanction of the British government. The governor-general, who appears to have adopted annexation as the keystone of his policy, was bent on carrying out the precedent established in the case of Sattara, and would have at once proceeded to extinguish the *raj*, as a dependency which had lapsed to the paramount power by the failure of heirs, though he at the same time freely admitted "that the continuance of the *raj* would be a measure calculated to reassure and conciliate the good will of the states of Rajpootana." Fortunately, in this instance the directors took a safer and we think a far more equitable course, and on the 26th of January, 1853, announced their decision that the succession of the adopted son should be sustained. They had not, they said, abandoned the principle established in the case of Sattara, but they saw "a marked distinction between the cases," Sattara being "a creation and gift of the British government, whilst Kerowly is one of the oldest of the Rajpoot states, which has been under the rule of its native princes from a period long anterior to the British power in India. It stands to us only in the relation of a protected ally, and perhaps there is no part of India where it is less desirable, except on the strongest grounds, to substitute our government for that of the native rulers."

Case of
Jhansi

The next case in which the question was raised was that of Jhansi, a territory in the north-west of Bundelcund, with an area of about 2600 square miles, and a population exceeding 250,000. This small Bundela state was tributary to the peishwa, and of course, when all his rights were forfeited, became tributary to the British government. At this time it was held by Sheo Row Bhao, with the title of *soubahdar*, but as he had claims to favour in return for important services which he had rendered during the Mahratta war, the inferior right implied by his title was overlooked, and a treaty was entered into, by which at his special request the right of succession was "confirmed in perpetuity" to Row Ram Chund his grandson. Accordingly, by the second article, the British government, with a view to confirm the fidelity and attachment of the government of Jhansi, "consents to acknowledge, and hereby constitutes Row Ram Chund, his heirs and successors, hereditary rulers of the territory," &c. Row Ram Chund, who succeeded under this treaty, was permitted in 1832 to exchange the title of *soubahdar* for that of *rajah*, and held the government till 1835, when he died without issue. A competition for the succession then arose, and was decided by the British government in favour of Row Rugonath, a son of Sheo Row Bhao, and consequently uncle of the late *rajah*. Row Rugonath, who was a leper, and so incompetent to rule that the British agent in Bundelcund was obliged to assume the administration, died in 1838. Like his predecessor he left no issue, and after another competition his brother, Baba Gunghadar Row, now the only remaining male descendant of

Sheo Row Bhao, was preferred. For a time after his succession the British agent continued to administer the government, and the revenue, which previous misrule had greatly diminished, began to flourish. At last, in 1843, an arrangement was made which restored the native administration, and Baba Gunghadar Row continued to rule till his death, on the 21st of November, 1853. As he too left no issue, the question of succession was once more raised, though under a new form. The whole male line of Sheo Row Bhao was extinct, but Gunghadar Row had endeavoured to secure a nominal succession to his family, by adopting a distant relation the very day before he died. The principle adopted in the Sattara case was obviously applicable here, and the governor-general lodged a minute, in which he declared his opinion that the territory of Jhansi had lapsed to the British government, and "should be retained by it equally in accordance with right and with sound policy." His council having concurred in this opinion, he proceeded to act upon it, and on the 4th of March, 1854, announced the decision to the home authorities in the following terms:—"The chief of the state of Jhansi, which was created by the British government a tributary and dependent principality, adopted a son the day before his death. We have decided in accordance with a precedent in the case of this same state, that this adoption should not be recognized as conferring any right to succeed to the rule of the principality, and that as the chief has left no descendants, and no descendants of any preceding chief of this state are in existence, the state has lapsed to the British government." These views were not allowed to pass without contradiction, for the widow of the late chief, who would have been entitled to the regency during the adopted son's minority, presented a *khureeta* or petition, in which she argued with some plausibility that the original Persian terms interpreted "heirs and successors," meant not merely "heirs of the body or collateral heirs," but "successors in general," and properly implied that "any party whom he (the chief) adopted as his son, to perform the funeral rites over his body, necessary to insure beatitude in a future world, would be acknowledged by the British government as his successor, and one through whom the name and interests of the family might be preserved." This reasoning proved unavailing, and as soon as the sanction of the home authorities was obtained, Jhansi shared the fate of Sattara, and was erased from the list of native states.

The principle of annexation through failure of heirs, thus sanctioned and practically acted upon for the second time, was now destined to be exemplified on a much more extensive scale, and to extinguish the largest of the then existing Mahratta states. Ragojee Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar, or as he was frequently designated from his capital, Rajah of Nagpoor, died on the 11th of December, 1853. He left neither issue nor collateral heirs, and had not even attempted to supply their place by adoption, so that the question of lapsing was for the first time raised in its simplest and purest form. The succession

A D 1854

Annexation
of Jhansi

Nagpoor.

A D 1854

Annexation
of Nagpoor

was regulated by a "treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," entered into in 1826, by which the British government, after stipulating for various advantages, including a large tract of territory, guaranteed "the rest of the dominions of the Nagpoor state to Ragojee Bhonsla, his heirs and successors." At the date of this treaty Ragojee Bhonsla, who had just attained majority, assumed the actual administration, but he had been the recognized ruler since 1817 when, though only maternally descended from the Ragojee who originally founded the state, the British government conferred the sovereignty upon him instead of Appa Sahib, who had forfeited it by treachery and rebellion. In this case, therefore, the claim of the British government to the "paramount power" could not be questioned, and accordingly the governor-general, true to his annexation policy, recorded his opinion "that by the death of the Rajah of Nagpoor, without any heir whatever, the possession of his territories has reverted to the British government which gave them; and further, that the possession thus regained should not again be given away, since their alienation a second time is called for by no obligation of justice or equity, and is forbidden by every consideration of sound policy." His lordship's language, though open to criticism, is moderate compared with that of a member of council, who, in his minute on the subject, is extravagant enough to defend the annexation policy on the ground of its being divinely decreed. "So far as we can foresee the ultimate destiny of this great empire," says Mr. Dorrin, "its entire possession must infallibly be consolidated in the hands of Great Britain. Thoroughly believing in this dispensation of Providence, I cannot coincide in any view which shall have for its object the maintenance of native rule against the progress of events which throws undisputed power into our possession."

Oude.

The last and crowning act of annexation was that of the kingdom of Oude. As it proceeded on grounds entirely different from those which have been already mentioned, and divided the opinions of the highest authorities, some applauding it as a master-stroke of policy, while others condemned it as a gross breach of public faith, it will be proper to consider it with some care. About 1760 when the Mogul empire was falling to ruins, Shujah-u-Dowlah, who was its hereditary vizier, and also held the soubah of Oude, seized upon the latter, and became though still professing a nominal allegiance to the emperor, an independent sovereign. He shortly afterwards made common cause with Meer Cossim, the deposed Nabob of Bengal, but being signally defeated by the forces of the Company, was glad to submit to a treaty which only deprived him of the districts of Allahabad and Corah, and left him undisputed master of all his other territories. In 1768, the Company having reason to believe that he was meditating the recovery of what he had lost, bound him by another treaty not to maintain a larger number of troops than 35,000. In 1773 he entered into the arrangements which have left a stain on the memory of Warren Hastings, and succeeded by means of British troops, shamefully hired for the iniquitous purpose, in crush-

ing the Rohillas. On his death in 1775, Shujah-u-Dowlah was succeeded by Asoff-u-Dowlah, and the Company, taking advantage of his position, obtained the cession of several districts, and in return for these and the payment of a subsidiary force engaged "to defend the soubah of Oude at all times." By subsequent arrangements the sum payable as subsidy was fixed successively at £500,000, £555,000, and £700,000, and at last in 1801, Sadat Ali, then nabob, was induced or rather compelled to enter into a treaty by which he ceded one half of his whole territory in perpetuity as a substitute for the pecuniary subsidy, and the Company, in return for the territories thus ceded, yielding a revenue of more than £1,500,000, became bound to defend him from all foreign and domestic enemies. The ceded territories were declared to be in lieu of all former subsidies, and demands of every kind for the maintenance of troops in Oude, whether to repel foreign foes or to suppress occasional internal disturbances or rebellions; but in order somewhat to modify the extent of this obligation, the nabob, while guaranteed in the possession and sole administration of his dominions, engaged to limit his own troops to a fixed number, to administer the government in such a manner as would be conducive to the prosperity and calculated to secure the lives and property of his subjects, and moreover to consult and act in conformity with the advice of the British government. Sadat Ali availed himself to the full extent of the obligations undertaken by the Company, and so carefully husbanded his revenue, though now reduced to one half of its former amount, that at his death in 1814 the treasury, which was empty on his accession, contained the large sum of £14,000,000.

A.D. 1819.

Early relations with Oude

Though the government of Oude under Sadat Ali was ably administered, repeated instances occurred in which the obligation to employ British troops in the suppression of rebellion and disorder could not be performed without countenancing oppression and injustice, and the resident had therefore been instructed not to afford military aid until he was satisfied that the occasion justified it. The task thus thrown upon him was, however, of too vague and extensive a nature to be adequately performed, and mutual complaints disturbing the harmonious co-operation of the two governments ensued. These necessarily increased under Sadat Ali's son and successor, Ghazee-u-din, a mere imbecile and debauchee, who left the government to an unscrupulous minister, and squandered its revenues among worthless favourites. For a time indeed the British government was scarcely in a position to remonstrate with much effect. Its financial difficulties had made it draw largely on the accumulations of the late nabob, and becoming debtor to Ghazee-u-din by three successive loans of £1,000,000 each, of which only one had been repaid, not in money, but by the cession of a tract of country conquered from Nepaul, it could not well take high ground with its creditor. On the contrary, a new honour was conferred upon him in 1819, when at the suggestion of the governor-general, and with the sanction of the Company, he threw aside his nominal allegiance to

Its nabob assumes the title of king.

A.D. 1827.

Relations
between
Oude and
British
government.

Delhi, and placed himself on a footing of equality with the Mogul, by assuming the title of king. But while instructing the resident that the British troops were to be actively and energetically employed in the Oude territory in cases of real internal commotion and disorder, the governor-general in council did not lose sight of the reciprocal obligation on the part of the king, not to require their interference without a just cause, and therefore, on the 22d of July, 1825, wrote as follows:—"This principle which has often been declared and acted upon during successive governments, must still be firmly asserted, and resolutely adhered to; and the resident must consider it to be a positive and indispensable obligation of his public duty to refuse the aid of British troops until he shall have satisfied himself on good and sufficient grounds (to be reported in each case as soon as practicable, and when the exigency of the case may admit of it, before the troops are actually employed), that they are not to be employed but in support of just and legitimate demands" Ghazee-u-din and his minister, when thus precluded from employing British troops in the perpetration of injustice, took the matter into their own hands, and disregarding the obligations of the treaty added so largely to the native army that it amounted to 60,000 men of all arms.

*succeeded in
detaching
prince

Ghazee-u-din was succeeded in 1827 by his son Nuseer-u-din, who imitated his reckless course, and kept up his large army, of which nearly two-thirds were entirely without discipline, and the remaining third, though accounted regulars, were so only in name, being badly trained, paid, clothed, armed, and accounted, and placed for the most part under idle, incompetent, and corrupt commanders. Abuses thus rose to such a height that in January, 1831, Lord William Bentinck, in a conference with the king, distinctly warned him of his determination to make a strong representation to the authorities in England, on the subject of the misrule prevailing in Oude, and solicit their sanction to the adoption of specific measures, even to the length of assuming the direct administration of the country, if the evils were not corrected in the interim. The personal warning having passed unheeded, the governor-general renewed it in the following year by a letter, in which he says:—"I do not use this language of strong remonstrance without manifest necessity. On former occasions the language of expostulation has been frequently used towards you with reference to the abuses of your government, and as yet nothing serious has befallen you. I beseech you however not to suffer yourself to be deceived into a false security. I might adduce sufficient proof that such security would be fallacious, but I am unwilling to wound your majesty's feelings." These warnings passed unheeded, but in 1837, when Nuseer-u-din died without issue, and was succeeded by his uncle Mahomed Ali, advantage was taken of a new reign to place the relations between the two governments on a more definite footing. With this view, a treaty was concluded, by which provision was made for an increased force to be placed more immediately under British control, and it was

expressly stipulated, not only that the king should exert himself in concert with the resident to remedy the existing defects of his government, but that in the event of his neglect to do so, and a consequent continuance of misrule, the British government would have right to appoint its own officers to the management of all portions of the Oude territory in which such misrule might have occurred, and to continue such management for so long a period as it might deem necessary. In this case a true and faithful account of the receipts and expenditure of the assumed territories was to be rendered to his majesty, any surplus remaining after defraying all charges was to be paid into his treasury, and native institutions and forms of administration were to be maintained so far as possible, so as to facilitate the restoration of the assumed territories to his majesty when the proper period for such restoration should arrive.

A D 1852

Condition
of Oude

Owing to the Afghan war and the military operations subsequently undertaken or contemplated by Lord Ellenborough, the increase of troops, which the British government had undertaken by the above treaty to maintain in Oude at its own expense, to the estimated amount of sixteen lacs a year, did not take place. To this failure on our part, the misrule which continued to prevail in Oude was probably in some degree attributable; but the whole blame was thrown on the profligate court and equally profligate ministers, who certainly seemed determined by their gross misconduct to justify the harshest measures that could be adopted against them. Still no decisive steps were taken, and though the abuses became every day more clamant, the British government was so much occupied otherwise, or so reluctant to act, that the throne of Oude was twice vacated by death and reoccupied before the final crisis came. In 1842 Mahomed Ali was succeeded by his son Soorya Jah, and he again, in February, 1847, by his son Wajid Ali Shah. The latter was by no means deficient in natural talents, but his indolence and low tastes rendered them of no avail, and the government fell entirely into the hands of worthless favourites. In the very first year of his reign, before its iniquities were fully developed, the governor-general, Lord Hardinge, visited Lucknow, and in a conference with the king caused a memorandum, prepared for the occasion, to be read and carefully explained to him. This document, after recapitulating the treaties which had been made with his predecessors, and showing how the British government, being both entitled and bound by them "to interfere if necessary for the purpose of securing good government in Oude," could not permit "the continuation of any flagrant system of mismanagement" without becoming a participator in it, concluded as follows:—"If his majesty cordially enters into the plan suggested by the governor-general for the improvement of his administration, he may have the satisfaction within the period specified of two years of checking and eradicating the worst abuses, and at the same time, of maintaining his own sovereignty and the native institutions of his kingdom unimpaired; but if he does not, if he takes a vacillating course, and fail by refusing to act on the

Increasing
degeneracy
in the ad-
ministra-
tion

A D 1852.

Remon-
strance
with King
of Oude

governor-general's advice, he is aware of the other alternative and the consequences. It must then be manifest to the whole world that, whatever may happen, the king has received a friendly and timely warning."

Sir W H
Sleeman's
report

In the above memorandum a respite of two years was allowed, and when these elapsed, though no symptoms of improvement appeared, the governor-general (Lord Dalhousie) deemed it necessary, before taking the final and irrevocable step, that General Sir W. H. Sleeman, the resident, should make a tour throughout the country and ascertain its actual state by personal inspection. This tour, made in 1849-50, and since published, completely established the worst that had been alleged against the King of Oude and his creatures, and made it clear that the British government could not, without loss of character, refrain from interference. The substance of the resident's report is thus given in a letter which he addressed to the governor-general in 1852:—"No part of the people of Oude are more anxious for the interposition of our government than the members of the royal family; for there is really no portion more helpless and oppressed; none of them can ever approach the king, who is surrounded exclusively by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters, worse than either, and the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. They appropriate at least one half of the revenues of the country to themselves, and employ nothing but knaves of the very worst kind in the administration. The king is a crazy imbecile, who is led about by these people like a child, and made to do whatever they wish him to do, and to give whatever orders may best suit their private interests. At present the most powerful of the favourites are Decan-od-Doula and Hussein-od-Doula, two eunuchs; Anees-od-Doula, and Mosahib-od-Doula, two fiddlers; two poetasters, and the minister and his creatures. The minister could not stand a moment without the eunuchs, fiddlers, and poets, and he is obliged to acquiesce in all the orders given by the king for their benefit. The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c. The minister has the land revenue; and all are making enormous fortunes." After adverting to what he conceived to be the proper remedy, Sir W. Sleeman continued thus:—"What the people want, and most earnestly pray for, is that our government should take upon itself the responsibility of governing them well and permanently. All classes, save the knaves who now surround and govern the king, earnestly pray for this—the educated classes, because they would then have a chance of respectable employment, which none of them now have; the middle classes, because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope that their children will be permitted to inherit the property they may leave, not invested in our government securities; and the humbler classes, because they are now abandoned to the merciless rapacity of the starving troops and other public establishments, and of the landholders driven or invited into rebellion by the present state of misrule. There is not, I believe, another government

in India so entirely opposed to the best interests and most earnest wishes of the people as that of Oude now is; at least I have never seen or read of one. People of all classes have become utterly weary of it." A D 1352

Though the necessity of interference was allowed on all hands to be urgent, the attention of the government was so much engrossed by the protracted hostilities in Burmah, and preparations for a new war, in which an open rupture with Persia, originating in a diplomatic squabble, had involved us, that two years more were allowed to pass away before the final step was taken. The governor-general, whose term of office was about to expire, was well aware of the difficulties with which the question was beset, and might have evaded responsibility by leaving it as a legacy to his successor. He was far too manly to adopt such a course, and therefore intimated to the directors that though the state of his health made an early departure from India absolutely necessary, he would remain if they desired it, and give practical effect to their decision in regard to Oude. This offer was gladly accepted by the home authorities, who having decided on assuming the government of the country, left him a large discretionary power as to the mode of procedure. In this, we cannot help thinking, he was more than unfortunate. Annexation involving the absolute extinction of Oude as a native government, and the nullification of all subsisting treaties with it, was decreed by a simple fiat, and then announced to the world by a public proclamation. Neither in this document nor in the instructions given to Colonel Outram, the resident, can we discover anything but a series of laboured attempts to disguise a gross breach of national faith. According to the account given, all the relations and mutual obligations of the two governments were regulated by the treaties of 1801 and 1837. By the former treaty the British government obtained the perpetual cession of one half of the Oude territory, for undertaking to defend the other half from all foreign and domestic enemies, and the Oude government was taken bound to establish a reformed system of administration, and act in conformity to the counsel of the Company's officers; by the latter treaty it was stipulated that in the event of a reformed administration not being established,

Determina-
tion to
annex Oude
to British
India

Justice of
the measure
questioned.

A D 1832

serious obstacle. Its very definiteness would not allow any other penalty than that which it prescribed to be exacted, and therefore if annexation was to be persisted in, it became absolutely necessary to hold that the treaty of 1837 was not binding. The means employed for this purpose were certainly very jesuitical. The King of Oude, on whom the treaty was in a manner forced, had subscribed it with great reluctance, the governor-general had ratified it, and nothing occurred to throw the least suspicion on its validity. On the contrary, Lord Auckland, under whose government it was concluded, referred to it in 1839, in a friendly letter addressed to the King of Oude, as "the recent treaty of 11th September, 1837," and after complimenting him on having, "in comparison with times past, greatly improved the kingdom," conveyed to him the gratifying intelligence that he had in consequence been authorized by the court of directors, if he thought it "advisable for the present," to relieve his majesty "from part of the clause of the treaty alluded to, by which clause expense is laid upon your majesty." This clause exacted from the king an annual payment of £160,000 for an additional subsidiary force, but the directors considering that one half of the territory of Oude had been ceded to them under the express condition that such force was to be maintained at their own sole expense, were ashamed to enforce the payment, and therefore remitted it. In all other respects, however, the treaty remained in full force, and even the extortionate clause demanding double payment having been remitted only "for the present," might at any future period be revived. Such was evidently the understanding of Lord Auckland. It was also that of his two immediate successors. Lord Ellenborough, when the question was put to him, declared that the home authorities did "not disallow the whole of the treaty of 1837, but only that portion of it which related to the payment, by the King of Oude of £160,000 for a military establishment of British officers." Lord Hardinge, when in 1847 he threatened the King of Oude with the penalty to which he should subject himself by failing to reform his administration, at once referred to and recognized the validity of the treaty of 1837, since in no other treaty is there any mention of the kind of penalty obviously intended. The thing is so clear that it is scarcely necessary to add the testimony of Lord Broughton, who as president of the Board of Control at the time must have known the fact. "My impression," he says, "certainly is that the treaty of 1837 was ratified by government at home, after the disallowance referred to; the whole treaty was not disallowed, but only one portion of it."

After reading the above cumulative evidence as to the validity of the treaty of 1837, one is startled on turning to the governor-general's instructions to Colonel Outram, and finding such passages as the following:—"It is very probable that the king in the course of the discussions which will take place with the resident may refer to the treaty negotiated with his predecessor in the year 1837. The resident is aware that the treaty was not continued in force,

Question
able justice
in annexa-
tion of
Oude

Views of
successive
governors-
general

having been annulled by the court of directors as soon as it was received in England. The resident is further aware, that, although the King of Oude was informed at that time that certain provisions of the treaty of 1837 respecting an increased military force would not be carried into effect, the entire abrogation of the treaty by the court of directors was never communicated to his majesty. The effect of this reserve and want of full communication is felt to be embarrassing to-day. It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled instrument was still included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845 by the authority of government. There is no better way of encountering the difficulty than by meeting it full in the face." And how was this to be done? Simply, we would say, by admitting that the government stood committed to the treaty, and could not recede from it without a breach of faith. Unfortunately the governor-general took a very different view, and wrote as follows: "If the king should allude to the treaty of 1837, and should ask why, if further measures are necessary in relation to the administration of Oude, the large powers which are given to the British government by the said treaty should not be put in force, his majesty must be informed that the treaty has had no existence since it was communicated to the court of directors, by whom it was wholly annulled. His majesty will be reminded that the court of Lucknow was informed at the time that certain articles of the treaty of 1837, by which the payment of an additional military force was imposed upon the king, were to be set aside." "It must be presumed that it was not thought necessary at that time to make any communication to his majesty regarding those articles of the treaty which were not of immediate operation, and that a subsequent communication was inadvertently neglected. The resident will be at liberty to state that the governor-general in council regrets that any such neglect should have taken place even inadvertently." Such was the mode in which it was proposed to "meet the difficulty full in the face," and we can now only wonder how it could have been supposed possible to do so by a method so unscrupulous.

A.D. 1852.

Curious
jealousy
prevailing in
justification
of annexa-
tion of Oude

A D 1852

Annexation
of Oude

the British government simply withdrawing its guarantee and giving back the territories obtained in return for it; if the latter alternative were adopted, the King of Oude might have been compelled by force of arms, if more peaceful means proved unavailing, to perform to the very letter everything to which the treaty bound him. This, however, was the utmost extent to which British interference could be legitimately carried, and gives no countenance at all to the extreme measure of annexation. After declaring the treaty of 1801 to be at an end, the British government had no right whatever to interfere with Oude any further than might be necessary in order to preserve tranquillity beyond its own frontier, and therefore, when instead of contenting itself with such precautions, it proceeded by a kind of *coup de main* to seize the kingdom of Oude and incorporate it with its own territories, it pursued a policy which wherever exemplified, whether in Europe or in Asia, cannot be too severely reprobated. It deserved not to prosper, and in this particular case, so far as subsequent events yet to be detailed entitle us to judge, it did not prosper. After annexation had been finally resolved, and all attempts to obtain the king's consent to it had, as must have been foreseen, proved unavailing, the deed was executed in defiance of him, and published to the world by a proclamation which, like the deed itself, will not bear criticism.

Lord Dal-
housie's
proclama-
tion

The remarks already made render it unnecessary to dissect this proclamation, and show how, with all its boldness of assertion and special pleading, it completely failed to justify the extirpation of the kingdom of Oude. During fifty years its sovereigns had not only remained faithful to the British alliance, but had again and again come forward in periods of the greatest emergency, and by liberal loans replenished the exhausted treasury of the Company. To abandon such an ally might have been taxed as ingratitude, but to take advantage of his weakness to strip him of his territories was an act for which, unless it was dictated by stern necessity, there is no excuse. Despicable as the government of Oude undoubtedly was, its inhabitants, for whose behoof alone we professed to interfere, made no application to us for that purpose, and so far from welcoming us as deliverers, united almost as one man in regarding us as invaders and unprincipled spoliators. All our professed anxiety for their prosperity and happiness they scouted as mere pretence, and ascribed the loss of their native independence to an unbounded ambition to extend our already overgrown empire by any means, however unscrupulous. In course of time, when the full benefits of our rule shall have been experienced, they may arrive at a different conclusion, but certainly the first effects of the annexation of Oude was to gain us a province at a serious loss of national character. Were it necessary, therefore, to test the merits of Lord Dalhousie's administration by his annexation policy, particularly as exemplified in its last and crowning act, it would be impossible to refrain from using strong terms of censure. Fortunately, he had merits of another kind which gave him a foremost place among

Indian administrators, and entitle him to the gratitude of his country. Even in regard to his annexations, it must be remembered that they were not all effected by questionable means. At least two of them—the Punjab and Pegu—were legitimate conquests made in wars which the unprovoked aggressions of the Sikhs and Burmese had rendered inevitable. The admirable administration of the former of these provinces, carried on under his lordship's auspices, is one of the greatest glories of his government. His other merits cannot be better summed up than in the following extract from an article in the *Times*:—

"He could point to railways planned on an enormous scale, and partly commenced: to 4000 miles of electric telegraph spread over India, at an expense of little more than £50 a mile; to 2000 miles of road bridged and metalled, near the whole distance from Calcutta to Peshawer; to the opening of the Ganges canal, the largest of the kind in the world; to the progress of the Punjab canal, and of many other important works of irrigation all over India; as well as to the re-organization of an official department of public works. Keeping equal pace with these public works, he could refer to the postal system, which he introduced in imitation of that of Rowland Hill, whereby a letter from Peshawer to Cape Comorin, or from Assam to Kurrachee, is conveyed for $\frac{1}{4}$ d., or $\frac{1}{8}$ th of the old charge; to the improved training ordained for the civil service, covenanted and uncovenanted; to the improvement of education and prison discipline; to the organization of the legislative council; to the reforms which it had decreed, such as permitting Hindoo widows to marry again, and relieving all persons from the risk of forfeiting property by a change of religion." As the Marquis of Dalhousie was only forty-four years of age when he quitted India, on the 6th of March, 1856, it was hoped that he had then only performed the first act of the brilliant career for which his talents and virtues so admirably fitted him. He foreboded otherwise, and in replying to a parting address from the inhabitants of Calcutta, thus gave utterance to his feelings: "I have played out my part; and while I feel that in my case the principal act in the drama of my life is ended, I shall be content if the curtain should drop now on my public career." The words were almost prophetic, for he only returned with a broken constitution to linger out a few years and die. This melancholy event took place on the 19th of December, 1860.

A.D. 1853

Merits of
Lord Dal
housie's
administra
tion


Before closing the narrative of Lord Dalhousie's administration, some account must be given of an important change which was made in the constitution of the Company. The act which regulated it being fixed to expire on the 30th of April, 1854, it was deemed necessary to anticipate that event by new legislation, and accordingly, on the 20th of August, 1853, an act (16 and 17 Vict. c. 95) was passed, by which, until parliament should otherwise provide, all the territories then in the possession and under the government of the East India Company were to continue under such government in trust for her majesty. As the act was avowedly temporary, and only remained in force for

Change in
the consti
tution of the
Company

A.D. 1803

Change in
the consti-
tution of the
Company

a very short period, it will be sufficient, instead of giving an analysis of its contents, to mention its two most important provisions—the one by which the number of directors was reduced from twenty four to eighteen, of whom twelve only were to be elected by the proprietors, and six to be nominated by her majesty—and the other by which the appointments to the civil service and those of assistant surgeon in India were withdrawn from the directors and thrown open to public competition



LANCHA OF THE STRAIT OF MALACCA

BOOK IX.

FROM THE SEPOY MUTINY TO THE PRESENT TIME

CHAPTER I

Lord Canning governor-general—Mutinous spirit prevalent among the Bengal sepoys—Objection to greased cartridges—Mutiny at Barrackpore—Precautionary measures adopted by government—Disbandment of the 19th and 34th native regiments at Barrackpore—Indications of a wide-spread conspiracy—Proclamation of the governor general—Massacres at Meerut and Delhi



WHEN Lord Canning, on the 29th of February, 1856,

A D 1856

commenced his administration, a period of tranquillity was confidently predicted. The Burmese and Sikh wars having been brought to a successful termination, no native power either within the limits or beyond the frontiers of India seemed able or disposed to involve it

Mutinous spirit of the Bengal sepoys.

once more in open hostilities. There was, however, cause for serious apprehension. Mutiny had repeatedly broken out in the native army, and the measures of repression resorted to had rather evaded the danger than fairly met and extinguished it. During the first Burmese war disaffection was general among the sepoys of Bengal who were ordered to serve in it, and was not only indicated by numerous desertions, but openly manifested by positive and combined refusals to obey the order to embark. On this occasion one wholesome measure of severity overawed the disaffected, but the spirit which animated the mutineers was by no means exorcised. In 1850, when Sir Charles Napier was commander-in-chief, disaffection, produced by the rejection of a claim to increase of pay during service in the Punjab, was so widely spread that that distinguished officer did not hesitate to denounce a large portion of the Bengal native army as mutinous, and ever after took credit to himself for having, by the vigorous measures he adopted, prevented a sepoy revolt which might have proved fatal to our Indian empire. It is true that he was then defending himself against the charge of having by these very measures exceeded his powers, and there is hence ground to suspect that his language was somewhat exaggerated. Still, however, there cannot be a doubt that the danger which he apprehended was by no means imaginary, and that he had even succeeded in tracing it to its true cause. The sepoys of Bengal, consisting in a large proportion of Brahmins and Rajpoots, whose high caste enabled them to exercise a prepon-

A.D. 1856

Causes of
mutinous
spirit
among
the Bengal
sepoys.

derating influence over their comrades, had become convinced that their services could not be dispensed with, and that the fate of our Indian empire was consequently in their hands. They had only to combine and present a united front in order to intimidate the government; and, if necessary, coerce it into compliance with their demands. Combination had accordingly become a kind of watchword among them, and every subject which affected their interests was discussed and agitated as a common cause. Hence, when the question of increased pay arose, the language of some of the sepoys of the 32d native



LORD CASSINO — From a photograph by Mayall.

infantry is said to have been, "We shall wait till three or four regiments come up, and whatever they do we will do also." In a similar spirit a Brahmin soldier, when his commanding officer, disgusted with sepoy grumblings, exclaimed, "For shame! you pretend to be soldiers: were I the general I would dismiss you from the army;" ventured to reply, "If you did, you would get no more; we would stop them; and where would you be then?" Sir Charles Napier met the danger with characteristic decision when he supplied the place of a sepoy regiment disbanded for mutiny by one of Ghookas, and proposed to give the sepoys a practical proof

that their services were not indispensable, by showing how easily their place could be supplied. Unfortunately he was not seconded either by the Indian or the home authorities, and matters remained on the same unsatisfactory footing as before. But though the fact of sepoy disaffection was virtually ignored, its existence was not denied. Even Lord Dalhousie, while he declined to sanction the decisive measures which the commander-in-chief recommended, frankly admitted that "the sepoy has been overpetted and overpaid of late; and has been led on by the government itself into the entertainment of expectations, and the manifestation of a feeling which he never held in former times;" and used a language of still more ominous import, when, in replying on the eve of his departure from India to the address of the inhabitants of Calcutta, he reminded them "how cruel violence, worse than all the excesses of war, may be suddenly committed by men who, to the very day on which they broke out in their frenzy of blood, have been regarded as a simple, harmless, and timid race, not by the government alone, but even by those who knew them best, were dwelling among them, and were their earliest victims." The danger thus pointed out, and proved to exist both by overt acts of mutiny and indications of wide-spread disaffection, though it must have suggested,

certainly did not produce new measures of precaution, and the Indian government continued to slumber on, and to receive the congratulations of the directors on the general tranquillity which prevailed even in Oude, where, if anywhere, disturbance and revolt might have been apprehended as natural results of the annexation policy. At the same time, from causes over which neither the directors nor the Indian authorities had any control, the number of European troops usually allotted to the Bengal presidency had been greatly diminished. Two regiments of horse, withdrawn to the Crimea during the Russian war, had not been replaced; four regiments of infantry, and the greater part of the 14th dragoons, had been called away to serve in the war which had suddenly broken out in Persia; and a large proportion of the remainder were stationed far in the north-west to maintain tranquillity in the Punjab, where it was not unreasonably, though, as it afterwards appeared, erroneously believed, that a large military force was necessary in order to curb and overawe the newly subjugated Sikhs. To this imaginary danger government had turned an anxious eye, and in providing against it had so bared the other stations of their proper complement of European troops, that Oude, swarming with discontented chiefs and disbanded soldiers, backed by a hostile population, was guarded only by a single regiment; while Delhi, notoriously the centre of Mahometan intrigue, was still more scantily provided, its immense magazine of military stores being committed entirely to the charge of native troops. Such a disregard of the plainest dictates of prudence looks almost like judicial blindness. For a long series of years almost every man who earned a name for himself in the civil or military service of the East India Company had lifted a warning voice, and called attention to the precarious tenure by which its possessions were held; subsequent events had shown that such fears were not unfounded, and that causes were at work which threatened to realize their worst forebodings; but, as if the frequency of alarm had weakened the impression produced by it, the crisis was permitted to approach, and when it actually arrived, found the government totally unprepared to meet it. The fearful disasters which followed must now be narrated. This, the latest portion of Indian history, is also in many respects the most eventful; and must therefore be given, with some minuteness of detail, care, however, being taken to relieve the record of sepoy atrocities by placing them in contrast with deeds of British heroism, at once more numerous and more illustrious than were ever before exhibited on so large a field and within so short a time.

The British rule in India never has been, and it is to be feared, never will be popular. Though far more beneficent than that of preceding conquerors and of the existing native princes, it is the rule of aliens in blood, in manners, and in religion; and is therefore submitted to as a galling yoke, to be endured so long as there is no hope of being able to shake it off, but not a day longer. Accordingly, when the native army had deluded itself into the belief that it

A.D. 1856

Accidental
deficiency
of European
troops in
India.

Imprudent
conduct of
government.

A D 1837

Unional
combination
of Mahome-
tans and
Hindoos

had obtained the mastery, and was in a condition to dictate terms to the government, revolt sooner or later became inevitable, and the only point that remained undetermined was the time. One of the most formidable obstacles in the way was the antipathy between the Hindoos and the Mahometans, the former composing the great bulk of the population, and the latter, while numerous enough to be formidable, deriving from their superior position as a once dominant class, a far greater degree of influence than was indicated by their numbers. The effect of this antipathy was to keep the two classes of religionists apart, and make it morally impossible for them to enter into a general combination for any common object. The British government, aware of this security against a united revolt, appear not to have underrated it, and yet from some strange fatality they, without intending it, destroyed this security, and enabled Hindoos and Mahometans to enter into a mutual league for the complete and final overthrow of our Indian empire. The cry raised was that their religion was in danger, and that henceforth Christianity alone was to be tolerated. It is difficult to understand how such a cry could carry any weight with it. The successive governors-general had vied with each other in carrying the principles of religious toleration to their utmost limits, and had even given so much countenance to native superstitions as to incur the charge of forgetting that they were themselves Christians and the representatives of a Christian government. It is almost needless, therefore, to say that there was no intention whatever to reverse this policy, and that the cry raised was unfounded. Unfortunately, however, the Bengal sepoy, now ripe for revolt, were not unwilling to give credit to any accusation, however monstrous, which might seem to justify their meditated treachery. The delusion spread like wildfire, and a circumstance so trivial in itself that one can hardly speak of it with gravity became, not perhaps the cause, but certainly the occasion, of a revolt not surpassed in magnitude and ferocity by any which history has yet recorded.

The Landfield
rifle intro-
duced into
Bengal
army

The improved rifle, now generally substituted for the old musket, is loaded with a greased cartridge, the end of which at the time of using it requires to be bitten off. In the beginning of 1837, after it had been resolved to arm the Bengal sepoy with this weapon, the manufacture of the necessary cartridges was commenced at the military depôt of Dumdum, situated about eight miles north east of Calcutta. It had never occurred to the officials that there was anything in these cartridges by which any religious prejudice could be offended, but it was not long before they were undeceived. As the story goes, a sepoy (a Brahmin) carrying his *lotah* filled with water, with which he was about to prepare his food, was met by a *classie* or workman of a low caste attached to the magazine, who asked him for a drink, and being refused on the ground that the *lotah* would thereby be defiled, observed, "You think much of your caste, but wait a little; the *sahib-log* (literally "gentleman-strangers") will make you

bite cartridges soaked in cow and pork fat, and then where will your caste be?" The mention of the two kinds of fat was as artful as it was malicious, the one being the abomination of Hindoos and the other that of Mahometans; and it is hence easy to understand how the subject once mooted was not allowed to drop, and being generally discussed produced much real, and probably more pretended alarm. Major Bontein, the officer commanding at Dumdum, when first made aware of it, paraded all the native troops stationed there, and called for any complaints. At least two-thirds of them, including all the native commissioned officers, immediately stepped to the front, and in a manner described as "perfectly respectful," stated their objection to the present method of preparing cartridges for the new rifle-musket. "The mixture employed for greasing the cartridges was," they said, "opposed to their religious feelings," and "they begged to suggest the employment of wax and oil in such proportion as, in their opinion, would answer the purpose required." The spirit of moderation thus manifested at the outset may have blinded the authorities as to the extent of the danger. At all events they seem not to have felt the necessity of instantaneous action in order to provide against it, and they contented themselves with issuing orders that the further manufacture of greased cartridges should cease, and that in future the men might purchase the ingredients at the bazaar, and "apply them with their own hands." Unfortunately the moderation exhibited at Dumdum proved to be the exception, and not the rule; and in several other quarters the excitement, instead of being allayed by the assurance that the cause which produced it had ceased to exist, continued to increase. At first only the grease employed had been objected to, but it was now discovered that there was something wrong with the paper. Unlike that formerly used, it had a glazed appearance, which, in the opinion of the sepoys, indicated the presence of grease, and accordingly on the 6th of February, General Hearsey, commanding the division of the Bengal troops, wrote from Barrackpore, situated sixteen miles north from Calcutta, as follows:—"A most unreasonable and unfounded suspicion has unfortunately taken possession of the native officers and sepoys at this station, that grease or fat is used in the composition of this cartridge paper; and this foolish idea is now so rooted in them that it would, I am of opinion, be both idle and unwise to attempt its removal."

Hitherto the objections to the cartridges were believed to be sincere, and the prevailing excitement was treated as if no ulterior or criminal purpose was in contemplation. Indications to the contrary were now manifested. On the 5th of February, the day preceding that on which the above letter of General Hearsey was written, a *jemadar*, or native lieutenant, waited on Lieutenant Allen, one of the European officers of the 84th native infantry, then stationed at Barrackpore, and informed him that the four native regiments in that cantonment were preparing to break out in open mutiny, and that he had been invited to attend a meeting which was to be held that very night for the

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Objections
to the use
of greased
cartridges

They are
employed as
a pretext
for disobe-
dience.

A D 1857.

Mutinous
 spirit ex-
 cited among
 the Sepoys
 through
 their reli-
 gious pre-
 judices

Unraveling
 attempt to
 remove their
 objections
 by argu-
 ment.

purpose of maturing the plot, and arranging the mode of execution Lieutenant Allen, without attaching much credit to so extraordinary a statement, deemed it necessary to visit the lines when the alleged meeting was to be held, and felt reassured, on ascertaining by ocular inspection, that there was not the least appearance of it. The jemadar, however, persisted in his statement, explaining that the resolution to hold the meeting had been abandoned, in consequence of a suspicion that it had been detected. It ultimately appeared that the jemadar's information was substantially correct, for on the 11th of February a startling confirmation of it was received from General Hearsey. "We have at Barrack-poor been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion. I have been watching the feeling of the sepoy's here for some time. Their minds have been misled by some designing scoundrels." In order to counteract the impression thus produced, he had on the 9th paraded all the troops, and availed himself of the thorough knowledge which he possessed of their language, to disabuse their minds of the falsehoods which had been instilled into them. "I myself," he says, "energetically and explicitly explained, in a loud voice, to the whole of the men, the folly of the idea that possessed them, that the government, or that their officers, wished to interfere with their caste or religious prejudices, and impressed on them the absurdity of their for one moment believing that they were to be forced to become Christians. I told them the English were Christians of the Book, i.e. Protestants; that we admitted no proselytes but those who, being adults, could read and fully understand the precepts laid down therein; that if they came and threw themselves down at our feet, imploring to be made 'Book' Christians, it could not be done; they could not be baptized until they had been examined in the tracts of the Book, and proved themselves fully conversant in them, and then they must, of their own good-will and accord, desire to become Christians of the Book ere they could become so. I asked them if they perfectly understood what I said, especially the 2d grenadiers; they nodded assent; I then dismissed the brigade." Had explanation been all that was needed, General Hearsey's harangue might have sufficed, and government rather hastily indulged the hope that the excitement was about to die away. The general himself must have had a very different presentiment when he wrote thus: "May I state my opinion in regard to the policy of having five or six regiments of native infantry assembled in brigade here, without any European corps of infantry, or artillery, or cavalry, as a *point d'appui*, in case of a mutiny occurring. You will perceive in all this business the native officers were of no use; in fact, they are afraid of their men, and dare not act; all they do is to hold themselves aloof, and expect by so doing they will escape censure, as not actively implicated. This has always occurred on such occasions, and will continue to the end of our sovereignty in India. Well might Sir Charles Metcalfe say, 'that he expected to awake some fine morning, and find India had been lost to the English crown.'"

A D. 1857.

part agreeing as a first step to withdraw his troops, and the mutineers on theirs agreeing, on this stipulation being complied with, to make their submission.

A European
regiment
brought
from Ran-
goun.

This arrangement, however necessary it may have been under the circumstances, was not the less to be deplored. A mutiny, which was visibly assuming larger dimensions, had only been suppressed by allowing the mutineers to dictate terms. A general invitation was thus virtually given to all the disaffected to lose no time in imitating a bad example. During these incipient disturbances, General Anson, the commander-in-chief, was unfortunately far away among the Simla Hills, to which he had gone for the benefit of his health. But government, previously somewhat lethargic, appeared at length to be fully awakened. The account of the Berhampoor mutiny reached Calcutta on the 4th of March, and only two days later the Oriental Company's ship *Bentinck* was steaming to Rangoon with orders to bring up her majesty's 84th foot with the utmost possible despatch. Meanwhile the 19th had been ordered down to Barrackpore. Thither too, as a preparation for the steps which it might be necessary to take, were detached a wing of her majesty's 53d, and two troops of artillery. Twelve pieces of cannon were also brought into the cantonment. The 84th regiment arrived at Calcutta on the 20th of March, and immediately proceeded to Chinsurah, to await the arrival of the 19th. The object of these preparations was too palpable not to be well understood by the disaffected, who no longer hesitated to give utterance to their feelings. The 34th native infantry in particular, throwing aside the moderation which they professed when General Hearsey addressed them, were now forward in expressing their sympathy with the 19th, who they thought merited not punishment but reward, for the stand which they had made in defence of their religion.

Another
overt act
of mutiny

In India the native mind is so impulsive, that words once uttered soon pass into deeds. Hence the 34th, though they could not but be aware of the advantage of remaining quiescent till they should be reinforced by their countrymen from Berhampoor, were unable to refrain from previously giving an unequivocal manifestation of the mutinous spirit which animated them. On the 29th of March, two days before the 19th reached Barrackpore, it was reported to Lieutenant Daugh, adjutant of the 34th, that a sepoy of the name of Mungul Pandey, belonging to that regiment, had intoxicated himself with *bang*, and was walking in front of the lines, armed with a sword and a musket, calling upon his comrades to rise, and declaring that he would shoot any European who came in his way. The lieutenant instantly mounted his horse, and rode off to the parade ground. As he approached, Mungul Pandey concealed himself behind a gun, and taking a deliberate aim fired. The shot took effect only on the horse, which fell, and brought down its rider. He, however, quickly disentangled himself, and seizing one of his pistols, hastened up and fired at the assassin. He had the misfortune to miss, and was unable to draw his sword before Mungul Pandey made a rush at him and cut him down. Happily the

blow was not mortal, and before it could be repeated, the sergeant-major of the regiment, who was a little behind Lieutenant Baugh, sprung forward, and by drawing the attack upon himself, saved the life of his superior officer by endangering his own, for he too in his attempt to seize the miscreant was severely wounded by him. Meanwhile a jemadar and twenty sepoy, though not more than thirty yards distant, refused to render any assistance, and the two Europeans would to a certainty have been murdered, had not a Mahometan orderly, who had followed Lieutenant Baugh, given a signal proof of fidelity by seizing Mungul Pandey, in the act of again levelling his reloaded musket. General Hearsey, with several other officers, aroused by the firing, was quickly on the spot, and by his boldness arrested what was on the eve of becoming a general mutiny. Riding up to the jemadar and his guard with a loaded pistol in his hand, and threatening to shoot the first man who showed any signs of disobedience, he ordered them back to their posts. They were at once overawed, and withdrew.

A.D. 1857

Mutiny at
Barrack-
poor.

On the day after the above outrage, the 19th native infantry, on the way to Barrackpoor, arrived at Baraset, which is only about eight miles distant. The punishment intended for them had transpired. Lord Canning, in a minute dated the 27th of March, had thus expressed himself:—"The open refusal of the whole regiment to obey orders, the seizure of arms with violence, and a tumultuous but combined resistance of the authority of its officers, with arms loaded, is an offence for which any punishment, less than dismissal from the service, would be inadequate; mutiny so open and defiant cannot be excused by any sensitiveness of religion or caste, by fear of coercion, or by the seductions and deceptions of others. It must be met promptly and unhesitatingly, and without the delay of a day more than may be necessary." It may be questioned whether Lord Canning acted up to his own ideas of the enormity of the crime when he proposed simple dismissal as the severest punishment to be inflicted on it. At this time, however, it was almost universally believed that the sepoy were so much enamoured of the service and of the emoluments, present and prospective, derived from it, that they dreaded nothing so much as expulsion. It would seem that the 19th still partook so much of this feeling that the prospect of their disbandment overwhelmed them with grief, and they were endeavouring to avert it by expressions of repentance. This was certainly fortunate, for it afterwards appeared that they had been waited upon by a secret deputation from the 34th, and urged without effect to concert a new and more formidable rising. On the 31st of March, when they entered Barrackpoor, they found their arrival anticipated by her majesty's 84th, a wing of her majesty's 53d, two European batteries, and the governor-general's body-guard, of whose fidelity, though composed of natives, there was no doubt. The disbandment was immediately carried into effect. On one side of the parade ground stood the European troops and batteries, and the body-guard;

Disband-
ment of the
mutinous
19th native
infantry

A D 1857

Disband-
ment of the
19th native
infantry

on the other side the 34th, and other native troops previously at the station; and in the middle, between them, the doomed 19th. It was a moment of great anxiety, for it was not impossible that all the native troops would make common cause. The 19th, however, when ordered to lay down their arms, obeyed without a murmur. Their peaceful and repentant demeanour, though it could not reverse the sentence, procured them some indulgences which they could hardly have anticipated, and they received payment, not only of their arrears to the uttermost farthing, but of the hire of cattle and boats employed in bringing down their families. "This gracious act," says General Hearsey, whose thorough knowledge of the native character did not on this occasion save him from being imposed upon, "was keenly felt, and they loudly bewailed their fate, many men saying the regiment had been misled."

Total made
quacy of the
punishment

Government, willing to believe that the question of the greased cartridges had been set at rest, and that the mere disbanding of a regiment would suffice to put down disaffection, began to speak of the danger as already past, and actually engaged a vessel to carry the 34th regiment back to Rangoon. It is difficult to understand how the governor-general and his council could have been betrayed into such a monstrous blunder. Not only were they aware that the 34th native infantry contained a number of men who had cheered on Mungul Pandey in his atrocious attempts at assassination; but incendiary fires, the invariable forerunners of general outrage, were constantly taking place in localities widely separated; general ferment, accompanied with a mysterious distribution, by flying messengers, of little unleavened cakes, called *chupatties*, was visible in many quarters, even among the general population; and distinct reports from various regiments proved the existence of so much bad feeling, as compelled General Hearsey to declare, as early as the 18th of April, that "the Hindoos generally are not at present trustworthy servants of the state." It is doubtful if any measures, however severe, could have averted or even retarded the general revolt, for which the whole of the Bengal sepoys were now ripe; but it is obvious that, under the circumstances, disbandment had ceased to be a punishment, and rather provoked than suppressed the crime against which it was directed. It in fact only anticipated the course which the men were about to take of their own accord, and must have been held by them in derision, while government were confidently trusting to it as an effectual means of working upon their fears and recalling them to a sense of duty.

Mutinous
spirit in
Oude

On the 2d of May, the 7th Oude irregular cavalry, stationed about seven miles from the Lucknow cantonments, when ordered to bite the cartridge, a regulation which, notwithstanding its formal repeal by the government, seems still, from some unexplained oversight, to have been enforced, refused. The regiment was one of those which had belonged to the King of Oude, and both from this circumstance, and the local influence which had probably been brought to bear upon it, there could scarcely be a doubt that the disaffection,

though it took the name of a religious scruple, was of a very different and more criminal nature. Accordingly, it appeared on the very next day that the ringleaders in the regiment, not contented with the mutinous spirit which prevailed among themselves, were endeavouring to instil it into others, for they had sent a letter to the 48th native infantry, then stationed at Lucknow, in which it was said, "We are ready to obey the directions of our brothers of the 48th in the matter of cartridges, and to resist, either actively or passively." Fortunately, the administration of Oude was at this time intrusted to a man who was equal to the crisis. Sir Henry Lawrence, the moment the intelligence reached him, mustered his forces, and set out with a wing of her majesty's 32d, a field battery, and various detachments of native infantry and cavalry. Previous to his arrival, the mutiny had assumed a more aggravated form, and the European officers had been threatened with violence. As soon, however, as the approach of the troops became known, the mutineers lowered their tone, and even attempted to escape from the consequences of their crime by delivering two of the ringleaders as prisoners, and offering to give up forty more. So completely indeed had they yielded to their fears, that every symptom of violence had disappeared, and the whole regiment had become perfectly quiet. On being ordered, they at once formed into line, while Sir Henry Lawrence placed his guns, and disposed the European infantry, so as to be able to control the other native regiments till the work of disarming was quietly accomplished. The first act of overt mutiny in Oude being thus suppressed, the chief-commissioner did not delude himself into the belief that permanent tranquillity was secured. He knew that his decisive course had at most procured a respite, which ought to be employed in preparing for a more formidable outbreak. After a court of inquiry, which led to a discovery of the principal offenders, who were consequently seized and put in irons, he began to concentrate the troops which had hitherto been located in isolated positions. At the same time he did not disdain to try the effect of moral suasion. With this view he held a public durbār at his residence in cantonments, and in presence of all the native officers, after conferring suitable rewards on several individuals who had proved their fidelity by disclosing the attempts made to tamper with the regiments to which they belonged, delivered an address in Hindoostanee, pointing out the advantages conferred on India by the British government, and the folly as well as the futility of any endeavour to overthrow it. The impression made is said to have been powerful, but of this some doubt may be entertained. The time for argument had passed, and there is good ground to suspect that every attempt at conciliation was regarded by the natives as an indication of fear. At first Sir Henry was disposed to disband the whole of the mutinous regiment, and thereafter allow those of the soldiers who might be found guiltless to be re-enlisted, but the governor-general in council, we think, acted more wisely when, approving generally of the prompt measures adopted, he resolved that

A. D. 1857.

Mutinous
spirit in
OudeIt is quelled
for the
present by
Sir Henry
Lawrence.

A D 1857.

Mutinous
spirit in
OudeFormidable
mutiny at
Meerut

"the disbandment, to whatever length it may be carried, should be real, and that the men whose innocence can be shown, and whose general character is irreproachable, or those by whom offenders have been denounced, and mutinous designs disclosed, should be retained in the ranks, the others being dismissed absolutely and finally," because there was "a fiction in discharging soldiers one day, to take them back the next, whatever may be their claims to mercy, which would greatly weaken the general effect of the measure of disbandment as an example." The idea of a general disbandment was in consequence abandoned, and only the native officers, with one or two exceptions, and about fifteen sepoys, were dismissed.

Almost simultaneously with the outbreak at Lucknow, another of a more atrocious character occurred at the important military station of Meerut, situated thirty-five miles N.N.E. of Delhi. Unfortunately the officer in military command of the district possessed none of the abilities which characterized the chief-commissioner at Lucknow, and the consequences were most disastrous. In the first week of May, the carabineers of the 3d regiment of Bengal light cavalry, when ordered to parade in order to learn the new regulation, which substituted tearing by the hand instead of biting the cartridges, declared their determination not to handle them. As the cartridges tendered were the same as those which they had been accustomed to use without objection, the refusal could only be regarded as mutinous, and accordingly the commander-in-chief, when the affair was reported to him, ordered that the eighty-five men, who had refused, constituting in fact, with the exception of five, the whole men of the regiment armed with carabines, should be tried by a general native court-martial. The sentence pronounced on the 9th of May condemned the whole of the prisoners to ten years' confinement with hard labour, and effect was immediately given to it by parading the whole troops then in Meerut, consisting of her majesty's 60th rifles, her majesty's 6th dragoon guards (carabineers), and the Bengal artillery, all European; and the following native regiments—the 3d light cavalry, the 11th native infantry, and the 20th native infantry, and in their presence fastening the chains and marching off the convicts to the common jail, preparatory to their removal to some of the government central prisons. The jail previously contained above 1200 prisoners, most of them, as may well be supposed, of desperate character; but notwithstanding the addition thus made to the number, under circumstances which obviously called for the utmost precaution, the jail remained as before under the sole charge of a company of native soldiers. While the authorities, civil and military (for both must bear the blame), were thus neglecting the plainest dictates of prudence, the native troops in Meerut completed their plans, and made ready to take the initiative in a general revolt. In the course of the day ominous warnings were given by placards, which called upon the natives to rise and slaughter the hated Feringhees. Nothing, however, but an actual rising seemed capable of arousing the

Gross care-
lessness of
the autho-
rities.

authorities to a sense of their danger, and as the 9th had passed away without disturbance, it was hoped that the 10th, a Sunday, would also prove peaceful. At first this hope was realized, and soldiers and civilians crowded to the church, one of the largest in India, to take part in the morning service. There was no visible appearance of danger, and it was therefore imagined that the evening service would be equally tranquil. Many were actually preparing for it, and the bell had begun to ring, when the noise of shouting and firing announced that the catastrophe had arrived. The day had been allowed to pass because the conspirators were aware how much darkness would aid them in the perpetration of their still darker deeds. Their plan was to seize the arms of the troops after they had marched off to church, and thus render them powerless either to defend themselves or afford any protection to others. Before relief could arrive the work would be done, and at all events the approach of night would give an opportunity of escape. Most providentially, either hurried on by their thirst for blood and plunder, which had become too impatient to be any longer restrained, or deceived by the sound of the church bells into a belief that the service had already commenced, they broke out prematurely, and thus partially defeated their diabolical design.

A D. 1857.

Mutiny at
Meerut

At the commencement a party of the 3d light cavalry galloped over to the jail, and, besides rescuing the eighty-five convicts, liberated all the other prisoners. Meanwhile the remainder of the regiment had broken out in open mutiny. Their European officers endeavoured to reason them into a sense of their duty, and, it would seem, not wholly in vain, for the 20th, the only regiment which had yet seized their arms, returned to their lines. The impression, however, was only momentary, for they suddenly rushed out again and began to fire. The 11th showed more reluctance to carry matters to extremes, and yielded to their officers so far as not to touch their arms, and allow Colonel Finnis their commander to go out and reason with the 20th. It was a desperate attempt, and proved fatal to that gallant officer, who was received with a volley of musketry and fell riddled with balls. All restraint was now thrown aside, and the whole of the native regiments shouting defiance, continued their work of plunder, fire, and murder. "The mutineers," says General Hewitt, in a report written on the following day, "then fired nearly all the bungalows in rear of the centre lines south of the nullah, including Mr. Grathed's the commissioner and my own, together with the government cattle-yard and

Proceedings
of the
mutineers.

A D 1857.

Incapacity
of General
Hewitt

"As soon as the alarm was given, the artillery, carabineers, and 60th rifles were got under arms, but by the time we reached the native infantry parade ground, it was too dark to act with efficiency in that direction; consequently the troops retired to the north of the nullah, so as to cover the barracks and officers' lines of the artillery, carabineers, and 60th rifles, which were, with the exception of one house, preserved." In other words, instead of advancing on the city he retired to a greater distance from it, and placing a nullah between himself and the insurgents, left them at full liberty to do their horrid work, and then escape without molestation. That there was the grossest mismanagement it is impossible to doubt, and we are therefore prepared to learn that the command which General Hewitt at this time held ought never to have been intrusted to him. Only two years before he had commanded on the Peshawer frontier, and, according to a statement of Colonel H. B. Edwardes, commissioner of the Peshawer division, had been removed because "physically unfit" for its "emergencies." "During the time he commanded the Peshawer division," adds the colonel, "it is believed he never once visited the outposts, and he used to inspect his troops in a buggy." He was in fact worn out by age and nearly half a century of service in India. Such was the man whom official blundering placed in an important command after his physical unfitness had been acknowledged, as if to prove the irreparable mischief of which mere imbecility is capable.

Details of
the mas-
sacre at
Meerut

It is unnecessary to dwell on the horrors of that Sunday night at Meerut, but in order to give some idea of them a few details by eye-witnesses seem necessary. A lady writes thus: "Bungalows began to blaze round us nearer and nearer till the frenzied mob reached that next our own. We saw a poor lady in the verandah, a Mrs. C, lately arrived. We bade the servants bring her over the low wall to us, but they were too confused to attend to me at first. The stables of that house were first burned. We heard the shrieks of the horses. Then came the mob to the house itself with awful shouts and curses. We heard the doors broken in, and many, many shots, and at the moment my servant said they had been to bring away Mrs. C, but had found her dead on the ground cut horribly, and she on the eve of her confinement." Mr. Rotton the chaplain gives his testimony, in his work entitled *The Chaplain's Narrative*, in the following terms:—"It was not until sunrise on Monday that any one knew, with anything like certainty, the extent of the atrocities committed by the savages within the cantonment of Meerut. What spectacles of terror met the eye almost simultaneously with the return of the day! The lifeless and mutilated corpses of men, women, and children, were here and there to be seen, some of them so frightfully disfigured, and so shamefully dishonoured in death, that the very recollection of such sights chills the blood." After reading these accounts it is no small relief to find that in the midst of the massacre there were natives whose fidelity remained unshaken, and who heroically risked their own lives in saving others.

General Hewitt says in his report, "I am led to think the outbreak was not premeditated;" but this is only another of his egregious blunders. While he was satisfying himself with defending the barracks and taking credit for having driven the mutineers out of the station, they were carrying out their plans and hurrying along the highroad to Delhi, where they had by previous arrangement made sure of a welcome reception. Had General Hewitt despatched at least a portion of his troops in pursuit, the mutineers must to a certainty have been overtaken. Besides the length of the road, there were other obstacles that must have retarded them. There was a river to pass, and as it was more than half-way between the two places, the mutinous infantry, at least, could not have crossed before his dragoons came up with them. It is said that an officer of this regiment volunteered to undertake the duty with a small detachment, and was not permitted. Thus saved from the speedy vengeance which might have been inflicted, the mutineers hurried on without interruption, and on the morning of the 11th were descried approaching Delhi. So certain were they that the native regiments would not oppose them, that at first about seven o'clock a body of troopers, numbering not more than thirty or forty, on reaching the bridge of boats which here crosses the Jumna, galloped over without slacking bridle, rushed into the city, and made their appearance in front of the palace, calling clamorously for the king. On being asked what they wanted, they told at once that they had revolted, and come from Meerut resolved on fighting for their faith and killing the Europeans. Had there been no traitors in the palace this answer would have sealed their fate, but they knew better, and delayed not a moment to commence their murderous work. Captain Douglas, the commander of the palace guards, and Mr. Simon Fraser, commissioner at Delhi, were among the first victims. The latter after shooting a trooper who had fired his pistol at him, was cut down and despatched by a number of the king's servants, who, as soon as he fell, rushed out upon him, and kept cutting at him with their swords till he was dead. This first taste of blood having as it were sharpened their appetite, they forced the door of Captain Douglas's apartments. He was lying on bed suffering from severe injuries which he had received by leaping from a height to escape from some troopers who had surrounded him. Beside him stood the Rev. Mr. Jennings the chaplain, his daughter, and another young lady. They were all ruthlessly murdered. After these horrible atrocities a general massacre of Europeans commenced. About thirty of them, who had barricaded themselves in the house of Mr. Aldwell, a government pensioner, made a resolute but unavailing defence, but the only persons who escaped were Mrs. Aldwell and her three children, who, by assuming the native dress, succeeded after several hairbreadth escapes in reaching the palace, and were there confined with about fifty other Europeans, whose lives the king was said to have guaranteed. In what way the guarantee was fulfilled will afterwards be seen.

A D. 1857.

The mutineers permitted to escape from Meerut

Their arrival at Delhi

Horrible atrocities.

A D 1857.

All the
native
troops at
Delhi join
the mutiny

Shortly after the first troopers had crossed the bridge and rushed to the palace, others took the direction of the cantonments, showing how well they were aware that the native troops there stationed, instead of encountering them as enemies, would at once fraternize with them, and take part in their atrocious designs. The British officers still hoped better things, and, indeed, even those who saw too clearly what the inevitable result would be had no alternative. There were no European troops, who, however outnumbered, might by deeds of heroism have defied the utmost fury of their assailants, and it therefore only remained to undertake the desperate task of attempting to put down a revolt by means of soldiers known to sympathize with it, and suspected of having pledged themselves to support it. The consequence was, that the Delhi regiments when brought face to face with the Meerut mutineers, not only refused to oppose them, but either stood by while their officers were shot down, or, with ineffable baseness, joined in the massacre. All idea of making head against the mutineers was now necessarily abandoned, but it was thought possible that the Flagstaff Tower, a work of some strength, might be held till relief should arrive from Meerut. Here, accordingly, the surviving officers and some European residents escaped from the city took refuge. The defence seemed practicable, for Brigadier Graves had posted himself there with two guns and about 300 sepoys, who were still apparently obeying orders. This exception to the general treachery was of short duration, and the handful of Europeans, almost entirely deserted, could only disperse and run for their lives. Meanwhile within the city the mutiny was assuming the form of an organized rebellion. The king either voluntarily in execution of a premeditated design, or, as he afterwards pretended, under the influence of intimidation, had assumed the sovereignty of India, and seated himself on the throne of the Mogul.

Attempts
of the
mutineers
to gain
the Delhi
magazine

After this extraordinary usurpation, no time was lost in giving practical effect to it. The horrible massacres which accompanied it have been already mentioned. The next steps were, if possible, still more explicit. The magazine, situated only at a short distance from the palace, immediately attracted the attention of the mutineers, and between nine and ten on the morning of the 11th it was intimated to the native officer commanding outside, that the king had sent a guard to take possession of the magazine, and either carry up all the Europeans within it to the palace or prevent them from leaving. At this time the number of these Europeans was only nine—Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer in command, Lieutenants Forrest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley, Shaw, and Scully, Sub-conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stewart. Had they at once on receiving the message attempted an escape it would have been impossible to blame them, as defence was evidently hopeless, but they were animated by a more heroic spirit, and prepared to meet death sooner than abandon their post. Their first measure accordingly was to close and barricade the gates, and to place guns double-charged with grape, so as to command the

points most likely to be attacked. Inside the gate leading to the park stood sub-conductor Crow and Sergeant Stewart with lighted matches in their hands, and with orders, if any attempt was made to force an entrance, to fire at once the two six-pounders under their charge, and then fall back on the part of the magazine where Lieutenants Willoughby and Forrest were posted; the principal gate was similarly defended by two guns, and at the same time within sixty yards of it were placed three six-pounder and one twenty-four pounder howitzers, which commanded two cross-roads, and could be managed so as to act upon any part of the magazine in the neighbourhood. The most important part of the arrangements still remains to be mentioned. The magazine was full of stores, and if once in possession of the mutineers would furnish them with almost inexhaustible resources. Lieutenant Willoughby calmly contemplating this contingency before it became imminent, had already provided against it by laying a train to the magazine, and preconcerting a signal to be given for firing it.

A D 1857

Attempt to
gain possession
of the
magazine

The message requiring delivery of the magazine had scarcely been received when a strong detachment of soldiers wearing the king's uniform arrived to enforce it. They began with placing guards over each gate of the magazine, and superintending a number of labourers whom they had employed to carry off the whole of the government stores deposited on the outside. As Lieutenant Willoughby had disdained to return any answer to the first message, it was followed by a second, which threatened that if the gates of the magazine were not immediately thrown open the king would send down ladders and scale the walls. After a short delay the ladders arrived and were placed against the south-eastern turret. The natives within the establishment had previously given proofs of insubordination, and now showed their determination to desert by climbing over a sloped shed inside the wall, and thus gaining the ladders, which enabled them to descend on the other side. The mutineers then began to mount, and crowded into the inside of the turret, from which they kept up a fire of musketry. Meanwhile the handful of beleaguered Europeans were not idle. As soon as their assailants began to descend into the magazine they opened upon them with grape from four field pieces. The only persons that could be spared to man these guns were Lieutenant Forrest and Conductor Buckley, who did not cease to ply them till their last rounds of ammunition were expended. The crisis had now arrived. The assailants had entered the magazine at two points, and in another moment would possess themselves of the guns, which, indeed, even if the ammunition had not been exhausted, could not have been worked, as both Lieutenant Forrest and Conductor Buckley had been disabled, the former by two musket-balls which struck his left hand, and the other by a musket-ball which lodged in his arm above the elbow. At this moment, half-past three P.M., Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order, and Conductor Buckley repeating it by the preconcerted signal, Conductor Scully

Heroic
defence of it
by nine
British
officers and
soldiers

A D 1857

Signal
courage dis-
played in
blowing up
the maga-
zine at
Delhi

applied the match. By the explosion which instantly followed hundreds of the mutineers were blown into the air, and suffered the death they had so richly merited. Unfortunately none of the heroic defenders were permitted to escape without severe injury. "Conductor Scully," says Lieutenant Forrest, "was so dreadfully wounded that his escape was impossible. I saw him after the explosion, but his face and head were so burned and confused that I don't think life could have long remained in him." Among the others who perished were several European women and children, who had fled to the magazine at the commencement of the outbreak. Lieutenants Willoughby and Forrest succeeded in reaching the Main Guard at the Cashmere gate. The latter eventually escaped, but the former, probably retarded in his flight by the injuries he had received, fell into the hands of the mutineers on the road to Meerut and was barbarously murdered. Lieutenant Raynor and Conductor Buckley, who had sought the same place by a different direction, were more fortunate in reaching it.

The
rebellion
regularly
organized

Delhi was now entirely in the hands of the mutineers, and the king, throwing off any disguise which he had previously worn, formally accepted the sovereignty which was tendered to him. On the very evening of the outbreak, a royal salute of twenty-one guns announced the fact, and on the following day, a silver throne, which had been in disuse since 1842, having been brought into the hall of audience, the king took his seat upon it, received the homage of the chiefs, and began to issue royal orders. His eldest son, Mirza Moghul, became commander-in-chief, and various other sons received appointments accordant with their assumed dignities. During the first tumultuous proceedings, there was some reason to allege that the massacres had received no countenance at court, and were entirely owing to the blood-thirsty rabble, which it was then impossible to restrain; but a deed of horror must now be related which completely destroys this excuse, and proves that the king and his sons were capable of repeating, in cool blood, the worst atrocities that had yet been perpetrated. Mention has already been made of some Europeans who fled to the palace in the hope of finding it an asylum. Others had been brought thither as prisoners, till the whole number exceeded fifty. The recesses of the palace were sufficiently large to have concealed them all, had they been ten times more numerous, and the king had only to give the order, which would by this means have secured their personal safety. The suggestion was actually made to him, but he declined to accede to it, and shut them up in a place, which Mrs Aldwell thus describes: "We were all confined in one room, very dark, with only one door, and no window or other opening. It was not fit for the residence of any human being, much less for the number of us who were there. We were very much crowded together, and in consequence of the sepoys, and every one who took a fancy to do so, coming and frightening the children, we were frequently obliged to close the one door we had, which then

left us without light or air. The sepoys used to come with their muskets loaded and bayonets fixed, and ask us whether we would consent to become Mahometans, and also slaves, if the king granted us our lives; but the king's special armed retainers, from which the guard over us was always furnished, incited the sepoys to be content with nothing short of our lives, saying we should be cut up in small pieces and given as food to the kites and crows." The agony in which the prisoners were thus kept was only preliminary to a horrid sacrifice. In the Court Diary, giving by authority an account of the daily occurrences at the palace, there is the following entry for the 16th of May: "The king held his court in the special hall of audience: forty-nine English were prisoners, and the army demanded that they should be given over to them for slaughter. The king delivered them up, saying, 'The army may do as they please.'" Although the infamous sanction thus appears not to have been formally given till the 16th, the fate destined for the prisoners was so well known that it was openly talked of in Delhi at least two days before. Accordingly, a native eye-witness of the whole proceedings bears the following testimony: "I heard of it two days before the occurrence; it was said the Europeans would be killed in two days, but I do not recollect what day it was. On the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great crowds of people were flocking to the palace about ten A.M. I entered with them." What are we to think of a people who could thus crowd to witness a spectacle almost too horrible for description, and keep the day on which it was to be perpetrated as a holiday? Mrs. Aldwell and her three children were the only European prisoners who escaped. When taken, she and they were disguised as Mahometans, and she had afterwards managed to complete the disguise by learning and teaching them the Mahometan confession of faith. In this way they passed as Mussulmans from Cashmere, and were specially excepted, when the order arrived to bring out the other victims. "The women and children," says Mrs. Aldwell, "began crying, saying they knew they were going to be murdered, but the Mahometans swore on the Koran, and the Hindoos on the Jumna, that such was not the case; that they wanted to give them a better residence, and that the one they were in would be converted into a magazine. On this they went out, were counted, but I do not know the number; a rope was thrown round to encircle the whole group, the same as prisoners are usually kept together when on the move; and in this manner they were taken out of my sight." All the victims thus marched off were, with four exceptions, women and children. The subsequent massacre is thus narrated by a native eye-witness:—"On reaching the first court-yard, I saw the prisoners all standing together, surrounded on all sides by the king's special armed retainers, or what you may term his body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineers. I did not observe any signal orders given; but on a sudden the men just mentioned drew their swords, and all simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and continued cutting

A.D. 1857.

Horrid
massacre of
European
women and
children
within the
precincts of
the palace

A D. 1857

Mutiny at
Delhi.

at them till they had killed them all. There were at least 100 or 150 men employed in this work of slaughter." Shortly afterwards, "the bodies were laden on two carts and thrown into the river." Such was the nature and such were the first-fruits of the revolt in Delhi. Before proceeding to give an account of the retribution which awaited it, it will be necessary to mention the principal localities in which about the same time similar outbreaks occurred, and thus furnish a general idea of the extent to which rebellion was carried, before effectual measures could be taken to curb or suppress it.

CHAPTER II.

The progress of the mutiny—Vigorous measures of repression in the Punjab—Outbreaks in other quarters—The Doab—Nemuch and Nusseerabad—Jhansi—Bareilly—Oude—Measures of government to meet the crisis—Reinforcements and proclamations—Siege of Delhi commenced



THE outbreak at Meerut, and the entrance of the mutineers into Delhi, operated as a common signal to all the native regiments throughout Bengal, and accordingly, in many localities the intelligence was no sooner received than a determination was evinced to follow the same course. The utmost, therefore, that could be done by the British authorities while preparing for the worst, was to interpose obstacles to immediate action, and diminish the means of mischief which the sepoy's possessed, by depriving them of their arms. Nowhere was this policy more quickly adopted and more vigorously carried out than in the Punjab. It must at the same time be admitted that the authorities there possessed peculiar advantages. The recent annexation of the country, and the warlike spirit of its inhabitants, dictated the necessity of keeping a firm grasp of it, and hence the troops within it amounted to 59,656. Of these 10,326 were Europeans, 13,430 Punjabees, and 35,900 Hindoostanees, chiefly sepoy's. The last, though outnumbering the other two classes, were so situated as to be incapable of combined action, and were moreover aware that they could not carry the sympathy of the inhabitants along with them, as they might have hoped to do in Bengal. They were in what they regarded as a foreign country, and the probability therefore was, that if they did venture on mutiny, it would be not merely to encounter a European force, but to be hunted down by a hostile population. The advantages which government thus possessed in the Punjab were admirably turned to account by the authorities, and the province from which at one time danger was most apprehended, not only remained comparatively tranquil, but became mainly instrumental in the final suppression of the mutiny.

State of
matters in
the Punjab

The Meerut outbreak and the possession of Delhi by the mutineers were made known at Lahore by telegraph on the 12th of May. Sir John Lawrence, the chief-commissioner, was then at Rawal Pindee, situated about 150 miles to the N.N.W., and owing to a stoppage of the telegraph could not be instantaneously communicated with. Immediate action was however felt to be necessary. General disaffection among the sepoy was notorious, and it could not be doubted that as soon as they should hear of the mutiny, they would seize the first opportunity to take part in it. Mr. Montgomery, the judicial commissioner, therefore, at once assumed the necessary responsibility, and having summoned a council of the leading authorities, civil and military, suggested the propriety of rendering the native troops comparatively innocuous by depriving them at least of their ammunition and percussion caps, if not by disarming them entirely. The latter, the bolder and more effectual course, was preferred, and on the following morning was carried into effect. The native regiments then in the large military cantonment of Mean Meer, situated about six miles from Lahore, were the 16th, 26th, and 49th, and the 8th light cavalry. To control and overawe all these regiments, the European force consisted only of her majesty's 81st, mustering about 850 men, and two troops of Company's horse-artillery. But only a portion of these could be employed in the important operation of disarming. In providing for the security of Lahore, which was itself a focus of mischief, and for the protection of the barracks, so many European troops were withdrawn, that the whole number brought to the parade-ground was not more than 300. When brought face to face with this small force, and the dozen guns of horse-artillery accompanying them, the sepoy, though mustering about 3500, did not venture to risk a combat, and at once obeyed the order to pile their arms. The security derived from this decisive act of disarming extended much further than the removal of the immediate danger. It dealt with the Asiatic mind in the manner which has always proved effectual, and while it confirmed the well-disposed, deterred many whose hearts were full of treachery from engaging in any overt act of rebellion. It was afterwards ascertained that the disarming was not effected an hour too soon. A plot had been formed for seizing the fort of Lahore and massacring all the Europeans there and at Mean Meer, and was on the very eve of execution, when it was thus most providentially frustrated.

On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, Mr. Montgomery sent off an express to Ferozepoor to intimate the event to Brigadier Innes. The intimation, which reached that officer on the morning of the 13th, seems not to have impressed him so deeply as might have been expected. The arsenal under his charge contained immense military stores, and he could not but feel the necessity of taking immediate steps for its security, but the native regiments, the 45th and 57th, were allowed to retain their arms, and immediately showed how little they deserved the confidence reposed in them. On this subject the

A D 1857

Critical
condition of
the PunjabVigorous
measures
adopted by
Mr. Mont-
gomery.Blunder at
Ferozepoor.

A D 1857.

Blunder at
Ferozepoor

opinion given by Sir John Lawrence, in his report on the mutiny in the Punjab, is decisive:—"On the British side affairs were badly managed. It was fortunate that the European barracks were close to the arsenal, into which building a company of Europeans were introduced, just before it was assailed by the native infantry. But after the arsenal had been secured and the mutineers repulsed, they were allowed to return and burn buildings in the cantonment at their pleasure during the whole night of the 14th May. No adequate efforts were made to destroy or even to punish them. Even those who, in their flight from the station towards Delhi, had been seized by the police and the country



SIR JOHN LAWRENCE, G C B
From a photograph by Calcutt, Mansford, & Co.

Another
blunder at
Umballa.

people, were not brought to trial until reiterated orders to that effect had been issued. But unfortunately at Ferozepoor errors did not end here; for when, at a date subsequent to the above occurrences, the 10th light cavalry were disarmed, their horses were not taken away. When, however, the taking of the horses was insisted on at last, the troopers had a full opportunity of concocting their plans for an outbreak; for the order about the horses, instead of being kept secret, was formally copied and circulated in the regimental order-book." Happily, notwithstanding this tissue of blunders, no massacre of Europeans was perpetrated.

At Umballa the native troops had for some time given proofs of disaffection. As early as the 19th of April mysterious fires began to occur, and were generally believed to be the work of the sepoys. On the 8th of May a prediction was current in the 5th and 60th native infantry stationed there, "that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa, and that a general rising would take place;" and only two days afterwards, the 10th, the day of the fatal Meerut outbreak, as if they had feared that others might anticipate them in fulfilling the prediction, both of the above regiments rushed simultaneously to their bells of arms, and began loading their muskets. They were afterwards induced to desist, but the portion of the 60th stationed as a guard over the treasury persisted in retaining their arms during the whole day. Strange to say, this overt act of mutiny was unconditionally forgiven by the military authorities, and the result which might have been anticipated was, that large portions of these regiments afterwards joined the rebels at Delhi.

The above blunders committed in the Punjab and the Cis-Sutlej states were fortunately only exceptions to the judicious management generally evinced in the same quarters. The important fort and arsenal of Phillour, on the frontier of the Jullunder Doab, was happily saved by throwing in a company of European infantry and some European artillerymen into the fort, and dispossessing

the native troops before they had time to give effect to the treachery which they had for some time been meditating. The same promptitude of action also saved the fort of Govindghur. This fort, besides being the most central and most important stronghold in the Punjab, completely commanded Amritsur, the religious capital of the Sikhs, and the possession of it was hence absolutely indispensable to the maintenance of tranquillity in that quarter. At the time of the outbreak it was occupied by a detachment of the 59th native infantry, and only seventy European artillerymen. The latter must have been overpowered had they not been reinforced by half a company of her majesty's 81st hurried over in *ekas* or native one-horse gigs from Lahore. What the former would have done may be inferred from the fact that it afterwards became necessary to disarm them.

A. D. 1857.

Fort of Govindghur saved

On the 11th of May, when the telegraph announced the outbreak, the forces occupying the Peshawer valley consisted of about 2800 European and 8000 native soldiers, with 18 field guns and a mounted battery. Immediately on the receipt of the disastrous intelligence, it was resolved, on the suggestion of Colonel John Nicholson, then deputy-commissioner at Peshawer, to form a moveable column of picked troops. At the same time orders were issued for the rigid examination of all sepoy correspondence at the post-office. For some time the disaffection of the 64th native infantry forming part of the Peshawer contingent had been notorious, and therefore one of the first steps taken was to cripple it for intrigue, by breaking it up into detachments, and marching them off to isolated outposts. While thus providing for the safety of the district, the general interest was not forgotten; and on the 13th of May the guide corps, which has since so greatly distinguished itself, quitted its cantonment at Murdan six hours after it got the order, and the next morning had accomplished the distance of thirty miles to Attock, while hurrying on to assist in the recovery of Delhi. Meantime the news of the outbreak having become known to the sepoys, a rapid change took place in their demeanour, and their mutinous intentions could no longer be disguised. Precautions were accordingly taken. The treasure, amounting to nearly a quarter of a million sterling, was removed from the centre of cantonments to the fort outside, which was at the same time garrisoned by Europeans. The inspection of native correspondence, at the post-office, was now making ominous revelations. Letters addressed to soldiers of the 64th, revelled in descriptions of the atrocities perpetrated in Hindoostan on the men, women, and children of the Feringhees, and contained messages from their relatives, urging them to emulate the example. Another letter, which did not pass through the post-office, but fell into the hands of Brigadier Cotton, commanding at Peshawer, was a formal communication from part of the 51st native infantry stationed there to the 64th. After some preliminary salutations, it proceeded thus:—"The cartridge will have to be beaten on the 22d instant. Of this you are hereby informed. This is addressed to you by the

State of affairs in the Peshawer valley

Mutinous correspondence detected.

A D 1857

Mutinous
correspon-
dence
detected

whole regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hindoos and Mahometans is all one. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of the jemadar, soubahdar-major, and bavildar-major. All are discontent with this business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best. High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation, and service." It was added by another hand. "The above is the state of affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it, come in to Peshawer on the 21st instant. Thoroughly understand that point. In fact eat there and drink here." The authorities thus made aware of the plot, and the very day fixed for its execution, were able to counterwork it, though not entirely to prevent overt acts of mutiny. On the 21st, the day appointed, a part of the 55th, on duty at the Attock ferry, suddenly quitted their post and marched away towards Nowshera. On the way they were joined by a detachment of the 24th native infantry, who were escorting commissariat stores to Peshawer. Major Verner, commanding at Nowshera, informed by an express of their approach, was able to intercept and disarm them. This success, however, only proved the signal to a more serious outbreak, for the moment he re-entered Nowshera with his prisoners, three companies of the 55th stationed there came to the rescue, and having succeeded, broke open the regimental magazine, supplied themselves with ammunition, and having succeeded in crossing the Cabool, hastened off in the direction of Murdan, where the main body of the 55th was stationed. The whole immediately fraternized, and the mutiny of the regiment was complete.

Outbreak at
Attock and
NowsheraDecisive
acts of
disarming

After such overt acts a general disarming of the native troops could no longer be delayed. It began with the regiments stationed at Peshawer, consisting of the 5th light cavalry, and the 24th, 27th, and 51st native infantry. Another regiment, the 21st native infantry, was exempted, because an infantry regiment seemed indispensable to carry on the duties of the station, and this one had hitherto shown no sympathy with the mutineers. Besides the above there were two regiments of irregular cavalry, the 7th and 18th. These also were exempted for similar reasons, though not without considerable hesitation, as the fidelity of the former of the two was already shaken, and that of the latter was at least problematical. The case then stood thus. Four native regiments were to be disarmed, and three, who were to be spectators of the operation, were by no means free from the suspicion of being more inclined to oppose than to assist in it. The European regiments were the 70th and 87th, and these, with the artillery, on the morning of the 22d, took up positions at the two ends of the cantonment. The measure had been resolved, and was carried out with so much promptitude that the native troops, however much inclined to resist, were too faint-hearted to venture upon it, and laid down their arms. The next step necessary was to deal with the 55th native infantry, who had mutinied at Murdan. Near midnight of the 23d, a force of 300

European infantry, 250 irregular cavalry, horse-levies and police, and eight guns, left Peshawar under command of Colonel Chute of her majesty's 70th, accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as political officer. At sunrise of the 25th, this force, increased by a detachment from Nowshera under Major Vaughan, was descried approaching Murdan. The mutineers no sooner heard the intelligence than they rushed from the fort and fled tumultuously towards the hills of Swat. They had got so far ahead before the pursuit commenced, and the ground was so rugged, that the guns of their pursuers were never brought within range. They were not, however, permitted to escape with impunity; for Colonel Nicholson, hurrying forward with a party of troopers, succeeded in overtaking them. Thus brought to bay the mutineers faced about, and a desperate encounter took place, but not with doubtful issue. Nicholson's impetuous charge drove his enemies before him, and they fled, scattering themselves over the country in companies and sections. The pursuit was continued, and with so much success, that before the day closed 120 had been slain and 150 made prisoners.

A.D. 1857.

Nicholson
defeats the
mutineers

While the mutiny was thus either anticipated by disarming, or curbed and punished by the vigorous measures adopted in the Punjab, it made rapid and alarming progress in other quarters. In the beginning of May the 9th native infantry was distributed in the Doab in four detachments—three companies being stationed at Alighur, three at Mynpoorie, three at Etawah, and one at Boolundshuhur. Hitherto the confidence of the European officers in the fidelity of the regiment had been unbounded, and though they could not but feel some anxiety after they had been startled by the disastrous intelligence from Meerut and Delhi, their hope still was that, however faithless others might be, their men would prove an honourable exception. And there certainly seemed to be good grounds for this charitable judgment. At Alighur, where the head-quarters of the regiment were established, the soldiers, so far from sympathizing with the mutineers, had readily assisted in hunting down some troopers of the 3d cavalry, who, after taking part in the atrocities at Meerut, had wandered into their neighbourhood, probably in search of plunder. They had given a still stronger proof of fidelity, by not only refusing to listen to a Brahmin, who had come among them as a secret agent to incite them to mutiny, but by taking him prisoner and handing him over to their commander. It is difficult to believe that in thus acting they were only seeking a cover to their real designs. The probability rather is that up to this time, though they may have been shaken by the sinister influences brought to bear on them, they had not formed any decided resolution, but were waiting the course of events in that dubious vacillating state where any sudden impulse from either side is sufficient to turn the scale. We accordingly learn that it was an impulse of this nature which actually determined them. The Brahmin, for his attempt to seduce them, had been condemned to die, and they had stood

Mutiny in
the Doab

A D 1857

Mutiny in
the Doab

on the parade ground when the sentence was carried into execution, without betraying any particular emotion. Unfortunately, the lifeless body was still hanging on the gallows, when some soldiers who had been absent on duty arrived. Far from participating in the apparent apathy of their comrades, the sight filled them with indignation, and one of their number stepping from the ranks, and pointing to the gallows, exclaimed—"That man is a martyr." No sooner were the words uttered than the whole soldiers present, as if seized by a sudden frenzy, rushed forth shouting defiance, proceeded directly to the treasury, plundered it, burst open the jail, liberating all the prisoners, and then took the highroad to Delhi. As there were no European troops present, no resistance could be offered to their proceedings, but it is only fair to mention that no blood-thirstiness was manifested, and no lives were taken. This outbreak, which took place on the 20th of May, was forthwith responded to by the other three detachments—by that of Mynpoorie on the 22d, of Etawah on the 23d, and of Boolundshuhur on the 24th. It is unnecessary to give the details of each, though honourable notice is certainly due to a young officer, Lieutenant de Kantzow, who, undeterred either by threats or actual violence, kept his post at Mynpoorie, and actually succeeded in inducing the mutineers to depart without plundering the treasury.

The mutiny
in Hurreana,
Nusseerabad
and Rohil-
cund

After these revolts in the Doab, nearly a week elapsed without any other actual rising, and many were sanguine enough to imagine that the insurrectionary spirit had nearly expended itself. And there is some ground to believe that could Delhi have been at this time wrested from the mutineers by a sudden onset, and a signal retribution inflicted for the atrocities of which they had been guilty, the revolt would have received its death-blow. The recapture of Delhi, however, by any troops which could be hastily mustered for the purpose was impossible, and the continued possession of the old Mogul capital by the insurgents gave a new and irresistible stimulus to revolt. All at once, after a short and delusive interval, a simultaneous burst of insurrection took place, though in localities so widely distant that it could scarcely have been in consequence of previous concert. On this recommencement, the first display of open violence occurred in the towns of Hansi and Hissar, in the district of Hurreana, lying to the north-west of that of Delhi. There, on the 28th of May, the Hurreana battalion of light infantry and the 4th irregular cavalry breaking out into open mutiny, commenced an indiscriminate massacre of Europeans, and were guilty of deeds as atrocious as any that had yet been perpetrated. On the evening of the same day, in the remote locality of Nusseerabad, situated fifteen miles south-east of Ajmere, in the very centre of Rajpootana, two regiments of Bengal native infantry, the 15th and the 30th, together with a company of Bengal native artillery, proceeded to execute the mutinous designs of which they had previously given many indications. One of their first steps was to make themselves masters of the guns. They were

not, however, permitted to retain them without a struggle. The first Bombay light cavalry (lancers), showing how little sympathy the army of that presidency had with that of Bengal, hastened to the rescue, and repeatedly charged the mutineers. It was unhappily without success. The disparity of numbers was too great, and they were obliged to retire in the direction of Beawr, situated about thirty miles to the south-west. During the struggle several of the European officers had fallen, but the survivors, together with the other European residents, protected by the lancers, were enabled to make their escape. A still more formidable outbreak had, in the meantime, occurred at Bareilly, the capital of Rohilcund. Having recounted the many wrongs which the Rohillas suffered in consequence of the iniquitous compact made between Warren Hastings and the Nabob of Oude, we can hardly deny that there was something retributive in the vengeance which they took on this occasion, though the parties who suffered were certainly not the wrong-doers. The troops stationed here were the 18th and 68th Bengal native infantry, the 8th irregular cavalry, and a company of native artillery. Their disaffection was well known, and they had so little attempted to disguise it, that the European women and children had been removed for safety to the hill station of Nynce Tal. The evil day was however postponed by dexterous management, and the excitement which for some days threatened immediate violence, had so far subsided that the danger seemed, at least for the present, to be passing away. The sepoys themselves employed all the arts of Asiatic treachery in countenancing this delusion. Professing deep contrition for having been misled by evil counsel, they were now only anxious that the past should be forgotten, and they requested, as a proof of restored confidence, that the women and children who had been sent off to Nynce Tal should return. With this request the British authorities were not so infatuated as to comply; but Brigadier Sibbald was so far imposed upon that he wrote to the government, assuring them, in confident terms, of the fidelity of his troops, provided their fears were set at rest by an assurance that they were not to be punished for any previous irregularities. The brigadier's letter could scarcely have reached its destination, when the sepoys proved the hollowness of all their professions, and he himself became one of their first victims. Having, like their fellow-fraitors at Meerut, fixed on a Sunday, they rose by preconcerted signal on the 31st of May, and at once commenced the work of murder and devastation, by opening on their officers both with grape and musketry, firing the bungalows, plundering the treasury, and throwing open the jail, which contained nearly 3000 prisoners. These mingling with a populace notoriously one of the most turbulent in India, had full scope to commit every form of outrage. The insurrection being thus completely triumphant, soon found fitting representatives, both of the military and the civil authority—of the former, in the person of Ruktawar Khan, soubahdar of artillery, who, assuming the rank of general,

A D 1857.

Outbreak at
Bareilly.Treachery of
the sepoys.

A D 1857. paraded the city in the carriage of the murdered brigadier, followed by a numerous staff; and of the latter, in the person of Khan Bahadur Khan, a retired native judge, who repaid his obligation to the British government, which had pensioned him, by turning traitor, and employing the forms of law to murder its officers. In this way two of the European judges, charged with imaginary crimes, were subjected to the mockery of a trial, condemned to death, and immediately executed. The example of Bareilly was speedily followed at Moradabad and Shahjehanpore, the other principal military stations of Rohilkund. At Moradabad the 29th native infantry, more avaricious than bloodthirsty, were so intent on plunder that they allowed their officers to escape. It was otherwise at Shahjehanpore, where the 28th native infantry, choosing the same Sunday as at Bareilly, shot one officer on the parade ground, and then sent a party of murderers into the church. Notwithstanding the suddenness and ferocity of this sacrilegious attack, the greater part of the European residents escaped into Oude. Here, however, instead of the asylum which they hoped to find, the whole party, men, women, and children, fell into the hands of savages, still worse than those from whom they had fled, and were barbarously massacred in the vicinity of Aurangabad.

The mention of Oude, as well as the sequence of events, would now naturally lead us to trace the course of the revolt in that province, but some advantage in respect of arrangement will be gained by previously noticing the disastrous outbreaks at some other localities. We begin with Neemuch, situated in an isolated portion of Scindia's dominions, near the south-east borders of Rajpootana, and, with Jhansi, long the capital of an independent native principality, but finally incorporated with British India, in accordance with the annexation policy, which refused to recognize an adopted heir. The troops stationed at Neemuch belonged to what was designated the Gwalior contingent, and therefore did not properly form part of our Indian army, but they were virtually included in it, because, though nominally belonging to Scindia, they were provided by the British government, in accordance with treaty, and commanded by British officers. Still the relations which they bore to a native prince gave additional importance to their movements, as from these an inference might be drawn as to the course which the prince himself might be disposed to take in the fearful struggle which had commenced, and the degree of control which he might be able to exercise, whether for good or evil. As to Scindia personally, there was indeed scarcely any room for doubt. At the very commencement of the outbreak he had come forward of his own accord to place his body-guard and all his other troops at the disposal of Mr. Colvin, the lieutenant-governor of the North-western Provinces, and his subsequent conduct had shown that the fidelity of the Gwalior contingent, if any efforts on his part could secure it, would remain unshaken. One more ominous feature was thus added to the revolt, when it appeared that the sepoys of the contingent fraternized with

Atrocities
at Bareilly
and Shah
jehanpore

Mutiny at
Neemuch,
in Scindia's
dominions

those of Bengal, and would in all probability follow their example. The troops at Neemuch consisted of the 7th and 72d regiments of infantry, the 1st regiment of cavalry, and the 4th company of artillery. For some time symptoms of disaffection had been visibly manifested, and on the two last days of May, and the 1st of June, the whole troops were in such a state of excitement that an actual rising was hourly expected. From some cause, however, it suddenly subsided, and the 2d passed in comparative tranquillity. On the 3d another change took place, the disturbance became worse than ever, and at last, towards midnight, the discharge of a gun, the preconcerted signal, announced that the mutiny had commenced. The main body of the troops occupied the cantonments situated without the town, but the fort within it was garrisoned by the right wing of the 7th regiment, while the left wing was stationed at an hospital about a quarter of a mile distant. The moment the outbreak commenced, the whole of the troops in cantonments took part in it, but the 7th regiment seemed not to have fully made up their minds, and the left wing marched off in obedience to their officers, and joined the right wing in the fort, both making loud protestations of unshaken fidelity. Meantime the work of destruction went on below, and many barbarous murders were committed. The officers within the fort, looking down from its ramparts, saw the air lighted up with the flames of their burning bungalows, but, though held in a torture of suspense as to the fate of their fellow-officers, and the other European residents, gave so much credit to the loyal professions of the garrison, that they scarcely doubted their own individual safety. On this point, however, they were soon undeceived, for when the mutineers appeared before the fort, and threatened to open upon it with their artillery, a soubahdar, who had seen nearly fifty years' service, and to whom, from the confidence reposed in him, the command of the picket placed at the gate had been intrusted, coolly ordered it to be thrown open. When the officers attempted to resist this treacherous order, they were significantly reminded that they had better look to themselves, since the garrison, though disposed to favour their escape, never would nor could save them from the mutineers outside, of whose murderous intentions they were well aware. This intimation left the officers no alternative but flight, which they accomplished with the utmost difficulty.

The mutiny at Jhansi was of a still more atrocious character. At this place, situated 140 miles south of Agra, near the north-west extremity of Bundelcund, a strong feeling of discontent existed, particularly among those who had formerly been connected with the native court, and regretted the loss of their independence by a course of policy which seemed to them at once fraudulent and violent. The ranee, indeed, so far from concealing her resentment, had given utterance to it in the most unequivocal form, by spurning the pension allotted to her by the British government. Under such circumstances, it was not to be expected that when the revolt began to spread, Jhansi would

A D 1857.

Mutiny at
Neemuch.Mutiny at
Jhansi.

A D 1857.

long refrain from taking a prominent part in it. The only troops in the place were the left wings of the 12th native and the 14th irregular infantry. From the first intelligence of the proceedings at Meerut and Delhi, an outbreak had been imminent, as the ranee and her advisers were suspected of tampering with the sepoys. But though the wish to break out into open violence was visibly manifest, the fear of being committed before success seemed certain sufficed to keep both the sepoys and their tempters in check, and the actual mutiny did not take place till the 4th of June. The Europeans, forewarned of their danger, had fixed upon the fort as their place of refuge. Accordingly, when the alarm was given, they rushed to it with one accord. The prospect before them was fearful. Their whole number, women and children included, amounted only to fifty-five, and how were these to withstand the hundreds of blood-thirsty wretches by whom they were beset? The struggle at once commenced, and the heroic band, fighting for life and all that was dear to them, made good their defence for four days. At last, when their resources had begun to fail, and their position was nearly desperate, a new and more formidable enemy appeared. The ranee sent her artillery and elephants, and the gates, though strongly barricaded, were forced. By retiring into some of the buildings, it might still have been possible to hold out a little longer, but as an unconditional surrender must speedily have been forced, we can easily understand how readily the terms were listened to, when the mutineers offered, on the delivery of the fort, to save the lives of all within it. This offer, after it had been confirmed by the most solemn oaths, was accepted, and all who had survived the miseries of the siege, having laid down their arms, were beginning to retire, when, in utter violation of all that had been stipulated and sworn, they were seized, carried off to a place of execution, and put to the sword, man, woman, and child, with a barbarity too horrible for description.

Horrible massacre

Mutiny at Agra

At the very commencement of the revolt, some anxiety was felt for Agra, once the capital of all India, and still the capital of the North-western Provinces. Fortunately, indeed, it had not, like Delhi, been left destitute of European troops, and it was therefore certain that, happen what might, it would not fall like that city without a struggle. The troops stationed in it at the time of the revolt were the 3d European fusiliers, a troop of European artillery, and two sepoy regiments, the 44th and 67th native infantry. Among the latter, when the first intelligence of the mutiny arrived, the excitement was extreme, and the mischief which they meditated was indicated by numerous incendiary fires. Their object in raising them apparently was to lure the European troops to their lines, for the purpose of extinguishing the flames, and take advantage of their absence while thus employed, to make themselves masters of the fort. If this was the plan, the judicious arrangements of the authorities defeated it. Knowing that everything depended on the possession of the fort, they made its security their first object, and never reduced the garrison so far as to give any

hope of attacking it with success. The lieutenant-governor at the same time exerted himself to the utmost to prevent or postpone the anticipated outbreak. As early as the 14th of May, he met the whole troops of the station on the parade ground, and harangued them in a manner which called forth the loudest protestations of inviolable fidelity. The sepoy in particular seemed unable to give sufficient utterance to their applause, and continued to make the air ring with their cheers long after he had retired. At this time the depth of native duplicity was so little understood, that Mr. Colvin himself did not hesitate to speak confidently of the effect which his address had produced, and he therefore naturally followed it up with a proclamation, in which he declared his belief that "European and native portions of the military forces now rapidly assembling, will honourably and eagerly vie with each other in the extirpation of the traitorous criminals who have endeavoured to sow utterly groundless distrust between the powerful and beneficent British government and its attached native soldiery." The two native regiments were on bad terms, and Mr. Colvin, well aware of the fact, endeavoured to turn it to account by employing them as a kind of mutual check upon each other. In accordance with this policy, when, in the end of May, it became desirable to bring in a quantity of treasure from Muttra, about thirty miles north-west of Agra, instead of sending Europeans, who could ill be spared for such a purpose, he selected for the service two native companies, one from each regiment, in the belief that their hatred would not allow them to be guilty of a common act of treachery. It proved otherwise. No sooner were they in possession of the treasure, than they forgot their own quarrels, broke out into open mutiny, and marched off with their plunder for Delhi. The incident was so far fortunate that it completely opened the eyes of the authorities, and by compelling them to disarm both regiments, as utterly unworthy of confidence, undoubtedly prevented a more serious catastrophe.

While Agra thus narrowly escaped, Allahabad, situated at the junction of the Jumna with the Ganges, was subjected to a still more fiery ordeal. This city, though justly regarded as the key of the lower provinces of Bengal, and containing an arsenal with 40,000 stand of arms, large numbers of cannon, and vast military stores, had been left entirely at the mercy of native troops. A few soldiers, forming the magazine staff, were Europeans, but the garrison within the fortress was composed of a regiment of Sikhs, about 400 strong, and a company of the 6th native infantry, while the remainder of the latter regiment occupied the cantonments. In this state of matters an assault by the sepoy must have been successful, and Allahabad, with its immense military stores, would, like Delhi, have become a stronghold of the mutineers. Fortunately the authorities were on the alert, and in the absence of any other means of reinforcement, a body of aged European invalids, about seventy in number, occupying the fort of Chunar, were despatched by steamer, and arrived in the

A.D. 1857

State of
matters at
Agra.Mutiny at
Allahabad

A D 1857.

Mutiny at
Allahabad

very nick of time. The company of the 6th native infantry, in charge of the principal gate of the fortress, had conspired to admit their comrades, when they found themselves suddenly displaced. They endeavoured, however, to make a merit of necessity, and as a cover to their treachery, the whole regiment made such professions of fidelity, that the thanks of the governor-general were publicly conveyed to them on the 6th of June. Their gratification seemed to know no bounds, and their cheers were still ringing in the ears of their deluded officers as they sat at mess, when they were startled by the intelligence that the mutiny had commenced. Several of them were shot down before they could leave the mess-room, and others were barbarously murdered as they hastened to the lines, in hope of quelling disturbance. The Europeans within the fort, though gallantly supported by the Sikhs, barely sufficed for its protection, and hence, both within the town and the cantonments, the work of plunder and devastation continued almost unchecked. Before the mutineers left, after plundering the treasury, throwing open the jail, which contained nearly 3000 prisoners, and burning down the cantonments, fifty Europeans had been massacred. The rest found refuge within the fort, and were obliged to remain there, as anarchy reigned within the city, and British authority had nearly ceased throughout the whole tract of country which skirts the Ganges from Allahabad up to Agra.

Mutiny at
Benares.


About sixty miles below Allahabad, and nearly due east from it, stood Benares, the great stronghold of Hindooism. If religion had anything to do with the revolt, it might have been anticipated that this was the place of all others where it would burst forth with the greatest fury. Its population exceeding 180,000 was notorious for turbulence, and the only troops in whom full confidence could be placed were 190 of her majesty's 10th foot, and a small detail of artillery, with three guns. The native troops consisted of a Sikh corps, the 37th native infantry, and the 13th irregular cavalry. It was hoped that both the Sikhs and the cavalry would remain faithful. The 37th, on the contrary, were known to be mutinous, and on the 1st of June it was resolved to deprive them of their arms. The resolution once taken ought to have been immediately executed, but was fixed only for the 5th. In the interval the sepoys, through some unknown channel became aware of what was intended; and to increase the difficulty intelligence arrived that at Azimghur, a place about fifty miles to the north of Benares, the 17th native infantry had mutinied on the 3d, and decamped after seizing treasure to the amount of £170,000. Not a moment could now be lost, and on the 4th the first step in the process of disarming was commenced by suddenly locking the *bells* or huts where the arms were kept. By this time the sepoys were equally on the alert, and having burst open the doors of the bells gained possession of their arms by open force. The struggle now commenced. On the one side stood the Europeans, mustering not more than 200, and on the other native troops to the number of about 2000.

This immense disparity was compensated to the former by the possession of three guns, while their opponents had none; by their indomitable courage, and by some reluctance on the part of many of the native troops finally to commit themselves. It is even said that the Sikhs, when they made common cause with the Bengal troops, acted rather under the influence of some unaccountable panic than from any premeditated design. Favoured by this combination of circumstances the Europeans gained a comparatively easy victory, only four, one of them the commander of the irregular cavalry, being killed, and twenty-one wounded. This first success had an excellent effect upon the populace, who, contrary to what had been feared, did not venture to rise.

A D 1857.

Mutiny at
Benares
suppressed

We now hasten towards Oude, which had become and was destined long to be a main centre of revolt. Its first mutiny, and the suppression of it,



THE RESIDENCY, LUCKNOW.—From view in Illustrated London News.

have already been described. As its recurrence sooner or later could hardly be doubted, Sir Henry Lawrence made diligent use of the respite which he had gained, and endeavoured to prepare for the worst. His head-quarters were at the residency of Lucknow, situated on the north side of the city, close to the right bank of the Goomtee. Beside it were the treasury and the hospital, and a number of buildings of solid masonry, occupied as dwelling-houses and public offices. About a mile and a half to the eastward was the Chowpeyrah Istubul, a cruciform building used as barracks by her majesty's 32d, the only European infantry then in the province. At some distance to the north of the barracks stood another building called the Kuddum Rasool, which had been converted into a powder magazine. In the same vicinity were the lines of the 3d regiment of military police. Immediately south of the barracks was the Tara Kotee or observatory, where all the law courts were concentrated. About a mile above the residency, and on the same side of the river, were the Dowlut Khana and Sheesh Muhlul, forming part of an old palace of the Kings of Oude.

Mutiny in
Oude

A. D. 1857.

Respective
positions of
the Euro-
pean and
native
troops in
Oude

In the one were the head-quarters of the brigadier commanding the Oude irregular force, and in the other a magazine containing many stands of arms and native guns. Still farther up the river, and to the westward, was the palace of Moosa Bagh, occupied by the commanding officers of the 4th and 7th regiments of Oude irregular infantry, which were cantoned in its vicinity. About a quarter of a mile above the residency the Goomtee was crossed by an iron bridge, the road from which led almost in a straight line to the Muriaon and Moodkeepoor cantonments. These, situated three miles north from Lucknow, were at this time occupied by the 13th, 48th, and 71st native infantry, a regiment of regular native cavalry, and two batteries of native and one of European artillery. The only other military station in the vicinity of Lucknow was that of the 2d Oude irregular cavalry at Chukkur Kotee, on the left bank of the river, nearly opposite to Kuddum Rasool, and nearly as far from the residency as the Muriaon cantonments. Sir Henry Lawrence, who obtained full military powers giving him the command of all the forces in Oude, at once saw the necessity of altering the above arrangement of the troops. Four guns were brought from the Muriaon cantonment to the lines of her majesty's 32d, and 120 men of this regiment were intrusted with the protection of the treasury and residency, which had formerly been entirely at the mercy of native guards. At the same time, while the women and the sick were lodged in the residency, the rest of the regiment was removed from its isolated position and moved down to the cantonment, and stationed close to the European battery. These measures, excellent so far as they went, were not deemed sufficient. A place of strength where the military stores might be concentrated, and an asylum might be found in case of attack, was still wanted. For this purpose choice was made of the Muchee Blowun, situated on the right bank of the river, about half-way between the residency and the Dowlut Khana. At the same time, though an attack on the residency was scarcely feared, some slight defensive works, chiefly as a precaution against any sudden insurrection of the populace, were begun. The treasury also was largely replenished, by sending out parties into the different districts, and bringing in the sums which had been previously collected.

Position of
Sir Hugh
Wheeler at
Cawnpoor

During the above preparations the progress of the mutiny in other quarters had added greatly to the difficulty of maintaining tranquillity in Oude, where there was reason to apprehend that any rising would, in all probability, not only involve the whole province, but extend beyond its limits, particularly to the important town and district of Cawnpoor, only separated from it by the Ganges. Here General Sir Hugh Wheeler had only a mere handful of Europeans to oppose a large brigade of native troops, consisting of the 1st, 53d, and 56th native infantry, and the 2d light cavalry, and was obliged to rest satisfied with preparations which were palpably inadequate. In the hope that if the sepoys did rise they would march off for Delhi, he formed an entrenchment, which, however incapable of permanent defence, might

furnish a temporary asylum. Reinforcements had been promised by the government and were daily expected, but the case was so urgent that Sir Henry Lawrence could not refuse his application for aid, and detached to him on the 21st of May fifty men of the 32d, conveyed in post-carriages, and two squadrons of cavalry. In this emergency Sir Hugh received an offer which was too tempting to be refused. It consisted of "two guns and three hundred men, cavalry and infantry, furnished by the Maharajah of Bithoor," the infamous miscreant now only too well known as Nana Sahib. He was the adopted son of Bajee Row, the last of the peishwas, who, when reduced to extremity, had obtained by treaty a pension of £90,000 a year, and a residence at Bithoor, situated on the Ganges about twelve miles above Cawnpoor. At his death Nana Sahib succeeded to a large portion of his immense wealth, but his claim to a continuance of the pension was refused. Though he often complained of the refusal, and stigmatized it as a breach of public faith, it did not suit him to assume the airs of a malcontent, or subject himself to suspicion as an enemy to British interests. On the contrary he courted the society of our countrymen, and was regarded by them as a favourable specimen of the liberalized Hindoo. Sir Hugh Wheeler's long residence in India and intimate acquaintance with native manners perhaps only laid him more open to the influence of such a character, and hence, though specially warned to be on his guard against the Nana, he not only accepted his proffered aid, but showed how unbounded his confidence was by employing his troops to guard the treasury.

A.D. 1857.

Position of
Sir Hugh
Wheeler at
Cawnpoor

The Eed, a moveable Mahometan festival which fell on the 24th of May, was generally believed to have been fixed upon for the outbreak in Oude. The crisis, however, somehow postponed, did not arrive till the 30th. That day had passed away quietly, and the evening gun had been fired as usual at nine o'clock, when the light company of the 71st native infantry suddenly turned out and began firing at random. At the same instant two parties, the one belonging to the same regiment, and the other to the 7th light cavalry, appeared at the opposite gates of the cantonment, and made directly for the mess-house, evidently with the diabolical design of placing the officers between two fires, and rendering their escape impossible. Fortunately the first shot had proved a sufficient warning. Sir Henry Lawrence, who was now residing in the cantonment, hastily proceeded with his staff to that part of it where the Europeans, mustering 300 men, with six guns, were stationed. Two of these guns were immediately posted on the road leading to Lucknow, so as to intercept the mutineers in the event of their attempting to reach it. The other guns swept the native parade ground, where the three native infantry regiments stood in the following order—first, the 71st, next the 12th, and last the 45th. The 71st, after shooting Brigadier Handscomb, who had ventured too near them, advanced boldly and fired. They were answered with grape, which sent them back to their lines, where they took the cowardly revenge of murdering one of

Rising in
Oude.

A D 1857.

Defeat of
the Oude
mutineers

their European officers, who was found pierced with bayonets and musket-balls. The 48th, whose position on the parade ground was so distant from the guns as to be beyond the reach of grape, did not at first take an active part in the mutiny. They refused, however, to aid in suppressing it; and while pretending to accept the proposal of their commanding officer to march to the residency, deserted by the way in such numbers, that when he reached the iron bridge he could not muster more than fifty-seven men around the colours. In the conflict which had taken place, the mutineers, though they had obtained a considerable amount of plunder, and gratified their savage natures by burning down the bungalows, and laying the cantonments in ruins, had sustained a defeat; but it still remained for them to show whether they had so much confidence in their



IRON BRIDGE, LUCKNOW.—From engraving in Illustrated London News

superior numbers, as to risk an encounter with British discipline and courage. At first it seemed that they had made up their minds to this, for at daybreak of the 31st they were found in force occupying the lines at Moodkeepoor. Their courage, however, was not proof against a few discharges from the guns, and they fled precipitately in the direction of Seetapoor.

Rising of the
Lucknow
mob.

During the above proceedings great alarm was felt in the city. A company of the 71st, who had been removed from the Muchee Bhowun for disaffection a few days before to another station, on being marched to the residency and ordered to pile their arms, refused to obey. From fear of precipitating an outbreak, it was deemed prudent not to coerce them. This indication of weakness was soon followed by its natural result. On the afternoon of the 31st the *budmashes* or mob of the city rose, and about 6000 of them, after crossing the Goomtee by a ford, moved towards Muriaon in order to join the mutineers, with whom they had a previous understanding. When this scheme was frustrated the budmashes returned to Lucknow, and commenced rioting in the quarter of Hoseynabad, near the Dowlut Khana. Fortunately the native

troops stationed there did not decline to act, and after an hour of heavy firing the insurrection was suppressed. Its occurrence, however, was a warning not to be neglected, and all the European women and children took refuge in the residency.

The mutiny at Lucknow operated as the signal for a rising in every leading station throughout the province. In giving a brief account of each, we take them as they occurred in the four divisions into which, for administrative purposes, Oude, after its incorporation with British India, had been distributed. Beginning with Khyrabad, or the north-west division, our attention is first called to its principal station Seetapoor, towards which, as has been mentioned, the fugitive mutineers of Lucknow had proceeded. At Seetapoor, the principal station of the Khyrabad, or north-west division of Oude, the outbreak which had long been feared took place on the 3d of June. On the morning of that day, a cry having been raised that the 10th irregulars were plundering the treasury, Colonel Birch, of the 41st, hastened with two companies to the rescue, and was shot dead. Two other officers immediately shared his fate, and the mutiny became general. Mr. Christian, the commissioner, anticipating the outbreak, had collected the civilians and their families at his house, and intrusted the defence of it to a strong guard of the military police. It was only to learn how utterly his confidence had been misplaced. His defenders, when called upon to act, only replied by firing upon him, and commenced an indiscriminate massacre of men, women, and children.

Outbreak at
Seetapoor.

The European fugitives from Shahjehanpore had arrived on the 1st of June at Mohumdee, another station of the Khyrabad division, then occupied by a company of the 9th Oude irregular infantry. By judicious management they were for a time restrained, but on the 4th, when fifty of their mutinous comrades came in from Seetapoor, they announced their determination to march to Seetapoor, at the same time promising that, if not opposed, they would not only spare the lives of all the Europeans at the station, but take them under their protection. With this promise, confirmed by a solemn oath, the Europeans were obliged to be contented, and the whole party, including eight women and four children, commenced the journey. The next morning, the 5th, the Europeans were abandoned by their escort, and told to go ahead wherever they liked. Fearing the worst they pushed on, but were overtaken within a mile of Aurungabad. "Then," says Captain Patrick Orr, one of the only two individuals whose lives were spared, "the most infernal carnage ever witnessed by

Atrocious
massacre
near Au-
rungabad.

A D 1857

Process-Logs
of the mu-
tineers at
Fyzabad.

infantry, and a regular light field battery. Shahgunge, in its vicinity, belonged to a talookdar of the name of Rajah Mansingh, who, in consequence of information received from Calcutta, had been arrested by order of Sir Henry Lawrence, and was in confinement. This man, when a mutiny of the troops was hourly threatened, offered, if released, to shelter the Europeans in his fort. Colonel Goldney, the commissioner, seeing no better alternative, accepted the offer, and Mansingh, set at liberty, began to prepare his fort. The mutinous troops, perhaps made aware of the agreement, resolved on immediate action, and began by demanding, on the plea of greater security, that the treasure should be placed under their charge. The authorities feeling themselves helpless were obliged to comply, and at the same time began to prepare for the worst, by sending their families to Shahgunge. The ladies in the cantonments, however, declined to quit them, because they were satisfied with the assurance of full protection given by the native officers, and solemnly sworn to by those of the 22d. Matters were in this precarious state on the 8th of June, when the 17th native infantry, who had mutinied at Azimghur, on the frontiers of Oude, and carried off a large amount of treasure, arrived at Begumgunge, within a march of Fyzabad. On this the troops at the station threw off all disguise, and told their officers to shift for themselves, adding that they might take the boats then lying at the cantonment ghat. The civilians preferred joining their families at Shahgunge, but the officers embarked in the boats and began to descend the stream. It was necessary to pass Begumgunge, and there, in accordance with the diabolical plan which had been concerted, the mutineers of the 17th were waiting to intercept them. Accordingly, when the officers approached, they were met by a volley of grape and musketry. Many immediately fell, and some who attempted to escape by swimming were either drowned or cut to pieces the moment they reached the bank. Colonel Goldney was seized in his boat and carried off to the rebel camp. "I am an old man," he said; "will you disgrace yourself by my murder?" The appeal was vain. The miscreants knew no pity, and shot him down. A few by almost superhuman exertions distanced their pursuers and escaped.

Mansingh
at Begum-
gungeTerrible
condition of
Lucknow

While mutiny thus spread itself at all the principal stations of Oude, the condition of its capital became daily more alarming, and the idea of a siege, which before had been generally scouted, began to be entertained. In the prospect of such an event it became necessary to dispose of the large number of native troops who, being notoriously disaffected, were more a source of weakness than of strength. After the suppression of the mutiny of the 30th and 31st of May, out of the four native regiments the whole number of men that mustered amounted only to 137. In a few days, however, nearly thrice that number had ranged under the native colours. The explanation was obvious. Many of them had come from detached posts, where their isolated position prevented them from taking actual part in the mutiny, though they

had been unable to disguise their sympathy with it, and several even of the mutineers after their defeat had crept back to the lines, in the hope of being able either to conceal their absence or give some plausible account of it. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it was strongly urged that the whole of the native troops, now amounting to 1200, or at least the most suspected portion of them, forming two-thirds of the whole, should be disarmed. Sir Henry Lawrence, perhaps because he thought that the measure might precipitate a crisis, refused his consent; but about a week later, when fatigue and anxiety had brought on such an alarming illness that he was interdicted from business by his medical attendants, the provisional council appointed to act for him took a step which, without the name, had all the effect of disarmament. The troops were paraded, and told that they were to take their leave and go to their homes till November. They objected at first, with a great show of zeal for the service, but ultimately all went off except 350, of whom a large proportion were Sikhs. Immediately after their departure the 3d regiment of military police, which furnished the jail guard, and took most of the civil duties at Lucknow, mutinied, and marched off on the road to Sultanpore.

A.D. 1857.

Penons
condition of
Lucknow.

By the 12th of June Sir Henry Lawrence had so far recovered as to be able to resume his functions. The most important object which now engaged his attention was the fortification of the residency, and the provisioning of it so as to stand a siege. At the same time he ordered several leading persons, suspected of treason, to be arrested, and confined as state prisoners. Among them were a brother of the ex-king, and two Delhi princes, who had for some time been resident at Lucknow. New levies of troops were also raised, particularly a body of volunteer cavalry, consisting partly of cavalry and infantry officers of disbanded regiments. A large addition was also made to the native police, no fewer than 2000 having been enlisted, not so much with a view to permanent employment, or from much confidence in their trust-worthiness, as to relieve the other troops from routine duties, and leave them free for those of more importance.

Fortification
and provi-
sioning of
the resi-
dency

Newabgunge Bara Bankee, eighteen miles north-east of Lucknow, had become the common rendezvous of the mutineers. On the 29th of June intelligence was received that their advanced guard of 500 foot and 100 horse had arrived at Chinhut, only eight miles east of the capital, and were collecting supplies for their main body, which was expected on the following day. In consequence of this intelligence the troops in cantonments were brought down and lodged in the residency and the Muehee Bhowun. This was only preparatory to a still more important step. At sunrise of the following morning there had assembled at the iron bridge a force consisting of 520 infantry, 300 of them belonging to her majesty's 32d, 116 cavalry, of whom thirty-six were European volunteers and the rest Sikhs, and details of artillery, with eleven guns, four of them European, and one an eight-inch howitzer. Sir Henry

Sir Henry
Lawrence
marches
against the
mutineers
at Chinhut


A.D. 1857 Lawrence, heading this force in person, set out to attack the mutineers. Some time was lost before the march commenced, and the heat became oppressive. The road, however, so far as the Kokrail, which is about half-way to Chinhut, was well metalled, and no difficulty was experienced. It was far otherwise beyond the Kokrail. After passing the bridge over it, instead of the metalled road, there was only a newly raised embankment of loose sandy soil, with occasional gaps, indicating the site of intended bridges. After a halt, during which apparently from some oversight no refreshment was served out, the force began to move sluggishly along this embankment, and the videttes had proceeded a mile and a half when they were fired upon from the village of Ismailgunge, on the left. The howitzer was ordered to the front, and was followed by the rest of the guns. The column still plodding along the embankment, was exposed to a fire of round shot, which though distant did some execution. The enemy was now seen posted in front of Chinhut, and the British line deployed, the 32d taking post on the left, between Ismailgunge and the line of road, and the native infantry crossing the road to the right, and drawing up in front of a small hamlet. After the distant firing had continued for about twenty minutes, the enemy appeared to be giving way, but they were only preparing to act more decidedly on the offensive, by advancing with their whole army, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in two large separate masses, one on each of the British flanks, evidently for the purpose of turning them. This attack was met by a fire of grape, which, however, had little effect in checking the advance, as parties of cavalry continued pushing forward, while the infantry made for Ismailgunge to cut off the 32d, who were posted beyond it, and lying on the ground to avoid the fire. At this crisis, four guns belonging to Alexander's Oude irregular battery were ordered from the right to the left in order to check the enemy's progress. The difficulty of the ground, and some reluctance on the part of the drivers, deprived this movement of the advantage expected from it, and the cavalry were ordered to charge. The volunteers did their part admirably. Not so the Sikhs, who turned their horses' heads and fled. Ismailgunge having in consequence fallen into the hands of the enemy, and a deadly fire been opened from it, it was absolutely necessary to dislodge them. The 32d advanced boldly for this purpose, but after losing several of their officers fell back in disorder. This repulse decided the battle, and a retreat was ordered. It could not but be disastrous. The enemy, taking advantage of every break in the ground, poured in a murderous fire. First the howitzer was abandoned, and then no fewer than six of the guns, with most of the ammunition waggons. The Europeans, who could least be spared, suffered severely, 112 being killed and 41 wounded; the loss in natives was also great, though far less by casualties than by shameful desertion. It seems that when Sir Henry Lawrence resolved on this ill-fated attack he was not aware of the vast superiority of the force which

Sir Henry
Lawrence
marches
against the
mutineers
at Chinhut

Disastrous
result

he was about to encounter. It consisted, as was afterwards ascertained, of A D 1857.
5350 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 160 artillery, with twelve nine-pounder guns.

The Chinhut disaster was, almost as a matter of course, followed by the Blockade of
the resi-
dency at
Lucknow.
defection of many native soldiers, who had till then remained at least nominally faithful. The 4th and 7th, and four companies of the 1st irregular infantry, quartered at the Dowlut Khana, under Brigadier Gray, immediately mutinied, and were soon imitated by the police occupying the Imambara, a large building, situated on the road between the Dowlut Khana and the Muchee Bhowun. Meanwhile, the exulting mutineers continued their pursuit unchecked till they reached the Goomtee, and attempted to force the brick bridge above the Muchee Bhowun, and the iron bridge above the residency. When repulsed, they gained



IMAMBARA, OR HOUSE OF THE TWELVE PATRIARCHS, LUCKNOW.—From photograph engraved in Illustrated Times.

an entrance into the city, and by fording the river established themselves within it in such numbers, that before the day closed, both the Muchee Bhowun and the residency were completely invested.

Three days before the disaster at Chinhut, a horrible massacre had been perpetrated at Cawnpore. There the mutiny, which for some days had been hourly dreaded, broke out at last on the 5th of June. It began with the 2d light cavalry, and soon extended to the three infantry regiments, the 1st, 53d, and 56th. The whole, after setting fire to some bungalows, and committing other outrages, set off in the direction of Newabgunge, a village situated a little to the north-west. Three days before the rising, all the non-military Christian residents had removed into the entrenchment. This had been furnished with provisions, calculated to maintain 1000 persons for thirty days. Unfortunately, the entrenchment itself was totally unfitted to stand a siege of such a duration. It was completely commanded from different quarters, and

Mutiny at
Cawnpore

A D 1857.

Sir Hugh
Wheeler's
entrench-
ment at
Cawnpoor

if assailed with any degree of vigour, must at once have been forced, as the bank inclosing it was barely breast-high. The selection of such a place was certainly a fatal error, and it is difficult to explain how an officer of so much experience and ability as Sir Hugh Wheeler could have fallen into it. He had a choice of other places. His entrenchment was at the south-east extremity of the cantonment, below the town of Cawnpoor, whereas, nearly at an equal distance above it, at the north-west extremity, stood the magazine, amply supplied with guns and military stores, and near it the treasury, which happened at the time to be well replenished. Nor were these the only advantages possessed by this locality. Ravines on the one side, and the proximity of the river on the other, gave the magazine strong natural defences; while a high inclosing wall of masonry, together with numerous substantial buildings, supplied at once the means of resistance, and, what was equally wanted, adequate shelter. The only plausible account of the preference given to the entrenchment is, that Sir Hugh, after having so long served with sepoys, and found them faithful, still clung to the belief that either they would not mutiny at all, or would at the worst, after temporary outrage, quit the station and hasten off to Delhi. The latter was the course on which they had resolved, and they would have carried it into effect, had they not been diverted from it by Nana Sahib, whose treachery was now about to be consummated. His troops had been intrusted with the charge of the treasury. The result was, that when the mutiny broke out, they immediately plundered it. The possession of the magazine was their next object. Sir Hugh, when he saw that he could not preserve it, had given orders to blow it up, but the native guard interfered, and it fell with all its guns and stores into the hands of the rebels. Nana Sahib had now full scope for his execrable designs. When the revolted regiments were about to depart, he tempted them to remain by taking them into his service, with the promise of a large increase of pay, and led them back to Cawnpoor under the Mahratta standard, which he had raised after proclaiming himself peishwa.

Attack on it
by Nana
Sahib.

Sir Hugh Wheeler, as soon as he saw that the entrenchment which he had intended only as a temporary asylum, was to become the scene of a protracted and desperate struggle, looked about for aid, and turned once more to Lucknow. His application, dated the 14th June, was in the following terms:—"We have been besieged since the 6th by the Nana Sahib, joined by the whole of the native troops who broke out on the morning of the 4th. The enemy have two twenty-four pounders and several other guns. We have only eight nine-pounders. The whole Christian population is with us in a temporary entrenchment, and our defence has been noble and wonderful, our loss heavy and cruel. We want aid, aid, aid. P.S.—If we had 200 men we could punish the scoundrels and aid you." Painful though it must have been to refuse such an application, Sir Henry Lawrence found it impossible to comply with it. On the 18th of June, two days after receiving Sir Henry's answer, Captain Moore of the 32d, who

A.D. 1857

Siege of
Cawnpore

Capitulation.

Treachery of
the rebels

was to assume the offensive, and by a desperate effort either seize and spike the enemy's guns, or perish in the attempt. Now that the event is known, it must be admitted that the boldest would have been the wisest course. We cannot wonder, however, that Sir Hugh Wheeler hesitated to incur the responsibility of sanctioning a step which nothing but absolute despair could justify, and chose rather to listen to the terms volunteered by Nana Sahib. On the 24th of June, Mrs. Greenaway, a very aged European lady, who, with her family, had been captured by the Nana, and only spared on the promise of paying a lac of rupees for their ransom, arrived at the entrenchment, bearing a note from him, the purport of which was, that all soldiers, and Europeans who had nothing to do with Lord Dalhousie's government, and would lay down their arms, should be sent to Allahabad. Sir Hugh Wheeler authorized Captain Moore to act in the matter as he should consider best, and on the following day an agreement was entered into, by which Sir Hugh, on the part of the British government, agreed to give up all the money, stores, and guns in the entrenchment, and the Nana on his part undertook, and solemnly swore, not only to allow all the inmates of the garrison to retire unmolested, but to provide means of conveyance for the wounded, and for the ladies and children. Hostilities immediately ceased, and the preparations for departure were commenced. These having been completed, on the 26th, the whole garrison, men, women, and children, quitted the entrenchment, and proceeded towards the boats. These they were permitted to enter without the least molestation, but no sooner had they embarked, than a horrid massacre began. Two guns, which had been concealed, were suddenly run out, and opened their fire. At the same time the sepoys, rushing in from all directions, began to ply their muskets. In the confusion, the men, instead of attempting to unmoor the boats, jumped into the water to swim for their lives. Three boats out of the whole number succeeded in reaching the opposite side; but it was only to encounter a new attack. In attempting to continue their flight, they were so closely pursued, that before they got a mile down the stream, two of them were swamped, and about a half of the whole party killed or wounded. The remaining boat, now crowded with wounded, and overloaded, was exposed during the whole day to a running fire of guns and musketry. Night brought some respite, but next morning the fugitives had again to run the gauntlet of a murderous fire from both banks. On the third day the boat stuck fast on a sandbank, and became a sure mark for the rebels, who by pouring in volley after volley, made it impossible to employ any effectual means of getting her off. In this extremity fourteen of the party undertook the desperate task of rushing to the bank and charging their savage assailants. The heroic deed was so far successful that they put the enemy to flight. Unfortunately, however, in pursuing their advantage, they lost their communication with the river, and only escaped from being surrounded by retiring in a direction parallel to the stream. After

proceeding in this way about a mile, they again reached the bank, but it was only to find their perils increased. Both banks were lined with troops, and escape seemed impossible. As a last resource they took refuge in a temple immediately in front of them. Here they defended themselves so manfully, that their cowardly foes, afraid to meet them in open fight, piled up wood around the temple and set it on fire. The smoke and heat soon became intolerable, and the small band, now reduced to twelve, one having been killed and one wounded, threw off their clothes, and charging through the fire, made for the water. Only seven succeeded in reaching it. Two of them were almost immediately shot, and the remaining five endeavoured to save themselves by swimming. Though followed by the rebels, who waded into the water and took aim at them at every available point, none of them was struck, and they had gone nearly three miles, when one of the party, an artilleryman, feeling exhausted, began to swim on his back. He thus lost the power of directing his course, and unconsciously floated to the bank, where he was seized and murdered. The four survivors ultimately escaped. The party left in the boat fell into the hands of a rebel zemindar near Futtehpoor, who sent them back to Nana Sahib as prisoners. Their companions left behind at Cawnpoor when the carnage began had already been disposed of. Those shot down in the boats were the most fortunate. Of the remainder every man was shot, while the women and children were carried off to Nana Sahib's camp. In the evening he celebrated what he called his victory by a series of salutes, one of twenty-one guns to himself as peishwa, or Mahratta sovereign, another of nineteen to his brother, Bala Sahib, now designated governor-general, and a third to Jowalla Pershaud, a Brahmin, and rebel soubahdar, whom he had appointed commander-in-chief. He concluded these ceremonies with a speech, in which he lauded his troops for their glorious achievement at Cawnpoor, and promised to reward it by a liberal largess. On the arrival of the fugitives from Futtehpoor, on the 1st of July, all the men, like those at Cawnpoor, were immediately put to death. The women and children were carried off to join the others, already imprisoned in a building called the Subada Ke Kothee, where they were destined to endure another fortnight of misery, and then become the victims of one of the most inhuman massacres ever perpetrated.

A.D. 1857.

Treachery of
the rebels.Atrocities of
Nana Sahib

Having taken a general survey of the progress of the sepoy revolt, and pointed out the leading localities in which the successive mutinies occurred, our next task must be to explain the measures employed by government to meet the crisis. For a time, as has been seen, the danger was greatly underrated, and in the belief that the disaffection was limited to a few regiments, and would either disappear of its own accord or be suppressed without difficulty, the interval which elapsed after the first notes of warning was not turned to due account. The European regiment which had been brought from Rangoon was on the point of returning, when the disastrous tidings from Meerut and

Government
measures.

A D 1857

Measures
adopted by
government

Delhi arrived. The authorities, now made aware that the passing cloud of which they were dreaming had been the gathering of a fearful storm, would fain have acted with vigour, but found themselves for a time almost destitute of the means. Large reinforcements of European troops were absolutely required, but though no time was lost in urging their immediate despatch from all the different quarters which seemed capable of furnishing them, several weeks must elapse before they could arrive, and the utmost that could be done in the interval was to concentrate the few European troops within the districts to which the mutiny was as yet confined, and endeavour meanwhile, not so much by force as by moral suasion, to prevent it from assuming more formidable dimensions. The orders issued on the subject of the greased cartridges, and the harangues made to different regiments when paraded for the purpose, have been already noticed. A wider publication of the views and intentions of government was now deemed expedient, and on the 16th of May the following proclamation was issued:—

Proclama-
tion by the
governor
general.

"The Governor-general of India in council, has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the government of India, are malicious falsehoods. The governor-general in council has learned that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only in the army, but among other classes of the people. He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussulmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly as well as openly by the acts of the government, and that the government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own. Some have been already deceived and led astray by these tales. Once more then the governor-general in council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them. The government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The governor-general in council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been, or will be done by the government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people. The government of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore the governor-general in council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies. This notice is addressed to those who hitherto by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct have shown their attachment to the government, and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice. The governor-general in council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors who would lead them into danger and disgrace."

The above proclamation intimates that an unfounded alarm on the subject

of religion was the sole cause of the disaffection which prevailed, and of the mutinies which had actually occurred, and yet at its date government knew of the atrocities which whole regiments of sepoys had perpetrated at Meerut and Delhi. It was surely too much to ignore these facts, instead of boldly denouncing them, and publishing to all the world that, come what might, they should certainly not go unpunished. Silence on such a subject was as unmanly as impolitic, and must have been generally interpreted as a virtual confession that punishment was not threatened, simply because government was either afraid or felt itself powerless to inflict it. This obvious inference received a strong confirmation from Mr. Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the North-western Provinces, who, at the very time when he was in communication with the governor-general on the subject, thought it unnecessary to wait for final instructions, and on his own responsibility issued a proclamation, which, by offering a general pardon to all except the murderers of *private persons*, seemed to promise immunity to those who had murdered their officers. The governor-general, however averse to severity, could not sanction such a pardon, and Mr. Colvin's proclamation was superseded by another which corrected his mistake. Fortunately the want of foresight which had been evinced in allowing India to be so much denuded of European troops was remedied to some extent by two most opportune contingencies. The Persian war having been brought to a successful termination sooner than the most sanguine had anticipated, the European regiments engaged in it were hastening back with the utmost expedition, while those which were prosecuting their voyage for the war in China had not proceeded so far as to be beyond reach, and in consequence of a message to that effect changed their destination to Calcutta. The result of these arrangements, and of applications to Rangoon, Madras, and Ceylon, was, that important reinforcements arrived before the end of May. At home also, where the astounding intelligence from India had produced an almost unparalleled amount of excitement and indignation, the general voice had proclaimed that, be the cost what it might, the revolt must be suppressed, and embarkations of troops on a scale adequate to the crisis accordingly commenced.

While large reinforcements from other quarters were thus secured, immediate steps were taken to collect all the available troops within reach of Delhi, and hurry them forward in order to attempt its recapture. As part of the force to be thus employed, three European regiments, her majesty's 75th foot, and the 1st and 2d European fusiliers, who had been stationed among the hills near Simla, where the Honourable George Anson, the commander-in-chief, was then residing, started under his immediate directions, and arrived on the 23d of May at Umballa. Here at that date the troops assembled included, in addition to the above regiments, the 9th and a squadron of the 4th lancers, the 60th native infantry, and two troops of horse-artillery. He had formed them into two small brigades, the one under Brigadier Halifax and the other under

A D 1857

Proclamation of Mr Colvin disavowed.

Preparation for recovery of Delhi.

A D 1857. Brigadier Jones, and was preparing to leave for Kurnaul, where he expected that the whole would arrive on the 30th, when he was seized with cholera, and died on the 27th. Preparations for recovery of Delhi. General Reid immediately succeeded as provincial commander-in-chief, but was in such wretched health as to be incapable of conducting the intended operations against Delhi, which were therefore intrusted to Sir Henry Barnard. To co-operate with the force thus advancing, a detachment from Meerut, consisting of a wing of her majesty's 60th rifles, two squadrons of 6th dragoon guards (carabineers), 50 troopers of the 4th irregulars, two companies of native sappers, and six guns, four of them belonging to Scott's battery, and two (eighteen-pounders) belonging to Tombs' troop of horse-artillery, started on the 27th of May, under the command of Brigadier Wilson, and encamped on the 30th near Ghazee-u-din, a small but well-fortified place on the Hindon, about ten miles from Delhi. A rumour that the mutineers, emboldened by their recent successes, meant to dispute the passage was generally regarded as unfounded, and hence a kind of surprise took place when, about four in the afternoon, a picket of irregulars who had been stationed beyond the bridge galloped into the camp to announce that the enemy was at hand. The rifles, who had scarcely formed when an eighteen-pounder shot bounded into the camp, hastened forward supported by the carabineers, and with their Enfields opened a deadly fire, which soon slackened that of the enemy's guns. Meanwhile the artillery having taken up effective positions, two companies of rifles which had been the first to cross the bridge made a gallant charge when not more than eighty yards from the enemy's guns. The movement was decisive, and the rebels, outnumbering their assailants at least sevenfold, were soon seen in disgraceful flight. Five guns, two of heavy calibre, were the trophies of the victory. The struggle, however, was not yet terminated. Trusting to the strength of the village in which they had entrenched themselves, the mutineers mustered courage for a second encounter, and the next morning, Sunday the 31st, once more made their appearance and commenced a sharp cannonade. The experience of the previous day had taught them a lesson by which they did not fail to profit, and they kept their guns at such a distance that no new captures could be made. This cowardly precaution, and the intense heat, which made pursuit all but impossible, favoured their escape, and enabled them to bear the tidings of their own defeat to their comrades at Delhi.

Encounter of the Meerut Brigade with the rebels.

The Meerut brigade did not again start till the 4th of June, and proceeded in the direction of Bagput, where it arrived on the 6th; on the 7th it reached Alipoor, and joined the two brigades from the north. The united force on quitting Alipoor on the 8th had the prospect of an immediate engagement, and therefore set out in three columns formed in order of battle. The enemy had strongly entrenched themselves at Badulee Ke Serai, so as to intercept the approach of the British troops to the cantonments, situated to the north-west of Delhi. It was here therefore that the encounter was about to take place.

Sir Henry's despatch gives the following account of it: "As soon as our advanced picket met the enemy, these brigades deployed leaving the main road clear. The enemy soon opened a very heavy fire upon us, and finding that our light field pieces did not silence their battery, and that we were losing men fast, I called upon the 75th regiment to make a dashing charge, and take the place at the point of the bayonet; this service was done with the most heroic gallantry, and to Lieutenant-colonel Herbert, and every officer, non-commissioned officer, and men of the 75th regiment, my thanks are most especially due; the 1st Europeans supported the attack, and on the second brigade coming up and threatening their right, and Brigadier-general Grant showing the head of his column and guns on their left rear, the enemy abandoned the position entirely, leaving his guns on the ground."

A D. 1857

Victory of
Badulee Ke
Serai

After all this success, the work of the day was not yet finished. Badulee Ke Serai is about five miles distant from Delhi, and Sir Henry Barnard was afraid that if he halted before reaching the position which he wished to occupy at the cantonments, the enemy might take advantage of the delay, and interpose more formidable obstacles than those he had just overcome. He resolved therefore, though aware that his men were much exhausted, to push on, and at once reap the full fruits of his victory. Accordingly, having divided his force into two columns, the one intrusted to Brigadier Wilson supported by Brigadier Shower's brigade, while he himself, supported by Brigadier Grave's brigade, led the other, he sent the former along the main trunk road, where it had to fight the whole way through gardens with high walls and other obstacles, while the latter diverging to the left proceeded straight through the cantonments. Both columns successfully accomplished the tasks assigned to them, though not till their skill and prowess had again been put fully to the test. The rebels were strongly posted on the ridge which overlooks the cantonments from the east, and stretches southwards till within a short distance of the north-west extremity of the city. The second column, as soon as it came within range of the guns in position on this ridge, was exposed to so destructive a fire that the design of forcing it by a direct attack in front was abandoned for a movement which would take it in flank. This movement, combined with that of the first column, which was now threatening the other flank, happily succeeded. The rebels abandoned their guns and retreated into the city, while the columns advancing from opposite directions swept the ridge, and finally met upon it at Hindoo Row's house, which thenceforward became the key of the British position.

British force
arrives on
the heights
above Delhi

On the 9th of June, the very day after the ridge was carried, the British force received a most valuable addition by the arrival of the guides, forming the first instalment of reinforcements from the Punjab. On the 12th of May, when they received orders to march, they were at Hotee Murdan in the vicinity of Peshawer. By the following morning they had made a march of thirty miles and arrived at Attock. Here they were still 580 miles from Delhi, and at the

Arrival of
the guides
from the
Punjab

A D 1857. ordinary rate of marching must have been two months in reaching it, but *forward* had always been their watchword, and by one of the most rapid marches on record, they accomplished the whole distance in twenty-four days.



1 OFFICER OF THE GUIDE CORPS —From Illustrated London News.
2 HAVILDER AND SOLDIER OF THE SIAMMOO GHOSSAKAS —From Illustrated Times

Deducting three of these, during which they halted by special order, they had pushed on continuously for three weeks, at the daily average rate of twenty-eight miles. It is needless to say that the acclamations of the British camp were long and loud when Captain H. Daly marched into it, at the head of his three troops of cavalry, and six companies of infantry. After their long march they were certainly entitled to repose, but it was not asked, and could not have been granted, as a can-

nonade which had continued all morning was followed in the afternoon by a desperate attack on the British right flank. The guides, called out to aid in repelling it, displayed a gallantry amounting to rashness, and followed the fleeing rebels up to the walls of Delhi. Having thus exposed themselves to a murderous fire they suffered severely. Captains Daly and Hawes were wounded, and Quintin Battye, a young officer of remarkable promise, who commanded the cavalry, received his death-blow, and only survived till the following day. This attack of the rebels was only the first of a series in which the enemy persisted for several successive days. On the 9th, 10th, and 11th, their endeavour was to turn our right flank by gaining possession of Hindoo Row's house, where our heaviest guns had been placed in battery. Foiled in this they turned to the left flank, and on the 12th assailed it with the utmost fury. At this time the British left extended no farther north along the ridge than the Flagstaff tower, immediately beyond which was a deep cut, through which a steep road, leading from the city to the cantonments, had been carried. A battery erected at the tower commanded this road, and made it impossible for the rebels to approach by it; but to the north of the tower the ridge sloped rapidly down toward the sandy bank of the Jumna, while another comparatively level road led circuitously round the extremity of the ridge towards the cantonments. In order to avail themselves of the facilities of attack in this direction, the rebels, after plundering the house of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, situ-


Various attempts of the rebels to turn the British position

ated close to the river, about a mile and a half north of the city, and laying it in ruins, had placed a battery in the grounds, and made their position so strong, that a military council, held in the British camp on the 11th, had decided against any present attempt to dislodge them. The danger of allowing them to occupy it was fully manifested on the 12th. Early in the morning of that day, they had managed to bring a formidable array of guns, and a strong body of troops, within 400 yards of the Flagstaff, while another body was stealing round by the extremity of the ridge to gain the cantonments, and thus place themselves in the British rear. This alarming attack was only discovered when the day broke, and created so much confusion, that the Flagstaff battery was for a short time in imminent danger, and a lodgment was nearly effected in the cantonment itself. It was not long, however, before sufficient means of resistance were mustered, and the rebels, repulsed at every point, endeavoured to regain their original position. Even in this they failed, for in the pursuit which followed, they were completely driven from the Metcalfe grounds, which thereafter remained in British possession.

It was hoped that the 12th of June, which had opened thus auspiciously, would not close before a still more brilliant success had been achieved. The

A D 1857.

Attempts of the rebels to turn the British position.



Hindoo Row's House, before Delhi.—From Illustrated London News.

impossibility of wresting Delhi from the rebels by the weak force which had boldly taken up a position before it, had already become apparent. The magazine blown up by Lieutenant Willoughby was only that which contained the small arms, and the rebels consequently possessed an almost inexhaustible supply of guns and military stores. The short trial which had been made sufficed to show that with an artillery far inferior both in number and calibre to that of the enemy, and troops barely sufficient to maintain the position, and consequently incapable of furnishing working parties, the regular siege of Delhi

Operations before Delhi

A.D. 1857

Proposal to
take Delhi
by surpriseIt is aban-
doned

was impossible; and hence, as the importance of recovering it, in order to crush the mutiny before it had assumed still larger dimensions, had been strongly urged by government, it became a question whether it might not be practicable to carry it at once by a sudden assault. This question, without undergoing a thorough discussion, had been answered in the affirmative, and it had been resolved that at the dead of night, while the cavalry remained in charge of the camp, the whole of the infantry should move out, and after blowing in two of the gates by powder bags, rush in and seize possession of that part of the city where the palace stood. The execution of this plan had been actually commenced, when it was suddenly countermanded. Sir Henry Barnard had changed his mind, because it had been forcibly represented to him that he was endangering the safety of the camp by denuding it of European infantry, and would be unable to hold the city, even if he should succeed in surprising it. On this subject opinions are still conflicting, and we therefore content ourselves with simply remarking how unfortunate it was that the objections which ultimately prevailed had not been previously considered. The troops, it is true, retired without sustaining harm, but the alarm which had been given put the enemy upon their guard, and thus precluded any similar attempt at surprise, when it might have been made under more hopeful circumstances. Nothing therefore now remained but to strengthen the position on the ridge, and wait the arrival of a siege train with adequate reinforcements, in the meantime submitting to exchange conditions with the rebels, and become the besieged instead of the besiegers. This was indeed a great disappointment to the government, who had not only calculated on the early recapture of Delhi, but in the eagerness of their wishes allowed themselves to be imposed upon by unfounded rumours, which announced that it had actually fallen. As a regular siege was now inevitable, and would necessarily require months of preparation, this seems the proper place to give a more detailed account of Delhi and its vicinity, in order that the subsequent operations before it may be more easily understood.

Description
of Delhi

Delhi, which in 1638 superseded Agra as the capital of the Mogul empire, stands on the right bank of a branch of the Jumna, which leaves the main stream about five miles above the city, and joins it ten miles below. Its site, about 800 feet above the level of the sea, is a comparatively barren tract, much broken by rocks, and made still more rugged in appearance by heaps of ruins, which, by the large space they cover, indicate the magnitude and importance which the city must have attained in very early times. The modern city, founded by the emperor Shah Jehan in 1631, is above seven miles in circuit, and contains, exclusive of the suburbs, a population of about 140,000, in which the number of Mahometans far exceeds the usual proportion found in the cities of India, being only a few thousands less than that of Hindoos. The wall on the east, facing the river, is nearly straight, but on the other three sides forms a

very irregular curve. As originally built, it had only a few weak towers, but since its possession by the British, its defences have been greatly strengthened by the excavation of a ditch, and the erection of large bastions, each mounting nine guns of large calibre. Of these bastions it is necessary to give the names only of those on the north and north-west sides, because, from fronting the British camp, mention will often be made of them as the siege proceeds. Beginning at the north-east extremity, and proceeding westward, they succeed each other in the following order—the Moira or Water, the Cashmere, the Shah or Moree, and the Burun bastions. The main gates are the Calcutta on the east, approached by the bridge of boats across the Jumna, the Cashmere on the north-east, the Moree and Cabool on the north-west, the Lahore on the west, the Ajmere on the south-west, and the Delhi on the south. The houses are in general substantially built, but almost all the streets are narrow; the only two which

A D 1857.

Description
of Delhi

MOREE GATE, DELHI.—From a photograph.

can be described as spacious and handsome are the principal one, called the Chanderi Chauk, running eastward from the palace to the Lahore gate, and another, leading also from the palace southward to the Delhi gate. The edifice surpassing all others, both in extent and structure, is the palace, situated on the east side, inclosed by a lofty turreted wall of red granite, a mile in circuit, and communicating at its north-east extremity with the old fort of Selimghur. The access to it is by two lofty and richly sculptured gateways, the one in its south, and the other in its west side. The principal one, called the Lahore gate, because leading to the city gate of the same name, contains the rooms in which the first murders, on the arrival of the mutineers from Meerut, were perpetrated, and is succeeded first by a noble arch, supporting the great tower, and then by a vaulted aisle, not unlike that of a Gothic cathedral. Beyond this aisle is the Dewani Khas, or council chamber, a splendid pavilion of white marble, and near it the open court, where, with the sanction, if not by the

The palace

A D 1857.

Description
of Delhi

express order of the king, a large number of unoffending women and children were cut to pieces by soldiers in his pay, while his sons and grandsons looked on and enjoyed the horrid spectacle. The only other edifice which need here be particularized, is the Jumma Musjid, or principal mosque, situated to the west of the palace, in a street leading from it to the Ajmere gate, and forming from its elevated site, and the marble domes and minarets which surmount it, the most conspicuous object which is seen when the city is approached. In addition to the city proper within the walls, Delhi has extensive suburbs, two of which, from the cover and means of annoyance which they gave to the rebels, became the scenes of frequent and sanguinary contests. The one, called Kissen-gunge, situated to the west of the Cabool gate, was skirted on the north, where it fronted the British position, by the Delhi canal; the other, called the Subzee Munde, was situated considerably farther to the north-west, on the trunk road leading to Kurnaul, and in some degree enveloped the British position, as it extended beyond the southern extremity of the ridge, and to the rear of Hindoo Row's house

Strong
defensive
position of
the British

The British position was certainly the most favourable which could have been selected for defensive purposes. The main body of the troops was encamped on the parade ground of the cantonments, which, having been burned by the mutineers, now existed only in name. On the west side it was protected by a canal, or rather outlet, from a large *jheel* or lake at Nujufghur, and on the east by the ridge, which in the course of a few days was rendered unassailable by any force which the rebels could bring against it. Besides the batteries at the Flagstaff tower and Hindoo Row's house, others were erected at several intermediate points, as the observatory and the mosque, while two, placed more in front, bore directly on the suburbs already mentioned. But though the strength of this position secured it against being forced, there were various circumstances which increased the difficulty of holding it. Cholera had made its appearance, and though not yet adding largely to the mortality, was creeping on insidiously, and might ere long rage like a pestilence. The rebels too, fully alive to the kind of tactics which their native cowardice as well as superiority of numbers suggested, seemed determined to give no respite from attack, thus occasioning losses which the British could ill spare, and threatening to overcome their means of resistance by mere exhaustion. It must also be remembered that the authority of the government had ceased in all the districts to the south and east, and that only from the north-west could supplies and reinforcements be obtained. The latter, collected chiefly in the Punjab, had a long march to accomplish, but by the aid of the Rajah of Pattiala and other friendly chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej protected states, were able to surmount all opposing obstacles. There was more doubt as to the supplies. Being required for daily use, and too bulky and perishable to admit of a distant conveyance, they had to be drawn chiefly from the neighbouring districts, and the danger

was that the rebels, by scouring the country and besetting all the routes leading to the cantonments, might to their other means of aggression add that of starvation. Happily this, the greatest danger of all, was not realized. To cut off the supplies either did not occur to the rebellious sepoys, or required more enterprise than they possessed, and from first to last, however great the privations endured in the British camp, a deficiency of provisions was not one of them.

The mutineers, notwithstanding successive repulses, did not abandon the hope of forcing the British lines, and on the 17th of June commenced a work which, if they had been permitted to complete it, would have enfiladed the position and seriously affected its security. This was the erection of a battery in the immediate vicinity of Kissengunge. To conceal their design and withdraw attention from the locality, they opened early in the day with a heavy cannonade, and continued it for some time without interruption, till the approach of a British detachment told them that they must either abandon the work, or contend manfully for the possession of it. The attacking party advanced in two columns, the one under Major Tombs, consisting of two companies of rifles, four companies of 1st fusiliers, thirty cavalry of the guides, twenty sappers and miners, and four guns; and the other under Major Reid, consisting of his own Sirmoor battalion of Ghoorikas, four companies of rifles, and four companies of 1st fusiliers. The rebels, expecting attack in front, were not a little disconcerted when the columns, by separate flank movements to the right and left, placed them between two fires. Their resistance, though by no means obstinate, cost them dear. Not only was the battery captured and the magazine established in its neighbourhood blown up, but a number of sepoys cut off from retreat paid the penalty of their crimes.

A D. 1857.

New attack
by the mu-
tineers.

The 18th of June, a day memorable in British annals, passed quietly, perhaps because the enemy were engaged in extensive preparations, which were fully developed on the 19th, when about mid-day they were seen issuing in great numbers from the Lahore gate. An attack in the direction of Hindoo Row's house was expected, but it soon appeared that something different was intended, as they were observed passing through Kissengunge, and disappeared among the ruins and gardens beyond. After waiting for some hours, the British troops were recalled, in the belief that the attack had been abandoned. This proved to be a hasty conclusion. The rebels, after proceeding westward by a circuitous route, had turned round, and were within a mile and a half of the British rear. As soon as the alarm was given, Brigadier Hope Grant, commanding the cavalry, hastened out with all the cavalry he could muster, and twelve guns. This force, however, was very inadequate. It consisted of only 250 sabres, while the enemy were found strongly posted, to the number of about 3000. Against such odds little could be effected, and the British cavalry towards dusk were retiring in some degree of confusion, when the arrival of about 300 of the rifles and fusiliers, gave the rebels a

Attempt of
the rebels
to gain the
British rear

A.D. 1857.

Operations
before Delhi.

sudden check, recaptured two guns which had fallen into their hands, and compelled them to retreat. Either unconscious of defeat, or determined not to acknowledge it; the rebels again made their appearance on the following day, and advanced so boldly and rapidly, that they were pitching their round shot into the British camp before they could be effectually met. At last, by bringing into action every man that could possibly be spared from the British camp, the enemy were driven across the canal, and compelled once more to seek the shelter of the city.

Mutual rein-
forcements

These defeats, however much they must have damped the spirits of the rebels, had not the effect of diminishing their real force, which was on the contrary daily augmented by reinforcements of revolted regiments. The Nusseerabad mutineers, comprising the 15th and 30th native infantry, had already arrived, and on the 21st, no less than four regiments—the 6th light cavalry, and the 3d, 36th, and 61st native infantry—were seen pouring into the city. Elated by these new arrivals, and rendered still more confident of success by a prophecy which foretold the downfall of British rule in India exactly a hundred years after it was founded, they had fixed on the 23d of June, the centenary of the victory of Plassey, for a great effort. The Rut Juttra, a high Hindoo festival, which happened to fall on the same day, added to the general enthusiasm, while *bang* was liberally supplied in order to inspire an artificial courage. On the other hand the admirable arrangements of Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab were now beginning to tell, and important additions were made to the British force before Delhi at the very moment when they were most wanted. On the morning of the 23d, 100 men of her majesty's 75th, 100 of the 1st fusiliers, three companies of the 2d fusiliers, and the 4th Sikhs, 400 strong, marched into the camp. The struggle had already commenced. Under cover of a furious cannonade from all the bastions, and from the advanced batteries in the suburbs, large bodies were advanced through the Subzee Munde, to assail Hindoo Row's house from the rear, and at the same time a battery which had been erected at the Eedgah, situated to the west of the Lahore gate, opened a destructive enfilading fire. Repulse after repulse seemed unavailing. The enemy refused to retire, and kept up such a deadly fire of musketry from the Subzee Munde, that the Hindoo Row battery could hardly be worked. It thus became necessary to obtain possession of the suburb by assuming the offensive, and attacking it at the point of the bayonet. The column formed for this purpose, consisting of the 1st and 2d fusiliers, supported by the 4th Sikhs, who had that very morning made a march of twenty-two miles, advanced through a shower of shot and shell, and pushed on for a small temple called the Sammy house, from which, under cover of its high inclosure, the enemy's fire of musketry was most destructive. This hand-to-hand fight issued as it always does when Asiatics are brought into contact with British bayonets. After a short resistance and a fearful carnage, the rebels fled and the whole suburb was cleared out.


Capture of
the Subzee
Munde.

The advantage thus gained would have been lost had the enemy been allowed to return, and therefore permanent possession of the Subzee Mundee was secured, by establishing a strong European picket at the Sammy house, and at a serai opposite to it on the Kurnaul road. The British loss was less than might be inferred from the nature of the struggle. Only 39 were killed and 114 wounded. This however does not contain the whole list of casualties. So intense was the heat that, out of ten officers of the 2d fusiliers, five were struck down, and in the 1st fusiliers one was struck down and six were disabled by sun-stroke.

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Capture of
the Subzee
Mundee

The centenary of Plassey, which, according to native prophecy, was to have witnessed the destruction of British rule in India, only witnessed the discomfiture of those who had treacherously rebelled against it—a discomfiture with



THE SERAI PICKET IN THE SUBZEE MUNDEE, before Delhi —From engraving in Illustrated London News.

which the only hope which the rebels had of forcing the British position at Delhi may be said to have expired. By the end of June the effective force of the British had been increased to 6000 men, and though much was still wanting to enable it to assume the offensive and prepare for the final assault, there was no longer any danger of being compelled to raise the siege, nor any reason to doubt that sooner or later the recapture would be effected. For this brightening prospect a large share of credit is undoubtedly due to Sir John Lawrence as chief commissioner, and the able men associated with him in the civil and military administration of the Punjab; and it is therefore not less due to them than essential to a full narrative of the mutiny, that before proceeding further some account should be given of their exertions.

British rein
forcements

In the beginning of June, when there was still some ground to hope that many of the sepoy regiments would pause before finally committing themselves

A.D. 1857.

Siege of
Delhi.Important
aid from
the Punjab

to mutiny, Sir John Lawrence issued an address to them, in which the following passage occurs: "Those regiments which now remain faithful will receive the rewards due to their constancy; those soldiers who fall away now, will lose their service for ever. It will be too late to lament hereafter when the time has passed by—now is the opportunity of proving your loyalty and good faith. The British government will never want for native soldiers. In a month it might raise 50,000 in the Punjab alone. If the 'Poorbeah' sepoy neglects the present day, it will never return. There is ample force in the Punjab to crush all mutineers. The chiefs and people are loyal and obedient, and the latter long to take your place in the army. All will unite to crush you." These words, which were doubtless regarded by the sepoys as a vain-glorious boast, contained the simple statement of a fact of which it became the business of the chief commissioner, as soon as unlimited authority to levy troops was given him, to furnish ocular demonstration. The first object was to confirm the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs whose territories intervened between the Punjab and Delhi, and whose friendly aid was hence necessary in order to keep open the communications between them. Here happily no difficulty was experienced. The Rajah of Jheend, instead of waiting to be urged, had organized a force of 800 men, and was pressing forward with it to join the force about to be collected for the recovery of Delhi. Still farther north, and consequently nearer the Punjab, a still more valuable auxiliary was found in the Maharajah of Pattiala, who, resisting all the native influences brought to bear upon him, at once declared his determination to stand or fall with the British government. The loyalty thus evinced he maintained unshaken to the last, and rendered services of which it is not too much to say that they contributed essentially to the suppression of the mutiny in the north-west of India. His example was followed by other chiefs, among whom those of Nabha and Kooperthalla deserve honourable mention. Some notice has already been taken of the vigorous measures adopted when intelligence of the first outbreak was received. Of these measures, one of the most important was the formation of a column which should be ready to move on every point where mutiny required to be put down. The command of this column was conferred on Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, who previously held that of the Punjab irregular force, and was acknowledged on all hands to be an officer of distinguished talents. The guides, which formed an important part of the original column, have already been seen pushing forward to Delhi, and performing excellent service on the very day of their arrival there, after completing a march of about 600 miles with almost unexampled rapidity. The rest of the column, after performing good service, was also moving southward to join the Delhi force, and on the 3d of June entered Lahore. After halting for a week it started again, intending to continue its progress southward, when intelligence arrived which obliged it to change its destination, and proceed eastward to Amritser. That important place was still undisturbed, but it was

feared that a mutiny which had broken out at Julundur might prove infectious, more especially as the mutineers had been permitted through some mismanagement to escape and were roaming the country. The moveable column after this delay, which was employed in checking or suppressing disturbance, again started for Delhi, commanded no longer by Brigadier Chamberlain, who had been appointed adjutant-general of the army, but by Brigadier Nicholson; who after rendering essential aid on the western frontier in raising new levies, and in maintaining tranquillity while surrounded by all the elements of disturbance, was destined to a more brilliant but unhappily a too short career. The formation of the moveable column was only one of the many means employed by the authorities of the Punjab to curb the mutiny and provide for its final suppression. In the months of May and June, five new regiments had been completed, and by the beginning of October the number had been augmented to eighteen. At the same time irregular levies of 7000 horse and as many foot had been raised, so that ultimately the total new force amounted to 34,000. It is not too much to say that, but for these exertions in the Punjab, the siege of Delhi must have been abandoned.

A D. 1857

Aid from the Punjab.

CHAPTER III.

Siege of Delhi continued—Repeated attempts on the British position by the rebels—Repulses—Death of Sir Henry Barnard, and appointment of Brigadier-general Wilson to the command—Reinforcements on both sides—Defeat of the rebels at Nujufghur—Preparations for the assault—Recapture of Delhi.



WHEN the month of June closed, the British force before Delhi had improved its position by the expulsion of the rebels from the Subzee Mundee, and the permanent occupation of that important suburb. Still, however, there was no immediate prospect of an assault which would seal the fate of the city at once, and no prospect at all of establishing a blockade, which could either exhaust its means of resistance or starve it into surrender. The British batteries, placed nearly 1500 yards from the walls, were too distant to make any serious impression on them; and moreover commanded only two gates, those of Cashmere and Cabool, while all the others remained as free as ever to send forth troops for attack, or to bring in reinforcements and supplies. These considerations, which it was impossible to overlook, produced some degree of despondency, and more than once the abandonment of the siege was gravely mooted. The arrivals from the Punjab did little more than supply the waste

Difficulties of the siege of Delhi.

A D 1857. by casualty and disease, so that the effective force of all arms did not exceed 5800, while every successive mutiny was adding whole regiments to the rebels, and increasing the already too great disproportion between them and their assailants. There is reason to believe that Sir Henry Barnard was not indisposed to follow the advice of those who would have withdrawn from Delhi. Having no experience of Indian warfare, he had little expectation of bringing the siege to a triumphant termination, and agreed with those who saw a more hopeful field of action if the British army were moved more to the eastward, and concentrated so as to secure the safety of Agra, and the important districts connected with it. Though opinions were divided on this subject at the time, only one now exists, and it is admitted that a withdrawal from Delhi would have given such a triumph to the mutiny as to have made its final suppression all but impossible. While the question of abandoning or prosecuting the siege was under discussion, the idea of a sudden assault was revived. Sir Henry Barnard, it will be remembered, had sanctioned it when formerly proposed, and countermanded it when on the point of execution. The same irresolution was again to be repeated. The whole plan was arranged. One column was to effect an entrance by blowing in the iron grating of the canal near the Cabool gate; and another was to blow in the Cashmere gate, and have the double chance of entering by it and by an escalade of the adjoining bastion, while a party moving stealthily round to the river side was to endeavour to find an entrance from the east. The plan, in order to insure secrecy, was never whispered in the camp, and it was hence taken for granted that the enemy had not the least idea of it. This was a complete mistake. Not only were they on the alert, but they had formed a counter-plan, which if they had been permitted to carry it out, would in all probability have annihilated the British force. A large party, sent out by a circuitous route, had been posted about two miles in our rear, and there only waited the departure of the storming party to hasten forward and seize the camp while denuded of its usual defenders. Providentially this fact became known in the very nick of time, and the idea of a sudden assault was once more abandoned. Shortly afterwards the British army was for the second time deprived of its general. On the 5th of July, Sir Henry Barnard was seized with cholera, and died in the course of a few hours. The event produced a feeling of deep and universal regret, a regret rendered all the more poignant by the fact that he had been brought by no choice of his own into a position in which the excellent qualities which he undoubtedly possessed, both as a man and a commander, were not displayed to advantage. The command of the Delhi force now devolved on General Reid, the provisional commander-in-chief, and was formally assumed by him. It was however more in name than reality. The state of his health, which previously unfitted him for active duty, obliged him before a fortnight elapsed to decline the responsibilities of office, and the appointment was conferred on Brigadier Wilson.

Siege of
Delhi

An assault
again pro-
posed

It is again
abandoned

In the beginning of July, a seasonable addition was made to the British force, by the arrival of about 450 men of her majesty's 51st foot, but as had almost invariably happened, the rebels could boast of having on the very same day been far more largely augmented. The Bareilly brigade, consisting of three whole regiments of infantry and some irregular cavalry, after mutinying, as has already been described, had arrived on the opposite bank of the Jumna. No attempt could be made to dispute their passage, and they entered the city, where their reception was all the more cordial from its being known that they were possessed of a considerable amount of treasure. In consequence of the new arrival, it was generally expected that a formidable attack would be made by the rebels to force our position, or at least to regain a footing in the Subzee Munde. But it would seem that the punishment which had there been inflicted upon them induced them to turn their views in a different direction. The village of Alipoor, forming the first station to the westward on the Kurnaul road, was known to have furnished large supplies to the British camp, and had therefore been marked out by the rebels for vengeance. Accordingly, on the 3d of July, a considerable force moved out from the Lahore gate, and proceeded westward. Their destination being at the time unknown, the British could only send out a force on their track, and it was not known till the following morning that they had been wreaking their fury on the inhabitants of Alipoor. It was sad enough that the aid which they had given to us should have brought such a disaster upon them; but though on this ground alone it was most desirable that the rebels should not be allowed to return with impunity, there was another reason why a blow should be struck which might deter them from attempting to gain a footing in that part of the country. It lay in the direct line of communication between the camp and the Punjab. Only the day before the village was destroyed, a large number of sick sent from the camp had passed through it, and but for a most providential delay the plunder would have included, in addition to that obtained from the village, a valuable convoy of treasure and ammunition. The force sent out from the camp had the good fortune to accomplish both objects. By intercepting the rebels before they could regain the city, it took summary vengeance for the atrocities which had been perpetrated at Alipoor, while by clearing the road it secured the safety of the convoy.

Though the mutineers had as yet been foiled in all their attempts to estab-



BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR ARCHDALE WILSON, G.C.B.
From a photograph by Mayall

Rebel expedition against Alipoor

A D 1857.

Renewed
attempt on
the British
rest

lish themselves in the British rear, they had by no means abandoned that mode of attack. Of this, after several days of comparative quiescence, striking proof was given on the 9th of July, when a body of cavalry suddenly emerging from cover, charged right into the camp, and were within it almost as soon as the alarm could be given. A picket of carabineers, most of them young, untrained soldiers, instead of opposing the enemy, lost all presence of mind, and fled. Still dashing on, the rebel troopers made for the guns of the native troop of horse-artillery, and called aloud on the men in charge of them to join them. The men remained stanch, and the troopers, without accomplishing their object, were obliged to decamp. The boldness of this attempt, and the little resistance offered to it, gave rise to grave suspicions of treachery. A short time previously, the few Bengal sepoy mingled with the irregulars had been turned out of the camp, because they were believed to be in communication with their comrades within the city. It now appeared that they were not the only traitors, and recourse was had to the somewhat extreme remedy of sending off the whole three corps of irregular cavalry, one of them to Umballa, and the other two to the Punjab. While the sowars were assailing the camp, a furious cannonade was kept up from the city, and volleys of musketry were directed against the British station from every available point in the suburbs. After the expulsion of the sowars, it became necessary to dislodge those who, with the view of supporting them, had taken post in the gardens and other inclosures of the vicinity. This task, after a sanguinary contest, was successfully accomplished. One result of the affair of the 9th was to make the rebels more chary of exposing themselves to similar repulses, and they allowed nearly a week to elapse before they again ventured out.

New attack
by the rebels.

On the 16th, the mutineers from Jhansi, stained with the blood of an atrocious massacre, arrived at Delhi. On this occasion, the usual custom was not forgotten, and after a day's rest, they were sent out to take the lead in a new attack, in order at once to signalize their zeal and display their prowess. As usual, the attack ended in a repulse. After desultory discharges of guns and musketry, which, as both parties were under cover, produced few casualties, the British became the assailants, and drove the rebels before them. On more than one occasion the British, after repulsing the enemy, had in the ardour of pursuit exposed themselves to a deadly fire from the city walls. The repetition of such fatal mistakes was at length corrected by a distinct order that they should in future act strictly on the defensive, and rest satisfied with repelling an attack, without following it up with any pursuit of the fugitives. This order, besides preventing an unnecessary waste of human life, had another beneficial effect, which could hardly have been anticipated. It changed the tactics of the rebels, who, on finding that they could no longer lure the British within range of their fire, had less inducement to persist in their incessant attacks, and allowed days to pass without renewing them. The respite was partly employed

in completing the breastwork on the ridge, so as to form an almost unbroken line from left to right, and enable the men to move from point to point as safely as under a regular covered way. Other changes, partly of a sanitary nature, were introduced, and the health, spirit, and discipline of the force visibly improved. Meanwhile the large increase of numbers obtained by the rebels had not added to their real strength. Mahometans and Hindoos, though they had combined, were by no means united, and intrigues, factions, and dissensions prevailed to such an extent that the king would gladly have saved himself by the sacrifice of his nominal supporters. "Only recognize him as titular king, and secure him in the enjoyment of his pension, and he will open the gate of the fort of Selimghur, and through it admit the British troops into the palace." Such were the terms. Inadmissible as they were, he could not have performed his part in them, and it is almost unnecessary to add that though Sir John Lawrence, when consulted on the subject, had replied, "Treat, but beware of treachery," the negotiation came to nothing. The position and prospects of the British force before Delhi at this time cannot be more briefly stated than in the following letter of General Wilson, dated 31st July:—"It is my firm determination to hold my present position, and to resist any attack to the last. The enemy are very numerous, and may possibly break through our entrenchments and overwhelm us, but the force will die at their post. Luckily, the enemy have no head and no method, and we hear dissensions are breaking out among them. Reinforcements are coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold on till they arrive, we shall be secure. I am making every possible arrangement to secure the safe defence of our position."

A D. 1857.

Dissension
among the
rebels.

The moveable column under Nicholson, to which, as appears from the above letter of General Wilson, so much importance was attached, arrived on the 14th of August. At first some disappointment was felt when its strength was ascertained to be far less than rumour had assigned to it, but the importance of the addition which it made to the British force before Delhi will at once be seen when it is mentioned that it nearly doubled it. The previous force, though nominally about 5600 of all arms, had about a fifth of the whole in hospital, and could therefore muster for duty not more than 2700 Europeans and 1800 natives; the moveable column amounted to about 4200. One essential want, however, still remained to be supplied. The siege train brought to Delhi had been pronounced totally inadequate to make the necessary breaches for assault, and another of much weightier metal, and more complete equipment, had been procured from the arsenals of Philour and Ferozepoor. It was already on the way, but moving very slowly, as its line of gun carriages, tumbrils, and carts, extended over thirteen miles of road. Meanwhile the rebels lost much of their confidence. To violent dissensions, sometimes terminating in bloodshed, were added wholesale desertions by sepoys who, when denied permission to visit their homes, took the remedy into their own hands; and even the Delhi princes, some

Arrival of
moveable
column
under
Nicholson.

A. D. 1857

Siege of
Delhi

of them the very miscreants who had ordered and exulted in the massacre of European women and children, had the effrontery to send letters into the British camp, in which they sought to escape the retribution about to overtake them, by declaring that "they have been all along fondly attached to us, and only want to know what they can do for us."

Exploit of
Captain
Hodson at
Rohtuk

As everything depended on the safe arrival of the siege train, it was necessary to clear the route along which it was to pass of all mutineers and marauding parties. In this respect the districts of Paniput and Rohtuk required special attention. The Raughurs, a turbulent and predatory horde located there, taking advantage of the revolt, withheld their revenue, and when threatened answered with defiance. An attempt to coerce them had not been completely successful, and in the beginning of August intelligence was received that they were again collecting in force, and had been or were about to be joined by a considerable body of Delhi rebels. The safety of the train being thus endangered, Captain Hodson, whose services during the mutiny, both in the intelligence department in the camp at Delhi and as the chivalric leader of a body of irregular horse, invest his brilliant but brief career with peculiar interest, set out on the 16th of August at the head of a small force, and pushed on for Rohtuk, which had become a rallying point for the rebels. The task assigned him seemed beyond the means at his disposal. His detachment consisted almost entirely of cavalry, and how could he hope with them to overcome an enemy shut up within a walled town, and apparently resolved to make a vigorous defence? Too clear-sighted not to perceive the hopelessness of attempting an assault, and too resolute to despair of success without making an effort to secure it, he withdrew in the meantime to bivouac in an inclosure in the vicinity. In the course of the evening he was waited upon by a deputation from the city, "having grass in their mouths," in token of submission. It was merely a trick to throw him off his guard, for on going out on the following morning to reconnoitre, he saw the enemy hurrying forward at full tilt, and had barely time to form his men before they were upon him. After a short encounter, the rebels were driven back, but it was only to keep up a galling fire under cover of the trees and gardens surrounding the city. It was now Hodson's turn to try stratagem, and lure the enemy into the open ground by commencing a feigned retreat. Nothing more was required. The rebels, yelling and shouting as if secure of victory, followed close upon his track, and were nearly a mile beyond their inclosure, when he gave the order to face about. The fancied pursuit was at once converted into a disorderly flight, and on the following morning Rohtuk itself was found to be evacuated.

While Hodson was thus clearing the way in the direction of Rohtuk, another and larger detachment, having the same object in view, had proceeded from the camp. Mahomed Bukht Khan, an old sepoy soubahdar, who had become commander-in-chief of the rebels, in order to wipe off the disgrace of

several recent repulses, set out from the city, swearing that he would either capture the siege train or die in the attempt. His force, amounting, according to the report of the spies, to 6000 men of all arms, with sixteen guns, started on the 24th. By an early hour of the following day, a British column commanded by Nicholson was marching in pursuit. Its progress was much retarded by torrents of rain, which had so flooded the roads and fields, that in seven hours the advance had only accomplished ten miles, and the main body was so far behind that a halt was necessary. That the time thus occupied might not be lost, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who was with the column as a volunteer, and had a good knowledge of the country, pushed on with two officers in search of the enemy. After proceeding about five miles and ascending a rising ground they found them encamped beyond a nullah, which here crosses the road, and was running deep and strong. A fatiguing march of two hours brought the column to the rising ground, from which the enemy were seen occupying a position well chosen both for defence and for retreat. It was situated in the vicinity of the village of Nujufghur, about fifteen miles south-west of Delhi, and formed a rectangular space open to the rear, but bounded on two adjacent sides by the nullah already mentioned, and the canal or outlet from the Nujufghur Jheel, meeting it at right angles. Within the area the rebels fronted the nullah, having on their right a village, where nine of their guns were placed, on their left a rising ground, and in the centre an old serai, which was defended by four guns, and formed the key of their position. Nicholson at once formed his plan of attack, but owing to detention in fording the nullah, it was five o'clock before he could put it in execution. His object was to force the enemy's left centre, and then changing front to the left, to sweep down their line of guns towards the bridge. The enemy made little resistance, all their guns were captured, and the conflict seemed to be at an end, when it was reported that a village a few hundred yards in the rear was still occupied. Strange to say, it was here only that any serious resistance was experienced. The rebels, seeing their retreat cut off, and knowing the fate which awaited them, fought with extreme desperation, and were with difficulty overpowered. So many of the cavalry were employed in protecting the baggage which had been left on the other side of the nullah, and in escorting the guns, that pursuit was impracticable. The enemy's loss was however severe, amounting, according to their own confession, to above 800.

A.D. 1857.
Defeat of the
rebels at
Nujufghur

On the 3d of September, before the rebels had recovered from the consternation produced by their defeat at Nujufghur, the siege train arrived, and the erection of heavy batteries within breaching distance was immediately commenced. At the same time a seasonable addition was made to the force by the arrival of reinforcements, including a contingent from Cashmere. The crisis being now at hand, General Wilson issued an address to the troops. It commenced thus:—"The force assembled before Delhi has had much hardship and

Arrival of
the siege
train.

A D 1857

Arrival of
the siege
train

fatigue to undergo since its arrival in this camp, all of which has been most cheerfully borne by officers and men. The time is now drawing near when the major-general commanding the force trusts that their labours will be over, and they will be rewarded by the capture of the city for all their past exertions, and for a cheerful endurance of still greater fatigue and exposure." It concluded with the expression of a confident trust "that all will exhibit a healthy and hearty spirit of emulation and zeal," and thereby secure "the brilliant termination of all their labours."

In regard to the direction from which the assault should be made, there was no room for choice. The north wall fronting the British position could alone be selected for that purpose, but the particular part of it to be selected for breaching was not so obvious, and some degree of stratagem was used to conceal it. Considerably in advance of Hindoo Row's house the ridge terminates in a kind of plateau. Here, nearly on a line with the Sammy house, the first battery was run out on the 6th of September. It consisted of six nine-pounders



WATER GATE OF PALACE, DELHI.—From a photograph.

Batteries
erected

and two twenty-four pounders, and was commanded by Captain Remington. Near this battery a dry nullah descends the ridge towards the left, and forms a natural parallel. Advantage was accordingly taken of it, and on the night of the 7th, another battery (No. 1), mounting six guns on the right and four on the left, was erected within 700 yards of the walls, and placed under the command of Major Brind. These two batteries placed on the right flank, where most of the fighting had hitherto taken place, convinced the rebels that the assault would certainly be made from this quarter. Hence the next advance took them somewhat by surprise. It was made considerably to the east at Ludlow Castle, which, though they had a strong picket stationed at it, was wrested from them almost without a struggle, and became the site of battery No. 2,

mounting on its right division seven eight-inch howitzers and two eighteen-pounders, and on its left nine twenty-four pounders. It was commanded by Majors Kaye and Campbell, till the latter, disabled by a wound, resigned his part of the charge to Captain Johnson. The number and large calibre of the guns in this battery indicated that the real attack would be from the left, where two other batteries were forthwith planted, the one mounting ten mortars under Major Tombs, at the Koodsia Bagh, near the banks of the Jumna, and the other in front of it, at a building which had once been the custom-house. This building, though within 160 yards of the Water bastion, had, from oversight or overweening confidence in the rebels, been left unoccupied, and the battery was so nearly completed when they discovered their mistake, that they were unable to make any impression upon it. All these batteries had been erected in the course of a single week, and before the end of it had successively opened fire—Remington's on the 6th, Brind's on the 8th, that at Ludlow Castle on the 10th, and those of the Koodsia Bagh and old custom-house on the 11th. The effect was soon apparent. The Moree or north-west bastion, against which the fire from the right flank was chiefly directed, was easily silenced, and the Cashmere bastion towards the north-east, though it had been recently restored and strengthened at the expense of the British government, began to crumble away within an hour after the twenty-four pounders of Ludlow Castle began to play upon it. Nowhere however was the fire so destructive as at the Water or north-east bastion, where, from the proximity of the battery, almost every shot told, and a large breach was speedily effected. Meantime the rebels were not idle. Besides maintaining a heavy fire from the bastions not silenced, and from every spot in the vicinity within range of grape and musketry, they succeeded in placing two batteries, one at Kissengunge, which enfiladed those on the ridge, and another on the opposite side of the Jumna, which enfiladed those of the Koodsia Bagh and custom-house. These, though they could not postpone the day of retribution, produced many casualties.

A D 1857.

Breaching
batteries
begin to
play.

The plan of attack as previously arranged, and the assault, fixed for three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, are thus succinctly described in General Wilson's official report:—"After six days of open trenches, during which the artillery and engineers, under their respective commanding officers Major Gaitskell and Lieutenant-colonel Baird Smith, vied with each other in pressing forward the work, two excellent and most practicable breaches were formed in the walls of the place, one in the curtain to the right of the Cashmere bastion.

The assault.

A.D. 1857.

Siege of
DelhiThe Cash-
mere gate
forced

being admirably covered by the 1st battalion of her majesty's 60th rifles, under Colonel J. Jones. The operation was crowned with brilliant success, the enemy after severe resistance being driven from the Cashmere bastion, the Main Guard, and its vicinity, in complete rout. The 2d column under Brigadier Jones of her majesty's 61st regiment, consisting of her majesty's 8th regiment (250 men), the 2d European Bengal fusiliers (250 men), and the 4th regiment of Sikhs (350 men), similarly covered by the 60th rifles, advanced on the Water bastion, carried the breach, and drove the enemy from his guns and position, with a determination and spirit which gave me the highest satisfaction. The 3d column under Colonel Campbell of her majesty's 52d light infantry, consisting of 250 of his own regiment, the Kumaon battalion (250 men), and the 1st Punjab infantry (500 men), was directed against the Cashmere gateway. This column was preceded by an explosion party under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld of the engineers, covered by the 60th rifles. The demolition of the gate having been accomplished, the column forced an entrance, overcoming a strenuous opposition from the enemy's infantry and heavy artillery, which had been brought to bear on the position. I cannot express too warmly my admiration of the gallantry of all concerned in this difficult operation. The reserve under Brigadier Longfield of her majesty's 8th regiment, composed of her majesty's 61st regiment (250 men), the 4th regiment rifles (450 men), the Belooch battalion (300 men), and 200 of her majesty's 60th rifles, who joined after the assault had been made, awaited the result of the attack, and on the columns entering the place, took possession of the posts I had previously assigned to it. This duty was ultimately performed to my entire satisfaction. The firm establishment of the reserve rendering the assaulting columns free to act in advance, Brigadier-general Nicholson, supported by Brigadier Jones, swept the ramparts of the place, from the Cashmere to the Cabool gates, occupying the bastions and defences, capturing the guns and driving the enemy before him. During the advance, Brigadier Nicholson was, to the grief of myself and the whole army, dangerously wounded; the command consequently devolved on Brigadier Jones, who finding the enemy in great force, occupying and pouring a destructive fire from the roofs of strong and commanding houses in the city on all sides, the ramparts themselves being enfiladed by guns, prudently resolved on retaining possession of the Cabool gate, which his troops had so gallantly won, in which he firmly established himself, awaiting the result of the operation of the other columns of occupation. Colonel Campbell, with the column under his command, advanced successfully from the Cashmere gate, by one of the main streets beyond the Chandel Chawk, the central and principal street of the city, towards the Jumma Musjid, with the intention of occupying that important post. The opposition, however, which he met from the great concentration of the enemy at the Jumma Musjid and the houses in the neighbourhood—he himself, I regret to state, being wounded—satisfied him that his most

prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position with the comparatively limited force at his disposal, and he accordingly withdrew the head of his column, and placed himself in communication with the reserve, a measure which had my entire approval; I having previously determined that, in the event of serious opposition being encountered in the town itself, it would be most inexpedient to commit my small force to a succession of street fights, in which their gallantry, discipline, and organization could avail them so little."

A.D. 1857.

Advance of the British troops into the town

After describing the position which had thus been gained, and mentioning his intention to use it as the base of "systematic operations for the complete possession of the city," General Wilson thus continues: "Simultaneously with the operations above detailed, an attack was made on the enemy's strong position outside the city, in the suburbs of Kissengunge and Pahareepoor, with a view of driving in the rebels and supporting the main attack by effecting an entrance at the Cabool gate after it should be taken. The force employed in this difficult duty I intrusted to Major C. Reid, commanding the Sirmoor battalion, whose distinguished conduct I have already had occasion to bring prominently to the notice of superior authority, and who was, I much regret, severely wounded on this occasion. His column consisted of his own battalion, the guides, and the men on duty at Hindoo Row's (the main picket), numbering in all about 1000, supported by the auxiliary troops of his highness the Maharajah Rumbeer Sing, under Captain R. Lawrence. The strength of the positions, however, and the desperate resistance offered by the enemy, withstood for a time the efforts of our troops, gallant though they were, and the combination was unable to be effected. The delay, I am happy to say, has been only temporary, for the enemy have subsequently abandoned their positions, leaving their guns in our hands. In this attack, I found it necessary to support Major Reid with cavalry and horse-artillery, both of which arms were admirably handled, respectively by Brigadier Hope Grant of her majesty's 9th lancers, commanding the cavalry brigade, and Major H. Tombs of the horse-artillery, who inflicted severe punishment on the enemy, though I regret their own loss was very heavy."

Partial failure.

The above account, admirably clear so far as it goes, is too brief to enter into detail, and hence necessarily omits several points of interest which must not pass unnoticed. The rendezvous of the three assaulting columns was at Ludlow Castle. Shortly after three o'clock A.M., the 1st column moved into the Koodsia Bagh, ready to rush on the main breach immediately to the left of the Cashmere bastion; while the 2d column took up a still more advanced position at the old custom-house, in the immediate vicinity of the breach adjoining the Water bastion. The 3d column moved along the main road, having at its head the "exploding party," by whom at daybreak the signal for the assault was to be given. This party consisted of Lieutenants Salkeld and Home of the engineers, Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, Corporals Burgess and Smith of the Bengal sappers and miners, and Bugler Hawthorne of her majesty's 52d, to sound the

Blowing open of the Cashmere gate.

A D 1857

Blowing
open of the
Cashmere
gate

advance. The signal was to be the explosion produced by blowing in the Cashmere gate. For this purpose the party were accompanied by twenty-four native sappers and miners, carrying bags of gunpowder. The subsequent operation is thus described by Colonel Baird Smith:—"The party advanced at the double towards the Cashmere gate, Lieutenant Home, with Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, and Havildar Mahore with all the sappers, leading and carrying the powder bags, followed by Lieutenant Salkeld and a portion of the remainder of the party. The advanced party reached the gateway unhurt, and found that part of the drawbridge had been destroyed, but passing along the precarious footway supplied by the remaining beams, they proceeded to lodge their powder bags against the gate. The wicket was open, and through it the enemy kept up a heavy fire upon them. Sergeant Carmichael was killed while laying his powder bag, Havildar Mahore being at the same time wounded. The powder being laid, the advanced party slipped down into the ditch to allow the firing party under Lieutenant Salkeld to perform its duty. While endeavouring to fire the charge, Lieutenant Salkeld was shot through the arm and leg, and handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgess, who fell mortally wounded just as he had accomplished the onerous duty. Havildar Tellah Sing of the Sikhs was wounded, and Ramlohl, sepoy of the same corps, was killed during this part of the operation. The demolition being most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily not wounded, caused the bugler to sound the regimental call of the 52d as the signal for the advancing columns. Fearing that amid the noise of the assault the sounds might not be heard, he had the call repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway with complete success. I feel certain that a simple statement of this devoted and glorious deed will suffice to stamp it as one of the noblest on record in military history." Lieutenant Home, Sergeant Smith, and Bugler Hawthorne escaped unhurt, and were duly rewarded for their heroism, but Salkeld died of his wounds after lingering only a few days.

Progress of
the attack

The rush of the 3d column after the explosion was irresistible, and in a few minutes the Cashmere gate and the Main Guard adjoining it were carried. The 1st and 2d columns had been equally successful, though the rebels somewhat recovered from the consternation into which the explosion had thrown them, and beginning to have the advantage of day-light opened a deadly fire from every available point. Brigadier Nicholson, who had been the first to mount the breach assigned to his column, taking the right of the Cashmere gate led it along the Rampart road, clearing the ramparts without meeting much resistance, till the whole of them as far west as the Moree bastion, and then southward to the Cabool gate, were gained. Here, had the attack on the suburbs of Kissengunge succeeded, he would have been joined by the force there employed, but that attack having failed, Brigadier Nicholson was left entirely to his own resources. Unfortunately he attempted more than his

column, now thinned in numbers and fatigued by previous exertion, could accomplish, and was in the act of urging his men forward to seize the Lahore gate after a rather serious check had been received, when he was shot through the chest from an adjoining window, and fell back mortally wounded. After this lamentable event no further progress was made, and the Cabool gate became for the time the limit of advance in that direction. The same cause arrested the progress of the other columns. When General Nicholson on leaving the Main Guard turned to the right, Colonel Campbell took the left, and having cleared the Cutcherry, the English church, and Skinner's house, all in the immediate vicinity, forced his way first into the Chanderi Chawk, and then into a narrow street leading to the Jumma Musjid. His object was to capture this celebrated mosque, but his means were totally inadequate. Its side arches had been bricked up, its massive gate closed and barricaded, and he had neither guns nor bags of gunpowder to attempt to force them. His only alternative was to retire under cover from the deadly fire which the rebels had opened, and rest satisfied with what had been already gained. Enough had been achieved for one day; enough too had been sacrificed, since the killed and wounded amounted to 66 officers and 1104 men, or nearly a third of the whole number engaged.

A.D. 1857.

General
Nicholson
mortally
wounded.


The next day passed without any new effort to advance. The reason, though discreditable, must be stated. During the assault, though no mercy was shown to the mutineers, whose atrocious barbarities could not be forgiven, the assailants did not forget their humanity, and gave full effect to the general's call to spare all women and children. Their natural love of justice and abhorrence of cruelty sufficed for this purpose, without requiring any great exercise of self-restraint, but there was another temptation which they were unable to resist, and in yielding to which they became so completely disorganized as to imperil their previous success. The rebels, well aware of what must still be regarded as the besetting sin of British soldiers, particularly when their passions have been roused, and their bodies exhausted by almost superhuman exertions under a burning sun, had taken care to place the means of unlimited indulgence within their reach, by piling up beer, wine, and brandy within the shops, and even outside along the pavement. The bait proved irresistible, and for a time discipline was lost in brutish intoxication. To such a height was it carried, that the necessity of vacating the city was forced on the general's consideration, and only avoided by ordering that all intoxicating liquors should be destroyed. The remedy thus applied allowed the advance to be resumed on the 16th, when the magazine was carried, and the position at Kissengunge so far turned that the rebels voluntarily abandoned it. Every successive day was now signalized by some new success. The nature and extent of it is thus described by General Wilson:—"During the 17th and 18th, we continued to take up advanced posts in the face of considerable opposition on the part of the rebels, and not without

Effect of in-
toxication
in retarding
the final
capture

A D 1857.

Capture of
Delhi.

loss to ourselves, three officers being killed, and a number of men killed and wounded. On the evening of the 19th, the Burun bastion, which had given us considerable annoyance, was surprised and captured. On the morning of the 20th, our troops pushed on and occupied the Lahore gate, from which an unopposed advance was made on the other bastions and gateways, until the whole of the defences of the city were in our hands. From the time of our entering the city, an uninterrupted and vigorous fire from our guns and mortars was kept up on the palace, Jumma Musjid, and other important posts in possession of the rebels; and as we took up our various positions in advance, our light guns and mortars were brought forward, and used with effect in the streets and houses in their neighbourhood. The result of this heavy and unceasing bombardment, and of the steady and persevering advance of our troops, has been the evacuation of the palace by the king, the entire desertion



THE TOMB OF HUMAYOON, near Delhi --From an oriental drawing in the East India House

of the city by the inhabitants, and the precipitate flight of the rebel troops—who abandoning their camp property, many of their sick and wounded, and the greater part of their field artillery, have fled in utter disorganization—some 4000 or 5000 across the bridge of boats into the Doab, the remainder down the right bank of the Jumna. The gates of the palace having been blown in, it was occupied by our troops about noon on the 20th, and my head-quarters established in it the same day.”

Flight of
the king.

The king appears to have at first accompanied the rebels in their flight, and it was feared that the influence of his name might still suffice to rally the fugitives, and keep alive the rebellion. Whatever his intentions may have been, he soon abandoned the idea of resistance, and took refuge in the tomb of Humayoon, situated a few miles to the south. As soon as the fact became known, Hodson, who was ever on the alert and ready for any enterprise,

obtained permission to proceed with a party of his irregular horse to the tomb, and endeavour to obtain possession of the king's person. On his arrival, a negotiation commenced, and was protracted for above two hours, the king gradually lowering his terms, till he at last offered to surrender, if his own life and the lives of his favourite wife Zeenat Makal and their son Jumma Bukht were guaranteed. Hodson having previously obtained the general's sanction gave the guarantee, and the king returned once more to Delhi, but only to occupy it as a prisoner till he should be transported beyond seas as a convict. Justice would have been defrauded had the members of his family, who were notoriously guilty of having sanctioned and witnessed the horrid massacre of women and children, been, permitted to escape on the same terms. It is not improbable that, on the following day, when Hodson searched them out and obtained the unconditional surrender of two sons and a grandson of the king, they too hoped that their lives would be saved. It is certain, however, that no promise to this effect had been given, and Hodson only anticipated the doom which awaited them, and which they certainly deserved, when, on finding that an attempt at rescue was about to be made while he was conveying his prisoners to Delhi, he shot them dead on the spot with his own hand.

A.D. 1857.

Capture of
the King of
DelhiSummary
execution
of his sons

While vengeance was thus taking its course, an event of a very different description was visibly approaching. John Nicholson was on his deathbed. From the course which the ball had taken, there could scarcely be a doubt that vital parts had been injured, and therefore skill and friendship could at the utmost do nothing more than alleviate his sufferings, and minister comfort, till the fatal hour should arrive. His death took place on the 23d of September, and filled the British camp with mourning. He was only in his thirty-fifth year, but had already given proof of such talents, both as a diplomatist and a soldier, that all with whom he came in contact, whether countrymen or natives, looked up to him with admiration. Brief as his career was, it did not terminate till he had achieved a deathless fame.

Death of
General
Nicholson

The capture of Delhi, which government, from underrating the difficulties, had been expecting with some degree of impatience, was all the more welcome when it was officially announced, and the governor-general issued a notification, in which the language of exultation was freely used. "Delhi, the focus of the treason and revolt which for four months have harassed Hindoostan, and the stronghold in which the mutinous army of Bengal has sought to concentrate its power, has been wrested from the rebels. The king is a prisoner in the palace. The head-quarters of Major-general Wilson are established in the Dewani Khas. A strong column is in pursuit of the fugitives. Whatever may be the motives and passions by which the mutinous soldiery, and those who are leagued with them, have been instigated to faithlessness, rebellion, and crimes at which the heart sickens, it is certain that they have found encouragement in the delusive belief that India was weakly guarded by England; and

Lord Can-
ning on the
capture of
Delhi.

A D 1857

Lord Canning on the capture of Delhi

that before the government could gather its strength against them, their ends would be gained. They are now undeceived. Before a single soldier of the many thousands who are hastening from England to uphold the supremacy of the British power has set foot on these shores, the rebel force where it was strongest and most united, and where it had the command of unbounded military appliances, has been destroyed or scattered, by an army collected within the limits of the North-western Provinces and the Punjab alone. The work has been done before the support of those battalions which have been collected in Bengal, from the forces of the queen in China, and in her majesty's eastern colonies, could reach Major-general Wilson's army, and it is by the courage and endurance of that gallant army alone—by the skill, sound judgment, and steady resolution of its brave commander—and by the aid of some native chiefs, true to their allegiance, that, under the blessing of God, the head of rebellion has been crushed, and the cause of loyalty, humanity, and rightful authority vindicated."

Lord Canning, when he said in the above notification that "the head of rebellion has been crushed," gave utterance as much to his wishes and hopes as to his convictions. Though checked and virtually crushed in the north-west, it was maintaining a bold front in other quarters, and even threatening, particularly in Oude, to celebrate its triumph by the perpetration of another horrid massacre. To this part of the narrative, which was necessarily left untold, in order to give a continuous account of the siege of Delhi, we must now turn.

CHAPTER IV.

Successes of General Neill at Benares and Allahabad—The British besieged in Lucknow—Death of Sir Henry Lawrence—Arrival of troops from Persia—General Havelock appointed to the command of a relieving force—His brilliant victories—Third Cawnpore massacre—Campaign in Oude—New victories—The Ganges recrossed—Battle of Bithoor.



IN answer to pressing applications from various places where mutiny had occurred, or was hourly threatened, government, though sadly hampered by a deficiency in the means of transport, had begun to forward detachments of her majesty's 84th. In this way some feeble relief had been given to Sir Hugh Wheeler, who had under him, when Nana Sahib perpetrated his horrid massacres, fifty men belonging to this regiment. Meanwhile another European regiment, the 1st Madras fusiliers, commanded by Colonel Neill, had arrived. At the moment of landing, the railway train from Calcutta to Raneegunge was on the point of starting, and

Relief force sent for wanted by government.

though it was now well known that not an hour was to be lost in pushing on troops, the railway officials would have started without them, because the time was up. Colonel Neill in this emergency gave proof of the energy and decision which characterized his subsequent proceedings, and by seizing the engine-driver and stoker, prevented the departure of the train till as many of his soldiers as it could carry had taken their seats. This decisive step is said to have saved Benares. On the 3d of June, when he reached it with only forty of his men, mutiny had already broken out. Feeble as the relief was in numbers, it sufficed under the conduct of its able commander to turn the scale, and before evening closed, the insurgents had paid the penalty of their crime in the loss of a hundred killed and twice as many wounded. This success, followed up vigorously by other measures of repression, so completely intimidated the mutineers, and the populace, who would willingly have made common cause with them, that Colonel Neill was able to leave Benares in tranquillity, and hasten westward to Allahabad, where his presence was still more urgently required. It has been told how its fort, and the immense military stores of its arsenal, were saved by the opportune arrival of seventy European invalids from Chunar. The rest of the city, however, was left at the mercy of the mutineers, whose unrestrained license had continued for five days, when Colonel Neill appeared with a wing of his fusiliers. Here as at Benares he put down the mutiny with a strong hand, and even pacified the surrounding country by the mere terror of his name. On reading the narrative of his doings, one cannot help wishing that he had been permitted to retain the command, in order to finish the work which he had so well begun; but all regret on this head must be suppressed on learning that the person about to supersede him was not only his superior officer, but one who in the course of a few months was to gain victory after victory, and be hailed with universal acclamation as one of the greatest heroes of modern times. But it will be necessary before bringing Havelock on the scene, to return to Oude, and take a survey of the British position at Lucknow after the disastrous affair of Chinhut.

A.D. 1857.

Reinforce-
ments for
warded by
government.

Sir Henry Lawrence, though hopeful that the mutiny might be kept in check till the promised reinforcements should arrive, was too prudent to trust to a peradventure, and had been diligently preparing for the worst, by fortifying and provisioning both the Muchee Bhowun and the residency, so as to have the option, if driven to it, of standing a siege. These labours were considerably advanced, but by no means completed, when the repulse at Chinhut left him no alternative but to retire within his defences. He was at first disposed to hold both the residency and the Muchee Bhowun; or if this were deemed impracticable, to give the preference to the latter. On further consideration he took a different view, and the Muchee Bhowun was abandoned. The necessity of this step was only too apparent. The enemy had already isolated it so completely from the residency, that there could be no direct

State of
matters at
Lucknow.

the residency, and the other the Bailey Guard gate, forming the principal entrance to it from the east. These gates were defended by barricades, as well as by guns placed on the streets which they terminated. The other defences consisted of a series of batteries, thrown up on all the most commanding points. On the north-east, to the left of the Water gate, and above the residency, were two batteries, called respectively Evans' and the Redan, with a mortar battery between them; at the south extremity, the Cawnpoor battery, and at the south-west Gubbin's battery. Owing to the suddenness of the siege, two batteries which had been commenced on the west side could not be finished, and were consequently left outside the inclosure.

A D 1857

British
position at
Lucknow.

The residency, an imposing pile of building of three stories, was very little adapted for defence. Its numerous lofty windows gave free entrance to the missiles of the enemy, and its roof, which was only edged round by an ornamental balustrade, was wholly exposed. The upper stories were necessarily abandoned at the very commencement of the siege by all the ladies and children; the ground floor was occupied by the soldiers, while their families found good shelter in the *tykhanas*, or underground rooms. A little to the east of the residency stood the banqueting hall, a building of two stories. Having very large lofty rooms, it was converted into an hospital, for which it would have been well adapted, had it not, like the residency, been too much exposed. The defect was however partially remedied by closing the doors and windows of the most exposed sides with any available materials. Still farther east stood the treasury, close to the Bailey Guard gate. Immediately on the opposite side of the street leading from this gate, was the house of Dr. Fayer, a large but not lofty building, with a flat roof, which, being well protected by sandbags, afforded a good cover for musketry, and with a *tykhana*, to which, when the firing became heavy, the female inmates were able to retire. Being thus used for defence, the house and its inclosure or compound were called Dr. Fayer's *garrison*, a name which was for the same reason applied to various other compounds. Thus proceeding south from Dr. Fayer's, occurred in succession the Financial garrison, Sagos, and the Judicial, overlooked from the west by the Post-office garrison, Anderson's, and Duprat's, the latter adjoining the Cawnpoor battery. On the west, with the battery at its extremity already mentioned, was Gubbin's garrison, to which the judicial commissioner of Oude has, both by his services during the siege and his work on the subject, given some degree of celebrity. The above enumeration makes the defences more formidable in name than they were in reality. The two strongest batteries—the Redan and the Cawnpoor—mounted only three guns each, and in many places the obstacles were so few and feeble, that nothing but the necessary courage was wanting to have enabled the enemy to force their way into the interior. One of the greatest disadvantages of the British position was the number and proximity of the native buildings by which it

Description
of the resi-
dency and
its fortifica-
tions

A D 1857 was on all sides surrounded. When a siege was not believed to be imminent, a proposal to clear away these buildings to a sufficient distance had been rejected from motives of humanity, and when the mistake became palpable, it was too late to remedy it effectually. In the vicinity of the Redan and of Mr. Gubbin's garrison some clearances had been made, but the ground remained covered with houses, from which the enemy's sharp-shooters kept up a ceaseless and destructive fire.

Death of
Sir Henry
Lawrence

The siege had a very lamentable and ominous commencement. On the 1st of July an eight-inch shell entered the room occupied by Sir Henry Lawrence, in the first story of the north-east angle of the residency. It burst without



SIR HENRY LAWRENCE.

injuring any one, but as the repetition of such a providential escape was not to be presumed, he was strongly urged, though unfortunately without effect, either to remove to a less exposed apartment, or to quit the residency altogether for safer quarters. The very next day a second shell entered the room and wounded him severely. Had his constitution been less impaired, it might have been possible to save his life by having recourse to amputation, but with his attenuated frame, the utmost that could be done was to apply the tourniquet in order to stop bleeding.

The respite thus procured lasted only for

two days, during which, though writhing with agony, he remained perfectly collected, and dictated a series of instructions, appointing Major Banks to the civil office of chief commissioner, Colonel Inglis to the command of the garrison, and Major Anderson to the subordinate command of the artillery and engineers. Alternately his thoughts turned to the perilous condition of the garrison and to the solemn change he was himself about to undergo. He often repeated, "Save the ladies;" at other times, addressing the sorrowing group around his bed, and referring to his own success in life, he asked, "What is it worth now?" The thought was not new to him. He had long acted upon it, and when he called upon all present to fix their affections on a better world, he only advised what he had steadily but unostentatiously practised. Never, indeed, was there a nobler spirit. Possessed of talents of the highest order, he was simple-hearted as a child, liberal almost beyond his means, and of so tender and affectionate a nature that it was impossible not to love him. His character may still be read in the modest epitaph which he ordered to be inscribed on his tomb: "Here lies Sir Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty. May

His noble
character

A D 1857

such essential service in the Punjab. The troops composing it were to include, among others the 64th and 78th Highlanders. These distinguished regiments had formed part of Havelock's division in Persia, and it was with no ordinary



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY HAVELOCK
From the bust by W. Behne.

General
Havelock
appointed
commander
of the force
for relief of
Lucknow.

feelings of gratification that the command of the column, conferred upon him three days after his arrival, again placed him at their head. The instructions given him by government on his appointment were, that "after quelling all disturbances at Allahabad, he should not lose a moment in supporting Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, and Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpoor; and that he should take prompt measures for dispersing and utterly destroying all mutineers and insurgents."


Havelock's first object was to provide against any delay in the progress of the column from want of carriage. He knew that during the outbreak at Allahabad 1600 bullocks collected by the commissariat had disappeared, and he therefore proposed that the carts and bullocks on the grand trunk road should be employed in transporting ammunition and stores, while the troops, with their baggage and tents, should be conveyed by water. Having obtained the necessary sanction to these arrangements, and also to a liberal use of secret service-money, for the purpose of making the intelligence department as complete as possible, he started from Calcutta on the 25th of June, and reached Benares on the 28th. By this time, one of the most important objects which he had in view had been frustrated by the perpetration of the first Cawnpoor massacre, though the fact was not made known to him till the 3d of July, three days after his arrival at Allahabad. Here another disappointment awaited him. The European column was to have included four European regiments, but on the 7th of July, when he marched out to the re-capture of Cawnpoor, he could not muster more than 1400 European bayonets. The day before he reached Allahabad, the Cawnpoor massacre not being yet known, Colonel Neill had detached for its relief, under Major Renaud of the Madras fusiliers, 400 Europeans, 300 Ferozepoor Sikhs, 120 native irregular cavalry, and two nine-pounders. This movement, though made with caution, was perilous, for should the enemy bear down upon him, they would be able to overwhelm him by mere numbers, even if the whole of his detachment should prove faithful. Should part prove otherwise, as was strongly suspected, his destruction would be all but inevitable. In this emergency General Havelock

The number
of his troops.

hastened forward by forced marches. The rebels on their part were equally active, and in the hope of having only the detachment to encounter, had pushed on to Futtehpoor, near the right bank of the Ganges, about forty-five miles below Cawnpoor. On the same day he effected a junction with Major Renaud, and hence on the 12th of July, when the rebels, who had mistaken a reconnoitring party for the detachment, rushed on without any regular formation, in the full confidence of an easy victory, they found themselves brought suddenly in presence of the whole British force. The position and subsequent operations are thus described in the general's despatch:—"Futtehpoor constitutes a position of no small strength. The hard and dry trunk road subdivides it, and is the only means of convenient access, for the plains on both sides are covered at this season by heavy lodgments of water, to the depth of two, three, and four feet. It is surrounded by garden inclosures of great strength, with high walls, and has within it many houses of good masonry. In front of the swamps are hillocks, villages, and mango groves, which the enemy already occupied in force. I estimate his number at 3500, with twelve brass and iron guns. I made my dispositions. The guns, now eight in number, were formed on and close to the chaussée, in the centre, under Captain

A D'1857.

General A. Havelock's first encounter with the mutineers at Futtehpoor.



FUTTEHPoor.—From engraving in Illustrated London News.

Maude, R. A., protected and aided by one hundred Enfield riflemen of the 64th. The detachments of infantry were at the same moment thrown into line of quarter distance columns, at deploying distance, and thus advanced in support, covered at discretion by Enfield skirmishers. The small force of volunteers and irregular cavalry moved forward on the flanks on harder ground. I might say that in ten minutes the action was decided, for in that short space of time the spirit of the enemy was entirely subdued. The rifle fire reaching them at an unexpected distance, filled them with dismay; and when Captain Maude was enabled to push his guns through flanking swamps to point-blank range,

A D 1857

his*surprisingly accurate fire demolished their little remaining confidence. In a moment three guns were abandoned to us on the chaussée, and the force advanced steadily, driving the enemy before it at every point."

General
order issued
by Havelock
after
victory of
Futteeipoor

The merit of this victory was greatly enhanced by the circumstances under which it was fought. The British troops had previously marched twenty-four hours, and from the preceding afternoon had not tasted food. No wonder that after the battle, which, though decided as the despatch says in ten minutes, really lasted four hours, the men sank down exhausted on the ground about a mile beyond the spot where the enemy made their last stand, and did not attempt pursuit. On the 13th of July, the day following the battle, while the troops were enjoying a necessary and well-merited repose, the general issued the first of his orders of the day. It deserves quotation: "General Havelock thanks his soldiers for their arduous exertions of yesterday, which produced in four hours the strange result of a rebel army driven from a strong position, eleven guns captured and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the loss of a single British soldier. To what is this astounding effect to be attributed? To the fire of British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all that the brigadier has ever witnessed in his not short career; to the power of the Enfield rifle in British hands; to British pluck, that great quality which has survived the vicissitudes of the hour, and gained intensity from the crisis; and to the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous cause, the cause of justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India."

Two victories
in one
day

General Havelock resumed his march on the 14th, and next day, on arriving a little after daybreak in front of the village of Aong, nearly half-way between Futteeipoor and Cawnpoor, ascertained that the enemy were encamped at a short distance beyond it, behind an entrenchment which they had thrown up across the road. Colonel Fraser Tytler, sent forward with about a third of the force, found the enemy strongly posted in gardens and inclosures. A short delay on the part of the British while their line was being formed, being mistaken by the enemy for hesitation, they advanced to the attack instead of waiting for it, and occupied a village about 200 yards in front of their entrenchment. The Madras fusiliers, ordered to dislodge them, effected it with the utmost gallantry, though unfortunately with the loss of Major Renaud, their intrepid commander, who was mortally wounded. After clearing the village, Colonel Tytler gave the enemy no respite, and continued to advance till they fled with precipitation. While the detachment was thus employed, the main body was assailed by large bodies of cavalry, who made repeated attempts to plunder the baggage, but in this they were completely foiled. The work of the day, however, was not yet over. As soon as the troops had breakfasted, the order to move was again given, and they pushed on for two hours under a vertical sun along the main road to Cawnpoor. The object of this extraordinary exertion was to gain the bridge which spans the Pandoo Nuddee,

before the enemy could destroy it. The stream, though usually fordable, was now flooded, and might have proved a serious obstacle to the advance, if the bridge had been removed. Fortunately the enemy were surprised in the very act of mining, and after a short but sharp contest, were compelled to retreat on Cawnpoor. This place was now only twenty-three miles distant, and every man was anxious to push on for it without the loss of a single hour. Above 200 European women and children, reserved by Nana Sahib when he perpetrated his two previous massacres, were reported to be still alive. What a glorious enterprise to rescue them, and at the same time take summary vengeance on their inhuman jailer!

A D 1857.

Advance on
Cawnpoor

Notwithstanding the universal eagerness to advance, some delay was unavoidable. Night had set in before the commissariat cattle had reached the encamping ground, and many of the men, before animal food could be prepared, had sunk down exhausted, after contenting themselves with porter and biscuit. In the morning when the men again started, a march of sixteen miles brought them to the village of Maharajpore. Here during a halt and a hasty meal, which like that of the previous night was more stimulating than nutritive, the force and position of the rebels were ascertained. Nana Sahib in person had come out from Cawnpoor with 5000 men and eight guns, and was encamped about seven miles on this side of it, near the village of Alceerwa. Could anything have given genuine courage and confidence to this execrable miscreant, he might have found it in the strength of his position. His left, resting on the high ground which sloped to the Ganges about a mile below, was defended by four twenty-four pounders, his centre, posted in a hamlet where a horse six-pounder and a twenty-four pounder howitzer stood entrenched, was intersected by two roads—the one the grand trunk road passing immediately on the right, and the other, which branched off from it about half a mile in front and led directly to the Cawnpoor cantonments, passing at some distance to the left; the right, posted behind a village embosomed among mango groves, and inclosed by a mud wall, had the additional defence of two nine-pounders and the railway embankment at some distance beyond. The whole line was in the form of a crescent, with its concavity fronting the trunk road, by which it was assumed that the attack would be made. General Havelock resolved to make it from a different direction. Any attempt to carry the entrenchments in front would, even if successful, entail a loss of life which might be almost as fatal as defeat; and his determination therefore was to turn the left flank, where the dryness of the ground and the gradual ascent fully compensated for its greater elevation.

Position of
the mili-
taires at Ma-
harajpore

The British force began to advance along the trunk road in a column of sub-divisions—the volunteer cavalry taking the lead in front. A march of three miles having brought them to the point where the two roads diverged, the column wheeled to the right, and under cover of a line of thick groves,

A.D. 1857

Signal defeat
of the rebels
at Maharaj
poor

advanced 1000 yards in that direction unseen by the enemy, who, when they saw the volunteer cavalry pursuing the direct road, naturally supposed that they were followed closely by the main body. At length an opening in the trees having made the rebels aware that their left was the real object of attack, they opened all their available guns on the flank of the advancing column, and at the same time attempted to meet it by a change of front. It was too late. Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, the column had emerged from the grove, and the companies wheeling into line were advancing rapidly under cover of an effective fire from the artillery. To this fire the rebels could not reply from their centre and right, without mowing down their own left, and thus one of their most powerful arms was in some measure paralyzed. Still, however, their twenty-four pounders on their left did so much execution, that a speedy resort to the bayonet became necessary. The mode in which this was done is thus described in the despatch: "The opportunity had arrived for which I have long anxiously waited of developing the prowess of the 78th Highlanders. Three guns of the enemy were strongly posted behind a lofty hamlet well entrenched. I directed this regiment to advance, and never have I witnessed conduct more admirable. They were led by Colonel Hamilton, and followed him with surpassing steadiness and gallantry under a heavy fire. As they approached the village, they cheered and charged with the bayonet, the pipes sounding the pibroch. Need I add that the enemy fled, and the village was taken, and the guns were captured?" When the enemy's left was thus crushed, their infantry rushing to the rear, appeared to break into two bodies, the one retreating a few hundred yards on the road to the Cawnpoor cantonments, and the other rallying near the howitzer which defended their centre. On this, the general calling again upon the 78th, exclaimed, "Now, Highlanders, another charge like that wins the day." They answered with a cheer and a rush, and aided by the 64th, who emulated their courage, captured the howitzer, scattering the masses who had made it their rallying point. During these operations the enemy's right had been driven in headlong flight. Though victory had now declared itself, the fighting had not ceased. From one of the villages where the fugitives had rallied, a heavy fire was kept up, and not silenced till the general, who well knew how to excite and maintain a spirit of honourable rivalry among his troops, called aloud, "Come, who'll take that village, the Highlanders or the 64th?" The appeal was instantaneously answered, and the village effectually cleared.

Battle
resumed.

One other effort was required. When the enemy seemed in full retreat, a destructive fire was suddenly opened from two light guns and a twenty-four pounder, which had been planted in reserve upon the road. The troops around these guns consisted partly of reinforcements whom Nana Sahib had called to his assistance from Cawnpoor, and who were consequently fresh, while our men were exhausted. As our guns were a mile in the rear, the British troops while

waiting for them lay down for shelter from the fire which was carrying death into their ranks. This halt gave new courage to the enemy. Nana Sahib was seen riding among them, while the noise of their drums and trumpets indicated that another grand effort was about to be made. They accordingly prepared to advance, while their cavalry spreading out in the form of a crescent, threatened to envelope the British force, which did not now exceed 800 men. Matters once more looked serious. "My artillery cattle," says the general, "wearied by the length of the march, could not bring up the guns to my assistance, and the Madras fusiliers, the 61th, 84th, and 78th detachments formed in line, were exposed to a heavy fire from the twenty-four pounder on the road. I was resolved this state of things should not last; so calling upon my men who were lying down in line, to leap on their feet, I directed another steady advance. It was irresistible. The enemy sent round shot into our ranks, until we were within 300 yards, and then poured in grape with such precision and determination as I have seldom witnessed. But the 61th, led by Major Stirling, and by my aide-de-camp (the general's own son, now Sir Henry Havelock), who had placed himself in their front, were not to be denied. Their rear showed the ground strewn with wounded, but on they steadily and silently came, then with a cheer charged and captured the unwieldy trophy of their valour. The enemy lost all heart, and after a hurried fire of musketry, gave way in total rout. Four of my guns came up, and completed their discomfiture by a heavy cannonade; and as it grew dark, the roofless barracks of our artillery were dimly descried in advance, and it was evident that Cawnpoor was once more in our possession."

A D 1857.

Fresh defeat
of the rebels


Tempting as the immediate occupation of Cawnpoor must have been to General Havelock, it would have been hazardous to enter it in the dark, and the exhausted troops bivouacked for the night on the bare ground. Next morning before starting, spies returned with the dreadful intelligence that the fiendish Nana, to compensate for the successive defeats of his adherents, had on the 15th taken the revenge of which only such a nature as his was capable, by massacring the 210 helpless women and children, whom a previous act of gross treachery had placed in his power. When the troops entered the town, Sir Hugh Wheeler's encampment, and the prison-house where the recent butchery had been perpetrated, were naturally the first objects of interest. The scene which presented itself is too horrible to be dwelt upon, and we therefore simply borrow the brief description of it by Mr. Marshman in his *Memoirs*. "The pavement was swimming in blood, and fragments of ladies' and children's dresses were floating on it. They entered the apartments and found them empty and silent, but there also the blood lay deep on the floor, covered with bonnets, collars, combs, and children's frocks and frills. The walls were dotted with the marks of bullets, and on the wooden pillars were deep sword-cuts, from some of which hung tresses of hair. But neither the sabre-cuts nor the

Cawnpoor
entered.Horrid spec-
tacle pre-
sented

A D 1857.

Horrible
scene pre-
sented on
entering
Cawnpoor

bullets were sufficiently high above the floor to indicate that the weapons had been aimed at men defending their lives; they appear rather to have been levelled at crouching women and children begging for mercy. The soldiers proceeded in their search, when in crossing the court-yard they perceived



THE 'SLAUGHTER HOUSE,' CAWNPOR where the Massacre took place
From D. S. Green's Sketches in India during the Mutiny

human limbs bristling from a well, and on further examination found it to be choked up with the bodies of the victims, which appeared to have been thrown in promiscuously, the dead with the wounded, till it was full to the brim. The feelings of those who witnessed the spec-

tacle it is easy to conceive, but impossible to describe. Men of iron nerve who, during the march from Allahabad, had rushed to the cannon's mouth without flinching, and had seen unappalled their comrades mowed down around them, now lifted up their voices and wept."

The exultation produced by the victory at Cawnpoor was followed by a certain degree of despondency. The British ranks had been thinned not only in fight, but by cholera, which carrying on its insidious ravages, scarcely allowed a day to pass without cutting short some valuable life which could ill be spared. While thus weakened, the magnitude of the task assigned to the force became more palpable, and it was impossible not to feel anxious when the question was asked, How will it be possible with a handful of men to clear the road of the myriads of rebels, and force the way to Lucknow? In answer to urgent applications for reinforcements, General Neill (such was now his rank) entered Cawnpoor on the 20th of July, bringing with him only 227 men. More than these were necessary to garrison the town, and thus the force which remained available for action in the field was less than before. To aggravate the difficulty, discipline had begun to yield to the love of plunder, and the general was obliged to exchange laudatory terms in addressing his troops for such language as the following: "The marauding in this camp exceeds the disorders which supervened on the short-lived triumph of the miscreant Nana Sahib. A provost-marshal has been appointed with special instructions to hang up, in their uniform, all British soldiers that plunder. This shall not be an idle threat."

Disorder in
the British
camp

While pondering the difficulties which lay before him, Havelock had been heard to exclaim, "If the worst comes to the worst, we can but die with swords in our hands." But this resource, which the brave man can always count upon, would be a very sorry excuse for the general who should bring matters to that desperate pass without absolute necessity. His very first step, therefore, after entering Cawnpoor, was to select a spot which he could fortify, so as at once to command the passage of the river and secure the safety of the garrison. Fortunately such a spot was easily found. It was situated on the bank of the river, and formed an elevated flat, about 200 yards in length and 100 in breadth. On this spot, necessary operations for a field-work, capable of accommodating and of being defended by 300 men, were immediately commenced and carried on with the utmost vigour. Nearly 4000 native labourers from the town were set to work, and encouraged to punctuality by regular payment every evening. The irregular cavalry, who had been disarmed on the march for disaffection, were also made to labour, while British soldiers possessing mechanical skill were induced to exert it by a gratuity of sixpence a day. The work made so much progress, that it promised to be able to protect itself by the time the passage of the Ganges could be effected. This last was a work of no small difficulty. The Ganges, nearly a mile wide, was swollen to an impetuous torrent; the bridge of boats had been broken by the mutineers; and

A. D. 1857.

Difficulty
and danger
of advancing
into
OudeHavelock's
entrench-
ment

WELL AT CAWNPOOR.—From sketch by Lieutenant Pearce, engraved in Illustrated Times.

there were neither boats nor boatmen to supply its place. After considerable difficulty, on the morning of 21st July, by the aid of a small steamer, a detachment of Highlanders was sent across amid torrents of rain. They landed in a swamp, and had the enemy been on the alert, must have been in the greatest peril. Fortunately no opposition was offered. A second detachment followed in the evening, and at the end of a week the whole force had safely crossed.

A D 1857.

First en-
counter
with the
Mintimers
in Oude

On the 28th of July the whole British force, consisting of 1500 men, of whom 1200 were British, and ten guns, was assembled at Mungulwar, about five miles from the river, on the road to Lucknow, situated forty-five miles to the north-east. On the following morning a march of three miles was made to Onao. Here the enemy were found strongly posted. "His right," says the general, "was protected by a swamp which could neither be forced nor turned; his advance was drawn up in an inclosure, which in this warlike district had purposely or accidentally assumed the form of a bastion. The rest of his (advance) force was posted in and behind a village, the houses of which were loopholed. The passage between the village and the town of Onao is narrow. The town itself extended three quarters of a mile to our right. The flooded state of the country precluded the possibility of turning in this direction. The swamp shut us in on the left. Thus an attack in front became unavoidable." It was commenced by the 78th Highlanders and Madras fusiliers, who succeeded in carrying the bastioned inclosure, but were met by such a destructive fire on approaching the village, that they could not carry it till reinforced by the 64th. After it was forced, and the guns defending it were captured, the whole force debouched between the village and the town of Onao. Here, however, it was impossible to halt. The main body of the enemy were seen hastening down to the town with a numerous artillery, and if permitted to establish themselves within it, would effectually bar all farther progress. There was no alternative therefore but to endeavour to outstrip them, and gain a position beyond the town before they could reach it. In this, by pushing rapidly forward, the column easily succeeded, and stood posted on the Lucknow side, on a piece of dry ground about half a mile in extent, commanding the highroad, along which the enemy, still in hope of gaining the race, were hurrying in great confusion. It would have been easy to arrest their progress, but the general knew better. They were rushing to their own destruction. He allowed them therefore to come on till they were in front of his line, and then, before they could remedy their mistake, or recover from the consternation produced by it, opened with such a fire both of guns and musketry, that victory soon declared in his favour, with a loss to the enemy of 300 men and fifteen guns.

Victory of
OnaoVictory of
Busserut-
gunge

The troops at the end of three hours again started, and marched to Busserut-gunge, a walled town, intersected by the highroad to Lucknow. The gate in front was defended by an earthwork, a trench, and four guns, and the walls, as well as two turrets flanking the gate, were loopholed. The road leading out from the farther gate was continued by a causeway across a sheet of water about 150 yards wide and 6 feet deep. Taking advantage of this circumstance, orders were given to the 64th to march round the town to the left, and interpose between the farther gate and the causeway, while the 78th Highlanders and the Madras fusiliers should storm in front. These combined movements

so alarmed the enemy, that after a short defence they abandoned the town and fled across the causeway. The flank movement ought to have cut off their retreat, but owing to an unfortunate delay, the opportunity of inflicting a more signal defeat was lost.

Once more two victories had been gained on a single day, but still the prospect was by no means cheering. During the action, a large body of troops, supposed to be those of Nana Sahib, had been seen hovering on the left, and new mutinies, particularly one at Dinapoor, had given new strength and courage to the mutineers. Meanwhile the sick and wounded had become so numerous, that the whole carriage available for their use was already required. Strong reinforcements had been promised, and in particular the arrival of two regiments, the 5th fusiliers from the Mauritius, and the 90th foot, forming part of the troops originally destined for China, had been confidently expected, but it now appeared that these regiments had been diverted to another quarter, and that some weeks must elapse before the real strength of the column could be increased. Under these circumstances a retrograde movement had become imperative, in order to keep open the communication with Cawnpoor, and deposit the sick and wounded in its hospital. The order, equally painful to the general and odious to the troops, was accordingly given, and the column returned to Mungulwar. This place had the double advantage of being within an easy distance of Cawnpoor, and furnishing a site for the camp on an elevated ridge which, held by a British force, was impregnable.

Shortly after reaching Mungulwar, General Neill pushed forward from Cawnpoor 257 bayonets, and five guns belonging to Captain Olphert's battery. The column, thus imperfectly reinforced, was in fact no stronger than when it first crossed the Ganges, but it was now the month of August, and Havelock felt that another advance for the relief of Lucknow must be attempted at all hazards. He therefore moved out of Mungulwar on the evening of the 4th, and next morning, on approaching Bussertungge, came in sight of the enemy. His plan of attack, nearly similar to that formerly adopted, was happily carried out with more success. While the 64th and 84th advanced in front, under cover of a thundering cannonade, the 78th Highlanders, the 1st fusiliers, and the Sikhs, with Captain Maude's battery, moved round by the right, which had been discovered to give easier access than by the left. The enemy, as before, rushed out from the farther gate, and made for the causeway; where they suffered severely from Captain Maude's guns, which were already in full play upon it. So complete was the rout, that they never halted till they reached Nowabgunge, five miles beyond the battle-field. Notwithstanding this success, Havelock was obliged once more to pause. With the force at his command, was he not attempting an impossibility? The Gwalior contingent had recently mutinied, and the report was, that while the mutineers of Dinapoor were advancing into Oude from the east, those of the

Havelock
retires to
Mungulwar

A.D. 1857
AUGUST

A D 1857

D Monte
position of
Havelock

contingent, forming in itself a little army, complete in all its parts and well-disciplined, had arrived in the vicinity of Calpee, situated on the Jumna, only forty-five miles south-west of Cawnpoor. The question raised was much more serious than before. Then it was simply a question of delay, and was decided under the conviction that the advance might still be resumed in time to effect the relief at Lucknow. Now, on the contrary, if another retrograde movement took place, the hapless garrison would be left to its fate—a fate which could be nothing but the repetition of the Cawnpoor massacre in an aggravated form. No wonder that “the mind of the general was,” as Mr. Marshman says, “a prey to conflicting anxieties.” Many commanders would in such a dilemma have had recourse to a council of war, but, “independently of his own spirit of self-reliance, his experience of the mischief which had attended these councils in Afghanistan was sufficient to deter him from any such attempt to divide the responsibilities of his post,” and after consulting with the officers of his staff, who unanimously concurred with him in the opinion that to advance to Lucknow under present circumstances would be only the uncompensated loss of his own force, he gave the order to return to Mungulwar. That he was fully alive to the momentous consequences involved in this step appears from his letters relating to it. In one addressed to Colonel Inglis, now commanding at Lucknow, after stating that stern necessity had left him no option but to retire, he continued thus: “When further defence becomes impossible, do not negotiate or capitulate. Cut your way out to Cawnpoor. You will save the colours of the 32d and two-thirds of your British troops.” In a letter to Sir Patrick Grant, he said: “It was with the deepest reluctance that I was compelled to relinquish as impracticable and hopeless the enterprise of the relief of Lucknow, but my force, diminished to 900 infantry, was daily lessened by the inroads of cholera. I should have had at least two battles to fight before I could have approached the Dilkoosha park, which is the direction in which I would have endeavoured to penetrate; and to win my way up to the residency through a fortified suburb would have been an effort beyond my strength. The issue would have been the destruction of this force, as well as of the gallant garrison; a second loss of Cawnpoor, and the abandonment of all this portion of the Doab to the insurgents.”

He is obliged
a second
time to
retireAlarming
news from
Cawnpoor

While the column remained at Mungulwar, the communication across the Ganges was rendered complete by taking advantage of three islands in its channel, opposite to the entrenchment, and connecting them by boats or rafts, so as to form a continuous line of road. The value of this road was soon put to the test. On the 11th of August General Neill forwarded the following startling communication: “One of the Sikh scouts I can depend upon has just come in, and reports that 4000 men and five guns have assembled to-day at Bithoor, and threaten Cawnpoor. I cannot stand this; they will enter the town and our communications are gone; if I am not supported I can only hold

A D 1857

Victory of
Bithoor.

left. Considering the superiority of the British artillery, an easy victory might have been anticipated, but the enemy, sheltered behind their entrenchments, stuck to their guns, and continued to pour forth volleys of musketry, which were only silenced at the point of the bayonet. When the flight became general, the want of cavalry was again grievously felt, and Havelock scarcely overstated the matter when he said that if he had possessed cavalry not a rebel would have escaped.

Active operations for the relief of Lucknow being suspended until adequate reinforcements should arrive, the campaign was virtually at an end, and we may therefore take advantage of the interval to give some account of important events which had occurred in other quarters, but have not yet been noticed.

CHAPTER V.

Mutiny at Dinapoor—Arrah besieged and relieved—Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell as commander in chief—Reinforcements from Europe—Havelock superseded in his command—Continued siege of the British garrison at Lucknow—Relief and subsequent blockade—Second relief—Sir Colin Campbell's campaign—Havelock's death

Mutiny at
Dinapoor

THE main cause of General Havelock's determination to desist for a time from attempting the relief of Lucknow was the detention of reinforcements, on whose arrival he had confidently calculated. While on the way to join him, their further progress was arrested by a mutiny at Dinapoor. This place, situated on the Ganges a little above Patna, near the junction of the Soane, was one of the great military divisions, and was occupied by her majesty's 10th, a wing of her majesty's 37th, a field battery, and three native regiments, the 7th, 8th, and 40th native infantry. The disaffection of these last could scarcely be doubted, and the prudent course would have been to deprive them of the power of mischief by disarming them. Unfortunately the division was commanded by General Lloyd, an aged officer, who owed his appointment more to the length than to the merit of his services, and who had persuaded himself that whatever other sepoys might do, those whom he commanded were proof against seduction. Government, naturally anxious to take the most favourable view, lent a too willing ear to his flattering reports, and did not awake from the delusion till they were shaken out of it by the intelligence that, on the 25th of July, the three native regiments had not only mutinied, but been permitted to march off in the direction of the Soane. The general, as slow to act as he had been to believe that there could be any necessity for it, gave the mutineers a respite of four hours, in the absurd expectation that they might yet be induced to


return to their duty, and then retired to a steamer to take lunch and a siesta. Meanwhile the mutineers were filling their pouches with ammunition, and preparing for their departure. At the last hour the European troops were called out, but it was only to find that they were too late. A.D. 1857.

The mutineers having crossed the Soane unchecked, proceeded westward to Arrah, situated only eight miles beyond it, and after plundering the treasury and throwing open the jail, beset a house in which the Europeans, only sixteen in number and all civilians, and fifty of Rattray's Sikh police, had taken refuge. The house in which this party took refuge was only a bungalow, but one of them was fortunately an engineer, who turned his professional skill to good account, and strengthened the post by all the means at his command. At best however the defence was

Heroic defence by a small party of civilians and native police at Arrah

desperate, and to all human appearance could not be successful, as the original mutineers had been augmented by the retainers of an insurgent chief, of the name of Koer Sing. Meanwhile a detachment of about 400 men, drawn chiefly from her majesty's 10th and 37th, had left Dinapoor by steam, to rescue the beleaguered garrison. Part of the route

was necessarily to be performed by land, and the troops having disembarked, proceeded till they reached a bridge about a mile and a half from Arrah. As the day was about to close, a halt till next morning was suggested, but the officer in command, in his eagerness to accomplish the task committed to him, pushed on without even stopping to reconnoitre. This rash proceeding was severely punished. On the outskirts of the town, while the troops were passing along the edge of a mango grove, they were suddenly assailed by volleys of musketry by an unseen enemy, and were ultimately obliged to make the best of their way back to the steamer, with the loss of half of their original number in killed and wounded. The fate of the civilians in Arrah now seemed sealed. Still however their courage never failed them; some of them were excellent rifle shots, and struck terror into their cowardly assailants by their deadly aim. At the same time they were admirably supported by their native comrades, who, though heavy bribes were offered to them, treated every offer with derision. They must however have been overpowered, had not a British officer, animated by a spirit like their own, flown to their relief. Major Vincent Eyre, already known to



FORTIFIED HOUSE AT ARRAB.
From sketch by Lieutenant V. Eyre, engraved in Illustrated London News.

Their desperate position

A D 1857.

The besieged
at Arrah
relieved by
Major Vin-
cent Eyre

the reader by his services in the Afghan war, and his work on the subject, was proceeding to the common rendezvous at Allahabad with his horse field-battery, and providentially arrived at Dinapoor on the very day when the mutiny occurred. As both Buxar, where the Company had a valuable stud, and Ghazeepoor, a place of still greater importance, were reported to be in danger, he continued his voyage, and reached the one on the 28th and the other on the 29th of July. Finding no cause for immediate alarm at either, he returned to Buxar, with the intention of advancing to the relief of Arrah, with the aid of such infantry as he could pick up from the detachments proceeding by the river. Happily 160 men of her majesty's 5th fusiliers had just arrived. Having thus quickly organized a field force with three guns, he started from Buxar, and on the morning of the 2d of August had, on advancing about half a mile beyond Gujragunge, found the enemy in force occupying a wood in front, and moving large bodies to other woods on his flanks. The evident intention being to surround him, he at once offered battle, and opened fire with his guns. The enemy, screening themselves behind some broken ground, replied with volleys of musketry, but he succeeded notwithstanding in obtaining a clear passage for the baggage and the guns beyond the woods, the advance now becoming comparatively easy, as the road was formed by a causeway, with inundated rice-fields on either side, which kept the enemy at such a distance that their musketry could not tell. Having come to a stream which he could not cross, Major Eyre made a flank movement towards the line of railway, along which there was a direct road to Arrah. This movement, concealed for a time by a brisk cannonade, was no sooner discovered by the enemy than they hastened to defeat it, the raw levies of Koer Sing following close on his rear, while the disciplined mutineers of Dinapoor moved parallel to him on the opposite side of the stream, and took post in a wood which abutted on the railway. This post having been carried after a fierce struggle, no further resistance was offered, and early on the morning of the 3d of August, the gallant band at Arrah, after a defence which Eyre does not hesitate to characterize as "one of the most remarkable feats in Indian history," had the happiness to welcome their deliverers.

Arrival of
Sir Colin
Campbell
at Calcutta

On the 13th of August Sir Colin Campbell arrived in Calcutta. As soon as the death of General Anson was known in England, he was appointed to succeed him: twenty-four hours after, he had embarked. There could not have been a more judicious appointment. His distinguished services in the Crimea had pointed him out as the man in whom, in the event of any great emergency, his country might repose the utmost confidence; and if there was any quarter of the globe for which he was more especially qualified, it was India, where he had spent many years of his life, and had thus the double advantage of being at once inured to its climate, and thoroughly acquainted with all that is peculiar in its mode of warfare. By taking the overland route he had outstripped most

of the reinforcements of which his army of deliverance was to be composed, but there was no reason to fear that the means placed at his disposal would prove inadequate, since the national spirit, completely roused, was no longer to be satisfied with desultory efforts, and troops to the number of 30,000 had already left, or were preparing to leave the British shores for India. Sir Colin's arrival at Calcutta had been recently preceded by that of another officer of a similar stamp. This was Sir James Outram, who had held the chief command in the Persian war, and was now, in consequence of its early and successful termination, without any fixed appointment. He could not be left unemployed, and it was nothing more than might have been expected, and was generally approved, when he was gazetted to the military command of the united Dinapoor and Cawnpoor divisions. The command of the former had been rendered vacant by the incompetency of General Lloyd; that of the latter, which had been held by the lamented Sir Hugh Wheeler, had not been formally filled up, but it would have been incongruous to confer it on any other than Sir James Outram, who having formerly been chief commissioner in Oude, had a natural claim to be reinstated in it with the full military powers which had been conferred on his distinguished predecessor. But while both professional routine and individual merit concurred in entitling him to the above command, the appointment had an effect which was probably overlooked at the time, or if perceived was considered unavoidable. It placed a superior officer in the district in which Havelock had achieved his glorious victories, and thus by reducing him to a subordinate position, really superseded him. The same thing took place, it will be remembered, in respect to General Neill, when Havelock himself was appointed, and if regret was then felt, it is impossible not to feel it still more when, returning with Havelock from his victory at Bithoor, we see him take up the Calcutta Gazette, and receive from it his first intelligence of the fact that the command which had already given and still promised to give him so many laurels, had passed into other hands.

Havelock's mortification at being superseded could not have been lessened by the increasing difficulties of his position. So much indeed had his force been weakened, while the rebels were gathering strength in the surrounding districts, that he seriously meditated a retreat upon Allahabad. In a despatch, dated 21st August, he thus explained his position:—"I will frankly make known to your excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2000 or 2500 men, I can hold

A D. 1857.

Sir James
Outram's
appoint-
ment

GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.
From a photograph by Kùburn

Havelock
superseded.

A.D. 1857

Increasing
difficulties
of Havelock's
position.

this place with a high hand, protect my communication with Allahabad, beat everything that comes against me, and be ready to take part in active operations on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the mutinous contingent with 5000 men and thirty guns, or by the large forces which are assembling at Furruckabad, under its rebellious nawab, which has also a formidable artillery. But as they can hardly unite, I can defeat either or both in successive fights. But if reinforcements cannot be sent me, I see no alternative but abandoning for a time the advantages I have gained in this part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything can be organized for a triumphant advance in the cold season. It is painful to reflect that in this latter event, Cawnpoor and the surrounding country, in fact the whole Doab, would be abandoned to rapine and misrule, and Agra will feel unsupported." The answer to this representation not only promised reinforcements, but communicated the pleasing intelligence that part of them were already far on their way. About seven companies of her majesty's 90th had left Dinapoor on the 14th, and were to reach Allahabad on the 21st or 22d; a considerable portion of the 5th fusiliers, detained at Mirzapoor, had been telegraphed to push forward for the same place, and a battalion of Madras infantry, with six guns, had proceeded by rail to Raneegeunge, and was to push on by land to Benares. After this assurance of reinforcements, Havelock laid aside all thoughts of retiring to Allahabad.

Sir James
Outram's
arrival at
Dinapoor

Sir James Outram arrived at Dinapoor on the 17th of August, and two days afterwards wrote to the governor-general, suggesting a new line of operations for the relief of Lucknow. It was to organize a column to proceed westward from Benares through Juanpoor, between the Sye and the Goomtee. An alternative plan was to start from Dinapoor and proceed by water, first by the Ganges, and then by the Gogra as far as Fyzabad. By either plan the passage of the Sye, which was assumed to have been the main obstacle to Havelock's advance, would be rendered unnecessary. On further consideration both plans were abandoned, and on the 28th of August, Sir James Outram, in his first communication to General Havelock, informing him of his intention to join him forthwith with adequate reinforcements, generously added: "But to you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already struggled so much. I shall accompany you only in my civil capacity as commissioner, placing my military service at your disposal should you please, serving under you as volunteer." The reinforcements promised suffered considerable deductions in their progress, particularly at Allahabad, which was threatened by Koor Sing, who had assumed the title of King of Shahabad, and began at the age of eighty to give proof of military talents, which it could hardly have been supposed that he possessed, after his disgraceful discomfiture at Arrah by Major Eyre. In consequence of the danger which thus threatened Allahabad, the effective force under Sir James Outram was reduced to 1419

men. Its comparative weakness tempted the enemy to endeavour to intercept it. With this view their advanced guard had actually crossed the Ganges from Oude at Dalamow, nearly opposite to Futtehpoor, and were about to have been followed by the main body, when Major Eyre, now in command of the artillery, was pushed forward, and by a sudden attack nearly annihilated the whole of the rebels who had already crossed, and rendered the crossing of others impossible by seizing the boats collected for transport. The importance of this service may be gathered from the statement of Sir James Outram to the commander-in-chief, that had the main body of rebels succeeded in crossing, a general insurrection throughout the Doab would have ensued. A.D. 1857.

The last of the reinforcements reached Cawnpoor on the 15th of September, and next morning appeared a division order, in which Sir James carried out the generous intention he had already intimated. After a just eulogy on the brave troops and their distinguished commander, and the expression of a confident hope that the great end for which they "have so long and so gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished," it concluded thus:—"The major-general, therefore, in gratitude for and admiration of the brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion; and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as chief commissioner of Oude, tendering his military services to General Havelock as volunteer. On the relief of Lucknow, the major-general will resume his position at the head of the force." No time was lost in preparing for the advance upon Lucknow, but it will be proper, before giving the details, to return to the beleaguered garrison there, and ascertain the condition to which a siege of more than two months by an overwhelming force had reduced them.

On the 23d of August, Havelock had received a letter from Colonel Inglis, in which, after referring to one received from Colonel Tytler, and containing the following passage—"You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we cannot force our way in," he continued thus:—"If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are daily being attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our post, and I have every reason to believe they are carrying on others. Their eighteen-pounders are within 150 yards of some of our batteries, and from their position, and our inability to form working parties, we cannot reply to them, and consequently the damage done hourly is very great. My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 natives, and the men are dreadfully harassed, and owing to part of the residency having been brought down by round shot, many are without shelter. Our native force having been assured on Colonel Tytler's authority of your near approach some twenty-four days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave us, I do not see how the defences are to be manned." In another

Sir James
Outram's
generous
resolution
not to
surrender
Havelock.

State of the
garrison in
Lucknow.

leaving the more adventurous of their number lying in the breach. While this operation was going on, another large body advanced on the Cawnpoor battery, and succeeded in locating themselves for a few minutes in the ditch. They were however dislodged by hand-grenades. At Captain Anderson's post they also came boldly forward with scaling-ladders, which they planted against the wall; but here as elsewhere they were met with the most indomitable resolution, and the leaders being slain, the rest fled, leaving the ladders, and retreated to their batteries and loopholed defences, from whence they kept up for the rest of the day an unusually heavy cannonade and musketry fire. On the 18th of August the enemy sprung another mine in front of the Sikh lines, with very fatal effect. Captain Orr (unattached), Lieutenants Mecham and Soppitt, who commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown into the air; but providentially returned to earth with no further injury than a severe shaking. The garrison, however, were not so fortunate. No less than eleven men were buried under the ruins, from whence it was impossible to extricate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from houses situated not ten yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty; but they succeeded under cover of the breach in establishing themselves in one of the houses of our position, from which they were driven in the evening by the bayonets of her majesty's 32d and 84th foot. On the 5th of September the enemy made their last serious assault. Having exploded a large mine a few feet short of the bastion of the eighteen-pounder gun, in Major Apthorp's post, they advanced with large, heavy scaling-ladders, which they planted against the wall, and mounted, thereby gaining for an instant the embrasure of a gun. They were, however, speedily driven back with loss by hand-grenades and musketry. A few minutes subsequently, they sprung another mine close to the brigade mess, and advanced boldly; but soon the corpses strewed in the garden in front of the post bore testimony to the fatal accuracy of the rifle and musketry fire of the gallant members of that garrison, and the enemy fled ignominiously, leaving their leader—a fine looking old native officer—among the slain. At other posts they made similar attacks, but with less resolution, and everywhere with the same want of success. Their loss upon this day must have been very heavy, as they came on with much determination, and at night they were seen bearing large numbers of their killed and wounded over the bridges, in the direction of the cantonments."

A.D. 1857.

The defence
of the resi-
dencyLast serious
assault of
the enemy

Such was the series of assaults made by the rebels, and such the heroic spirit in which the garrison repulsed them. At length, however, the day of deliverance was approaching. Leaving about 400 men under Colonel Wilson to garrison the entrenchment at Cawnpoor, the whole of the other troops began to cross the Ganges on the 19th. The force, mustering in all 3179 men, of

Day of
deliverance
approaches

A D 1857

Advance of
the relieving
forces

whom 2388 were European infantry, 109 European volunteer cavalry, and 282 European artillery, and 341 Sikh infantry, and 59 native irregular cavalry, was formed into two brigades, the 1st under General Neill, and the 2d under Colonel Hamilton of the 78th Highlanders. On the 21st, the enemy, found in position with six guns at Mungulwar, were instantly attacked and put to flight. This first discomforture cleared the road as far as Bussurutgunge, where the force bivouacked amid torrents of rain. Next morning an advance was made to Bunnee on the Sye. The passage of this river was expected to prove a most formidable difficulty, but the rebels, pursued only by their fears, continued their headlong flight without even stopping to destroy the bridge, and were not again seen till the morning of the 23d, when they were found in force in the vicinity of the Alumbagh, a large palace belonging to one of the princes of Oude, about



INTERIOR OF THE ALUMBAGH, near Lucknow.—From Lieutenant Mechem's Siege of Lucknow.

four miles south of Lucknow. It stood in a beautiful park, inclosed by a lofty wall, with turrets at each angle, and in addition to the main building had an extensive range of offices for the accommodation of a numerous body of retainers. The enemy, evidently determined to risk a battle, stood drawn up in a line which extended nearly two miles, with their right and centre posted on some mounds, and their left resting on the Alumbagh. Their strength was estimated at 10,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and six guns. The plan of attack was to turn their right flank, but as a morass intervened, it was necessary that the attacking force should make a considerable circuit. During this operation it was exposed to a withering fire, till the guns from which it proceeded were silenced by Eyre's heavy battery of four twenty-four pounders. At the same time the cavalry massed on the right were driven back, and the whole of the enemy's line was thrown into disorder. The only resistance worthy of the name was made at the Alumbagh, in the wall of which two embrasures had been hastily struck out after

Capture of
the Alumbagh.

A.D. 1857

ordered to advance. The moment the order was given, Lieutenant Arnold and ten of his men rushed forward without waiting for the rest, and received a discharge of grape, which struck down the lieutenant, shot through both legs, and swept off his followers almost to a man. This perilous rush had been shared by two mounted staff officers, Colonel Tytler and Lieutenant Havelock. The former had his horse shot under him, the latter reached the bridge, where he stood unscathed waving his sword till the fusiliers came up and drove the enemy before them.

Further advance and capture of the Secunder Bagh

After crossing the bridge, the main body of the relieving force followed the lane skirting the canal, and then proceeded in a northern direction as far as the Secunder Bagh, where they made a sharp turn west towards the residency, and arrived without much opposition within a short distance of the Motee Munzil, situated on the right bank of the Goomtee. At this spot, still three-quarters of a mile east from the residency, the enemy had concentrated their strength, and a new struggle, in difficulty and fierceness resembling that of the Charbagh bridge, began. A battery, which the rebels had erected at the Kaiser Bagh or king's palace, opened a fire which, with that of the musketry from the adjoining streets and inclosures, was so destructive as to make further advance all but impossible. Two of Major Eyre's heavy guns succeeded twice in silencing the battery for a time, but the resistance was still formidable, when relief came from an unexpected quarter. A body of Highlanders who had been left at the Charbagh bridge, had been following in the track of the main body till they came to a point where all trace of it was lost, and providentially turned off to the left by a street which brought them to the gate of the Kaiser Bagh, and gave them an opportunity of capturing its battery. This accomplished, they succeeded in forming a junction with the rest of the force. The distance from the residency was still about 500 yards, and as night was setting in after a whole day spent in fighting, a halt was proposed. The troops however were too impatient to rest till the grand achievement was accomplished. The Highlanders and Sikhs having been called to the front for the purpose, pushed on through an incessant storm of shot. General Neill, after leading the Madras fusiliers as they followed in their wake, was unfortunately struck in the head by a musket-ball, and died almost instantaneously. The troops meanwhile continued their advance in the face of obstacles which, but for the noble spirit which animated them, must have proved insurmountable, and at last found their full reward when the gates of the residency were opened to receive them.

The garrison relieved

The scene within is thus described by a staff officer:—"Once fairly seen, all our doubts and fears regarding them were ended, and then the garrison's long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sandbags piled on shattered houses—from every post held by a few gallant spirits, rose

A D 1857.

Colonel
Ingliš's de
spatch.

An account has already been given of the repeated assaults made by the rebels, and the manner in which they were repulsed by the heroic garrison; but in order to make the account complete, we must again borrow from Colonel Ingliš's despatch:—"If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the struggle which we have, under God's blessing, so long and so successfully waged, I would point to the roofless and ruined houses, to the crumbled walls, to the exploded mines, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and defences, and lastly, to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted officers and men who have fallen. These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended."

Admirable
conduct of
the inmates
of the resi-
dency dur-
ing the siege.

In another part of the despatch, Colonel Ingliš says:—"I cannot refrain from bringing to the prominent notice of his lordship in council, the patient endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by the women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel struggle. But all such seem resigned to the will of Providence, and many, among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barbor, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital." Lest it should be supposed that the whole merit of the defence belonged to the British alone, Colonel Ingliš has added a passage, which it would be ungenerous and unjust to withhold: "With respect to the native troops, I am of opinion that their loyalty has never been surpassed. They were indifferently fed, and worse housed. They were exposed, especially the 13th regiment, under the gallant Lieutenant Aitken, to a most galling fire of round shot and musketry, which most materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between them; and every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat was alternately resorted to in vain, to seduce them from the handful of Europeans who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion." This praise must of course be confined to those native troops who fell at their post during the siege, or were found at it when relief arrived, for it is an indubitable fact that nearly a third of the native troops shut up within the residency when it was first invested, were unable to resist the temptations which Colonel Ingliš describes. The garrison, as it stood at the beginning and at the termination of the siege, is thus stated by Mr. Gubbin:—"The garrison of Lucknow originally was 1692 strong. Of these 927 were Europeans and 765 natives. We lost in killed, of Europeans 350 and 133 natives, and of the latter 230 deserted, making a total loss of 713. There remained of the original garrison, when relieved on the 25th of September by General Havelock, a total number of 979, in which both sick and wounded are included, of whom 577 were Europeans, and 402 natives."

It had been intended that the garrison and its deliverers should forthwith quit Lucknow for Cawnpoor, and accordingly, while the baggage, and military stores were left in the Alumbagh, the relieving column took with them only three days' food, and no change of clothing. The course of a few days sufficed to throw doubts on the expediency and even practicability of an early departure. The provisions of the garrison, so far from being exhausted, as had been supposed in consequence of some miscalculation, were found sufficient to feed the whole force for upwards of two months, and while the most urgent reason for retiring was thus unfounded, the impossibility of finding the necessary means of conveyance had become apparent. The determination therefore was to remain at the residency, and wait for reinforcements. The detachment left at the Alumbagh now caused much anxiety, and an attempt was made to open a communication with it by the Cawnpoor road. The operation was commenced on the 3d of October, with crowbar and pickaxe, but was relinquished on the 6th, "it being found," says Sir James Outram in his despatch, "that a large mosque, strongly occupied by the enemy, required more extensive operations for its capture than were expedient." The enemy in fact, recovering from their first surprise, had again assumed the offensive, and placed the whole force in a state of blockade. Fortunately the detachment in the Alumbagh proved able to repel any hostile attempt, and by means of forays in the neighbourhood, and supplies brought under escort from Cawnpoor, was freed from all risk of starvation. The area occupied by the garrison being barely sufficient for its own accommodation, a large addition was made to it on the north and east. By this means, while the mutineers were thrown back about 1000 yards, the defences were greatly strengthened, and all the points formerly most vulnerable were effectually secured. On the south and west sides also, though little additional space was inclosed, the damages were repaired and new works erected. The following quotation from a despatch by Sir James Outram, gives a sufficient idea of the nature and extent of the operations carried on on both sides:—"I am aware of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war; twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3291 feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts; of these they exploded three which caused us loss of life, and three which did no injury; seven had been blown in; and out of seven others the enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners—results of which the engineer department may well be proud."

Sir Colin Campbell, on learning that the intended retirement of the original garrison of Lucknow, and of the relieving column, was abandoned as impracticable, hastened to place himself at the head of a force more adequate than that which had previously been sent. Nor were the means wanting. Reinforcements had begun to pour in from Europe, and in addition to the usual land forces, another of a peculiar character, destined to render excellent

A D 1857

Garrison and
relieving
force unable
to quit
Lucknow

Sir Colin
Campbell's
advance
and Peel's
brigade

A D 1857

service, had been organized, under the name of the naval brigade, commanded by Captain Peel, a son of the late Sir Robert Peel, who promised to be no less distinguished as a naval officer than his father had been as a statesman. The brigade, consisting chiefly of the crew of the captain's own ship, the *Shannon*, with a sprinkling of seamen from Calcutta, carried with them eight guns of the largest calibre, and before reaching Cawnpoor had given proof of what might be expected from them by encountering, in concert with a military force of about 700 men, a body of rebels, estimated at 4000, and utterly routing them. Among the other troops which had arrived at Cawnpoor, and passed over into Oude to form part of the new relieving force, was a moveable column which had been formed at Delhi immediately after its recapture, and sent in pursuit of the rebels who had escaped from it. This column, commanded by Colonel Greathed, consisting of her majesty's 8th and 75th, the 2d and 4th Punjab infantry, the 9th lancers, 200 of Hodson's horse, with some Punjab cavalry and horse-artillery, had marched south-east, and inflicted successive defeats on the rebels at Boolundshuhur and Alighur. A more important encounter still awaited it. Agra, the capital of the North-western Provinces, had already had its full share of disaster. On the 2d of August, a body of rebels, composed chiefly of the regiments which had mutinied at Nusseerabad and Neemuch, and estimated at 10,000, encamped within four miles of Agra. The authorities there preferring a bold to a timid course, resolved to take the initiative, and sent out all the troops which they could muster to offer battle. Unfortunately, a large portion of them belonging to what was called the Kotah contingent went over in a body to the enemy. This untoward event was followed by another of a still more fatal character. After a long and obstinate struggle, the British ammunition failed, and it became necessary to retreat. As has almost invariably been the case in India, the rebels, who had previously been kept at bay, pressed on in the full confidence of victory, and with so much rapidity that the retreat became disastrous. In the course of the evening the British troops found themselves shut up within the fort with a crowd of fugitive non-combatants, amounting to several thousands, and had the mortification of beholding from the ramparts the devastation of the rebels flushed with victory, and undisputed masters of the city. This calamity, aggravated by previous anxiety and mortification, broke the heart of

Proceedings
of the col-
umn from
Delhi


Affair at
Agra.



GENERAL SIR COLIN CAMPBELL
From a photograph by Herbert Watkins

Mr. Colvin, and thus deprived the Indian government of one of its best servants, at a time when, as the governor-general in council justly expressed it, "his ripe experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy would have been more than usually valuable to the state." The rebels, after wreaking their vengeance and satiating themselves with plunder, had retired, but in the beginning of October the defenceless state of the city and weakness of the garrison tempted another body of them, amounting to about 7000, to repeat the visit. Providentially their arrival had been preceded a few hours by that of Greathed's column. Neither party, however, being aware of the proximity of the other, the result was a mutual surprise. At first the rebels had the advantage, but it did not long avail them. On finding that instead of the easy victory which they had anticipated, they were confronted by the whole Delhi column, they endeavoured to make off, and were closely pursued for nearly ten miles, with great slaughter. Immediately after this exploit the column crossed the Jumna and proceeded eastward. On the 14th of October

A.D. 1857.

Death of Mr
Colvin.

INTERIOR OF FORT OF AGRA.—From engraving in Illustrated Times

Colonel Greathed resigned the command to Brigadier Hope Grant, who, after new successes at Mynpoorie and Canouje, entered Cawnpoor on the 28th of October, and two days after crossed the Ganges into Oude.

The commander-in-chief left Cawnpoor on the 9th of November, and after halting three days at Buntara to allow the detachments still on the road to come up, started on the 12th at the head of a force composed as follows:—Naval brigade, eight heavy guns; Bengal horse-artillery, ten guns; Bengal horse field battery, six guns; heavy field battery, royal artillery; detachments Bengal and Punjab sappers and miners; her majesty's 9th lancers; detachments 1st, 2d, and 5th Punjab cavalry, and Hodson's horse; her majesty's 8th, 53d, 75th, and 93d regiments of infantry; 2d and 4th Punjab infantry. This

Sir Colin
Campbell
in Ouda

A D 1857. force, amounting to about 700 cavalry and 2700 foot, received reinforcements on the 14th, which made the whole number of men of all arms nearly 5000. On the 9th of November, after the approaching relief had become known to the garrison, Mr. T. H. Kavanagh of the uncovenanted service volunteered to go out and make his way to the British camp. It was a most perilous enterprise, as every outlet was strictly guarded by the enemy's posts and pickets, and the way lay through the very heart of the city. Mr. Kavanagh's task was not only to convey information as to the state of the garrison, but to make himself useful as a guide. Both objects he happily accomplished, and was rewarded by government with £2000 and admission to the regular civil service.

On the 14th of November the commander-in-chief began his advance on the city. On approaching the Dilkoosha park, the advance guard was met by a long line of musketry fire. Reinforcements were immediately pushed on, and after a running fight of about two hours, the rebels were driven across the grounds of the Martiniere, and beyond the canal to the north of them. The rear-guard, hung upon by the enemy, was unable to close up to the column till late on the 15th. On that day, therefore, no further progress was made, but early on the 16th, leaving every description of baggage at Dilkoosha, under charge of her majesty's 8th, the column began to advance direct on the Secunder Bagh. "This place," says Sir Colin Campbell in his despatch, "is a high-walled inclosure of strong masonry, of 120 yards square, and was carefully loopholed all round. Opposite to it was a village, at a distance of 100 yards, which was also loopholed, and filled with men. On the head of the column advancing up the lane to the left of the Secunder Bagh, fire was opened on us. The infantry of the advanced guard was quickly thrown in skirmishing order to line a bank to the right. The guns were pushed rapidly onwards, viz: Captain Blunt's troop, Bengal horse-artillery, and Captain Travers' royal artillery heavy field battery. The troop passed at a gallop through a cross fire from the village and Secunder Bagh, and opened fire within easy musketry range in a most daring manner. As soon as they could be pitched up a stiff bank, two eighteen-pounder guns under Captain Travers were also brought to bear on the building. While this was being effected, the leading brigade of infantry, under Brigadier the Honourable Adrian Hope, coming rapidly into action, caused the loopholed village to be abandoned, the whole fire of the brigade being directed on the Secunder Bagh. After a time a large body of the enemy who were holding ground to the left of our advance were driven by parties of the 53d and 93d, two of Captain Blunt's guns aiding the movement. The Highlanders pursued their advantage, and seized the barracks, and immediately converted it into a military post, the 53d stretching in a long line of skirmishers in the open plain, and driving the enemy before them. The attack on the Secunder Bagh had now been proceeding for about an hour and a half, when it was determined to take the place by

Sir Colin
Campbell's
advance
upon Luck
now

Desperate
street fight.
ing


storm through a small opening which had been made. This was done in the most brilliant manner by the remainder of the Highlanders, and the 53d, and the 4th Punjab infantry, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston. There never was a bolder feat of arms, and the loss inflicted on the enemy, after the entrance of the Secunder Bagh was effected, was immense—more than 2000 of the enemy were afterwards carried out." A.D. 1857.

The next capture was the Shah Nujeef. It is thus described in the despatch:—"The Shah Nujeef is a domed mosque with a garden, of which the most had been made by the enemy. The wall of the inclosure of the mosque was loopholed with great care. The entrance to it had been covered by a regular work in masonry, and the top of the building was crowned with a parapet. From this and from the defences in the garden, an unceasing fire of musketry was kept up from the commencement of the attack. The position was defended with great resolution against a heavy cannonade of three hours. It was then stormed in the boldest manner by the 93d Highlanders, under Brigadier Hope, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston, who was, I regret to say, severely wounded, Captain Peel leading up his heavy guns with extraordinary gallantry within a few yards of the building, to batter the massive stone walls. The withering fire of the Highlanders covered the naval brigade from great loss, but it was an action almost unexampled in war. Captain Peel behaved very much as if he had been laying the *Shannon* alongside an enemy's frigate." Capture of the Shah Nujeef.

The garrison were not idle while the relieving column was engaged with the Shah Nujeef. This building was within a few hundred yards of a garden, in which a battery had been established to co-operate in the relief. This battery was screened from the view of the enemy on two sides by a high wall, and the intention was to throw down the wall by exploding a mine under it, as soon as the moment for opening the battery arrived. Orders to this effect were accordingly given during the fierce struggle at the Shah Nujeef, but the explosion in a great measure failed, because the powder with which the mine had been charged three days before had in the interval become damp. Some time was thus lost in battering down the wall with the guns, which, after this preliminary obstacle was removed, opened with good effect on the Hureen Khana and the steam-engine house, the two strongest buildings, immediately in front. After practicable breaches had been effected, a storming party from the garrison rushed out and carried the buildings by assault. Co-operation of the residency garrison.

On the morning of the 17th the struggle was resumed, and proved so obstinate, that it cost six hours to carry the mess-house. The operations are thus described in the commander-in-chief's despatch:—"Captain Peel kept up a steady cannonade on the building called the mess-house. This building, of considerable size, was defended by a ditch about 12 feet broad, and scarped with masonry, and beyond that a loopholed mud wall. I determined to use Final relief of the garrison.

A.D. 1857 the guns as much as possible in taking it. About three P.M., when it was considered that men might be sent to storm it without much risk . . . (it) was carried immediately with a rush. The troops then pressed forward with great vigour, and lined the wall separating the mess-house from the Motee Munzil, which consists of a wide inclosure and many buildings. The enemy here made a last stand, which was overcome after an hour, openings having been broken in the wall, through which the troops poured with a body of sappers, and accomplished our communication with the residency." The contest was not yet over. The enemy kept up such a galling fire of musketry from the Telru Kotee or observatory, and of artillery from the battery of the Kaiser Bagh, that much street fighting, as well as some skilful strategy, was still required. The plan of



BAILEY GUARD GATEWAY.—From Mehar's Siege of Lucknow.

Removal of
the non-
combatants

the commander-in-chief was not to retain present possession of Lucknow, but rest contented in the meantime with effecting the deliverance of the garrison, and conducting the women and children, together with the sick and wounded, in safety to Cawnpore. The delicate operation of removing the women and children, and the careful manner in which it was conducted on the 19th, is thus described by Mr. Gubbin:—"Most of them were conveyed in carriages closely packed, every description of vehicle being pressed into service on the occasion. Many were seated on native carts, and not a few walked. They were conducted through the Bailey Guard gate, the Furlut Buksh and Chuttur Munzil palaces, and emerging near our advanced battery, crossed the line of fire from the Kaiser Bagh to Martin's house. Thence they entered and passed through the court of the Motee Munzil, on the further side of which they gained the highroad leading to the Secunder Bagh. Here, and near Martin's house, they were exposed to the fire of the enemy's guns placed on the farther side of the

river. Screens formed of the canvas walls of tents, or doors placed on each side of the way they traversed, as far as the Motee Munzil, concealed the march of the fugitives from the enemy, and on one side of this a ditch or traverse had been dug, along which, dismounting from their carriages, they walked past all the exposed places. All most fortunately reached the Secunder Bagh in safety."

A D 1857

The garrison was yet to be extricated, and the commander-in-chief having resolved to effect this "without exposing it to the chance of even a stray musket-shot," thus explains his mode of procedure:—"Upon the 20th, fire was opened on the Kaiser Bagh, which gradually increased in importance, till it assumed the character of a regular breaching and bombardment. The Kaiser Bagh was breached in three places by Captain Peel, and I have been told that the enemy suffered much within its precincts. Having thus led the enemy to believe that immediate assault was contemplated, orders were issued for the retreat of the garrison through the lines of our pickets at midnight on the 22d. The ladies and families, the wounded, the treasure, the guns it was thought necessary to keep, the ordnance stores, the grain still possessed by the commissariat of the garrison, and the state prisoners, had all been previously removed (two Delhi princes, and some other leading natives arrested on suspicion). Sir James Outram had received orders to burst the guns which it was thought undesirable to take away; and he was finally directed silently to evacuate the residency at the hour indicated. The dispositions to cover the retreat and resist the enemy should he pursue were ably carried out by Brigadier the Honourable Adrian Hope; but I am happy to say the enemy was completely deceived, and he did not attempt to follow. On the contrary he began firing on our old positions many hours after we had left them. The movement of retreat was admirably executed, and was a perfect lesson in such combinations."

Removal of
the garrison
and relief-
ing force

The whole force reached Dilkoosha at four in the morning of the 23d. The sick and wounded had left the residency on the 19th, and Lieutenant Havelock, who was included among the latter, in calling to take leave of his father, now Sir Henry Havelock, found him seated alone by his lamp, reading Macaulay's *History of England*. The very next morning the general was seized with diarrhoea. His constitution, shattered by past and recent exertions, was little able to contend with the formidable disease which, during the 21st, assumed so serious a form that it was deemed necessary to convey him at nightfall to the Dilkoosha. His own conviction, calmly conveyed to those around him, was that he should not recover. In the course of the 23d, when a fatal issue became only too probable, he met it, not only without fear, but cheerfully. "I die happy and contented." "I have for forty years so ruled my life, that when death came I might face it without fear." On the morning of the 24th, after some slight revival, there was a sudden change, and at half-past nine he breathed his last, dying as he had lived, a Christian hero of the highest stamp. Immediately

Havelock's
death.

A D. 1857. after his death, the troops, who had been selected as a moveable column to be left in Oude under the command of Sir James Outram, set out, bearing



HAVELOCK'S GRAVE AND ALUMBAGH PICKET HOUSE.—From Meham's Siege of Lucknow

with them the mortal remains of their departed general, which on arriving at the Alumbagh, they laid in a humble grave. Sir Henry Havelock had attained the age of sixty-three, and can hardly be said to have died too soon. After long and patient waiting, full scope had been given him

for the display of his extraordinary talents, and his country, which reaped the benefit of them in one of the most eventful periods of her history, has not been ungrateful.

CHAPTER VI.

Cawnpoor attacked by the rebels—Victory of Cawnpoor—Other successes in the Doab—The auxiliary force from Nepal—General Outram in Oude—Final march upon Lucknow—Its capture—Subsequent operations in Behar, Oude, and Rohilkund—The campaign in Central India.



THOUGH the defences of Lucknow had been forced for a second time, the place remained in the possession of the rebels, and the commander-in-chief commenced his return to Cawnpoor. Meanwhile General Outram remained at the Alumbagh with a force of 4000 men, at once to keep open the communication across the Ganges and to keep the enemy in check should they attempt any hostile movement. On reaching Bunnce, encumbered with an immense train of waggons and other carriages employed in the conveyance of baggage, ammunition, commissariat stores, and nearly 2000 helpless non-combatants, the returning force was startled at the sound of a cannonade in the direction of Cawnpoor. There could be little doubt as to the nature of it. That place had

Cawnpoor
attacked

long been threatened by the rebels, and they had at length actually attacked it. The commander-in-chief when he crossed the Ganges believed he had provided sufficiently for its safety by intrusting the command of it to General Windham, with a force of above 2000 men. All previous reports seemed to indicate that there was but little chance of an immediate attack, and hence the continued silence of General Windham for several days was naturally accounted for by assuming that he had nothing of importance to communicate. It was far otherwise. He had sent urgent messages which had not been delivered, and it was only next morning, when hastening on as rapidly as possible, that Sir Colin Campbell "received two or three notes in succession—first, announcing that Cawnpoor had been attacked; secondly, that General Windham was hard pressed; thirdly, that he had been obliged to fall back from outside the city into his entrenchment."

A D 1857.

Starting
intelligence
from Cawn
poor

At Calpee, situated forty miles south-west of Cawnpoor, the mutineers of the Gwalior contingent had for some time fixed their head-quarters, and obtained complete command of the surrounding districts. Nana Sahib was also hovering about in the neighbourhood at the head of a considerable force. The whole had united, and on the morning of the 26th of November were in full march on Cawnpoor. General Windham, on being made aware of their approach, sent to the commander-in-chief for instructions, but, in consequence of the miscarriage of his message, not having received any answer, felt obliged to act for himself. Had he remained on the defensive he could not have been successfully assailed, but he determined, with more spirit than prudence, to pursue a bolder course; and leaving part of his force to guard the entrenchment, hastened out to meet the coming foe with the remainder, consisting of about 1200 bayonets, 8 guns, and 100 mounted sowars. His object was to strike a blow at the enemy's advance, and thereby perhaps induce the whole body to retire. He did strike the blow, and with no small degree of success. "The enemy," he says in his despatch, "strongly posted on the other side of the dry bed of the Pandoo Nuddee, opened a heavy fire of artillery from siege and field guns; but such was the eagerness and courage of the troops, and so well were they led by their officers, that we carried the position with a rush, the men cheering as they went; and the village more than a mile and a half in its rear was rapidly cleared. The mutineers hastily took to flight, leaving in our possession two eight-inch iron howitzers and one six-pounder gun." General Windham must have made this advance under the impression that the main body of the enemy was still so distant as to leave him time to withdraw his


Advance of
the Gwalior
contingent
on Cawn
poor

General
Windham
attacks it.

A.D. 1857. the face of an enemy estimated at 20,000 men, with forty guns, was not effected without considerable difficulty. Next morning, the 27th, the contest was renewed, and General Windham was obliged, at the end of five hours, on finding himself "threatened on all sides," and "very seriously attacked" on his front and left flank, to make the best of his way to the entrenchments. It was high time, for they were already beset. Had they fallen, the safety of the force in Oude would have been seriously compromised.

Arrival of
the com-
mander-in-
chief at
Cawnpore

The commander-in-chief, pushing on in advance of the column, reached the entrenchment on the evening of the 28th. During this day the fighting was very severe, and it had "become necessary to proceed with the utmost caution to secure the bridge" over the Ganges. This operation and its success are thus described in a despatch:—"All the heavy guns attached to General Grant's division, under Captain Peel, R.N., and Captain Travers, R.A.,



Cawnpore.—From a drawing by W. Carpenter, Junr., engraved in Illustrated London News.

were placed in position on the left bank of the Ganges, and directed to open fire and keep down the fire of the enemy on the bridge. This was done very effectually, while Brigadier Hope's brigade, with some field artillery and cavalry, was ordered to cross the bridge and take position near the old dragoon lines. A cross fire was at the same time kept up from the entrenchment to cover the march of the troops. When darkness began to draw on, the artillery-parks, the wounded, and the families were ordered to file over the bridge, and it was not till six P.M., the day of the 30th, that the last cart had cleared the bridge." The passage of the force with its encumbrances over the Ganges had occupied thirty hours. As soon as the passage was effected, an earnest wish was felt to drive out the enemy, and make them pay dearly for their temporary triumph. By none could this wish be felt more strongly than by the commander-in-chief, but he justly felt that his first duty was to place the

His army
crossed the
Ganges.

helpless intrusted to his care beyond the reach of danger, and therefore was obliged, as he himself expresses it, "to submit to the hostile occupation of Cawnpoor, until the actual despatch of all my encumbrances towards Allahabad has been effected."

A D 1857.

The safe removal of the families and the wounded having been completed on the 5th of December, the respite which had been given to the rebels in Cawnpoor, and which had greatly increased their confidence, immediately ceased, and the very next day was fixed for the attack. The position of the enemy and the plan of attack are thus described by Sir Colin Campbell's despatch:—"His left occupied the old cantonment, from which General Windham's post had been principally assailed. His centre was in the city of Cawnpoor, and lined the houses and bazaars overhanging the canal which separated it from Brigadier Greathed's position, the principal streets having been afterwards discovered to be barricaded. His right stretched some way beyond the angle formed by the grand trunk road and the canal, two miles in rear of which the camp of the Gwalior contingent was pitched, and so covered the Calpee road. This was the line of retreat of that body. In short, the canal, along which were placed his centre and right, was the main feature of his position, and could only be passed in the latter direction by two bridges. It appeared to me, if his right were vigorously attacked, that it would be driven from its position without assistance coming from other parts of his line, the wall of the town which gave cover to our attacking columns on our right being an effectual obstacle to the movement of any portion of his troops from his left to right. Thus the possibility became apparent of attacking his division in detail" After mentioning that the enemy mustered about 25,000 men, with thirty-six guns, the despatch continues thus:—"Orders were given to General Windham on the morning of the 6th to open a heavy bombardment at nine A.M. from the entrenchment of the old cantonment, and so induce the belief in the enemy that the attack was coming from the general's position. The camp was struck early, and all the baggage driven to the river side under a guard, to avoid the slightest risk of accident. Brigadier Greathed, reinforced by the 64th regiment, was desired to hold the same ground opposite the enemy which he had been occupying for some days past . . . and at eleven A.M., the rest of the force . . . was drawn up in contiguous columns in rear of some old cavalry lines, and effectually masked from observation of the enemy. The cannonade from the entrenchment having become slack at this time, the moment had arrived for the attack to commence. The cavalry and horse-artillery having been sent to make a detour on the left and across the canal by a bridge a mile and a half farther up, and threaten the enemy's rear, the infantry deployed in parallel lines fronting the canal. Brigadier Hope's brigade was in advance in one line, Brigadier Inglis's brigade being in rear of Brigadier Hope. At the same time Brigadier Walpole, assisted by Captain Smith's field battery, R.A., was

Preparations
for attack-
ing the
rebels

The attack

Its complete
success

A D 1837.

Success of
the attack

ordered to pass the bridge immediately to the left of Brigadier Greathed's position, and to drive the enemy from the brick-kilns, keeping the city wall for his guide. . . . The advance then continued with rapidity along the whole line, and I had the satisfaction of observing in the distance that Brigadier Walpole was making equal progress on the right. The canal bridge was quickly passed, Captain Peel leading over it with a heavy gun, accompanied by a soldier of her majesty's 53d, named Hannaford. The troops which had gathered together resumed their line of formation with great rapidity on either side, as soon as it was crossed, and continued to drive the enemy at all points, his camp being reached and taken at one P.M., and his rout being complete along the Calpee road. I must here draw attention to the manner in which the heavy twenty-four pounder guns were impelled and managed by Captain Peel and his gallant sailors. Through the extraordinary energy with which the latter have worked, their guns have been constantly in advance throughout our late operations, from the relief of Lucknow till now, as if they were light field pieces, and the service rendered by them in clearing our front has been incalculable. On this occasion there was the sight beheld of twenty-four pounder guns advancing with the first line of skirmishers. Without losing any time, the pursuit with cavalry, infantry, and light artillery was pressed with the greatest eagerness to the fourteenth milestone on the Calpee road, and I have reason to believe that every gun and cart of ammunition which had been in that part of the enemy's position which had been attacked, now fell into our possession." During these operations, General Mansfield was equally successful in gaining the rear of the enemy's left, and completely routing the troops of Nana Sahib, who were there posted. After a successful pursuit, the troops returned at midnight of the 6th. The following day the troops reposed, waiting for the arrival of the baggage, but early next morning Brigadier Grant started again in pursuit with the cavalry, some light artillery, and a brigade of infantry. After reaching the Nana's residence at Bithoor, and discovering a large quantity of treasure which had been concealed in a well, he hastened on to the Serai Ghaut, where he had the good fortune to overtake the fugitives in the very act of crossing over into Oude, and capturing fifteen guns. These, added to those previously taken, made the whole number thirty-two, thus nearly annihilating the whole artillery which the contingent possessed, and depriving them of the arm in which they had been most powerful. The whole British loss in this important victory was only ninety-nine in killed and wounded.

Pursuit of
the rebelsConcentra-
tion of the
British
forces at
Farrucka-
bad

After the victory of Cawnpore, the troops were compelled to remain inactive for several days, waiting the return of the means of conveyance from Allahabad. At length on the 24th of December, when they were prepared to start, the plan of the campaign was more fully developed. The more immediate object was to clear the Doab of rebels, and retain command of it, so as to keep open the line of communication by the great trunk road from Allahabad to

Delhi. The northern portion of this line had already been to some extent secured by Colonel Seton, who having set out from Delhi at the head of a column consisting of the carabineers, Hodson's horse, the 1st Bengal fusiliers, and a Sikh regiment, mustering in all about 1900 sabres and bayonets, was proceeding southwards with an immense convoy of tents, ammunition, carts, camels, and in short everything most wanted at head-quarters. He was now advancing towards Mynpoorie, and in order to co-operate with him, and finally join him at that place, Brigadier Walpole was detached with the rifles, and a strong body of cavalry and artillery, mustering about 2000 men of all arms, to sweep across the Lower Doab by proceeding westward in the direction of Etawah, and then turn northwards so as to be able, after the junction with Colonel Seton, to reach Furruckabad, situated on the Ganges about eighty miles N.N.W. of Cawnpoor. This place, the only one of which the rebels still had undisputed possession, it was of the utmost importance to wrest from them, as the fort of Futtebghur in its vicinity gave it the command of the eastern portion of the Doab, while its bridge of boats, forming the leading communication with both Oude and Rohilcund, furnished the mutineers with which they swarmed with full opportunity whether of annoyance or of retreat. The capture of this place, which the commander-in-chief had reserved for himself, was easy, for the enemy, instead of making the bold stand which had been anticipated, evacuated both the fort and town with such headlong haste, that a large amount of government property, which they doubtless meant to destroy, was found uninjured. The whole British army encamped at Furruckabad fell little short of 10,000 men.

While the commander-in-chief had thus the happiness of seeing himself at the head of a force more adequate to the task still before him than he had hitherto been able to muster, an important diversion in his favour was being made towards the eastern frontiers of Oude, by an auxiliary force of 10,000 Ghoorkas, who had descended from Nepaul under the personal command of Jung Bahadoor, in name only the prime minister, but to all intents the actual sovereign of that country. These troops, possessing a high reputation for courage, and animated by an intense hatred of the sepoys, having crossed the Nepaul frontier, reached Segowlee on the 21st of December, and then marched westward to Gorruclpoor, clearing the country of mutineers as they passed, and preparing to enter Oude from the east, with the view of cutting off the retreat of the rebels in that direction, and then advancing to Lucknow, to take part in its final capture.

A Ghoorka
force from
Nepaul.

The commander-in-chief, though anxious for immediate action, remained for some time encamped at Futtebghur. The plan of campaign which he preferred was to cross the Ganges into Rohilcund, which was almost entirely in the hands of the rebels, and re-establish the authority of government, so as to make it impossible for the insurgents to find an asylum in it after they should be

Plan of
campaign

A.D. 1857.

Plan of
campaign.

driven out of Lucknow. The governor-general's plan was different. He thought that the time which would necessarily be occupied in the subjugation of Rohileund would be more advantageously employed in Oude, where the rebellion still counted the largest number of adherents, and possessed its most important stronghold. This was the plan ultimately adopted, and Sir Colin Campbell, leaving a sufficient garrison in the fort of Futtelghur, broke up his camp on the 1st of February, and set out for Cawnpore. At this time the whole force under his personal command amounted to 18,277, composed as follows: infantry 12,498, cavalry 3169, artillery 1745, and engineers 865. These included the strong detachment under General Outram, who, besides gallantly holding his post at the Alumbagh, had on two different occasions put to rout large bodies of the enemy who had ventured to assail it. Another British force under General Franks, which had been organized at Benares, after defeating a body of rebels estimated at 25,000, was hastening forward to take part in the operations before Lucknow.

Oude again
entered and
Lucknow
attacked

The first portion of the army crossed the Ganges on the 4th of February, but the whole did not cross till the 28th, on which day headquarters were transferred to Buntara. On the 2d of March the Dilkoocha palace was seized, and occupied as an advanced picket, though not without opposition from the enemy, who opened a heavy fire from a series of strong entrenchments in the line of the canal, and kept it up with so much effect as to make it necessary to retire from the spot which had at first been selected for the camp, and carry it back as far as the nature of the ground would permit. On the 3d and 4th, after the last of the siege train was brought up, the right of the position rested on the Goomtee and Bibrapoor, situated within an angle formed by that river, while the left stretched in the direction of Alumbagh, which was about two miles distant. Hodson's horse, stationed in the interval between the two positions, kept the communication open. After these preliminary steps, the plan of attack began to be developed. The nature of it will be understood from the following explanation given in the commander-in-chief's despatch:—"Having received tolerably correct information with respect to the lines of works which had been constructed by the enemy for the defence of Lucknow, it appeared



JUNG BAHADUR
From a painting in the Museum, East India House.

evident to me that the necessity would arise for operating from both sides of the Goomtee, when the capture of the city should be seriously entertained. Two very important reasons concurred to show the expediency of such a course, the one that it would become possible to enfilade many of the enemy's new works; the other, that great avenues of supply would be closed against the town, though I could not hope to invest a city having a circumference of twenty miles."

A.D. 1857

— In accordance with this plan, a bridge formed of casks which had been previously provided was hastily thrown across the river, and on the 6th a complete corps of infantry, cavalry, and guns, under Sir James Outram, who had been withdrawn from the Alumbagh to assume the command, passed over, with instructions to proceed northward in a line nearly parallel to the course of the river, and then endeavour to penetrate westward, so as to obtain command of the two bridges, the one of iron and the other of stone, giving access to the city from the north. The works which the first part of this movement was designed to turn are thus described in the despatch:—"The series of courts and buildings called the Kaiser Bagh, considered as a citadel by the rebels, was shut in by three lines of defence towards the Goomtee, of which the line of the canal was the outer one. The second line circled round the large building called the mess-house, and the Motee Mahul, and the first, or interior one, was the principal rampart of the Kaiser Bagh, the rear of the inclosures of the latter being closed in by the city, through which approach would have been dangerous to an assailant. These lines were flanked by numerous bastions, and rested at one end on the Goomtee, and the other on the great buildings of the street called the Huzratgunge, all of which were strongly fortified, and flanked the street in every direction. Extraordinary care had been expended on the defence of the houses and bastions to enfilade the streets." As soon as it became apparent that Sir James Outram had turned the first line of defence by pushing forward to the vicinity of the Chukkur Walla Kotee, all the batteries at the Dilkoosha opened their fire on the Martiniere, and with so much effect, that on the 9th it was successfully stormed by the 42d, 53d, and 90th regiments, under the direction of Brigadier Sir Edward Lugard and the Hon. Adrian Hope. This first success was immediately followed by one of still more consequence, when the 4th Punjab rifles, supported by the 42d Highlanders, climbed up the entrenchment abutting on the Goomtee, and swept down the whole line of works forming the outer defence as far as the building known as Banks's house, which was carried next day at sunrise, and secured as a strong military post. Sir James Outram had in the meantime been making rapid progress, having not only captured the Badshah Bagh, one of the finest of the King of Oude's summer palaces, but established himself strongly at the north extremity of the iron bridge. The continuance of the attack is thus described in the despatch:—"The second part of the plan of attack against

Formidable difficulties to be encountered.

Gallantry with which they are mounted.

A D 1857

the Kaiser Bagh now came into operation, viz., to use the great blocks of houses and palaces extending from Banks's house to the Kaiser Bagh as our approach, instead of sapping up towards the front of the second line of works. By these means I was enabled to turn towards our own left, at the same time that they were enfiladed on the right by Sir James Outram's advance. The latter had already received orders to plant his guns with a view to raking the enemy's position, to annoy the Kaiser Bagh with a vertical and direct fire, also to attack the suburbs in the vicinity of the iron and stone bridges shortly after daybreak, and to command the iron bridge from the left bank. All this was carried out by Sir James Outram with the most marked success. The enemy, however, still held pertinaciously to his own end of the iron bridge on the right bank, and there was heavy cannonading from both sides, till the bridge was afterwards taken in reverse."

Successive
captures of
enemy's
strongest
works

The front attack as continued from the 11th is thus described:—"The operation had now become one of an engineering character, and the most earnest endeavours were made to save the infantry from being hazarded before due preparation had been made. The chief engineer, Brigadier Napier, placed the batteries with a view to breaching and shelling a large block of the palaces called the Begum Kotee. The latter was stormed with great gallantry by the 93d Highlanders, supported by the 4th Punjab rifles, and 1000 Ghoorkas, led by Brigadier the Hon. Adrian Hope, under the direction of Brigadier-general Sir Edward Lugard, at four A.M. The troops secured the whole block of buildings, and inflicted a very heavy loss on the enemy, the attack having been one of a very desperate character. This was the sternest struggle which occurred during the siege. From thenceforward the chief engineer pushed his approach with the greatest judgment through the inclosures by the aid of the sappers and of heavy guns, the troops immediately occupying the ground as he advanced, and the mortars being moved from one position to another, as the ground was won on which they could be placed. The buildings to the right and the Secunder Bagh were taken in the early morning of the same day without opposition. During the night of the 12th, Sir James Outram was reinforced with a number of heavy guns and mortars, and directed to increase his fire on the Kaiser Bagh, while at the same time mortars placed in a position at the Begum's house never ceased to play on the Imambara, the next large palace it was necessary to storm, between the Begum Kotee and the Kaiser Bagh."

Arrival of
the Nepa-
lese force
at Lucknow

On the 11th, Jung Bahadoor, after long delays, arrived with a force of about 9000 men and twenty-four field guns, with which he took up a position close to the canal, where he was advantageously employed for several days in covering the left of the British force, whose whole available strength was then massed towards the right, in the joint attack carried along both banks of the Goomtee. The attack of the Imambara, under the direction of General Franks,

who had relieved Sir Edward Lugard, took place on the 14th, and not only succeeded, but was followed up in a manner which none had been sanguine enough to anticipate. After the Imambara had been forced by the column of attack led by Brigadier D. Russell, Brayser's Sikhs pressing forward in pursuit entered the Kaiser Bagh, and made good their footing within it. The third line of defences having thus been turned without a single gun being fired from them, "supports," continues the despatch, "were quickly thrown in, and all the well-known ground of former defence and attack, the mess-house, the Tara Kotee, the Motee Mahul, and the Chuttur Munzil, were rapidly occupied by the troops, while the engineers devoted their attention to securing the position towards the south and west. The day was one of continued exertion, and every one felt that although much remained to be done before the final expulsion of the rebels, the most difficult part of the work had been overcome." How much had been achieved may be learned from the following brief descrip-

A.D. 1857.

Continued progress of the British arms.



CHUTTUR MUNZIL PALACE, LUCKNOW — From a photograph engraved in the Illustrated Times

tion which the despatch gives of the various buildings successively sapped into or stormed:—"They formed a range of massive palaces and walled courts of vast extent, equalled perhaps, but certainly not surpassed, in any capital in Europe. Every outlet had been covered by a work, and on every side were prepared barricades and loopholed parapets. The extraordinary industry evinced by the enemy in this respect has been really unexampled. Hence the absolute necessity for holding the troops in hand, till at each successive move forward the engineers reported to me that all which could be effected by artillery and the sappers had been done before the troops were led to the assault."

The 15th having been employed in securing what had been gained, and fixing mortars for the bombardment of all the positions still held by the enemy,

Final capture of the city.

A D 1857. active operations were resumed on the following day, when Sir James Outram, with the 5th brigade under Brigadier Douglas, supported by two other regiments, crossed the Goomtee by a bridge of casks, a little above the iron bridge, and was able not only to take the latter bridge in reverse, which was the chief object in view, but to advance more than a mile up the right bank of the river, and take possession both of the Muchee Bhowun and another building considerably beyond it, called the Great Imambarā. At the same time, a portion of his force having turned eastward, passed through the Chuttur Munzil into the residency. The city was now won, but the far greater part of the rebels had made their escape. This was perhaps unavoidable, as the extent of the city made it impossible effectually to guard the leading outlets from it.

Defeat of the
Begum of
Oude and
the Moulvie
of Fyzabad

Two considerable bodies of rebels still remained to be disposed of. One of these, estimated at about 7000, occupied the Moosa Bagh, a large palace with gardens and inclosures, situated at some distance to the west, near the right bank of the Goomtee. It was under the immediate direction of the Begum Huzrat-Mahul, the ex-queen of Oude, who had throughout been the very soul of the insurrection in that kingdom. She had with her her son Brijeis Kuddr, of whom, in the absence of her husband, then a prisoner at Calcutta, she had made a puppet king, and also her notorious paramour, Mumoo Khan, who had so long been permitted to usurp her husband's place, as to make the real paternity of Brijeis Kuddr more than doubtful. The other body of rebels occupied a stronghold in the heart of the city, and was headed by the Moulvie of Fyzabad, whose combined ability and fanaticism made him one of the most influential of the insurgent leaders. On the 19th Sir James Outram moved directly on the Moosa Bagh, by the right bank of the Goomtee, while Brigadier Hope Grant cannonaded it from the left bank, and Brigadier Campbell moved round from the Alumbagh to the west, for the purpose of preventing retreat in that direction. The result was a complete rout. The moulvie, after a stout resistance, was driven out on the 21st by Sir Edward Lugard, and pursued by the cavalry under Brigadier Campbell for six miles. Resistance being now at an end, the commander-in-chief deemed it "possible to invite the return of the inhabitants, and to rescue the city from the horrors of this prolonged contest." Notwithstanding the desperate fighting which had taken place, so much care had been taken not to expose the troops unnecessarily, that the capture was effected with a comparatively trifling numerical loss. In another respect the loss was serious, as it included two of the most promising officers in the service, Hodson and Peel. The former fell mortally wounded during the assault, and died almost immediately after; the latter, now become Sir William Peel, in just recompense for his distinguished services, was also severely wounded, but had given good hopes of an early and complete recovery, when an attack of small-pox, aggravated by his previous suffering, carried him off, after he had been removed to Cawnpoor.

Death of
Hodson and
Peel.

When Lucknow was captured, it must have become apparent to the rebels that all hope of successful resistance was at an end. But they did not therefore at once abandon the struggle. On the contrary, with the exception of the capital and the small portion of country adjoining the road leading from it to Cawnpoor, the whole of Oude was still in their possession; while they mustered strong in Behar on the east, where Koer Sing still headed the revolt; in Rohilcund on the north-west, where Khan Bahadur, reinforced by insurgent fugitives from other quarters, had become so strong, as to make it a question whether a campaign against him ought not to have preceded that undertaken against Lucknow; and in the south and south-west, where, throughout the greater part of Central India, the authority not only of the British government, but of the two leading native princes, Scindia and Holkar, who remained in alliance with it, had for the time been completely extinguished. Much important work thus remained to be done, and though ultimate success could no longer be considered doubtful, there was little prospect of being able to achieve it before the rains would set in, and render campaigning all but impossible. Under these circumstances, all that the commander-in-chief could do was to provide for the security of Lucknow by intrusting the command of it to Sir Hope Grant, with a force adequate not only to garrison it, but to overawe the disturbed districts in its vicinity, to send out moveable columns to clear the way in those directions where his communications were endangered, and then prepare for the final suppression of the mutiny by moving against Rohilcund, effecting a junction with Sir Hugh Rose, who had been leading a large and victorious force northwards through Central India, and lastly return with augmented force into Oude, and drive the rebels before him into the pestilential morasses of the Terai of Nepaul.

The Ghoorkas, impatient to return to their homes laden with plunder, quitted the vicinity of Lucknow shortly after its capture, and proceeded eastward by way of Fyzabad. They were followed shortly afterwards by Sir Edward Lugard, at the head of a strong column, consisting of three regiments of infantry, three of Sikh horse, the military train, and three batteries, which started from Lucknow on the 29th of March, and proceeded south-east to Sultanpoor. The immediate destination of the column was Azimghur, which had for some time been held in a state of siege by Koer Sing, with the greater part of the Dinapoor mutineers, about 3000 levies, and three or four guns. On

A.D. 1857.

The struggle
in Oude still
continued.

Proceedings
in the
direction of
Azimghur

A D 1857.

poor had been broken down, and the column being in consequence obliged to take a somewhat circuitous route, did not reach Juanpore till the 9th of April. Another detention, caused by the defeat and pursuit of a body of rebels, who threw themselves across its path, prevented it from reaching Azimghur before the 15th. Here the final encounter took place, and terminated as usual in the discomfiture of the rebels, who broke up into three different parties, one of which fled northward on the road to Gorruckpore, and another back towards Oude, while the third and main body, under Koer Sing himself, moved eastward towards his own zemindaree, in the vicinity of Arrah, where the wounds which he had received in the action shortly afterwards terminated his career.

Defeat and
death of
Koer Sing

On the 10th of April another strong column, mustering nearly 6000 men of all arms, and fully provided with light and heavy artillery, under General Walpole, set out from Lucknow with the intention of clearing that part of the country, and moving upward along the left bank of the Ganges toward Rohilcund. No opposition was experienced till the 15th, when, on arriving at Rhoodamow, fifty miles west of Lucknow, its fort was found in possession of a body of rebels. Their number did not exceed 400, and the defences of the fort consisted only of a high loopholed wall and a ditch. An easy capture was consequently anticipated; and with strange disregard both of ordinary caution, and of the special instructions of the commander-in-chief to risk no assault until due preparation had been made for it by the use of artillery, an attacking party, consisting of the 42d Highlanders, supported by the 4th Punjab rifles, was ordered to advance to the attack. This was a serious and costly blunder. The rebels, completely sheltered, kept up such a deadly fire, that the assailants, after an unavailing display of gallantry, were obliged to retire with a loss of nearly 100 in killed and wounded, including among the former four officers, one of them Brigadier the Hon. Adrian Hope, almost adored by his own regiment, the 93d, and described, with little exaggeration, as "the most gallant and the best beloved soldier in the army." The folly of having risked this repulse was demonstrated next morning, when it was found that the place had been evacuated during the night.

Unhappy
affair at
Rhoodamow.

Death of the
Hon. Adrian
Hope.

The commander-in-chief having opened the campaign in Rohilcund by the capture of Shajehanpore, started again on the 2d of May, and began to advance northwards on Bareilly, on which, at the same time, in consequence of a well-managed combination, two other columns were moving—one under General Jones from the north-west, by way of Moradabad, and the other under General Penney from the south-west, by way of Budaon. This concentration of force, provided for the suppression of the mutiny in Rohilcund, shows that a very formidable resistance was anticipated. Khan Bahadur Khan, while allowed to remain in undisturbed possession of his usurped authority, carried matters with so high a hand, that the whole of the Rohillas, who had grievous wrongs of their own to avenge, seemed to have rallied round his standard. The

Battle of
Bareilly and
flight of the
rebels.

A D 1857.

Flight of the
rebels.Campaign
in Central
IndiaProgress of
the British
forces

result, however, showed that he was formidable only so long as he was unopposed. When the encounter took place he made little more than a show of resistance, and seeking safety in a precipitate flight, left the British to resume almost undisputed possession of Bareilly. More boldness and dexterity were displayed by the Moulvie of Lucknow, who, taking advantage of the departure of the British army for Bareilly, mustered a large promiscuous force, and by making a dash at Shajehanpore, actually succeeded in seizing and plundering it. Some mistake must have been committed in intrusting it to a garrison so feeble that they were obliged to take refuge in the jail, and remain entirely on the defensive till they were again set free by General Jones, who had been detached from Bareilly for that purpose. With the capture of Bareilly the Rohilkund campaign virtually terminated. The rebels, unable to keep the field, only attempted a desultory warfare, while the approaching rains made the continuance of active operations on the part of the British in great measure impossible. In contemplation of this period of comparative quiescence, the commander-in-chief fixed his head-quarters at Futtelghur, there to wait till the return of the cold season should allow the campaign to be resumed. Meanwhile it will be necessary to turn to another quarter, to which due attention has not yet been paid, and give a brief account of the progress of events in Central India.

In the earlier stage of the mutiny no effort could be made to check its progress in Central India, and the mutineers, headed in some instances by native princes, were allowed to indulge a temporary triumph. It was not of long duration. The presidencies both of Bombay and Madras, after a short period of anxious suspense, gave satisfactory proof that they were not implicated in the treachery which prevailed in Bengal, and it in consequence became practicable to organize columns from their respective armies, which, entering Central India from the south-east and south-west, might afford effectual aid in restoring the authority of government. The former column, under General Whitlock, after quitting Nagpore, proceeded northwards towards Jubbulpore; the latter, under General Roberts, coming from Rajpootana, proceeded in the direction of Kotah; both were intended to co-operate, and ultimately form a junction with a more central column, when the whole, under the command of Sir Hugh Rose, was to assume the name of the Central India field force.

At the outset the central column, consisting of about 6000 men, of whom 2500 were British, was formed into two brigades. One of them, commanded by Brigadier Stuart of the 14th light dragoons, having on the 2d of August, 1857, effected the relief of Mhow, which since the commencement of the mutiny had been kept in a state of siege, spent the remainder of the rainy season in repairing and strengthening the fort, erecting new batteries, and throwing up entrenchments, with the view of making the locality a basis for subsequent operations. On the 19th of October the brigade was again in

A D 1857.

Dhar
besieged

motion, and proceeded west to Dhar, the capital of a small principality, where a body of mutineers, collected from various quarters, had, contrary to the wish of the native authorities, taken forcible possession. The actual rajah was a mere boy, and the probability is that his guardians were playing a double game, conciliating the rebels by complying with their demands, and at the same time professing to the British government that they did so not voluntarily, but under compulsion. As the brigade approached the town, the rebels, quitting the fort, advanced to the attack, and opened a brisk fire from three brass guns which they had planted on an adjoining height. After a short encounter their courage failed, and they took refuge within the fort, leaving their guns behind them. A siege in consequence became necessary, and after the arrival of the siege train on the 24th of October, operations were immediately commenced. While from a position at some distance to the south shells continued to be thrown into the fort with little intermission, advantage was taken of the cover afforded by the huts and mud walls of the town to place a breaching battery, which began to play at the distance of 300 yards on the curtains and bastions of the fort, which were all substantially built of stone. Means were at the same time taken to invest the place so closely as to prevent the escape of the garrison, which was supposed to fall little short of 4000 men. By the 29th, after a considerable breach had been made, the garrison began to talk of terms, but on being told that nothing but an unconditional surrender would be accepted, declared their determination to hold out to the last. This was only a feint. They were already preparing their escape, and notwithstanding all the precautions which had been used, accomplished it with so much dexterity, that their flight was not known till the storming party entered the breach and found the place deserted.

Capture of
Dhar and
Mundisore.

After laying the fort in ruins so as to prevent the rebels from again using it as a stronghold, and receiving a considerable reinforcement by the arrival of the Hyderabad contingent under Major Orr, the column resumed its march in two divisions,—the contingent starting on the 7th of November for Mahidpoor, where the Dhar rebels, greatly augmented by others from the neighbourhood, were reported to have committed great outrages; while the rest of the force did not set out till the following day. The contingent pushing forward, came up with the enemy at the village of Rawul, and by a gallant charge drove them from their guns, which were captured, together with large quantities of ammunition, and of bullocks and carts loaded with plunder. This success having cleared the road, no further encounter took place till Mundisore was reached on the morning of the 21st of November. Here the rebels had fixed their head-quarters, and felt so confident in their superior numbers, that instead of waiting to be attacked, they first attempted a surprise, and when it failed, advanced steadily with banners flying, threatening at once both British flanks and centre. After a short encounter they turned their backs, and were pursued

almost to the walls of the town. Meanwhile intelligence was received that a body of rebels, estimated at 5000, who had been laying siege to Neemuch, had set out to form a junction with those at Mundisore. As this junction would have given the enemy an overwhelming preponderance, Brigadier Stuart determined to frustrate it, by throwing himself between the two bodies, though at the risk of opposing himself to an attack both in front and rear. He accordingly set out on the morning of the 22d, and had an encounter with the enemy's advance-guard without any very decisive result. On the following day, after advancing a short way along the road between Mundisore and Neemuch, he found the enemy in great force, strongly posted in and beyond the village of Goraria. This position was too strong to be forced, and when night closed, after a fierce struggle, still remained in possession of the enemy. While the battle was raging in front, a party of rebels from Mundisore had made an attack on the British rear, and attempted, though without success, to carry off the baggage. On the 24th the battle was renewed and maintained by the rebels with great obstinacy, till they were driven from the village at the point of the bayonet, and fled, scattering themselves over the country. Their loss was estimated at not less than 1500. The result was the relief of Neemuch, where a considerable number of Europeans, shut up within the fort, had for some time been maintaining a gallant but almost desperate defence, and the capture of Mundisore which, when the column returned to it the day after the battle, was found evacuated. Leaving Major Orr with the contingent in occupation of Mundisore, Brigadier Stuart retraced his steps, and on the 13th of December arrived at Indore, where Sir Hugh Rose assumed the command in person of the two brigades, composing what was henceforth designated the Central India field force.

A.D. 1858.

Mundisore
captured.

From Indore, the capital of Holkar's dominions, Sir Hugh Rose, in the beginning of January, 1858, marched north-east in the direction of Sehore, a town in the principality of Bhopal, ruled at this time by a princess or begum, who had remained faithful to the British alliance during the general disaffection, though most of the troops belonging to her contingent had joined the mutineers. After reaching Sehore, and executing summary vengeance on a number of mutineers, the force continued its march through Bhopal and Bhilsa to the fort of Rhatghur, situated about twenty-five miles W.S.W. of Saugor. This fort was one of the largest and strongest in Central India, and was then garrisoned by a large body of rebels, who had retired to it as a stronghold which could not be wrested from them. It stood on the spur of a lofty ridge, isolated on the east and south sides by scarped precipices, while the north side was inclosed by a deep ditch, and the west side, in which the gateway was placed, was flanked by several square and round bastions. With much labour and difficulty, a mortar and a breaching battery having been completed, fire was opened from them on the 27th January, at the distance of about 300 yards,


Sehore and
Saugor re-
lieved.

A.D. 1858

and kept up with so much vigour, that on the evening of the 28th the breach was pronounced practicable. It was however unnecessary to storm. The garrison, descending by a precipice which, as it seemed to bar the possibility of egress, was carelessly guarded by a body of Bhopal troops, had made their escape. The next advance was to Saugor, where Sir Hugh Rose had the happiness of relieving a body of Europeans who had been cooped up for eight months within the fort. A few days afterwards, the Madras column, under General Whitlock, which had been advancing by way of Jubbulpoor, made its appearance, after having successfully cleared the districts through which it passed.

Continued
progress of
the British
arms

At some distance to the east of Saugor stood the fort of Gurrukotta. It was occupied by a body of rebels, and was expected to give some trouble, but the garrison only made a show of resistance while preparing for flight, and



Fort of Saugor.—From Illustrated London News.

then moved off, leaving a large quantity of accumulated plunder behind them. Sir Hugh Rose now prepared for a long march to the north. His destination was Jhansi, where a hideous massacre had been perpetrated, and where the begum, resenting the questionable act which had incorporated the territory with British India, had headed the revolt, and given proof of talents which, but for her share in the Jhansi massacre, might have extorted admiration. The road led over some of the ridges of the Vindhya Mountains, and through several passes which, if properly defended, could not have been forced without great difficulty and sacrifice of life. Malthoor, the most difficult of these, was in the direct line, and the rebels, assuming that the British force would proceed by it, had blocked it up with boulders and barricades, and occupied it with a large body of troops, under the personal command of the rebel Rajah of Banpoor. Sir Hugh Rose having taken up a position from which he might move on any one of the passes which might eventually be selected, took means to confirm the enemy in the belief that he had fixed upon Malthoor, and then made a sudden

Malthoor
threatened.

flank movement, which brought him to the pass of Mudanpoor. The resistance offered by the rebels only showed how much more effective it would have been if they had not been taken by surprise, and after a short struggle the pass was cleared. The level country having thus been gained, several places of some strength were captured, and the whole force continued its advance on Jhansi, where it arrived on the 21st of March.

A D 1858

The town of Jhansi, situated in the midst of extensive woods, covers an area of about four miles and a half in circuit, and is surrounded by a wall of solid masonry from six to twelve feet thick, and eighteen to thirty feet high, flanked with bastions for ordnance, and loopholed for musketry. Within the town, and inclosed by it on all sides except the west, where the rock on which it stands terminates in an abrupt and lofty precipice, rises the citadel, completely commanding both the town and the roads leading to it, and strongly fortified both by nature and art. Its walls, constructed of solid granite from sixteen to twenty feet thick, were flanked by elaborate outworks of the same solid construction; while the interior, partly occupied by the massive buildings of the palace, contained several lofty towers mounting heavy ordnance, and in some places pierced with five tiers of loopholes. The south side appearing to be the only one from which the fort could be successfully assailed, batteries were so placed as to bring a concentrated fire upon it, and immediately opened with great effect. Several of the enemy's guns were silenced, and the battlements gave evident signs of crumbling away. The besiegers were in consequence indulging the hope of a speedy and successful assault when this cheering prospect became suddenly clouded. On the evening of the 31st March, a telegraph which Sir Hugh Rose had taken the precaution to establish on a commanding hill in the vicinity, signalled that "the enemy were coming in great force from the north." There could be no doubt as to the enemy thus announced. The very day when the siege commenced it was rumoured that a whole army of rebels, composed chiefly of the gathered remnants of the Gwalior contingent, under a distinguished leader of the name of Tantia Topce, was about to advance to the ranees relief from Calpee, situated on the Chumbul, about ninety miles to the north-east. This, then, was the enemy; and the British force, which barely sufficed to carry on the siege, was suddenly called upon, while continuing to man its batteries and keep in check a garrison of 12,000 men, to encounter an army of nearly double that number in the open field. The odds were fearful, for all the troops that could be spared from the siege did not exceed 1200, and of these only 500 were British infantry. With these Sir Hugh Rose moved out with as little delay as possible, and found the enemy marching in masses, and taking up a position in front of the British camp, near the banks of the Betwa. The battle was deferred till the following morning (1st April), and furnished another signal example of the utter inability of a native to cope with a British force properly handled. After a cannonade which made

The fort of Jhansi.

Attempted relief of it by the rebels.

A.D. 1858.

Jhansi taken
by assault

havoc among the dense masses of the enemy, a charge of cavalry, directed simultaneously against both wings, increased the confusion, and made it comparatively easy for the infantry to push forward and complete the victory at the point of the bayonet. All the guns brought by the enemy from Calpee were captured, and nearly 1000 of their number lay dead upon the field. After this victory the siege was prosecuted with so much vigour, that an assault took place on the 3d of April. It was made in two columns—the one on the right, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the 3d Europeans, and Hyderabad infantry, effecting an entrance by escalade, while that on the left, composed of the royal engineers and the 86th and 25th Bombay native infantry, stormed the breach. Both attacks succeeded, and the two columns, after clearing the way before them, met, and were concentrated at the palace. The fighting, however, was still continued in different parts both of the city and the fort, and did not finally cease till the 6th, when the capture was completed. Large numbers of the rebels were slain, but still larger numbers escaped, and among them the ranee, who, though seen in full flight, mounted on a gray horse, and attended only by a few followers, could not be overtaken.

Victorious
career of
two British
auxiliary
columns.

While Sir Hugh Rose was pursuing his victorious career, the other two columns under Generals Roberts and Whitlock were also making a successful advance. The Bombay column under the former general, advancing through Rajpootana by way of Nusseerabad, reached Kotah on the right bank of the Chumbul on the 22d of March. Here the position of affairs was somewhat singular. Immediately on the arrival of the British on the left bank of the Chumbul, the rajah crossed over by one of the fords and entered the camp. He had all along been a faithful ally, and at the head of a body of troops, whose fidelity remained unshaken, was still in possession of the citadel and palace, situated in the southern division of the town. The northern division, however, was wholly in the power of the rebels, and thus Kotah was truly a city divided against itself. The arrival of General Roberts threw the balance so completely in the rajah's favour, that little difficulty was found in expelling the rebels, though they managed as usual to distance their pursuers and escape. The Madras column, under General Whitlock, had been equally successful. After traversing a large extent of country, and clearing it of rebels, it arrived on the 19th of April in the vicinity of Banda, about ninety miles west of Allahabad. Here the native ruler or nabob was in open arms against the government, and advanced at the head of about 7000 men, of whom about 1000 were sepoy of the Bengal army, to offer battle. General Whitlock, though outnumbered nearly sevenfold, gladly accepted the challenge, and after a contest, which was obstinately maintained for four hours, gained a decisive victory.

After remaining some time in Jhansi to prepare for a movement on Calpee, where it was understood that the rebels, again augmented by fugitives from various quarters, had resolved to make a final stand, Sir Hugh Rose, somewhat

weakened in consequence of being obliged to deprive himself of a considerable portion of his troops who were to remain in garrison, started again on the 29th of April, and made several midnight marches, which were daily becoming more difficult from the oppressive heat. The first serious opposition was encountered in the vicinity of Koonch, where a body of rebels, headed by the Rancee of Jhansi, the Rajah of Baunpoor, the Nabob of Banda, Tantia Topee, and others, and estimated at 20,000, had assembled. It would seem however that the succession of disasters which had befallen the rebels had deterred them from risking a fair encounter, and after a distant cannonade, and some volleys from musketeers who remained under cover, the British advance became the signal for general flight. Calpee was now only forty miles distant, and was gradually approached by slow marches, the heat rendering rapid movement absolutely impossible, and daily producing heavier loss than the enemy were able to inflict. On the 22d of May, after Golowlee, within six miles of Calpee, had been reached, and several days had been spent in a kind of desultory and harassing warfare, the enemy were seen advancing in force along the Calpee road, in order of battle. An immediate encounter took place, and was for some time maintained by the enemy with so much determination; and in such overwhelming numbers, that the issue looked doubtful, till the bayonet was resorted to, and proved as usual decisive. The enemy's masses of infantry driven headlong, broke up in confusion, and fled panic-struck in all directions. The result of this victory was the capture of Calpee, with large quantities of ammunition, military stores, and the plunder of the different stations from which the mutineers had come. Assuming that the campaign was now virtually ended, Sir Hugh Rose, who was about to depart on sick certificate, issued the following order:—"Camp, Calpee, 1st June, 1858. The Central India field force being about to be dissolved, the major-general cannot allow the troops to leave his immediate command without expressing to them the gratification he has invariably experienced at their good conduct and discipline, and he requests that the following general order may be read at the head of every corps and detachment of the force: Soldiers: you have marched more than a thousand miles, and taken more than a hundred guns; you have forced your way through mountain passes, and intricate jungles, and over rivers; you have captured the strongest forts, and beat the enemy, no matter what the odds, wherever you met him; you have restored extensive districts to the government, and peace and order now reign where before, for twelve months, were tyranny and rebellion; you have done all this and you have never had a check. I thank you with all my sincerity for your bravery, your devotion, and your discipline. When you first marched I told you that you as British soldiers had more than enough of courage for the work which was before you, but that courage without discipline was of no avail, and I exhorted you to let discipline be your watchword; you have attended to my orders. In hardships, in temptations, and in

A.D. 1858.

Advance of
Sir Hugh
Rose on
Calpee.His victory
of Golowlee
and capture
of CalpeeHis general
order.

A D. 1359. dangers, you have obeyed your general, and you have never left your ranks. You have fought against the strong, and you have protected the rights of the weak and defenceless, of foes as well as friends; I have seen you in the ardour of the combat preserve and place children out of harm's way. This is the discipline of Christian soldiers, and this it is which has brought you triumphant from the shores of Western India to the waters of the Jumna, and establishes, without doubt, that you will find no place to equal the glory of your arms."

The rebels
capture
Gwalior

The above excellent order, considered as a parting address, was rather premature. The rebels rallying after their defeat, had carried their arms into another district, and achieved a success to which they had for some time been strangers. Most of them in their flight from Calpee had taken the direction of Gwalior, situated about 100 miles due west, and wreaked their vengeance on Scindia, for his refusal to share in their revolt. This native prince, who had hitherto offered only a passive resistance to their measures, was emboldened, on hearing of their approach toward his capital, to take more active steps, and mustering the troops still in his service, sent them out to offer battle. When the decisive moment arrived, a large proportion of them deserted, and returning with the other mutineers to Gwalior took forcible possession of it, while Scindia himself, unable to offer any effectual resistance, fled northward and took refuge in Agra. His place was immediately supplied by Row Sahib, a nephew of Nana Sahib, who was placed upon the musnud, and received the homage of the rebels as the new sovereign. Sir Hugh Rose, on hearing of these events, once more buckled on his armour and set out for Gwalior, after sending instructions to different detachments to join him by the way. The rebels during the short respite which had been given them, had exerted themselves to strengthen their position, and conscious that they were playing their last stake, prepared for a determined resistance, by carefully occupying all the roads by which it was supposed that the British force might approach. In the absence of Tantia Topee and other leaders, who after their defeat at Calpee were probably convinced that they would be more safely, if not more usefully employed elsewhere, the command of the rebels was undertaken by the Ranee of Jhansi, who clad, it is said, in male attire, mounted on a noble steed, and attended by a picked and well-armed staff, kept moving about wherever her presence was required, superintending all arrangements, and displaying a skill, energy, and courage worthy of a better cause. The first struggle was for the possession of the cantonment, out of which the rebels were driven with heavy loss. On the following day the battle was resumed, and raged with great fierceness, invariably to the disadvantage of the rebels. At last, on the afternoon of the 19th, after the greater part of the town had been occupied, all their courage failed them, and they thought only of saving themselves by flight, leaving the battle-field and the street covered with their dead. Among these the Ranee of Jhansi was known to be included, but her body, probably because it had been carried off

A new vic-
tory over
them.

and burned by her attendants, was never discovered. Meanwhile Scindia, in the prospect of being reinstated in his sovereignty, had set out from Agra and was approaching his capital. He re-entered it on the 20th, and thus obtained the reward of a fidelity which, though it must have been sorely tried, seems never to have been shaken. The campaign being now virtually ended, the Central India field force was broken up, and Sir Hugh Rose, left at liberty to carry out his original intention, started for Bombay.

A D 1858

Scindia
returns to
Gwalior.

CHAPTER VII.

Proposed change in the government of India—Change of ministry—Lord Canning's Oude proclamation—Lord Ellenborough's despatch—Extinction of the East India Company—The Queen's proclamation—Suppression of the mutiny—Conclusion.



INDIA, in consequence of the mutiny, had attracted, both from the country at large and from the legislature, a degree of attention which it had never been able to command before, and the result was a general conviction that a radical change in the mode of governing it was imperatively required. The subject had on several occasions been incidentally discussed in both Houses of Parliament, and the Company, made aware by communications with government, that their very existence as the rulers of India was seriously threatened, had presented a long and elaborate petition, in which, pleading the merits of their past services, and denying that the mutiny was owing to their mismanagement, they deprecated legislation of the kind which they understood to be in contemplation, as at once pernicious and unseasonable; pernicious, because it would substitute a bad form of government for one which had on the whole worked admirably; and unseasonable, because, proposed at a time when mutiny was raging, its natural effect would be to unsettle the native mind still more, and increase the existing confusion. This petition was presented to the House of Lords on the 11th of February, 1858. Next day Lord Palmerston introduced into the House of Commons a "Bill for the better government of India." Leaving arrangements in India unchanged, it was intended to apply only to home management, and proposed that the functions of the Courts of Directors and Proprietors should cease; that for these bodies there should be substituted a president assisted by a council for the affairs of India; that the president should be a member of the government, and the organ of the cabinet in everything relating to Indian affairs; and that the council, named, like the president, by the crown, but restricted to individuals who had either been directors of the Company or had resided in India for a

Proceedings
in parlia-
ment.A new India
bill.

A D 1858.

A new
India bill.

certain period, with or without employment, should consist of eight members, elected for eight years, two retiring by rotation every second year, in order that successive administrations might have an opportunity of renewing the council from time to time, by the introduction of persons returning from India with fresh knowledge and ideas. The final decision was in all cases to remain with the president, because the cabinet of which he was the organ was henceforth to be solely responsible for his measures; but in the event of a difference of opinion, the members of council should have the power of recording that difference, together with the reasons of it, in the minutes. In regard to patronage, all the appointments hitherto made in India were to be made there as before; and at home, while the writerships remained as at present open to public competition, the appointments of cadets should be shared by the president and the council, in the same manner as they were previously shared by the president of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. When the usual motion for leave was made, Mr. Thomas Baring, who had presented the petition from the Company, moved as an amendment, "That it is not at present expedient to legislate for the government of India;" but after a debate continued during several successive nights, the amendment was negatived by 318 to 173. In this first trial of strength, the supporters of the bill so far outnumbered its opponents, that it was considered beyond the reach of danger, and yet, owing to a contingency which suddenly arose, and was not at all connected with Indian affairs, the bill was not destined to become law.

Sudden
change of
the British
ministry.

An attempt had recently been made to assassinate the French emperor, and as the assassins, though foreigners, were known to have come from England, violent tirades were made against this country for having afforded them an asylum. These might have been overlooked, had they been confined to ordinary newspapers, or even to congratulatory addresses which were printed in the *Moniteur*, and in which blustering soldiers asked permission to cross the Channel, to root out the nest of hornets and those who fostered them; but the matter assumed a graver form when tirades were followed, not only by a speech in a somewhat similar spirit by M. Morny in the legislative body, but by an official despatch from Count Walewski, in which, after saying, at least by implication, that assassination was here "elevated to doctrine," and "preached openly," he indignantly asked, "Ought then the right of asylum to protect such a state of things? Is hospitality due to assassins? Ought the English legislature to contribute to favour their designs and their plans?" &c., and called upon her Britannic majesty's government for "a guarantee of security, which no state can refuse to a neighbouring state, and which we are authorized to expect from an ally." The only answer given by government to this despatch was the introduction of what was called a conspiracy bill, the object of which was, without trenching on the right of asylum given to foreigners, to amend the English law by making conspiracy to murder, instead of a misdemeanour

punishable only by fine and imprisonment, a felony punishable by penal servitude, wherever the murder was intended to be committed, whether in this or in a foreign country. After a debate continued for two successive nights, leave was given to introduce the bill by a majority of 299 against 99. The conservatives had voted generally in the majority, but on the 19th of February, when the second reading was moved, a combination, encouraged by the general unpopularity of the measure, had taken place, and the conservatives, now in league with its opponents, succeeded in placing government in a minority of nineteen, by supporting an amendment expressive of "regret that her majesty's government, previously to inviting the house to amend the law of conspiracy at the present time, had not felt it to be their duty to reply to the important despatch received from the French government." In consequence of this vote the Palmerston ministry resigned.

A.D. 1853.

The new ministry formed by Lord Derby could hardly fail, both from its general character and the particular appointment of Lord Ellenborough as president of the Board of Control, to have a marked effect on Indian politics. Not only had the conservatives supported Mr. Baring's amendment, declaring that "it is not at present expedient to legislate for the government of India," but their leaders in both houses, when votes of thanks were moved to the Indian officials civil and military, "for the eminent skill, courage, and perseverance displayed by them" in the suppression of the mutiny, took special exception to the name of Lord Canning, on the ground that the merits of his administration during the crisis were very questionable, and at least ought not to be recognized till they were better ascertained. There were thus two points to which the new ministry stood committed, as far as previous expressions of opinion could bind them—the one, the impolicy of introducing an India bill at present, and the other, a determination not to recognize the merits of Lord Canning's administration without further inquiry. The latter point, though insignificant compared with the other, was perhaps felt to be the more pressing, as it was of a party character, and we cannot therefore wonder that in the vigorous hands of Lord Ellenborough, to whose department it officially belonged, it soon gave rise to discussions which for a time absorbed all the interest which was felt in the other.

Policy of the new cabinet

With regard to the impolicy of introducing a bill for the government of India, the new ministry could not but feel that they stood in a false position. The vote in favour of a bill was overwhelming, and it was not to be supposed that the very same house which carried that vote, would reverse it merely at the bidding of a new cabinet. Under these circumstances, the ministry took the only course which was open to them if they were to retain their places, by bringing their opinions into harmony with those of the majority, and announcing their intention to lose no time in introducing an India bill, which would secure most of the objects of the bill of their predecessors, and at the same time

Their difficulties and mode of surmounting them.

A D 1858

India bill
No 2Its principal
provisions.

be-free from the objections to which it was liable. The change of opinion thus implied was accounted for with some degree of plausibility, by adverting to the effect which the previous vote must have had in weakening the authority of the Company, and thereby rendering the transfer of it to the crown, which might otherwise have been inexpedient, absolutely necessary. Accordingly on the 26th of March, Mr. Disraeli, now chancellor of the exchequer, and leader of the House of Commons, introduced what was called "India bill No. 2," to distinguish it from the previous bill, which not having been abandoned, retained its precedence, and was called "India bill No 1." The main object, the transfer of the government of India to the crown, was the same in both bills; but the mode of effecting it was very different, and in the case of "No. 2," called into existence a very novel and curious piece of political machinery. There was to be, as in No. 1, a president and a council, but the latter, instead of being limited to eight members all nominated by the crown, was to consist of eighteen, of whom half were to be nominated and half elected. In regard to the latter, the power of the crown would of course be entirely excluded; but in regard even to the former, though they were to be named by crown warrant, the qualifications necessary to eligibility would be such as to make them truly representatives not of the crown, but of distinct Indian interests. Four, representing the civil service, must have served in it ten years—one in Upper India, one in Bengal proper, one in the presidency of Madras, and one in that of Bombay. Of the four representing the military service, one a queen's officer, must have served five years in India, and each of the other three ten years in their respective presidencies. The remaining nominee was to be an individual whose employment in India as resident, or political agent at a native court, must be presumed to have made him well acquainted with native character. Of the elected half of the council, four were to be eligible only after ten years' employment, or fifteen years' residence without employment, in India. The electors, estimated at 5000, were to consist of all civil and military officers who had resided ten years in India, and of all persons still resident there possessed of shares in an Indian railway, or other public work, to the value of £2000, and of all proprietors of £1000 of India stock. The other five elected members must have resided ten years in India, or must have been engaged for five years in trading or exporting manufactures to India, and were to be elected respectively by the parliamentary constituencies of the five following towns—London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Belfast. This bill, though denounced by one member as "a sham," and by another as "clap-trap," was allowed to be introduced without a vote; but when during the Easter recess, which took place immediately afterward, its provisions had been fully canvassed, it began to appear in so ridiculous a light as to threaten the very existence of the ministry who had been so ill advised as to introduce it. In this emergency Lord John Russell, who had not formed part of the last ministry, came unexpectedly

to the rescue, by suggesting that the house should not proceed by bill, but, by a series of resolutions on which a bill more acceptable than either of those yet proposed might afterwards be founded. Mr. Disraeli at once closed with the suggestion, and so heartily, that he was even willing to allow the resolutions to be proposed by Lord John Russell himself. This mode of resigning the proper business of government to a private member being however disapproved, Mr. Disraeli undertook the task, and proposed a series of fourteen propositions, to be discussed separately, in order that those rejected might be thrown aside, and those approved might form the groundwork of a third bill, combining all that was unobjectionable in the other two. After considerable debate, the two first resolutions, the one declaring the expediency of an immediate transfer of the government of India to the crown, and the other empowering her majesty to commit the home administration to one of her responsible ministers, were adopted without a division. Here however the discussion was arrested, and the whole attention both of parliament and the country was turned aside from the general question to a very subordinate one, to which Lord Ellenborough had, by an act of singular indiscretion, given an adventitious importance.

Lord Canning, in contemplation of the capture of Lucknow by the commander-in-chief, had prepared a proclamation, which he meant to issue as soon as that achievement should be effected. It was in the following terms:—
 “The army of his excellency the commander-in-chief is in possession of Lucknow, and the city lies at the mercy of the British government, whose authority it has for nine months rebelliously defied and resisted. This resistance, begun by a mutinous soldiery, has found support from the inhabitants of the city and of the province of Oude at large. Many who owed their prosperity to the British government, as well as those who believed themselves aggrieved by it, have joined in this bad cause, and have ranged themselves with the enemies of the state. They have been guilty of a great crime, and have subjected themselves to a just retribution. The capital of their country is now once more in the hands of the British troops. From this day it will be held by a force which nothing can withstand, and the authority of the government will be carried into every corner of the province. The time then has come at which the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India deems it right to make known the mode in which the British government will deal with the talookdars, chief land-owners of Oude, and their followers. The first care of the governor-general will be to reward those who have been steadfast in their allegiance, at a time when the authority of the government was partially overborne, and who have proved this by the support and assistance which they have given to British officers. Therefore, the Right Honourable the Governor-general hereby declares that Drigbiggei Sing, Rajah of Butrampoor; Koolwunt Sing, Rajah of Pudnaha; Row Horda Buksh Sing, of Kutiarree; Kashee Pershad, Talookdar of Sissaindie; Zabr Sing, Zemindar of Gopal Ghair; and Chumdee Lal, Zemindar

A D 1858.

Abandonment of India bill No 2.

Lord Canning's proposed proclamation in Oude

A D. 1858. of Morson (Baiswarah)—are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the land which they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to such moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them; and that these loyal men will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent as upon consideration of their merits and their position the governor-general shall determine. A proportionate measure of reward and honour, according to their deserts, will be conferred upon others in whose favour like claims may be established to the satisfaction of the government. The governor-general further proclaims to the people of Oude, that with the above-mentioned exceptions the proprietary right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British government, which will dispose of that right in such manner as it may seem fitting. To those talookdars, chiefs, and landowners, with their followers, who shall make immediate submission to the chief commissioner of Oude, surrendering their arms and obeying his orders, the Right Honourable the Governor-general promises that their lives and honour shall be safe, provided that their hands are not stained with English blood, murderously shed. But as regards any further indulgence which may be extended to them, and the condition in which they may hereafter be placed, they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British government. As participation in the murder of English women will exclude those who are guilty of it from all mercy, so will those who have protected English lives be entitled to consideration and leniency."

Lentent
policy pro-
posed by
ministers

When Lord Canning drew up this proclamation he was ignorant of the change of ministry, and had not received a despatch which had been transmitted to him through the secret committee of the Court of Directors, and in which the views of the new government as to any amnesty which might be granted to those who had taken part in the revolt were fully explained. This despatch, dated 24th March, 1858, after expressing a hope that Lucknow had been captured, and that the Indian government might in consequence deem themselves "sufficiently strong, to be enabled to act towards the people with the generosity as well as the justice which are congenial to the British character," proceeded as follows:—"Crimes have been committed against us which it would be a crime to forgive; and some large exceptions there must be of the persons guilty of such crimes from any act of amnesty which could be granted, but it must be as impossible as it would be abhorrent from our feelings to inflict the extreme penalty which the law might strictly award upon all who have swerved from their allegiance. To us it appears that whenever open resistance shall have ceased, it would be prudent, in awarding punishment, rather to follow the practice which prevails after the conquest of a country which has defended itself to the last by desperate war, than that which may perhaps be lawfully adopted after the suppression of mutiny and rebellion, such acts always being excepted from forgiveness or mitigation of punishment as have exceeded

the license of legitimate hostilities." After several other passages counselling leniency, the despatch concluded in the following terms:—"In carrying these views into execution you may meet with obstructions from those who, maddened by the scenes they have witnessed, may desire to substitute their own policy for that of the government; but persevere firmly in doing what you may think right; make those who would counteract you feel that you are resolved to rule, and that you will be served by none who will not obey. Acting in this spirit you may rely upon an unqualified support."

A.D. 1858.

The account given in a previous part of our history certainly does not exhibit Lord Ellenborough during his brief tenure of the office of governor-general in the light of an indulgent ruler, disposed to humour the prejudices and deal lightly with the delinquencies of the natives of India. On the contrary, we have seen him hunting out treason in the Ameers of Scinde, in order that he might have a plausible pretext for confiscating their territories and treating Gwalior as imperiously as if he had conquered it, because its rulers had presumed to thwart his wishes. His lordship's moderation and leniency being thus new-born, he naturally fostered them with all the zeal of a young convert, and hence must have been in some degree shocked when, only a few weeks after sending off his despatch, he was furnished with a copy of Lord Canning's intended proclamation, accompanied with a letter of instructions addressed to Sir James Outram, as the chief commissioner of Oude, which plainly showed the confiscation of proprietary rights in that country was to be not an idle threat, but an actually inflicted penalty. There were some considerations which might have induced Lord Ellenborough to pause before sitting down to write a letter to Lord Canning animadverting on his proclamation in the severest terms. As yet, the fact of its having been issued was not known, and circumstances might occur to induce a change in its terms, or even prevent it from being issued at all. It was moreover obvious from the instructions that a large discretionary power was to be vested in the chief commissioner; and it might have been charitably inferred, that a governor-general whose chief error hitherto was alleged to be undue lenity, would be able to give some satisfactory reason for having apparently rushed into the opposite extreme. Either overlooking such considerations, or deeming them beneath his notice, the president of the Board of Control penned a new despatch, in which he not only denounced the proclamation in language so bitter and sarcastic as to be almost insulting, but spoke of the talookdars and other proprietors of Oude as if they were more sinned against than sinning, and were entitled to be treated rather as patriots than as rebels. This singular despatch, after briefly describing the contents of the proclamation, contains such passages as the following: "We cannot but express to you our apprehension that this decree pronouncing the disinherison of a people, will throw difficulties almost unsurmountable in the way of the re-establishment of peace. We are under the impression

Lord Ellenborough's reply to the proclamation.

His indulgent publication of its contents.

A.D. 1858

Lord Ellen
borough's
despatch

that the war in Oude has derived much of its popular character from the rigorous manner in which, without regard to what the landowners had become accustomed to consider as their rights, the summary settlement had in a large portion of the province been carried out by your officers. . . . We cannot but in justice consider that those who resist our authority in Oude are under very different circumstances from those who have acted against us in provinces which have been long under our government. We dethroned the King of Oude, and took possession of his kingdom, by virtue of a treaty which had been subsequently modified by another treaty, under which, had it been held to be in force, the course we adopted could not have been lawfully pursued; but we held that it was not in force, although the fact of its not having been ratified in England, as regarded the provision on which we rely for our justification, had not been previously made known to the King of Oude. That sovereign and his ancestors had been uniformly faithful to their treaty engagements with us, however ill they may have governed their subjects. They had more than once assisted us in our difficulties, and not a suspicion had ever been entertained of any hostile disposition on their part towards our government. Suddenly the people saw their king taken from amongst them, and our administration substituted for his, which, however bad, was at least native. . . . We must admit that under the circumstances, the hostilities which have been carried on in Oude have rather the character of legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation. Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted upon a different principle; you have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they feel as the severest punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country. We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oude. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people. There cannot be contentment when there is general confiscation."

Consequent
proceedings
in parlia-
ment.

From the account formerly given of the annexation of Oude, it will be seen that Lord Ellenborough is in the main correct in what he says on the subject, but even those who agree with him in opinion may be permitted to question the necessity or propriety of giving so much prominence to it after the act which it condemns was done beyond recall. In his description of the nature

and probable effects of the proclamation, there is some truth with much exaggeration. Fact is sacrificed to antithesis, and the confiscation directed against refractory talookdars, most of whom had acquired their lands by intrigue or violence, is converted into a blow struck at "the mass of the inhabitants of the country." But waiving all question as to the merit or demerit of this despatch, all must admit that nothing was more to be deprecated than its premature publication, inasmuch as its natural tendency was to weaken the hands of the governor-general at a most critical period, and encourage rebellion by the hope of impunity. At all events, as the despatch was transmitted through the secret committee, and was consequently known only to a few individuals, who had been sworn to secrecy, nothing can be conceived more preposterous than to place it in the hands of the public weeks before it could reach those of the governor-general himself. Yet this preposterous thing had taken place with the knowledge, and directly through the instrumentality of Lord Ellenborough. Great was the indignation felt by Lord Canning's friends, and strong the disapprobation expressed by men of all parties at this most discourteous and unstatesmanlike proceeding. The first effect was to put the ministry on their defence. Lord Ellenborough, as the member of the cabinet more immediately responsible, had nothing more to offer than the very lame excuse that, having sent a copy of the despatch to Lord Granville, as a friend of Lord Canning, and a leading member of the former ministry, he deemed it only fair to send another copy at the same time to Mr. Bright, as the leader of another political party. This explanation, which certainly justified the suspicion that the ministry, under a consciousness of numerical weakness in the House of Commons, had been endeavouring to make political capital out of their despatch, had to a certain extent been forestalled by Mr. Disraeli, who, when consenting to lay the despatch on the table, volunteered the statement that her majesty's government "disapproved of the policy of the proclamation in every sense." Notice was immediately given by Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Cardwell of their intention to bring the subject before both Houses of Parliament, by motions which, amounting to a direct censure of ministers, would, if carried, compel them to resign. In this emergency, Lord Ellenborough endeavoured to save his colleagues by making a victim of himself, and retired from office, his official connection with the government of India thus coming a second time to an abrupt termination.

A.D. 1858.

Lord Ellenborough, to save his colleagues in the ministry, resigns.

The Whig party, anxious to regain the places from which they thought that a political combination more skilful than honourable had driven them, refused to be satisfied with Lord Ellenborough's retirement, and the motions of which notice had been given were persisted in. It was a mere party struggle, and ended in a ministerial triumph, obtained principally by the opportune arrival of despatches from India at the very time when the debate was proceeding. From these despatches it appeared that the proclamation, before

A ministerial triumph.

A.D. 1858. being issued, had been modified in substance, and would be still more modified in practice, in consequence of a remonstrance by Sir James Outram, who, on acknowledging receipt of the proclamation, declared his "firm conviction that as soon as the chiefs and talookdars become acquainted with the determination of the government to confiscate their rights, they will betake themselves at once to their domains, and prepare for a desperate and prolonged resistance," and the result would be "the commencement of a guerilla war for the extirpation, root and branch, of this class of men, which will involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure." To this opinion the governor-general yielded so far as to introduce the following additional paragraph relative to the landowners:—"To those of them who shall promptly come forward, and give to the chief commissioner their support in the restoration of order, this indulgence will be large, and the governor-general will be ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights." In consequence of the new information furnished by the despatches, the motions for censure could not be maintained, at least in the terms in which they were expressed. Lord Shaftesbury's motion in the House of Lords had indeed been already defeated by a majority of nine, and that of Mr. Cardwell, which was still under discussion, was ultimately, at the earnest request of many of its pledged supporters, withdrawn. Ministers were thus at liberty once more to proceed with the India resolutions, which, after they had been thoroughly discussed and modified, were embodied in a bill, which became law on the 2d of August, 1858, and ranks in the statute book under the title of "An act for the better government of India" (21st and 22d Vict. c. 106).

New act for
the better
government
of India.

Its principal
provisions.

This act consists of eighty-five sections. Its main object is to transfer the government of India from the Company to the crown. For this purpose it enacts that India shall be governed by and in name of her majesty, through one of her principal secretaries of state, assisted by a council, to consist of fifteen members, and to be styled the Council of India. Of these fifteen councillors, who are all to hold their office "during good behaviour," eight are to be nominated by her majesty, and seven to be elected, on the first election only, by the existing court of directors, and ever after, on the occasion of any vacancy, by the council, subject always to this proviso, that the major part of the council, whether nominated or elected, shall always, with the exception of those elected by the directors, be persons "who shall have served or resided in India for ten years at least," and "shall not have left India more than ten years next preceding the date of their appointment." The secretary of state for India, should he be a fifth one appointed by her majesty, in addition to the present four, shall have the same salary as they, and each member of council a salary of £1200, or in the event of resignation from infirmity after ten years' service, a retiring pension of £500; all such salaries to be paid out of the revenues of India. Every order or communication sent to India shall be signed by one of the principal

secretaries of state, but the council shall, under the direction of the secretary of state acting for India, conduct the business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the government of India and the correspondence with India. In all cases where a difference of opinion may arise, the determination of the secretary of state shall be final, but each member may require that "his opinion, and the reasons for the same, be entered in the minutes of the proceedings." Wherever the secretary shall act in opposition to the opinions of the majority, he shall record his reasons. Communications with India, or despatches from it, which would formerly have been addressed to the secret committee, may still be marked "secret," and "not be communicated to the members of the council, unless the secretary of state shall so think fit and direct," but all other communications and despatches shall be submitted to them. In regard to patronage, all appointments hitherto made by the directors with the approbation of her majesty, shall henceforth be made by her majesty, by warrant, under her royal sign-manual. The appointments made in India continue as before. Appointments to the civil service, as well as cadetships in the engineers and artillery, shall be thrown open to public competition, and conferred on the successful candidates in the order of proficiency. "Except as aforesaid, all persons to be nominated for military cadetships shall be nominated by the secretary of state and members of council, so that out of seventeen nominations, the secretary of state shall have two, and each member of council shall have one," but each nomination shall take effect only if approved by the secretary of state, and "not less than one-tenth of the whole number of persons to be recommended in any year for military cadetships (other than cadetships in the engineers and artillery), shall be selected, according to such regulations as the secretary of state in council may from time to time make in this behalf, from among the sons of persons who have served in India in the military or civil services of her majesty or of the East India Company." The remaining sections, relating to transfer of property, revenues, existing establishments, &c., need not be specially noticed.

A. D. 1858

Principal provisions of the new act for the better government of India.

Shortly after the passing of the above act, her majesty in council caused a proclamation to be issued, for the purpose of notifying the important changes introduced by it, and the course of policy which it was her desire and intention to pursue. It was addressed to the princes, chiefs, and people of India, and was published with some degree of ceremony by the governor-general in person at Allahabad, on the 1st of November, 1858. Considered as the first act of government exercised directly by the crown in the British Indian empire, it forms, we trust, the commencement of a happier era than any yet recorded in Indian annals. For this reason, as well as on account of the sound and liberal views which the document promulgates, it will be necessary to quote from it at some length. After intimating that her majesty had, with the advice and consent of parliament, resolved "to take upon ourselves the government of the

The queen's proclamation to the princes, chiefs, and people of India.

A D 1858

territories of India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company," calling upon all subjects within said territories to bear true allegiance, constituting Viscount Canning "first viceroy and governor-general," to administer the government "in our name and on our behalf," and confirming all persons now employed in the Company's service in several offices, civil and military, the proclamation proceeds in the following terms: "We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them, by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company, are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part. We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government. We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us, that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure. And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge. We know, and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the state, and we will that generally in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India. We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty."

On the subject of an amnesty, after approving and confirming all that Lord

The queen's
proclama-
tion

Rights of
native
princes to be
respected

Qualified
natives to
be admitted
into govern-
ment offices

Canning had promised in his Oude proclamation, her majesty declares as follows:—"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy. To those who have willingly given an asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but in apportioning the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to any circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men. To all others in arms against the government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offence against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits. It is our royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next. When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

A.D. 1858

The royal
amnesty.

This excellent proclamation could hardly fail to produce a strong impression, particularly on those who, having taken part in the mutiny merely because they imagined that it was destined to triumph, must have been anxious, now when they saw it doomed to failure, to escape from the consequences. On the other hand, those of the leaders who still held out, either because they could not stoop to the humiliation of accepting pardon, or because they had been guilty of atrocities which placed them beyond the reach of mercy, naturally employed every means in their power to throw discredit on the proclamation, and thus check the threatened desertion of their followers. The most singular attempt of this kind was made by the Begum of Oude, who, acting in the name of her son, whom she had induced the rebels of that province to recognize as their sovereign, issued a formal answer to the proclamation, and dissecting it paragraph by paragraph, laboured to show that no dependence could be placed on any of the promises contained in it. As a specimen of the kind of reasoning employed, and of the delusions and grievances which probably originated and certainly fostered the mutiny, the following criticism on the portion of the proclamation which refers to religion, is not unworthy of quotation:—"In the proclamation," says the begum, a bigoted Mahometan, "it is written that the Christian religion is true, but no other creed will suffer oppression, and that

The Begum
of Oude's
reply to the
proclamation.

A D 1858

the laws will be observed towards all. What has the administration of justice to do with the truth or falsehood of a religion? That religion is true which acknowledges one God and knows no other. Where there are three gods in a religion, neither Mussulmans nor Hindoos—nay, not even Jews, sun-worshippers or fire-worshippers—can believe it to be true. To eat pigs and drink wine, to bite greased cartridges, and to mix pigs' fat with flour and sweetmeats, to destroy Hindoo and Mussulman temples on pretence of making roads, to build churches, to send clergymen into the streets and alleys to preach the Christian religion, to institute English schools, and pay people a monthly stipend for learning the English sciences, while the places of worship of Hindoos and Mussulmans are to this day entirely neglected, with all this, how can the people believe that religion will not be interfered with? The rebellion began with religion, and for it millions of men have been killed. Let not our subjects be deceived, thousands were deprived of their religion in the north-west, and thousands were hanged rather than abandon their religion."

Lord Clyde's
proclamation

The commander-in-chief, now raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Clyde, after taking part in the ceremony of reading the queen's proclamation, crossed the Ganges at Allahabad on the 2d of November, 1858, and proceeded northward to join his head-quarters at Pertabghur, a town of Oude, about twenty-five miles distant. It would be a misnomer to speak of his subsequent operations as a campaign, for the rebels no longer kept the field, and were able to do no more than keep up a desultory warfare, confined mostly to the districts where refractory chiefs, trusting to the strength of their forts or the number of their retainers, still kept up a show of resistance. The nature of the task still to be performed may be inferred from a proclamation which had been issued on the 26th of October, in which the commander-in-chief announced to the inhabitants of Oude that he was coming "to enforce the law." "In order to effect this without danger to life and property, resistance must cease on the part of the people. The most exact discipline will be preserved in the camps and on the march, and where there is no resistance, houses and crops will be spared, and no plundering allowed in the towns and villages. But wherever there is resistance, or even a single shot fired against the troops, the inhabitants must expect to incur the fate they have brought on themselves. Their houses will be plundered and their villages burned. This proclamation includes all ranks of the people, from the talookdars to the poorest ryots. The commander-in-chief invites all the well-disposed to remain in their towns and villages, where they will be sure of his protection against all violence."

His military
movements.

Preceded by this proclamation, and the far more important one issued by the queen, Lord Clyde commenced his first direct attempt at pacification with the Rajah of Amethie, who possessed, like most of the Oude chiefs, a mud fort in the midst of jungle, and was reported to be at the head of a force estimated at 20,000 men, with a large number of guns. There would not have

been much difficulty in knocking the place about his ears and putting his rabble force to flight, but as this might have cost many British lives, and pacification was now the order of the day, communications had been opened with the rajah, and a day had been fixed on which he was to declare for or against surrender. On the 9th of November, when the force was within three miles of Amethie, the outposts considerably in advance were fired upon, and the grass-cutters rushed back, shouting "The enemy!" It was a false alarm, for in the evening a messenger arrived from the rajah to express regret for the firing, and account for it by representing that it had been done without his orders by the sepoy, whom he was unable to control. He would willingly, he said, make his submission, and surrender all his guns, but his power over the troops was limited to his own infantry. Lord Clyde, not satisfied with the explanation, left the rajah the alternative of surrender or bombardment on the following day. This alternative at once decided the wily chief, who stole out of his fort during the night, and sent word that he would next morning enter the camp. He did so, and thus secured the safety of his person and his property, though there could be no doubt that he had played a trick. After his departure, doubtless by previous concert, the sepoy had marched off, and when the fort was entered, it was found to contain only about 3000 matchlock-men, the rajah's own retainers, and a few old guns, instead of the thirty which he was known to possess, and was bound to surrender. Several of those missing were afterwards found hidden in the jungle.

A.D. 1826
Surrender of
the chief of
Amethie.

Having dismantled the fort and cleared the jungle as far as possible, Lord Clyde proceeded in the direction of Shunkerpoor, another mud fort of vaunted strength, belonging to a powerful chief of the name of Bene Madhoo, who was reported to have added to his troops by receiving the fugitive sepoy from Amethie. During the march a vakeel arrived from the chief, asking what terms would be given. The answer was, that his excellency would not treat with a rebel, but that clemency might be expected on surrender. Shortly afterwards a characteristic letter was received, not from Bene Madhoo himself, but his son, who wrote as follows:—"If the government will continue the settlement with me, I will turn out my father. He is on the part of Brijais Kuddr (the puppet-king), but I am loyal to the British government, and I do not wish to be ruined for my father's sake." The obvious design of this proposal, probably concocted between the father and the son, was to allow the former to continue in his rebellion, and at the same time elude the forfeiture, which would deprive the latter of the succession to his estates. No notice therefore was taken of it, and the march upon Shunkerpoor was continued. On the 15th the force with Lord Clyde arrived at Pechwarra, three miles south-east of Bene Madhoo's stronghold, while a separate detachment under Sir Hope Grant moved upon it from the north-west by the Roy Bareilly road. The wily

Capture of
Shunker-
poor.

A D 1858

rebel chief, thus in danger of being hemmed in, outwitted his assailants, and moved off in the dark with all his troops, guns, treasure, and baggage. In the morning, when the fort and entrenched camp were entered, only a few old men, priests, and fakirs, some gun bullocks, and a mad elephant were found. Bene Madhoo, when next heard of, was at a place called Poorwa, from which, with strange effrontery, he sent a vakeel to ask what terms he might now expect.

Pursuit of
Bene Mad-
hoo, chief
of Shunker-
poor

After the evacuation of Shunkerpoor, the force which had been combined for the purpose of moving upon it was broken up. Sir Hope Grant proceeded northwards across the Gogra into the Gorruckpoor district, and a detachment from Lucknow moved eastward in the direction of Fyzabad, while Colonel Evelynagh, at the head of another detachment, was instructed to follow Bene Madhoo, and not lose sight of him for a moment. Lord Clyde, keeping the same object in view, reached Roy Bareilly on the 20th of November, and starting again on the following day, crossed the Sye at Keenpoor. On the 22d Bene Madhoo was reported to be at Doundeakira, a place situated on the left bank of the Ganges, about twenty-eight miles SSE of Cawnpoor, and belonging to a zemindar of the name of Ram Bux, who had acquired an infamous notoriety by the murder of several of the Cawnpoor fugitives. Here it was hoped that the arrangements for the attack were so complete as to bring the rebels to bay, and make their escape impossible, but though an encounter did take place, and Ram Bux's stronghold was captured, it proved a barren conquest, as Bene Madhoo had again disappeared with most of his troops and all his treasure. For some days nothing was heard of his movements, and Lord Clyde made several marches which brought him to the vicinity of Lucknow. Here Mr. Montgomery, whom we formerly saw doing good service in the Punjab, had become chief commissioner in the room of Sir James Outram, who had been called to a seat in the governor-general's council. Under him the pacification of the country was making satisfactory progress, numerous chiefs daily coming in to take advantage of the amnesty offered by the queen's proclamation.

His versatile
movements
and half-
breath-
escapes.

After a halt of several days, during which the force had encamped at Bunnee, on the Cawnpoor road, Lord Clyde again took the field, and marched north-east about twenty miles to Newabgunge, on the road to Fyzabad. Here on the 6th of December tidings were obtained of Bene Madhoo, who was reported by the spies to be not more than twenty miles off, at a place on the Gogra, called Beyram Ghat. Thither accordingly a forced march was made, while Lord Clyde himself, leaving the infantry in charge of Brigadier Horseford, pushed on for the ghat at full gallop with a body of cavalry and four horse-artillery guns. It was only to experience the old disappointment. Bene Madhoo with his rebels had just crossed and taken all the boats along with him. After halting on the 7th for the infantry, and leaving a detachment at Beyram Ghat to protect the

A.D. 1858

Revolt in
Oude extin-
guished

eighteen guns fell into our hands. In the meantime, Brigadier Rowcroft attacked Toolosepoor on the 23d December, driving Bala Row from that point to the foot of the mountains, and taking two guns. Sir Hope Grant was alarmed about his flank being turned to the eastward, and to the north of Gorruckpoor. Acting according to his instructions, and with great judgment, he made that point absolutely safe before renewing his attack on Bala Row. That being done, he advanced through the jungles on that leader, and took fifteen guns from him, almost without the show of resistance on the part of the rebels, the latter dispersing and seeking refuge in the adjacent hills, and Bala Row fleeing into the interior, as the Nana his brother had done before him. Thus has the contest in Oude been brought to an end, and the resistance of 150,000 armed men been subdued with a very moderate loss to her majesty's troops, and the most merciful forbearance towards the misguided enemy."

Public re-
cognition of
the suppres-
sion of the
mutiny.

The rebels of Oude having thus been forced to quit the field and hide themselves in the pestilential morasses of Nepaul, where a vengeance not less certain nor less fatal than that of the sword would inevitably overtake them, the mutiny was virtually at an end. It is true, indeed, that perfect tranquillity had not been restored. In several districts bands of rebels kept up at least a show of resistance, and by the rapidity and dexterity of their movements gave infinite trouble to the various detachments sent out against them. There could be no doubt, however, that the task of dispersing them, though difficult, would ere long be effectually accomplished, and it was therefore resolved by the authorities, both at home and in India, to assume the complete suppression of the mutiny as an accomplished fact, and attest it by some form of public acknowledgment. At home this acknowledgment was made in a manner becoming a Christian nation, by the appointment of a day of special "thanksgiving to Almighty God for the constant and signal successes obtained by the troops of her majesty, and by the whole of the force serving in India, whereby the late sanguinary mutiny and rebellion which had broken out in that country hath been effectually suppressed, and the blessings of tranquillity, order, and peace are restored to her majesty's subjects in the East." In India, where the difference of circumstances made a similar mode of national acknowledgment impracticable, it was deemed expedient to adopt a less solemn and more ostentatious procedure, which, while it proclaimed leniency toward those who had incurred the guilt of rebellion, provided they returned forthwith to their allegiance, gave due honour and reward to those whose fidelity had remained unshaken. The King of Delhi, though he had, in consequence of the promise given, escaped the capital punishment which he deserved, was expiating his crimes as a transported convict; the Ranee of Jhansi, after the perpetration of a horrid massacre, had perished in battle; Tantia Topce, who had acted as the right-hand man of Nana Sahib, had paid the penalty of his treachery on the gallows, and a similar fate was awaiting Khan Bahadur Khan of Bareilly, the

A D — specially eulogized the Chikaree rajah for his marked devotion to the British cause, in having not only borne arms against the rebels, but offered his son as a hostage in order to save the life of a British officer.

Wonderful
rise and
progress of
the British
Indian em-
pire

In looking back upon the whole course of events recorded in these volumes, it is impossible not to be struck with wonder and admiration. At first a small body of merchant adventurers, with no higher ambition than to obtain a share in what was known to be a lucrative trade, contribute their capital and send out a few ships of moderate burden to the eastern seas by way of experiment. Some of the ships are wrecked, and others fall into the hands of enemies who plunder or destroy them. A few are more fortunate, and return laden with cargoes so valuable as to compensate for other losses and stimulate to new exertions. For a time the continent of India is in a great measure overlooked, and the main exertions are directed to the Persian Gulf and the spice islands of the Indian Archipelago. In the former direction the returns, though increased by the very discreditable practice of seizing and pillaging native ships, prove unsatisfactory; in the latter direction Dutch jealousy presents insuperable obstacles, and the long-cherished idea of a spice trade is all but abandoned. India now begins to attract more attention, and in addition to a few places on the Malabar coast, where pepper formed the staple article of export, other localities are selected, particularly on the Coromandel coast, and northwards towards the Bay of Bengal.

Acquisition
of Bombay
and change
of policy

Hitherto all the factories established in India were held by the most precarious tenure. The property in the soil remained with the native princes, whose protection, though purchased by much fawning and many costly presents, was not unfrequently withdrawn, as often as the pillage of a factory promised to be more profitable than its tribute. In one quarter, however, the tenure was of a different and more satisfactory nature. The island of Bombay, possessing the best harbour in India, had passed to the British crown as part of the dowry of the Portuguese princess who became the wife of Charles II. At first there was room to doubt whether this acquisition was to promote or to damage the interests of the East India Company. Prerogative pushed to its utmost limits was then the favourite policy of government, which accordingly began to exercise its new sovereignty in the East in a manner which seemed to set the Company's chartered privileges at naught. Complaint and recrimination of course ensued, and the results threatened to be disastrous, when government made the happy discovery that the possession of Bombay, instead of being a gain, was annually entailing a heavy loss. This was one of the last evils which a court so needy and avaricious as that of Charles II. could endure, and little difficulty therefore was felt in concluding an arrangement by which the Company entered into possession of Bombay with all its burdens. This was a new and important step in advance. Previously they were only traders existing by the sufferance of the native powers; now they too were

sovereigns, and laying aside the abject forms of address with which they had been accustomed to approach native princes, began to use a more dignified language, and act in a bolder spirit. The profits of trade had hitherto satisfied them, but they now talked of revenue from territory, and gave their servants to understand that they expected it to form an important item in their future returns. The idea was never after lost sight of, and the aims of the Company became visibly enlarged. They would no longer exist by sufferance, and began to familiarize their minds with the idea of conquest. It was not long before full scope was found for this warlike temperament. Not merely had they to repel aggression on the part of native rulers; but a great European power, which had settled on the east coast, had engaged in a vast scheme of ambition, which, if realized, would almost as a necessary consequence annihilate British interests in India. The collision with France thus rendered inevitable, led to a desperate struggle, in which, after various alternations of success, France was obliged to succumb. Meanwhile a war fraught with still more important consequences had commenced in another quarter. The atrocity of the Black Hole of Calcutta had been perpetrated, and Clive, who marched to avenge it, had, in return for dethroning one ruler and placing another upon the throne, obtained for the Company an absolute control over the revenues of the immense and populous provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, with full right to appropriate them to their own use, subject only to certain stipulated payments. This grant of the dewannee was properly, as its name implies, only one of revenue, but revenue generally suffices to make its possessor master of all the other rights of property, and accordingly the Company acted from the date of the grant as if the three provinces belonged to them in absolute sovereignty. The British Indian empire having been thus founded, continued to advance in the face of hostile combinations which interrupted its progress, and at times even threatened its existence, till every power hostile to it was overthrown, and its supremacy was completely established.

While pursuing the remarkable career which has just been slightly sketched, the constitution of the Company had been radically changed. Its connection with trade had been entirely dissolved, and its directors had been converted into a kind of middle men, through whom, but in immediate subservience to the British ministry, the government of the country was conducted. This anomalous form of administration, which was rather dictated by circumstances than deliberately adopted, was not entitled, and was indeed never meant to be permanent. The right of sovereignty had been declared by repeated acts of the legislature to be vested exclusively in the British crown, and it seemed necessarily to follow that the crown would sooner or later exercise this right in India in the same way as in its other dependencies. It was necessary, however, owing to the magnitude of the interests involved, to proceed with the utmost caution, and though the obvious tendency of all recent legislation

A.D. —
Struggles for
supremacy
with France

Changes in
the constitution
of the
Company.

A.D. — on the subject had been to increase the direct authority of the British government and diminish that of the directors, the final step of annexation had not been taken, and was to all appearance at some distance, when it was precipitated by the Sepoy Mutiny.

The sepoy
mutiny fol-
lowed by
new changes

It would be unfair to lay the whole blame of this fearful catastrophe on the Indian government, as then actually administered. The causes which led to it had long been in operation, and were so deeply seated, that even some of the ablest Indian statesmen, though they saw and lamented them, failed to discover or suggest any effectual remedy. Still it must be confessed that a government, which was not ignorant of the danger, but allowed itself to slumber over it till the crisis actually arrived, must have laboured under grave defects both in substance and form, and we therefore cannot wonder, that as soon as the horror and indignation produced by the atrocities of the mutineers had subsided so far as to leave room for reflection, a general desire was felt to rid the Indian government of its most striking anomalies, and assimilate its machinery as much as possible to that which has so long stood the test of experiment at home. The desired changes have accordingly been made. The queen now rules India in her own name, like all her other dependencies. Ministers, one of whom now bears the name and office of secretary of state for India, are strictly responsible for the mode in which it is administered. The jealousies and heartburnings produced by the maintenance of two European armies, have been set at rest by their amalgamation. The best talents of this country have been employed in reforming the Indian financial system, and the question of patronage has been happily solved, by substituting qualification for family or political influence, in appointing to the more important branches of the public service. The strange policy of discouraging European settlers has been completely reversed, and liberal measures have been devised for the purpose of attracting European capital to the country, as one of the most obvious and effectual means of developing its vast resources. Nor is it out of place to mention that under the new arrangements India will never again be placed at the mercy of pampered sepoy regiments. A native army cannot be dispensed with, but it will henceforth be kept in its proper place as an auxiliary force, capable of doing good service in subordinate departments, but too few in numbers, and composed of elements too heterogeneous, to admit of such formidable combinations as were witnessed during the late mutiny.

Extinction
of the Com-
pany

Such are a few of the important improvements which have been, or are in course of being introduced into the administration of our Indian empire, but it ought to be remembered, that in regard to still more important improvements, government is almost powerless. In the matter of education it is much doubtless to be able to open schools and to provide them with well-qualified teachers, but in selecting the subjects to be taught, government must stop

short and exclude the only topics by which the Hindoo mind and heart can be effectually reached. It may be fairly calculated that the teaching of the government schools is in a great measure lost upon three-fourths of those who attend them. The knowledge communicated cannot find a resting-place in the minds of persons whose previous beliefs consist of such monstrous dogmas as Hindooism inculcates, and whose religious observances, entwined with the ordinary business of life, have become to them a second nature. The case of the remaining fourth of the scholars is somewhat different. Their object probably is to obtain some of the government appointments for which the knowledge acquired in schools and colleges is an essential qualification. They accordingly pass through the whole curriculum, and will in due time be found seated at the desks of government offices. They have succeeded in their object, and are become public servants. So far so good. They have procured a livelihood, and owe it to the education provided for them at the public expense. But there is unfortunately another side to the picture, and when inquiry is made into the private character of those men, it is too often found that they have paid dear for their knowledge. They have cast away their early beliefs without substituting anything better, and belong to the class of liberalized Hindoos, who ape the manners and practise the worst vices, but are utter strangers to the virtues of European society. To this class, but with all its worst qualities exaggerated, the infamous miscreant Nana Sahib belonged.

A D. —

Measures of
improvement in
India

Education

When the question is asked, In what way can the affections of the Hindoo be gained, and his fidelity to British rule placed beyond jeopardy? the answer is, By making him a Christian. A common faith will give him a common interest, and form a bond of union which not even violence will be able to sever. During the late mutiny, those of the natives who had embraced Christianity are understood to have remained true to their allegiance, and it may reasonably be expected that in all similar cases the same course will be pursued. Here, however, the interference of government is precluded, simply because the suspicion which it would produce, would in all probability more than counterbalance any benefit that could be derived from it, and hence, a work on which, more than any other, the prosperity and happiness of India depend, must be carried on by private benevolence. It is pleasing to know that Christian missionaries, distinguished alike for talents and piety, have long been devoting them to this sacred task, and that the mutiny itself, by awakening attention to the real wants of India, has given a new impulse to efforts for christianizing it. The time is in some respects singularly propitious. Under a native dynasty, the suppression of the mutiny would have been followed by general massacre and devastation, and every province in which the mutineers had mustered in strength would have been converted into a desert. We have used our triumph with moderation, and the punishments have been few compared with the number

Religious
instruction

AD —

and enormity of the crimes. The natives cannot fail to have perceived this, and are acute enough to have inferred that the Christian religion, which teaches those who profess it to act thus generously, must be infinitely superior to their own barbarous and cruel superstitions. If such was the impression produced by our leniency in the hour of victory, how greatly must it have been deepened by the liberality displayed during the late famine, when, forgetting all their wrongs, and listening only to the cry of suffering humanity, the inhabitants of the United Kingdom were seen contributing their thousands and tens of thousands, in order to save millions of Hindoos from starvation. If the heart of that people be not incurably hardened, this noble return of good for evil must surely have softened it, and now therefore is the time to win them over, and induce them to exchange their monstrous and cruel superstitions, for the pure faith, which, while it prepares man for his final destiny, tames his savage nature, and effectually civilizes him. The task of conversion from heathenism is indeed the most difficult and delicate in which human agents are permitted to co-operate, and if we may judge by the past, nowhere encounters such formidable obstacles as in India. Hindooism has bound its votaries as with adamantine fetters, and it would almost seem as if every attempt made to break them only rivets them more firmly. Men eminent for piety and talents, after wearing out their lives in missionary labours, are obliged to confess that their converts are few and not always of a satisfactory description. However sanguine therefore, we may be, and however confident that the task will be ultimately accomplished, a long period may be expected to elapse before any visible impression will be made on the great bulk of the Hindoo population. Meanwhile the path of duty is plain, and no degree of difficulty can afford any valid excuse for not attempting to walk in it. A good cause must never be abandoned in despair; and though some may seek a pretext for indolence, by representing the conversion of the Hindoo as a work which the Almighty has reserved to himself, and will accomplish in his own time without human intervention; and others, disdaining even to use a cloak for their infidelity, may ridicule the very attempt as quixotic, or stigmatize it as intolérant—the Christian who is true to his vocation, and grateful for the many blessings which he derives from it, will be more stimulated than dispirited by the obstacles thrown in his way, and console himself with the assurance that his work of faith and labour of love, however limited the measure of success granted to it, will not be forgotten.

To the attempts made to christianize India, it has been objected that the inevitable result of their success would be to destroy the British rule. The inhabitants made aware of their natural rights, and become capable of self-government, would throw off our yoke, and declare their independence. Unquestionably they would. But what then? Is it meant that for the purpose of perpetuating our empire in the East, we must endeavour to keep our subjects there in a state of semi-barbarism, and discountenance all endeavours to raise

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of the Hin-
doos

Duties of the
British
people in
regard to
this subject.

them to our level in respect of intelligence, religion, and general civilization? The time has been when such selfish and heartless policy would have been looked upon with favour, but a better spirit now prevails; and the determination, as announced in the queen's proclamation, and cordially acquiesced in by all classes of society, is to do justice to India, and more than compensate her for all the wealth she has bestowed upon us, by furnishing her with the means of rising above her present degraded state, and attaining to the highest form of European civilization. Should the effect be to enable her to dispense with our tutelage, we shall have the satisfaction of feeling that we ourselves have been the willing instruments of her emancipation; while she, even in severing the political ties by which she is now bound to us, will not forget how much she shall then owe to us for the enlightened and generous policy which gradually prepared her for freedom. Should the day ever come that India, in consequence of the development of her resources by British capital, and the enlightenment of her people by British philanthropy, shall again take rank among the nations as an independent state, then it will not be too much to say, that the extinction of our Indian empire by such peaceful means sheds more lustre on the British name than all the other events recorded in its history.

AD —
Future
destiny of
India



ARMS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

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By HENRY BEVERIDGE, Esq.,

ADVOCATE

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS.

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MDCCLXXII.

PREFACE.

INDIA, the most valuable dependency of the British crown, is also one of the most interesting portions of the globe. Even some of its physical features are on a scale of unparalleled grandeur. The stupendous mountain chain along its northern frontier rising gradually from a plain of inexhaustible fertility, has snowy summits which tower nearly six thousand feet above the loftiest of any other country in either hemisphere; while over the vast expanse of its magnificently diversified surface almost every product possessed of economical value grows indigenously, or having been introduced is cultivated with success. Nor are its moral less remarkable than its physical features. In its rugged recesses and jungly forests various tribes, supposed to represent its aboriginal inhabitants, may still be seen in a state bordering on absolute barbarism. The great bulk of the population, however, consists of a race, or rather aggregation of races, who, though far advanced in civilization, at least in the ordinary sense of the term, since they have for ages lived under regular government, dwelt in large and splendid cities, and carried most of the arts of common life to high perfection, are yet the dupes and slaves of a most childish and galling superstition. That the dominant class, to which all others are subservient, should be full of religious zeal, is nothing more than might have been expected, but a new phase of human nature seems to be presented when those occupying the lower grades of the social scale are seen submitting without a murmur to be lorded over, and treated as mere outcasts whose very touch is pollution. What makes this submission the more extraordinary, is that those who exemplify it are by no means deficient in natural acuteness, and, on the contrary, often give proofs of intellectual culture. Hindooism, though little better than a tissue of obscene and monstrous fancies, not only counts its domination by thousands of years, but can boast of having had among its votaries, men who, in the ages in which they lived, extended the boundaries of knowledge, and carried some of the abstrusest of the sciences to a height which they had never reached before. This remarkable combination of pure intellect and grovelling superstition, nowhere displayed so strikingly and unequivocally as in India, gives a peculiar value even to that part of its history which, relating only to its social state, is necessarily the least fruitful in stirring incidents.

So long as the leading powers of Europe made India a kind of common battle-field, on which they met to contend for supremacy, no one nation could be said to possess any exclusive or peculiar interest in its affairs; but from the moment when Great Britain stood forth, virtually if not formally recognized as the paramount power, the history of both countries became in a manner identified, and ought therefore to be studied as one great whole. The vast space which separates them is a mere circumstance which, if it have any weight

at all, ought rather to increase the interest of the British reader, who is not only introduced to new scenes and new modes of social existence, but follows his countrymen step by step, and sees them in a new sphere displaying the same unrivalled talents, civil and military, the same indomitable courage and perseverance, the same enlightened, humane, and generous spirit, which have placed Great Britain at the head of modern nations, and given her the largest and mightiest empire that the world has yet beheld. While India was placed under a kind of tutelage, and those intrusted with its administration, instead of encouraging, systematically repressed the public curiosity, there was doubtless some excuse for a feeling of apathy in regard to its affairs; but now that the anomalous form of government has been abolished, and the Queen, ruling India in her own name without any adventitious intervention, has called upon her loving subjects to unite with her in developing its resources, as one of the most effectual means of promoting the general welfare of all her dominions, how can the call be properly responded to, unless the actual circumstances of the country, and the whole course of events by which these have been formed—in other words, all the details of its history—are carefully studied?

A subject so important and so attractive as that of India could not fail to engage the pens of many writers, and accordingly a number of works relating to it has appeared, some of them by distinguished men, who bore no unimportant part in many of the transactions which they narrate. To all these works, however, there is one serious objection, which, without impugning their merits, goes to prove that so far from exhausting the subject, they have left important blanks, which deprive them of the character of complete histories. Some of them are professedly confined to particular periods or particular provinces; while others of a more general description either omit part of the earlier history, or after bringing it down as far as was practicable at the time, stop short at the very period when it becomes at once most interesting and most instructive. The present work, which differs from them in plan, and is also intended to be of a more popular character, was undertaken in the belief that if written after due research, in a perspicuous style, and with strict impartiality, it might supply a want which had long been felt, and to which recent events had given much additional urgency. It is, as its name implies, a *Comprehensive History of India*, beginning with its earliest period, and continued, without the known omission of any transaction of importance, to the present time. In composing it, the author has not trusted to previous compilations, but derived his materials as much as possible from original and official sources. How far he has succeeded, it remains for his readers to decide. The only part of the work on which he ventures to anticipate the judgment of the public is that of the maps, plans, and numerous illustrations, which, independently of their merit as embellishments, bring all the leading topics of the history—its campaigns, its battle-fields, its cities, and other localities, and even its most celebrated personages—immediately before the eye, in a manner which not only does much credit to those employed upon them, but must greatly facilitate the intelligent perusal of the history itself.

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A COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA.

COMPREHENSIVE

HISTORY OF INDIA,

CIVIL, MILITARY AND SOCIAL,

FROM

THE FIRST LANDING OF THE ENGLISH,
TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPOY REVOLT;

INCLUDING

AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF HINDOOSTAN.

By HENRY BEVERIDGE, Esq.,

ADVOCATE

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS.

VOLUME II.



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A COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA.

COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA,
CIVIL, MILITARY AND SOCIAL,

FROM

THE FIRST LANDING OF THE ENGLISH,
TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPOY REVOLT;

INCLUDING

AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF HINDOOSTAN.

By HENRY BEVERIDGE, Esq.,

ADVOCATE

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS.

VOLUME III.



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